The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: Lessons from Corporate Governance by Chahar, Vijit Singh
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna 
 
 
 
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN 
 
European Doctorate in Law and Economics (EDLE) 
 
 
Ciclo _XXVI______ 
 
 
 
 
Settore Concorsuale di afferenza: 12/E3 
 
Settore Scientifico disciplinare: IUS/05 
 
 
 
 
TITOLO TESI 
 
 
The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
Presentata da: ______Vijit Singh CHAHAR __________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coordinatore Dottorato     Relatore 
 
 
Prof. Luigi A. Franzoni    Prof.Dr. Alessio M. Pacces 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
 
 
 
Esame finale anno __2014________ 
 
1 
 
 
The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs:  
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
De invloed van directe democratie op agency kosten: 
Lessen vanuit corporate governance 
 
 
 
 
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam op gezag van 
 de rector magnificus 
Prof.dr. H.A.P. Pols 
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties 
 
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op 
vrijdag 10 oktober 2014 om 09.30 uur 
door 
 
 
 
Vijit Singh Chahar 
geboren te Jhajjar, India 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Promotiecommissie 
 
Promotor:  Prof.dr. A.M. Pacces  
  
Overige leden: Prof.mr M.J. Kroeze 
Prof.dr. S. Voigt 
Prof.mr R. de Lange 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was written as part of the European 
Doctorate in Law and Economics programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A collaboration between  
 
 
 
     
 
 
4
5The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
2 
 
CONTENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 6 
1.1 RELEVANCE AND RELATED LITERATURE ................................................................................. 9 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PURPOSE ................................................................................. 15 
1.3 METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................... 17 
1.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH .............................................................................. 19 
1.5 STRUCTURE ........................................................................................................................... 23 
PART I: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED ABOUT DIRECT DEMOCRACY FROM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? .. 29 
2 AN AGENCY COST FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING IN CORPORATE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 30 
2.1 THE PRIMA FACIE PARALLELS IN DELEGATION ..................................................................... 31 
2.1.1 Structure ........................................................................................................................ 31 
2.1.2 Function ........................................................................................................................ 34 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................. 37 
2.2.1 Agency Theory............................................................................................................... 37 
2.3 INTRODUCING DIRECT DEMOCRACY .................................................................................... 44 
2.3.1 Direct Democracy in Corporate Governance ............................................................... 45 
2.3.2 Direct Democracy in Constitutional Law ..................................................................... 47 
2.3.3 The Role of Direct Democracy: Balancing Accountability & Authority....................... 47 
2.4 THE IMPACT ON AGENCY COST............................................................................................. 49 
2.5 THE UNIQUE VALUE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS TO INFORM 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ..................................................................................................................... 57 
3 RECONCILING THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH KEY DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF CORPORATE 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ................................................................................................................. 61 
3.1 THE NATURE OF FRANCHISE ................................................................................................. 62 
3.1.1 Why the Allocation of Voting Rights Affects Agency Costs? ......................................... 63 
3.1.2 Shareholder Franchise v. Universal Adult Franchise .................................................. 67 
3.1.3 Voting Rights Determined by Shareholding v. One person-One vote ........................... 70 
3.2 LEGAL LIABILITY RULES .......................................................................................................... 74 
3.3 SUPER AGENTS ...................................................................................................................... 80 
3.3.1 Super agents: Impact on Delegated Decision-Making ................................................. 82 
3.3.2 Super agents: Impact on Direct Decision-making ........................................................ 87 
3.4 NATURE OF ELECTIONS & THE WALL STREET RULE: COMPETITION TO BECOME AGENTS .. 89 
3.4.1 Nature of Elections........................................................................................................ 91 
3.4.2 The Wall Street Rule ..................................................................................................... 93 
6The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
3 
 
3.4.3 Consequences of Divergence ........................................................................................ 95 
4 KEY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGING AGENCY COST ............................. 97 
4.1 RULES OF THE GAME DECISIONS & SPECIFIC BUSINESS DECISIONS ................................... 103 
4.1.1 Rules of the Game Decisions ...................................................................................... 103 
4.1.2 Specific Business Decisions ........................................................................................ 104 
PART II: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY: INITIATIVES AND REFERENDUMS .... 107 
5 THE UTILITY OF HAVING INITIATIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ............................................... 108 
5.1 THE RIGHT TO VETO – SETTLED IN CORPORATE LAW, VARIED IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109 
5.2 THE RIGHT TO INITIATE – UNSETTLED IN CORPORATE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ......... 111 
5.2.1 The US Position .......................................................................................................... 112 
5.2.2 The UK Position .......................................................................................................... 115 
5.3 WHEN ARE REFERENDUMS NOT ENOUGH? ....................................................................... 117 
5.3.1 Agents Prefer the Status Quo ...................................................................................... 118 
5.3.2 Agents Prefer the Worse of Two Beneficial Options ................................................... 118 
5.3.3 Agents Bundle the Good with the Bad......................................................................... 119 
5.3.4 Logrolling and Bundling by Principals....................................................................... 119 
5.4 SEPARATING SPECIFIC DECISIONS FROM ELECTIONS ......................................................... 122 
5.4.1 Loss of Accountability and Responsibility .................................................................. 124 
5.5 BYPASSING A BIASED EXECUTIVE ........................................................................................ 127 
5.6 PREVENTING DISTORTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL EVOLUTION ....................... 131 
5.6.1 Comparison with ‘Empire-building’ ........................................................................... 136 
5.7 SETTING DEFAULTS ............................................................................................................. 139 
5.8 INDIRECT BENEFITS ............................................................................................................. 142 
5.9 FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................. 144 
6 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS FOR IMPLEMENTING INITIATIVES EFFECTIVELY ............. 147 
6.1 PROPER INCENTIVES FOR VALUE INCREASING INITIATIVES ............................................... 147 
6.1.1 Individual Shareholder Activists ................................................................................. 151 
6.1.2 Mutual Funds and Pension Funds .............................................................................. 152 
6.1.3 Hedge Funds ............................................................................................................... 154 
6.1.4 Social Activists ............................................................................................................ 156 
6.1.5 Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 157 
6.2 NUISANCE PROPOSALS ....................................................................................................... 159 
6.3 IMPERFECT INFORMATION ................................................................................................. 162 
6.4 THE NEED FOR LONG TERM PLANNING AND CONSISTENCY IN DECISION-MAKING .......... 167 
7The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
4 
 
6.5 SPECIAL INTERESTS, SHORT-TERMISM AND BLACKMAIL .................................................... 169 
6.6 THE SUBJECT MATTER OF INITIATIVES ................................................................................ 175 
6.7 FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................. 181 
7 SHOULD REFERENDUMS BE BINDING? ....................................................................................... 184 
7.1 REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: BINDING OR NON-BINDING? ............................... 185 
7.2 FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE DECISIONS ............................................................................ 188 
7.3 OTHER IMPORTANT DECISIONS REQUIRING SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL ........................... 190 
7.4 INCENTIVE TO GET INFORMED ........................................................................................... 192 
7.5 FRAMING CONCERNS .......................................................................................................... 196 
7.6 SEPARATION OF DECISION MANAGEMENT AND DECISION CONTROL ............................... 198 
7.7 THE FINALITY OF BINDING REFERENDUMS ......................................................................... 200 
7.8 FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................. 202 
8 SHOULD INITIATIVES BE BINDING? ............................................................................................. 206 
8.1 INITIATIVES AROUND THE WORLD: BINDING OR NON-BINDING? ..................................... 206 
8.2 THE FINALITY OF DECISIONS INITIATED AND APPROVED BY SHAREHOLDERS ................... 208 
8.2.1 The US Position .......................................................................................................... 208 
8.2.2 The UK Position .......................................................................................................... 215 
8.3 COMPARING NON-BINDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS WITH NON-BINDING INITIATIVES
 217 
8.4 COMPARING BINDING SHAREHOLDER BYLAW AMENDMENTS AND BINDING INITIATIVES
 223 
8.5 KEY CONCERNS REGARDING BINDING INITIATIVES AND BYLAW AMENDMENTS .............. 235 
8.5.1 Drafting ....................................................................................................................... 235 
8.5.2 Diluting the Accountability of Agents ......................................................................... 237 
8.5.3 The Role of Special Interest Groups ........................................................................... 241 
8.6 FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................. 243 
9 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 246 
10 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 254 
 
  
8The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
5 
 
List of Abbreviations 
1. ABA: American Bar Association 
2. CAL. CORP. CODE: California Corporations Code 
3. DGCL: Delaware General Corporation Law 
4. FLA. STAT. ANN.: Florida Statutes Annotated 
5. ISS: Institutional Shareholder Services 
6. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW: New York Business Corporation Law 
7. NYSE: New York Stock Exchange 
8. OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
9. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.: Ohio Revised Code Annotated 
10. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.:  Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated 
11. PAC: Political Action Committee 
12. SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission 
13. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.: Texas Business Corporation Act Annotated 
 
 
  
9The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
6 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The administration of large public corporations and the administration of countries require 
frequent decision-making on complex problems. Big public companies and countries have a 
large number of shareholders and citizens respectively. This creates in shareholders and 
citizens alike an incentive to shirk the responsibility of gathering and analyzing the 
information required to make good decisions for two reasons. First, shareholders and citizens 
alike have reason to believe that there are numerous others who will take on their 
responsibilities if they fail to fulfil them; and second, because they would bear all the costs of 
making informed decisions but receive only a small share of the benefits. A large number of 
time sensitive decisions requiring complex information need to be made by companies and 
countries on a regular basis. This heavy requirement makes it very unlikely that sufficient 
numbers of shareholders or citizens will collectively inform themselves and effectively 
coordinate their actions in order to manage the regular affairs of a company or a country 
respectively. Excessive collective action problems, therefore, make direct decision-making by 
shareholders and citizens unworkable as a mechanism for making the large majority of such 
decisions. 
Due to the inability of principals to make such decisions directly, corporate and constitutional 
law provide for systems of centralized delegated decision-making to avoid gridlock due to 
excessive collective action cost. This use of representatives introduces agency costs. 
This dissertation focuses on identifying the circumstances under which representative 
decision-making is effective and where representative decision-making fails and instead 
imposes greater agency costs than the collective action costs it seeks to replace. In other 
words, when is it better for the principals to make decisions directly? In what circumstances 
is it better to incur the costs of collective action in order to change policy made by elected 
representatives? When does the use of direct decision-making reduce the total cost of 
decision-making? 
In order to answer these questions in the sphere of constitutional law, this dissertation looks 
at the vast and sophisticated body of law and economics scholarship which deals with agency 
cost in the field of corporate governance. In particular, it looks towards the vigorous debate 
surrounding shareholder rights in the United States to study the influence of direct democracy 
on agency cost via a comparative analysis. 
10
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After pointing out the utility of this comparative approach to direct democracy, the 
dissertation seeks to answer two particular questions concerning the operation of direct 
democracy. They are as follows: 
 Should citizens be allowed to initiate proposals (initiatives) or is it sufficient to have 
the power of veto (referendums)? 
 Should initiatives and referendums be binding? 
The normative criterion adopted for answering these questions is the reduction of the total 
cost of decision-making. This is the sum of the cost of using agents along with the cost of 
using direct decision-making as a monitoring mechanism. Since direct decision-making is 
used as a monitoring device rather than a replacement for delegated decision-making, the 
costs associated with such decision-making are characterized as a component of agency cost. 
This dissertation aims to find the optimum balance between representative and direct 
decision-making in order to make the principal-agent contract more efficient.1 This is done by 
examining how this balance is struck in the governance of large public companies primarily 
in the US and then seeing whether those methods can be replicated in constitutional law. 
For the purposes of the comparative analysis, the dissertation defines “direct democracy” as 
any decision-making process by which citizens directly adopt laws without making use of 
their representatives.2 This definition is used throughout in its wider sense which includes 
both initiatives and referendums.3 The definition of agency cost adopted for the purpose of 
this dissertation is typified by the work of Professors Jensen, Fama, Meckling and Ross.4 This 
                                                 
1 The efficiency criterion is explained in the course of the subsequent discussion. It suffices to say that an 
agency contract can be considered efficient if it minimizes the cost of using an agent. 
2 Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy.” The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer US, 2003. 473-477. 
3 Prof. Matsusaka defines them as follows. “Initiative” is understood to be a “process [that] allows ordinary 
citizens to propose new laws by petition, that is, by collecting a predetermined number of signatures from their 
fellow citizens. The proposal becomes law if approved by a vote of the electorate at large”. “Referendum” on 
the other hand is understood to mean “a process that allows the electorate to approve or reject a proposal by the 
legislature.” See Matsusaka, John G. “Initiative and Referendum,” The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer 
US, 2003: 624-628. 
4 See Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economics 3, no. 4 (1976): 305-360; Jensen, Michael C., and 
Jerold B. Warner. “The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors.” 
Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988): 3-24; Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. “Agency Problems 
11
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characterization of agency cost will be dwelt upon in suitable depth in Chapter two. It 
suffices to say that ‘agency cost’ as used here can generally be understood to be the total cost 
of using an agent, as accrued by the principal.  
                                                                                                                                                        
and Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 327-349 and Ross, Stephen A. “The 
Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem.” The American Economic Review 63, no. 2 (1973): 134-
139. 
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1.1 RELEVANCE AND RELATED LITERATURE 
This dissertation seeks to improve the existing understanding of agency cost and direct 
democracy in constitutional law by re-examining their relationship using paradigms from 
corporate governance literature.  There is already considerable literature that seeks to address 
the relationship between agency cost in both the constitutional and corporate governance 
fields.5 However, no research could be found which carries out a comparative analysis of the 
two systems to study the relationship between direct democracy and agency cost.  
This dissertation contributes to existing literature by creating a theoretical framework for the 
comparative analysis of agency costs in corporate and constitutional law. It also throws new 
light on the influence of direct democracy on agency cost and provides conclusions and 
recommendations to minimize agency cost by using referendums and initiatives more 
effectively. 
The contribution of this dissertation to current literature can only be discovered through a 
study of the works that already exist. Accordingly, some papers that represent the existing 
understanding of the relationship between agency cost and direct decision-making in the 
corporate and constitutional system are presented below. 
An excellent example of a comparative analysis of corporate and constitutional law involving 
a study of agency costs is the work of Professors Frey and Benz.6 In two articles, they argue 
that constitutional governance mechanisms have much to contribute to finding a solution for 
                                                 
5 There seems to be more research that examines constitutional law for insights to improve corporate 
governance rather than the other way around. For example, Ribstein, Larry E. “The Constitutional Conception 
of the Corporation.” Supreme Court Economic Review (1995): 95-140; Frey, Bruno S., and Matthias Benz. “Can 
Private Learn from Public Governance?” The Economic Journal 115, no. 507 (2005): 377-396 and Benz, 
Matthias, and Bruno S. Frey. “Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn from Public Governance?” Academy 
of Management Review 32, no. 1 (2007): 92-104. See also working paper Benz, Matthias, and Bruno Frey. 
“Towards a Constitutional Theory of Corporate Governance.” Available at SSRN 933309 (2006). On the other 
hand, See Rodrigues, Usha. “Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, The.” Wash. & Lee 
L. Rev. 63 (2006): 1389. This paper examines the use corporate governance insights to improve constitutional 
law like this dissertation does. However, Professor Rodrigues does not deal with issues of direct democracy nor 
does she use a methodology based on agency theory. 
6 See Frey, Bruno S., and Matthias Benz. “Can Private Learn from Public Governance?” The Economic Journal 
115, no. 507 (2005): 377-396 and Benz, Matthias, and Bruno S. Frey. “Corporate Governance: What Can We 
Learn from Public Governance?” Academy of Management Review 32, no. 1 (2007): 92-104. See also working 
paper Benz, Matthias, and Bruno Frey. “Towards a Constitutional Theory of Corporate Governance.” Available 
at SSRN 933309 (2006). See also Frey, Bruno S., and Margit Osterloh. “Yes, Managers Should be Paid like 
Bureaucrats.” Journal of Management Inquiry 14, no. 1 (2005): 96-111 which specifically addresses the issue of 
paying corporate managers along the lines constitutional officials are paid. 
13
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recent corporate scandals. This research differs from the dissertation insofar as it seeks 
lessons from constitutional law to improve corporate governance rather than lessons from 
corporate governance to improve constitutional law. Furthermore, while Professors Frey and 
Benz also utilize a methodology based on agency theory as this dissertation does, they do not 
address the issue of direct democracy.  
Professors Frey and Benz argue that corporate law is based on agency theory and it relies on 
extrinsic incentives to align the interests of directors with shareholders. They then 
demonstrate that constitutional law faces a similar problem in motivating agents to further the 
interests of their principals. In light of a spate of corporate scandals, the authors suggest that 
corporate governance incentives have failed to properly align the interests of agents to those 
of their principals. To remedy this situation, the authors propose the following solutions from 
constitutional law based on a study of its institutions: 
1. Performance linked compensation of agents supplemented by fixed income.  
2. The use of non-monetary incentives like titles to motivate agents. 
3. Selection of corporate agents through a rigorous selection process inspired by tough 
civil services recruitment processes. 
4. A clear delineation of power as is seen in constitutional law. 
5. A clear plan for succession for senior positions in the corporation. 
6. Institutionalized competition for positions in management.  
The work by Professors Frey and Benz, therefore, illustrates an example of comparative 
analysis between corporate and constitutional law which proposes public governance 
solutions for corporate problems. This dissertation does the exact opposite and hopes to 
complete the circle by applying perspectives from corporate governance to constitutional law 
thereby allowing the enrichment of both fields. 
A survey of positive constitutional economics was carried out by Professor Stefan Voigt in 
1997.7  His book identifies a breadth of literature that discusses the role of citizens and 
legislators in the framework of the principal-agent paradigm of agency theory. The survey 
reveals that the use of agency theory in the field of constitutional law is not new and has been 
taken up by a number of authors. However, the survey does not identify works that carry out 
a substantial comparative analysis of corporate governance and constitutional law with 
                                                 
7 Voigt, Stefan. Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey. Springer Netherlands, 1997. 
14
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agency theory adopted as the analytical framework. This dissertation seeks to build upon the 
literature dealing with the principal-agent conceptualization of constitutional law identified 
by Professor Voigt by providing insights from corporate governance. The argument why a 
study of corporate governance can extend and augment the voluminous literature that exists 
in the field of constitutional law which is identified in the survey can be found in section 2.5. 
In 2006, Professor Rodrigues tried to use corporate governance insights to improve 
constitutional law.8  In her paper, she carries out a study of the historical basis behind the 
indirect election of the President in the United States of America via an electoral college. She 
compares this to the indirect appointment of the CEO and the senior managers of a company 
by the Board of Directors. This historical comparison addresses the fact that shareholders, 
like citizens, do not choose the top functionaries responsible for the day to day administration 
of the company or the country respectively. Rather, shareholders vote for a board of directors 
which in turn appoints the CEO and top executives. Similarly, US citizens vote for ‘electors’ 
who in turn choose the President and the Vice-President.9 She concludes by rejecting the 
comparison stating that there are too many significant differences between the Board of 
Directors and the Electoral College that give them characteristics too divergent for a valid 
comparison. 
It is worth noting that Prof. Rodrigues does not use agency theory to compare the Electoral 
College and the board of directors. Having learnt from her paper, this dissertation compares 
the corporate setting with a parliamentary democracy rather than the Presidential system used 
by Professor Rodrigues and utilizes agency theory to be able to draw useful conclusions.   
Another paper which touches upon the subject matter of this dissertation is a paper published 
in the same year by Professor Dunlavy.10 This paper limits itself to an analysis of the 
                                                 
8  Rodrigues, Usha. “Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, The.” Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
63 (2006): 1389. 
9 The President and the Vice-President of the United States of America are chosen by ‘electors’ who are chosen 
at the state level by popular vote. With exceptions in the case of Guam, Puerto Rico and the District of 
Columbia, all states vote to elect as many ‘electors’ as they appoint members to the US Congress. It should be 
noted that the manner in which the states appoint electors vary considerably from a pro rata system to a winner 
takes all model. For a detailed discussion into the election of the US President, see Peirce, Neal R., and 
Lawrence D. Longley. The People’s President: The Electoral College in American History and the Direct-Vote 
Alternative. Simon and Schuster, 1968. 
10 Dunlavy, Colleen A. “Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting 
Rights.” Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 63 (2006): 1347. 
15
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democratic nature of political representation as opposed to plutocratic nature of shareholder 
representation.11 By providing a detailed historical background of shareholder voting rights, 
she explains why corporate and constitutional voting rights have the similarities and 
differences that they have today. Professor Dunlavy, however, stops short of a comparative 
study of corporate law with any particular constitutional institutions. All the same, she does 
compare corporate and constitutional systems of franchise i.e. the rules regulating voting to 
elect representatives in some instances.12   
This dissertation will expand on existing literature by using agency theory13 as a framework 
to improve constitutional law by suggesting lessons learned from corporate governance. In 
particular, this comparative analysis will be used to optimize the use of direct democracy in 
order to minimize the costs incurred by principals to use an agent which is termed as ‘agency 
cost’.  
Other authors have examined the historical and philosophical relationship between the 
corporate and constitutional forms.  In a fine paper tracing the historical origins of the 
constitutional state, Professor Enlow states that “In medieval and early modern history, the 
application of corporate law principles to the state contributed to the development of the idea 
of constitutionalism and to the idea of popular sovereignty.”14 This research, supported by the 
words of James Madison, suggests that corporate law principles have indeed been influencing 
constitutional law for hundreds of years.15  The paper ends with an analysis of canon law and 
                                                 
11 Democratic representation under constitutional law presupposes a rule of one person-one vote with universal 
adult franchise. Corporate voting rights are characterized as plutocratic because they are determined by 
shareholding (with consideration to their voting rights if stock is issued with differential voting rights) and not 
by individual membership. 
12 See section 3.1 for a discussion into the different ways voting rights are allocated under corporate and 
constitutional law. 
13 Agency theory focuses on the study of the costs of using an agent as incurred by the principal. Please see 
Chapter 2 for a detailed explanation.  
14 Enlow, Eric. “Corporate Conception of the State and the Origins of Limited Constitutional Government, The.” 
Wash. UJL & Pol’y 6 (2001): 1. “The word “corporations”, in its largest sense, has a more extensive meaning 
than what people are generally aware of.  Any body politic (sole or aggregate), whether its power be restricted 
or transcendent, is in this sense “a corporation”.  The King, accordingly, in England is called a corporation…  
So also, by a very respectable author… is the Parliament itself.  In this extensive sense, not only each state 
singly, but even the United States may without impropriety be terms “corporations”.  (emphasis added) 
15 In the paper, Professor Enlow explains that the corporate law influences led to the conceptualization of both 
the sovereign and the state as corporations. He argues that “corporate principles expressed the purely legal  
nature of the king’s political office and its consequential subordination to the law.” This changed the position of 
16
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the popular sovereignty tradition where Professor Enlow proposes that “corporate analogies 
enabled political theorists to postulate a legal authority in the people themselves”.   
Professor Enlow argues that this conceptualization only got stronger since medieval times 
and has become a cornerstone of the American constitution. As early as 1793, in a case 
concerning state sovereign immunity, the US Supreme Court clearly upheld the idea of the 
corporate nature of the American constitutional structure. Deciding an issue of constitutional 
law, four out of five judges in Chisholm v. Georgia held that “there is no other part of the 
common law… which can by any person be pretended in any manner to apply to this case, 
but that which concerns corporations.”16   
In light of this paper and its coverage of these issues, the dissertation does not carry out a 
historical study of the evolution of the two institutions.  Rather, it extends the literature by 
building upon similarities in the structure and the functional parallels which exist between 
institutions in corporate and constitutional law. This is done by characterizing the similarities 
in the way decision-making authority is delegated in the two systems in terms of agency 
theory. By analyzing the relationship between shareholders and the board of directors using 
the same theoretical framework used to study the relationship between citizens and the 
legislature, this dissertation can import insights that may be useful in improving 
constitutional law. Specifically, it examines how and when shareholders can bypass the board 
of directors to make decisions directly under corporate law in order to improve the use of 
direct democracy in constitutional law. 
This dissertation seeks to fill an important gap. The shareholder rights debate has not yet 
educated our understanding of the relationship between agency cost and direct democracy 
mechanisms like referendums and initiatives. This dissertation will extend existing 
scholarship by providing new findings and a novel framework to analyze the impact of direct 
democracy on agency costs in constitutional law. These steps will allow the use of numerous 
                                                                                                                                                        
the King from being divinely appointed and all-powerful to having a political office with its accompanying 
limitations.  The second point made by Eric Enlow is that corporate law influences led to the conception of the 
various organs of the government acting together as a corporation. This meant that the King held power only by 
virtue of being the head of this corporation. The King therefore lost political power in his individual capacity.   
16 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).  Cited from Enlow, Eric. “Corporate Conception of the 
State and the Origins of Limited Constitutional Government, The.” Wash. UJL & Pol’y 6 (2001): 1. 
17
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insights about the law and economics of corporate governance that are widely known to also 
be used to improve constitutional law.  
18
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1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PURPOSE 
The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the influence of direct democracy on 
agency cost in constitutional law.  To accomplish this, the dissertation adopts an agency 
theory framework for the comparative study of the direct decision-making processes used in 
corporate and constitutional law. The adoption of a single theoretical framework allows the 
structural and functional similarities in corporate and constitutional decision-making 
institutions to be compared effectively. This allows insights from corporate governance to be 
used to minimize agency cost in constitutional decision-making. 
The dominance of the corporate form as the vehicle of choice for large-scale collective 
endeavor by large and dispersed groups of individuals has driven enormous resources and 
expertise into the study of its governance.  The study of corporate governance has also had 
the benefit of observing the results of experimentation over centuries. Companies are 
constantly forced to respond to the perceptions of shareholders about how well their agents 
represent their interests. This is because investors react to changes in corporate structure that 
affect agency costs by increasing or decreasing their investment accordingly. The pressure to 
convince large numbers of investors that their interests will be better protected as 
shareholders in a company rather than as investors in competing organizational forms like 
partnerships, cooperatives etc. puts intense pressure on the corporate system. The need to 
maintain investor confidence in their ability to control agency cost has forced companies to 
evolve mechanisms such as providing for direct decision-making by shareholders for certain 
types of decisions. 
The evolution of the corporate form has also led to corporate governance scholarship 
accumulating a rich body of learning on how to minimize agency cost. This is highlighted in 
the fact that the literature on agency cost focuses on corporate governance much more than it 
discusses constitutional law. While there are a number of institutional contexts where agency 
theory is critical to the understanding of the delegation of authority, corporate governance 
was the field that initiated the scholarly debate on agency cost. This fact is underscored by 
the fact that the scholarship of Professors Jensen, Meckling and Fama,17 which forms some of 
the most prominent scholarship on agency theory, used corporate law to discuss issues related 
                                                 
17 See Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360; Jensen, Michael C., and Jerold 
B. Warner. “The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 20 (1988): 3-24 and Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. “Agency Problems and 
Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 327-349. 
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to, and stemming from, the principal-agent relationship. This dissertation uses the rich 
corporate governance scholarship in order to solve constitutional problems that are similar in 
nature. The potential for a productive comparative study is greatly enhanced by the recent 
developments in corporate governance, particularly in the US, which have sparked a vibrant 
debate over shareholder rights and in particular over the role, limitations and viability of 
shareholder proposals and shareholder bylaw amendments.18 
To further the purpose of this dissertation, the following questions are examined: 
 What are the agency costs involved with direct democracy that can be studied using a 
comparative study of corporate governance and constitutional law? 
 What legal solutions can be recommended to minimize these costs? 
To help answer these questions and further the existing understanding of these issues, this 
dissertation will focus on the following sub-questions: 
 What influence does direct democracy have on agency cost in corporate and 
constitutional law? 
 Should voters be allowed to initiate proposals or should they only have the power to 
veto fundamental changes? 
 Should the results of direct decision-making by the principals (through initiatives and 
referendums) be precatory or binding on the agents? 
 
  
                                                 
18 See, for example Bainbridge, Stephen. “Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, The.” UClA l. reV. 53 
(2005): 601; Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv. “Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management.” 
Review of Financial Studies 23, no. 11 (2010): 4115-4147; Hutchison, Harry G. “Director Primacy and 
Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm.” Loyola 
University Chicago Law Journal 36, no. 4 (2005): 1111; Hayden, Grant, and Matthew T. Bodie. “Shareholder 
Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy.” Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 51 (2010): 2071-2095; 
Yermack, David. "Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance." Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 2, no. 1 (2010): 
103-125; Fairfax, Lisa. “The Future of Shareholder Democracy.” Indiana Law Journal 84 (2009): 2012-93 and 
Stout, Lynn A. “The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control.” Virginia Law Review (2007): 789-809. 
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1.3 METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation utilizes a law and economics methodology, centers on an agency cost based 
analysis and relies on the extrapolation of corporate governance paradigms to solve 
constitutional problems.  More specifically, this dissertation adopts a normative approach to 
provide recommendations to minimize agency cost in constitutional law by identifying and 
analyzing insights taken from corporate governance.  
The criterion for the normative analysis is limited to the minimization of agency cost. It 
disregards other factors and externalities outside this framework. Externalities are costs or 
benefits visited upon parties that did not agree to incur them.19 In this context, this means that 
the theoretical framework of this dissertation will not consider the impact of direct 
democracy on stakeholders other than those defined as the principals. 
Due to this limitation, under certain circumstances, this framework might identify solutions 
that are socially sub-optimal (because they do not optimize social welfare) as optimal 
solutions because they might incur the least possible agency cost. For example, a government 
might expropriate the property of foreigners or wage wars of conquest against other nations. 
In the corporate governance context, a board might take actions that are detrimental to the 
environment or to the interests of debtors and bond holders provided that they are not 
represented on the board. In both these scenarios, the methodology adopted by this 
dissertation would not take into account the cost to economic actors other than citizens and 
shareholder respectively.  In other words, a situation with optimal agency costs might on the 
whole prove to be socially sub-optimal because agency theory does not internalize costs to 
third parties.20 The framework of the dissertation does not account for externalities imposed 
on economic actors other than the principals (shareholders and the electorate respectively) 
                                                 
19 Buchanan, James M. “Externality.” Economica 29, no. 116 (1962): 371-384. 
20 See Barnett, Michael L. “Stakeholder Influence Capacity and the Variability of Financial Returns to 
Corporate Social Responsibility.” Academy of Management Review 32, no. 3 (2007): 794-816. Professor Barnett 
explains that an action taken by management that results in great social welfare but costs more than the benefit 
captured by the shareholders is an example of very high agency costs. For example, a $1 anonymous charitable 
contribution by a company that results in millions of dollars’ worth of social welfare may well be an example of 
an agency problem since an anonymous donation will not net the company and hence its shareholders public 
goodwill or enhanced reputation.  
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when optimizing agency costs. This is a key limitation of the methodology adopted and is 
discussed further in the section on the scope and limitations of this research.21 
The dissertation will utilize law and economics literature from the field of corporate 
governance to analyze the agency issues arising from the use of direct democracy. This will 
provide a set of concepts that, to the extent of their applicability in constitutional law, will 
extend the existing understanding of these issues.  This methodology should provide a whole 
new set of tools to examine other issues in constitutional design and functioning as well.  
                                                 
21 Jensen, Michael, and Clifford W. Smith Jr. “Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of 
Agency Theory.” Recent Advances in Corporate Finance. Harvard University Press (1985). See section 1.4 for 
more details. 
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1.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
The aim of this dissertation is to use insights from corporate governance literature to fine tune 
the use of direct democracy in constitutional law in order to minimize the total agency cost. 
To do this, a theoretical framework is established that allows insights from corporate 
governance to be used to understand and improve the principal-agent relationship in the 
constitutional system.  Since agency theory is adopted for the comparative analysis, the scope 
of this research is exclusively limited to agency issues. 
The normative criterion for the analyses in this dissertation is the minimization of net agency 
cost. This is the agency cost of representative decision-making plus the cost of using direct 
decision-making as a monitoring mechanism when necessary. The selection of agency theory 
as the analytical framework, however, has a serious limitation that must be highlighted. 
As mentioned in the research methodology, agency theory only considers the relationship 
between two constituencies, namely the principals and the agents. An agency relationship is 
defined as a relationship whereby a party (the principal) engages another (the agent) to 
perform some service and delegates some decision-making authority to the agent in order to 
allow him to do so. The agency cost in such a relationship is the cost of using an agent as 
borne by the principals.22 This means that an analysis based on agency theory does not take 
into account the interests of other stakeholders who may be involved and does not consider 
the interests of society at large. 
This limitation of agency theory means that the conclusions of the dissertation will not 
necessarily lead to an outcome that maximizes social welfare.  Accordingly, caution must be 
exercised when evaluating the applicability of corporate governance paradigms in the 
constitutional setup based on the conclusions presented. Admittedly, issues such as human 
rights, equal treatment of citizens etc. are key issues in constitutional law. However, this does 
not negate the value of understanding how agency cost can be minimized by the use of direct 
democracy. Once this is understood, other requirements can always be examined to decide 
the best course of action when designing constitutions and democratic processes.   
                                                 
22 See Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3, no. 4 (1976): 305-360 at 308. Professors Jensen 
and Meckling characterize agency cost as the sum of monitoring cost, residual loss and bonding cost. These 
concepts will be discussed in detail in chapter two. The key thing to note at this stage is that in their 
conceptualization, agency cost is borne exclusively by the principals and not by other stakeholders. 
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Another important limitation is the specificity of the findings to constitutional law in a 
narrow sense. The scope of this dissertation is limited only to a comparative analysis of 
agency problems in the corporate and constitutional systems. It does not extend to issues of 
administrative law and administrative organization.  This limitation means that the theoretical 
framework and the recommendations of this dissertation should not be used to analyze and 
improve the pervasive adoption of corporate governance philosophies at the administrative 
level. The recommendations of this dissertation are, therefore, not directed at organizations 
such as the non-departmental public bodies of the UK even though they are very closely 
based on the corporate model.23 
Another key limitation of this dissertation is that it is restricted to a comparative analysis of 
the corporate form specifically with the parliamentary system of democracy.24 This means 
that the analysis and recommendations of this research are tailored to the parliamentary 
system where voters elect legislators who then select the executive. This system is seen in 
countries such as the UK, Australia and India.  
This approach is not designed to address the presidential form of democracy where the 
legislators as well as the head of the executive can be directly elected by the citizens.  It is 
believed that a comparative study between the corporate model and the presidential system is 
also possible but this would require a reworking of the structural and functional parallels that 
underpin the analysis. That discussion is therefore reserved for subsequent research. 
                                                 
23 Wilks, Stephen. “Boardization and Corporate Governance in the UK as a Response to Depoliticization and 
Failing Accountability.” Public Policy and Administration 22, no. 4 (2007): 443-460. Professor Wilks points out 
the UK as a prime example of a country where non-departmental public bodies (commonly referred to as 
‘quangos’) advice ministers, deliver certain public services, serve a judicial or quasi-judicial function or fulfill a 
monitoring role. He points out that their governance structure is remarkably similar to that of the public 
corporation. 
24 For a discussion on the differences between the parliamentary and other forms of democratic government, see 
Stepan, Alfred, and Cindy Skach. “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: 
Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism.” World Politics (1993): 1-22. and Lijphart, Arend. “Democracies: 
Forms, performance, and constitutional engineering.” European Journal of Political Research 25, no. 1 (1994): 
1-17. For the purposes of this dissertation, the dictionary definition of parliamentary democracy is sufficient. It 
is defined as a system of government where the real executive power is vested in a cabinet composed of 
members of the legislature who are individually and collectively responsible to the legislature. See 
“parliamentary government." Merriam-Webster.com 2012. http://www.merriam-webster.com (1 May 2012). 
This is in contrast to the presidential system of democracy which provides for the direct election of the President 
(or through an electoral college as in the United States of America).  
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It should be noted that when the dissertation refers to corporate law without specifying the 
jurisdiction, the corporate law of the State of Delaware is being referenced. Also, when the 
dissertation mentions ‘companies’ or ‘corporations’, it is referring to very large public 
companies with dispersed shareholders such as Boeing, Microsoft or General Electric.  
There are also certain notable differences between the corporate and constitutional setups that 
restrict the applicability of corporate governance solutions to constitutional law. Companies 
and countries allot principals the right to vote differently. The rule of one person-one vote is 
universal under the constitutions of democratic countries while one share-one vote or stock 
with differential voting rights is commonplace in corporate governance. The process for 
holding elections is also quite different in corporations and countries.  
These factors, together with the inability of the agency cost methodology adopted here to 
account for externalities, means that the recommendations of this dissertation must be 
reviewed carefully before being adopted. 
This research should, therefore, not be seen as a general attempt to correlate constitutional 
and corporate agency problems. It should certainly not be seen as an attempt to equate the 
two schemes of design. In this dissertation, several comparisons are made between the organs 
of a company and those of a political unit.  It must be noted that these comparisons are valid 
only for the analysis of agency issues that are involved in direct decision-making and may not 
be applicable for other analyses. These limitations preclude any correlation or extrapolation 
between the corporate and constitutional systems that is not related to the study of agency 
cost.  
Lastly, this dissertation does not examine the use of direct democracy with respect to a 
‘recall’. This term refers to a direct democratic process by which citizens can end the term of 
an elected official before his or her term ordinarily expires. The process does not involve 
direct decision-making by principals on policy issues but rather seems to augment the 
function played by elections. This is because the only action possible through a recall vote is 
to undo the result of the previous election and nothing more can be accomplished.   
These limitations on the scope of the dissertation do not invalidate the fact that much can be 
gained by using corporate governance paradigms to develop our knowledge of the agency 
costs that burden democracies of all forms.  While there are no universal equivalencies 
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between corporate and constitutional law, there are several instances where unique parallels 
exist between corresponding organs of the corporate and the constitutional setup. When these 
conditions are met, practical insights can indeed be gained by using agency theory to carry 
out a comparative analysis.  
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1.5 STRUCTURE 
This dissertation is divided into two main parts. The first part comprises of chapters two, 
three and four and explains what can be learned about direct democracy from corporate 
governance and why.  
Chapter two forms the foundation of the comparative analysis. It points out the structural and 
functional similarities in the corporate and constitutional schemes for delegating decision-
making authority. This is done by highlighting the delegation of decision-making authority 
by numerous and dispersed principals to a small group of elected agents. This chapter also 
shows that both systems also provide for exceptions whereby the principals can make certain 
types of decisions, under certain circumstances, by means of a direct vote. 
This forms the basis of the theoretical arguments that underpin the whole dissertation: (1) The 
agency relationship between shareholders and the board of directors is similar to agency 
relationship which exists between citizens and the legislature. (2) Both systems use direct 
decision-making as a monitoring mechanism in a similar manner to address these agency 
problems. 
It should be noted that direct democracy performs functions besides that of monitoring in the 
constitutional context but it is undeniable that the monitoring function is a key role of direct 
decision-making and it is this role that is examined by the dissertation. 
Understanding the agency relationship in both corporate and constitutional law in terms of a 
shared theoretical framework then allows the following chapters to apply corporate 
governance insights to minimize agency cost in constitutional law. 
Chapter two concludes with an argument that highlights why insights and principles for 
managing agency cost derived from corporate governance are not only theoretically 
applicable to constitutional law but are also uniquely useful. This is because large public 
companies are organizations that come closest to duplicating the scale and complexity of the 
decision-making required in a country or a federal sub-division. 
Chapter three is devoted to addressing important divergences in the corporate and 
constitutional setups. Carefully examining these differences ensures that the 
recommendations of this analysis are not rendered inapplicable due to practical differences in 
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the way the two systems work. This chapter begins by examining how voting rights are 
allocated in the corporate and constitutional systems. It identifies two main differences. First, 
only shareholders vote under corporate law as compared to universal adult franchise25 in 
constitutional law. Secondly, voting rights in corporate law are tied to the number of shares 
owned as compared to the rule of one person-one vote prevalent under constitutional law.  
The next difference in the two systems examined to ascertain its impact on agency cost is the 
legal liability of agents under the corporate and constitutional law. This is followed by an 
examination of the role played by intermediaries under corporate and constitutional law. 
These intermediaries, referred to as ‘super agents’, have a strong impact on agency cost. This 
discussion looks at how the role they play in both systems influences the applicability of 
corporate governance solutions to minimize agency cost in the constitutional setup. 
The chapter then looks at the difference in the nature of elections for appointment to the 
board of directors as opposed to elections to win seats in the legislature. The significant 
difference in the competitiveness of these elections creates a difference in the entrenchment 
of agents. The consequences of this difference in the nature and competiveness of elections to 
be appointed as the agent is then factored into the comparative analysis. 
The last issue discussed here is the difference in the ease of exit between the corporate and 
constitutional systems. It is argued that it is easier for shareholders to sell shares and to end 
the agency relationship with a public company than it is for citizens to emigrate from a 
country in order to end the agency relationship with its government.26 Therefore, difference 
in the ease of exit is also identified as an issue that must be considered when borrowing 
corporate governance insights for minimizing agency cost in constitutional law. 
Chapter four provides an explanation of certain key principles of corporate governance 
scholarship that are important for understanding how agency cost is managed in corporate 
law. In order to establish a common vocabulary for corporate and constitutional law to be 
used in the comparative analysis, this chapter introduces the concepts of ‘rules of the game’ 
                                                 
25 Universal adult franchise refers to a system where all adult citizens have the right to vote with limited 
exceptions being possible to exclude convicts, the mentally infirm etc. 
26 Note that even emigration may not suffice to end the agency relationship with one’s country in certain 
circumstances. For example, US citizens living anywhere in the world may be required to pay tax to the US 
government unless they relinquish their citizenship. 
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and ‘specific business decisions’ and explains how they apply to both corporate and 
constitutional law.  
This discussion marks the end of Part I.  Part II includes chapters five through eight. 
Chapter five examines whether referendums and initiatives serve a function complementary 
or supplementary to each other. First, it examines whether agency cost can be suitably 
minimized by giving voters the power to veto fundamental decisions. Once this is done, 
chapter five examines whether the power to initiate decisions is also required in order to 
minimize agency costs assuming the right to veto government proposals via referendum 
already exists. 
The first part of the problem which compares shareholder approval of fundamental corporate 
decisions to referendums is relatively uncomplicated. The corporate laws of virtually all 
major economies of the world give shareholders the right to veto fundamental corporate 
decisions. It is shown that such a veto right typically has an impact on the principal-agent 
relationship and on agency cost. In light of this, the dissertation uses well-reasoned 
arguments which support the provision of this right in nearly country’s corporate laws to 
make a case for requiring major decisions which change the relationship between citizens and 
their government to be approved via referendum.   
The issue of initiatives is more subtle because modern economies do not have a uniform 
position regarding the ability of shareholders to initiate decisions. Since there is no clear 
answer, corporate governance literature is scrutinized for arguments for and against the need 
for shareholders to have the power to initiate decisions under different circumstances. Section 
5.3 shows that shareholders may need the right to initiate decisions (1) when the board 
prefers the status quo; (2) when there are two value enhancing proposals and the board 
prefers the less value-enhancing of the two, and lastly, (3) when the board bundles a self-
serving proposal with a value enhancing one. These arguments are then extrapolated to the 
political context where they are generally found to be applicable. 
Section 5.4 then examines how initiatives can allow citizens to change a particular policy 
without requiring them to replace a majority of the legislators. Using insights from corporate 
governance, it argues that this has the advantage of requiring citizens to only get informed 
about one specific issue rather than getting informed about all the issues required to elect new 
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legislators. On the other hand, corporate governance literature also cautions that separating 
specific decisions from elections can dilute the accountability of representatives. This is 
because it can be very difficult to determine whether future consequences are the results of 
decisions made via representative or direct decision-making in the past.   
The chapter then compares corporate and constitutional law to see how allowing principals to 
initiate decisions can help the board of directors and the legislature to determine the true 
preferences of shareholders and citizens respectively. This is particularly important because 
the board of directors and the legislature normally rely on the management and the executive 
who may have conflicting interests and have the potential to pass on biased information that 
favors their retention and promotion. 
Section 5.6 deals with unique problems relating to the long life of corporate charters and the 
constitutions of countries. Using insights from corporate governance, it argues that the 
cumulative effect of amendments over several decades or centuries can transfer more power 
to the agents than the principals intended if only the agents are allowed to initiate the 
amendments. By looking at the literature relating to ‘empire building’ in corporate law, 
solutions are offered to alleviate similar concerns in constitutional law. 
Mindful of the analysis in all the sections of Chapter five, section 5.7 advocates for initiatives 
to be provided for as a reversible default in newly framed constitutions. Based on the 
corporate governance insights, the option more restrictive on the legislature should be chosen 
as the default arrangement because the legislature is well positioned to amend the constitution 
and to ban the use of initiatives if they are later found to be undesirable. 
Chapter five concludes with a comparative analysis of the indirect benefits of allowing 
principals to initiate decisions and how they influence the comparative analysis in this 
dissertation.  
Chapter six analyzes corporate governance to draw lessons for implementing initiatives as 
effectively as possible. The first issue discussed is the incentives of shareholders and citizens 
to get informed regarding the matter they are deciding. This is done by comparing the 
incentives of citizens with different types of shareholders such as individual shareholder 
activists, mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds and social activists.  
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Section 6.2 then looks at how corporate governance solutions for avoiding nuisance 
shareholder proposals can be adapted to keep out nuisance initiatives in constitutional law. 
The next section looks at how corporate law scholarship addresses concerns that shareholders 
will not be sufficiently informed to further their interests by proposing and deciding matters 
directly and applies them to constitutional law. 
Section 6.4 then looks at how strategies to prevent myopic decision-making by shareholders 
can be used to ensure long-term planning and consistency in decision-making in 
constitutional law. Section 6.5 looks at how interference and blackmail by special interest 
groups can be avoided.  
The last issue examined in this chapter is the subject matter of initiatives. By looking at state 
and federal laws which regulate what can submitted as a shareholder proposal and the scope 
of shareholder bylaw amendments, section 6.6 suggests which issues should be open to 
decision-making via the initiative process. It argues that corporate law is an excellent guide to 
identify exactly what types of policy decisions should be open to initiatives. This is because 
the board of directors, like the legislature, makes policy decisions whereas the management 
of a company and the executive of a country focus on micromanagement. This creates a very 
similar allocation of decision-making responsibility under corporate and constitutional law. 
Chapters seven and eight answer the following question: Should the results of referendums 
and initiatives be binding or non-binding (i.e. precatory) in order for such interventions to be 
effective in minimizing agency cost? Chapter seven compares the binding or non-binding 
nature of referendums under constitutional law with the finality of shareholder approval or 
rejection of fundamental corporate decisions under constitutional law. On the other hand, 
chapter eight compares initiatives to the rights of shareholders to propose and adopt certain 
decisions by means of a direct vote.27  
After looking at whether or not agents are bound by decisions initiated or approved by their 
principals, Chapters seven and eight examine whether or not boards and legislatures should 
be allowed to repeal or amend already existing amendments that were bought about by direct 
                                                 
27 Shareholders in the US initiate decisions under Rule 14a-8 passed under the Securities and Exchange Act, 
1934 and via shareholder bylaw amendments. Rule 14a-8 passed under the Securities and Exchange Act, 1934 
allows shareholders to have their proposal circulated to all the company’s shareholders at the expense of the 
company. This mechanism can, in certain circumstances be used to circulate a proposal to amend the bylaws of 
the company. 
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democratic action. This issue is addressed separately in both chapters because by taking such 
an action, the agents appear to be actively undoing the will of the principals rather than just 
passively ignoring it. 
Lastly, both chapters seven and eight analyze the impact of non-binding shareholder voting 
on the actions of the board. This analysis is used to determine whether or not the persuasive 
value of non-binding direct decision-making is sufficient to incentivize its use by the voters 
under constitutional law. In other words, it carries out a comparative analysis to answer 
whether principals have enough confidence in non-binding direct democracy mechanisms to 
utilize them effectively? Answers to these questions obtained from the corporate governance 
debate are then used to evaluate whether agency problems caused by the delegation of power 
to the legislature are best overcome by precatory or by mandatory direct decisions making. 
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PART I: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED ABOUT DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
FROM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?  
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2 AN AGENCY COST FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING IN 
CORPORATE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Chapter 2 begins by demonstrating that the agency problems prevalent in companies and 
democratic polities are shaped by similar factors. This is done by showing that both systems 
delegate decision-making authority in a manner that converges in terms of the structure of the 
decision-making hierarchies employed. Additionally, it is shown that they also converge in 
terms of the functions that are discharged by the principals and agents in the two systems.  
The delegation of decision-making authority from principals to agents in both these systems 
creates the principal-agent relationship in both systems.28 Since converging systems of 
delegation create the principal-agent relationship in both systems, it is argued that they would 
create similar agency problems that can benefit from a comparative analysis.  
Having demonstrated that the agency problems in the corporate and constitutional setups 
share parallels in term of characteristics and causes, the next section will demonstrate how 
both systems can be understood in terms of agency theory.29 While the first section 
demonstrates the intuitive connection between the two systems, section 2.2 provides the 
theoretical basis for addressing agency problems in constitutional law using corporate 
governance insights.  
Section 2.3 highlights the similarity in the use of direct decision-making by principals in the 
corporate and constitutional context. In other words, this section demonstrates that both the 
corporate and constitutional systems provide for the limited use of direct democracy in 
somewhat similar circumstances.30  
                                                 
28 Ross, Stephen A. “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem.” The American Economic 
Review 63, no. 2 (1973): 134-139 at 134. “We will say that an agency relationship has arisen between two (or 
more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, 
designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems.” 
29 Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.” Academy of Management Review 14, 
no. 1 (1989): 57-74 at 58. “Specifically, agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in 
which one party (the principal) delegates work to an-other (the agent), who performs that work. Agency theory 
attempts to describe this relation-ship using the metaphor of a contract” 
30 In both systems, the principals can approve or reject certain types of decisions (typically major decisions) and 
propose new policies if they can get a specified amount of support for a petition. These provisions are limited 
insofar as they only constitute a small minority of the decisions taken in the governance of the company or 
polity. The default source of decision-making is the agents to whom authority has been delegated.  
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This is followed by section 2.4 which uses agency theory to understand the impact of direct 
decision-making by the shareholders on agency cost. This section provides the theoretical 
basis for the subsequent analysis that suggests ways to minimize agency cost by fine tuning 
the use of direct democracy in constitutional law. 
Having shown that corporate governance can theoretically help to inform the use of direct 
democracy to minimize agency cost in constitutional law, section 2.5 shows why these 
insights are uniquely valuable. In other words, it explains why lessons from corporate 
governance have the ability to improve the framework for minimizing agency cost that exists 
in constitutional law scholarship through the use of direct democracy.   
Chapter 2 therefore shows that not only do the corporate and constitutional systems have 
similar designs of delegation that create similar agency problems, but that they also provide 
for the similar use of direct democracy to control these agency problems.31 
2.1 THE PRIMA FACIE PARALLELS IN DELEGATION    
At first glance, the modern public company and a representative democracy like a nation state 
share a key quality, which in turn creates agency problems in both systems. This key 
commonality is the delegation of decision-making authority from a large dispersed 
constituency of principals to an elected body of representatives. The following discussion 
will demonstrate two key points. First, how corporate and constitutional law share key 
similarities in terms of the structure of authority created by this delegation of decision-
making powers. And second, that the key participants in this shared scheme of delegation 
also fulfil similar functions. 
 
2.1.1 Structure 
At first glance, Figure 1 shows that the governance arrangements of public companies and 
political democracies share a pyramidal scheme. The pyramid structure of the corporation has 
been characterized as having the shareholders at the base “whose vote is required to elect the 
board of directors and to pass on other major corporate actions…” At the middle comes the 
                                                 
31 In both the constitutional and corporate setups, there is a uniform trend whereby direct democracy is only 
provided for in limited circumstances. For example, both may allow direct democratic measures to approve 
fundamental decisions, require a certain allow for an initiative or shareholder proposal only if a certain 
percentage of votes back it etc.  
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board of directors “who constitute the policy making body of the corporation, and select the 
officers…” At the top lie the officers of the corporation “who have some discretion but in 
general are deemed to execute policies formulated by the board.” 32 
Figure 1 
                               
In the Parliamentary system of government,33 a similar setup is present. The base, as it were, 
is formed by the citizens who elect the legislature and whose vote may also be “required to 
pass on major actions” such as a constitutional amendment, a major treaty like joining the EU 
etc. that needs to be approved in a referendum.  
In the middle comes the legislature that, like the board of directors is formally tasked with 
setting policy by making laws and appointing the executive by selecting the Prime Minister 
and the Cabinet.  
                                                 
32 Eisenberg, Melvin A. The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis. Beard Books, 1976 at 1-2.    
33 Strøm, Kaare. “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” European Journal of Political 
Research 37, no. 3 (2000): 261-290 at 263-64. In the context of agency cost, Professor Strøm identifies two 
essential characteristics of the parliamentary system. They are parliamentary supremacy and the notion of fused 
or unified powers. By ‘parliamentary supremacy’, he means that the legislature controls the executive branch 
and policy making. By ‘fused or unified powers’, Professor Strøm is referring to the fact that the executive 
comprising of the Prime Minister and the cabinet of Ministers are a part of the legislature and their resignation 
triggers a dissolution of the house.  This is in contrast to the presidential system of democracy which provides 
for the direct election of the President who is not a member of the legislature (or through an electoral college as 
in the United States of America). See also “Parliamentary Government: a system of government having the real 
executive power vested in a cabinet composed of members of the legislature who are individually and 
collectively responsible to the legislature.” See “parliamentary government." Merriam-Webster.com. 
2012. http://www.merriam-webster.com (1 May 2012).  
Management
Board of 
Directors
Shareholders
Executive
Legislature
Citizens
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On the top of the pyramid comes the executive comprising of the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet which (like the management of a corporation) is tasked with managing day-to-day 
affairs34. Like corporate management, the executive is only empowered with limited 
discretion and must, in the long term, execute the policies formulated by the legislature.35 It 
should also be noted that the executive under the parliamentary system and the management 
of a company are both indirectly appointed through the parliament36 and the board of 
directors respectively.  
In commonwealth countries such as the UK, India and Australia, the executive comprising of 
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are appointed by majority in the legislature. The Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet are themselves members of the legislature and continue to be so 
after taking on their executive functions.37 This situation is found mirrored in the corporate 
system where the CEO and top executives are appointed by the board. These top executives 
often comprise of executive directors who are both appointed by the board of directors and 
continue to be members of the board of directors thereby performing a dual role like the 
ministers mentioned earlier.  
In terms of agency costs, the analogous presence of a pyramidal structure for the delegation 
of authority from principals to agents in the two systems makes a prima facie case for a 
comparative study. This case is strengthened by the parallel existence of a vast dispersed 
principal (shareholder/citizens) that delegates authority to an elected specialized group of 
agents (board of directors/legislature) to make policy. Furthermore, these elected agents are 
tasked with appointing and monitoring a group of agents (management/executive) to whom 
they subsequently delegate authority in both systems. These facts suggest that companies and 
                                                 
34 See Moe, Terry M., and Michael Caldwell. “The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A 
Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
(JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft. 150, no. 1 (1994): 171-195; Verney, Douglas V. 
“Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government.” Parliamentary versus Presidential Government 31 
(1992): 47 and Golder, Matt. “Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2000.” Electoral Studies 
24, no. 1 (2005): 103-121. 
35 The cabinet may deviate from the policy set by the legislature temporarily by passing laws by means of 
ordinances. However, these laws are not permanent and are subject to affirmation by Parliament. 
36 Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability.” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (1997): 1163-1202 at 1167. 
37 Strøm, Kaare. “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” European Journal of Political 
Research 37, no. 3 (2000): 261-290 at 263. 
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parliamentary democracies share a similar ordering in terms of the structure whereby 
decision-making authority is delegated. In light of this, agency relationships, being 
relationships between parties that have delegated authority (the principals) to other parties 
(the agents) are also likely to have notable similarities.  
It should be noted that the structural similarities alluded to relate only to the principal-agent 
relationship between citizens and the legislature on one hand and shareholder and the board 
of directors on the other. In other words, the structure of countries and companies is similar 
insofar as the aspects affecting the principal-agent relationship is concerned. It should be 
noted that the comparative analysis restricts itself to a study of the structural similarity in the 
manner in which the principal-agent relationship is structured in the corporate and 
constitutional contexts and does not make further equivalencies between the two systems.  
 Accordingly, this section establishes that a prima facie parallel exists between the principal-
agent relationship that exists between shareholders and the board of directors and the 
principal-agent relationship that exists between citizens and the legislature due to similarities 
in the structure by which decision-making power is delegated.  
  
2.1.2 Function 
Having highlighted the structural parallels in the previous section, in this sub-section I focus 
on parallels in terms of function. I demonstrate that the prima facie structural parallels 
between shareholders, the board of directors and management on one hand and the citizens, 
legislature and the executive on the other also extend to the functions carried out by these 
constituents.  
Together with the prima facie structural parallels illustrated earlier, the establishment of 
functional parallels between the corresponding principals and agents in both systems go a 
long way towards establishing that corporate and constitutional law suffer from similar 
agency problems. This similarity will then be used to set up the theoretical framework for 
comparison in the following sections. Subsequent chapters will then identify insights from 
corporate governance to optimize the said agency costs in the constitutional setting.  
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The parallels in the scheme for the delegation of power as laid down under corporate law and 
constitutional law can be conceived as follows. The right to vote and elect the main policy 
making body is vested with the shareholders of companies and with citizens in political 
democracies. In terms of the agency relationship, they both perform the function of electing 
the centralized decision-making body to which the power and the responsibility to govern the 
collective are delegated.  
Additionally, shareholders and citizens (when the constitution provides for certain forms of 
direct democracy) also perform the function of directly voting to approve or reject certain 
types of proposals coming from the board of directors (major corporate changes, appointment 
of auditors etc.) or the government (various types of referendums). Shareholders and citizens 
of polities that provide for initiatives also retain the power to make proposals if they 
demonstrate the support of a certain number or proportion of votes.38 If these qualifying 
requirements are met, shareholder and citizens further perform the function of voting to adopt 
or reject the said proposal that some of them earlier proposed. 
The functional parallels of the board of directors and the legislature can be seen in terms of 
their role as decision makers and policy setters who are delegated with the power to manage 
the affairs of the company or polity. Additionally, their principals are bound by their actions 
with respect to third parties.39 The board of directors and parliaments are both in turn tasked 
with appointing the management and the executive respectively.40   
As discussed earlier, in some parliamentary democracies, the functional parallel is further 
extended since the executive comprising of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet continue to be 
members of the legislature which appointed them.41 This means that members of the 
legislature in a number of countries serve a dual function by also being part of the executive. 
                                                 
38 This is possible through shareholder proposals under corporate law and through initiatives under 
constitutional law. 
39 The rule of limited liability restricts shareholders’ liability for the actions of the Board of Directors to the 
extent of their investment in the company while citizens are bound by the actions of their legislatures in terms of 
international agreements, treaties and debt obligations. 
40 This is an element of divergence in the Presidential system where the executive is directly appointed. See 
Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability.” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (1997): 1163-1202. at 1167. “The procedure for appointing the 
executive is direct in a presidential system, but indirect, through the legislature, in a Parliamentary system.” 
41 This system is common in commonwealth countries such as the UK, India and Australia. 
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This duality is also witnessed in corporate law which provides for executive directors who 
remain members of the board of directors while also being part of the management of the 
company. 
The board of directors and the legislature share further parallels insofar as their function of 
monitoring the management and the executive respectively. 42,43 To enable them to perform 
this function, they are both empowered with the authority to investigate the workings of the 
management/executive and to demand and receive access to the information required by them 
to do so. The analogies drawn between the monitoring function of board of directors44 and 
legislatures45 are amply highlighted by the similar use of committees and procedures to 
facilitate investigation and oversight in both systems.  
The parallels in the monitoring function performed by boards of directors and legislatures are 
clear in the allocation of the power to parliament to appoint and remove the executive which 
only remains in office while it enjoys the confidence of the majority of its members. This 
situation is analogous to the corporate situation where the CEO and the top executives may 
be removed from office by the board of directors.46  
At the last level of delegation lie the management and executive who manage the daily 
running of the organization and implement and fructify the policies of the board or the 
legislature, as the case may be. This level of the decision-making hierarchy will usually be 
included together with the board of directors in the category of “agent” in the forthcoming 
comparative analysis whenever the distinction is unimportant. 
                                                 
42 Eisenberg, Melvin A. “Board of Directors and Internal Control, The.” Cardozo L. Rev. 19 (1997): 237. 
43 Galloway, George B. “The Investigative Function of Congress.” The American Political Science Review 21, 
no. 1 (1927): 47-70. 
44 Supra note 42. 
45 Supra note 43. 
46 The CEO serves at the pleasure of the board and while his/her employment contract might provide for 
compensation in the event of removal, the board retains the power to both hire and fire the CEO. See § 142 (2), 
Delaware General Corporation Law: 
Delaware General Corporation Law § 142 (2): “Officers shall be chosen in such manner and shall hold their 
offices for such terms as are prescribed by the bylaws or determined by the board of directors or other governing 
body. Each officer shall hold office until such officer's successor is elected and qualified or until such officer's 
earlier resignation or removal. Any officer may resign at any time upon written notice to the corporation.” 
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It can, therefore, be said that there is a mirroring of the functional and structural delegation of 
power in the corporate and constitutional systems. This extends to the provision of exceptions 
whereby some types of decisions may be made directly by the shareholders or the citizens. 
The next section examines the consequences of this prima facie similarity on agency costs by 
applying an appropriate theoretical framework to facilitate the comparative analysis. 
 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section examines the parallels in the causes and the nature of the agency problems 
experienced by companies and representative democracies in terms of agency theory. The 
characterization of the agency problems of both systems in terms of a shared agency theory 
paradigm allows the use of corporate governance insights to understand and to help improve 
constitutional law. 
Needless to say, the applications of such insights would also be limited to addressing agency 
costs due to the limitations of the common thread of agency theory that makes the 
comparison possible. In the previous discussion, the delegation of authority from a dispersed 
group of shareholders or citizens to a small specialized group of decision makers was 
identified as the key to agency cost in the corporate and constitutional systems.47 This section 
explains how the factors that influence agency cost in corporate and constitutional law can 
both be explained using the same theoretical framework. 
 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory can be characterized as an attempt to use the metaphor of a contract to 
understand the relationship between two parties where one (the principal) delegates certain 
                                                 
47 Ross, Stephen A. “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem.” The American Economic 
Review 63, no. 2 (1973): 134-139 at 134. “We will say that an agency relationship has arisen between two (or 
more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, 
designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems.” 
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work or responsibility to the other (the agent) to be performed by the latter. 48 It focuses on 
three main problems that arise in such relationships:49 
(a) The desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and;  
(b) It is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. 
(c) It is not possible to make a complete contract. 
The characterization of the principal-agent relationship as a contract means that the goal of 
this analysis using agency theory is to maximize the efficiency of the contract. This is done 
given “assumptions about people (e.g., self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion), 
organizations (e.g., goal conflict among members), and information (e.g., information is a 
commodity which can be purchased).”50 In this dissertation, the analysis will look for the 
optimum balance between representative and direct decision-making in order to make the 
principal-agent contract more efficient.51 
The theoretical framework adopted for this purpose is agency theory as typified by the work 
of Professors Jensen, Meckling, Fama and Ross.52 This approach has two advantages. It 
focuses on the study of governance mechanisms to deal with the impact of conflicting 
interests of principals and agents. Additionally, it also specializes in the study of the agency 
problem between the shareholders and managers of large corporations.53 On the other hand, 
                                                 
48 See Jensen, Michael, and Clifford W. Smith Jr. “Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications 
of Agency Theory.” Recent Advances in Corporate Finance. Harvard University Press (1985) at 3.  
49 Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.” Academy of Management Review 14, 
no. 1 (1989): 57-74 at 58. 
50 Ibid. 
51 The efficiency criterion is explained in the course of the subsequent discussion. It suffices to say that an 
agency contract can be considered efficient if it minimizes the cost of using an agent. 
52 See Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360; Jensen, Michael C., and Jerold 
B. Warner. “The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 20 (1988): 3-24; Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. “Agency Problems and 
Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 327-349 and Ross, Stephen A. “The 
Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem.” The American Economic Review 63, no. 2 (1973): 134-
139. 
53 See Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.” Academy of Management 
Review 14, no. 1 (1989): 57-74 at 59. See also Jensen, Michael, and Clifford W. Smith Jr. “Stockholder, 
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constitutional law is also characterized as an agency contract between citizens and their 
government and can be treated in a similar fashion.54 
Under the agency theory propounded by Professors Jensen and Meckling, an agency 
relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principals) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision-making authority to the agent.”55  
The shareholders of a company delegate decision-making authority to the board of directors 
and the management and entrust them to manage the affairs of the company.56 In the 
constitutional scenario, the citizens delegate power to the legislature and the executive 
entrusting them to govern the polity.57 This delegation of decision-making authority from 
shareholders to the board of directors and managers and the delegation of power from citizens 
to the legislature and executive creates a relationship typical of a principal-agent contract.58  
                                                                                                                                                        
Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory.” Recent Advances in Corporate Finance. 
Harvard University Press (1985) at 3. 
54 Merville, Larry J., and Dale K. Osborne. “Constitutional Democracy and the Theory of Agency.” 
Constitutional Political Economy 1, no. 3 (1990): 21-47 at 22. “The United States Government was established 
as an agent of the people. Its founders (e.g., Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78) often spoke of the proposed 
new government as "the agent" or "the people's agent," and the incidental nature of their remarks leaves no 
doubt that the concept of government as agent was widely understood and accepted. Therefore, the 
constitutional convention of 1787 can be interpreted as the search for a defining relation between the people as 
principal and the government as agent. And the search resulted in a contract, the explicit part of which is the 
United States Constitution. The U.S. Constitution is an agency contract.” (emphasis added) 
55 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360 at 308. 
56 Berle, Adolph Augustus, and Gardiner Gardiner Coit Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
Transaction Books, 1932. 
57 See The Federalist No. 78 in Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. 
Oxford University Press, 2008. The role of the government as the agent of the people with their power 
stemming from the people is clearly established in both the preamble of the US Constitution and the Indian 
Constitution. Both clearly state that the people delegate power to government. Such sentiments are enshrined in 
the constitutions of most democratic republics. 
58 The United States Government was characterized as an “agent” or “the people’s agent” by Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78. See Merville, Larry J., and Dale K. Osborne. “Constitutional Democracy 
and the Theory of Agency.” Constitutional Political Economy 1, no. 3 (1990): 21-47. The principal-agent 
relationship in the corporate context has of course been explored and recognized in the whole of ‘positivist’ 
agency theory literature. See Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360; 
Jensen, Michael C., and Jerold B. Warner. “The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, 
Shareholders, and Directors.” Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988): 3-24; Fama, Eugene F., and Michael 
C. Jensen. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 327-349 
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In terms of agency theory, decision-making authority is delegated by the shareholders and 
citizens. As such, they are characterized as the principals for the purposes of the analysis.59 
As the board of directors and management jointly perform the task of administering the 
affairs of the company and are delegated power directly or indirectly by the shareholders, 
they will be jointly characterized as the agents. The same is true for the legislature and the 
executive which also jointly perform the function of government and enjoy power delegated 
by the citizens. Accordingly, they are jointly characterized as the agents in the principal-agent 
relationship under constitutional law.60   
Having established this, an analysis of agency theory shows that in principal-agent 
relationships, the tendency of both the agents and principals to maximize their own utility can 
lead to situations where the former will not act in the best interests of the latter.61 This means 
that: 
 Both the principal and the agent are expected to act in their own self- interest.  
 The agent’s interests may not always be the same as those of the principal. 
 The agent will, therefore, act in his own interest and not in the interest of the principal 
in such circumstances. 
“Both agency and political perspectives assume the pursuit of self-interest at the individual 
level and goal conflict at the organizational level.” 62 It is, therefore, clear that agency theory 
identifies the same problem to be central to the creation of agency problems in the both 
systems. 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Ross, Stephen A. “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem.” The American Economic 
Review 63, no. 2 (1973): 134-139. 
59 See Strøm, Kaare. “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” European Journal of 
Political Research 37, no. 3 (2000): 261-290 at 267. “Democracy as popular sovereignty means that ordinary 
citizens are the ultimate principal.”   
60 Due to this, the direct election of the executive in the Presidential form of democracy as opposed to the 
indirect delegation of power to the management and executive in the corporate and parliamentary systems 
becomes irrelevant in this instance.  
61 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360 at 308. 
62 Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. “Agency theory: An assessment and review.” Academy of management review 14, 
no. 1 (1989): 57-74 at 63. 
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This is the first factor that gives rise to agency problems. In addition to the conflict of interest 
between the principal and the agent, another factor responsible for agency problems is the 
difficulty experienced by the principals in determining whether or not the agents are behaving 
appropriately.63 At first glance, it is clear that this problem is a strong factor in both the 
corporate and political systems due to the complex and specialized information and decision-
making involved. The existence of a large number of external factors influencing the 
performance of the agents only makes matters worse. This is because principals have trouble 
deciding whether poor performance is due to bad decision-making by agents or bad 
conditions outside of their control. This problem in assessing the performance of the agents is 
further exacerbated by the fact that the principals are numerous and uncoordinated, lack the 
required information and specialized skills to make reasoned decisions and do not have the 
proper incentives to acquire such resources.64 
This sentiment is echoed by Professors Jensen and Meckling who explain that it is almost 
impossible to ensure at zero cost that the agents will act in the best interests of the principals. 
They argue the use of an agent necessarily entails a cost. This cost known as agency cost is 
comprised of 3 parts namely monitoring cost, bonding cost and residual loss. 65These are 
discussed in the following discussion. 
As per Professors Jensen and Meckling’s conception of agency theory followed in the 
dissertation, principals must expend resources to monitor the actions of their agents. This is 
                                                 
63 Id at 61. 
64 See Arrow, K. E. The Limits of Organization. Norton, 1974 at 69. Using a cost-benefit analysis, shareholders 
can only be expected to expend effort to gather the information required for them to make informed decisions if 
the perceived benefit exceeds the effort. In this instance, the costs of gathering the required information are 
substantial due to the voluminous and complex nature of numerous disclosures and the acquisition of specialist 
skills required to make informed decisions. 
On the other hand, shareholders can typically expect only a miniscule proportion of any benefits due to their 
relatively small proportion of the stock of the company. Relatively small holding also mean that shareholders 
only have a negligible chance of influencing the outcome of the decision which makes them more apathetic. See 
Bainbridge, Stephen. “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment.” Harvard Law Review 119 (2006): 
1735-2644 at 1745. This leads to shareholders delegating decision-making authority to a smaller group (the 
board of directors) to ensure long term maximization of shareholder value. See Bainbridge, Stephen. “Case for 
Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, The.” UClA l. reV. 53 (2005): 601 at 624. 
These problems can also be seen mirrored in the constitutional system with the free rider problem, rational 
ignorance and lack of specialized human capital emerging as serious problems for direct democracy. These will 
be discussed later. 
65 Supra note 61. 
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known as monitoring cost. It includes not just the cost of “measuring and observing the 
behavior of the agent” but also the resources expended by the principal to control the 
behavior of the agent.66 Accordingly, resources have to be spent to monitor the actions of the 
agent and to induce the agent to incur bonding costs. 
Bonding costs can be characterized as the resources expended by the agent to guarantee that 
he or she will not take actions detrimental to the interests of the principal. As the agent is 
compensated for his services by the principal, bonding costs are ultimately borne by the 
latter. 
Furthermore, despite the expenditure of these resources, the interests of the agents and 
principals will still not coincide perfectly. The company or polity will also incur the cost of 
the divergence of the actions of the agents from those that would be in the principal’s best 
interests.67 This cost is termed as residual loss. 
This shows that a comparative analysis of agency cost and the influence of limited direct 
decision-making in the corporate and constitutional setups can be studied in terms of agency 
costs measured as the sum of the following: 68 
 The monitoring expenditures by the principal,  
 The bonding expenditures by the agent, (but ultimately paid for by the principal)  
 The residual loss. 
Therefore, as per Professors Jensen and Meckling, agency cost can be summarized by the 
following equation: 
Agency Cost = Monitoring Cost + Bonding cost + Residual Loss 
                                                 
66 “As it is used in this paper the term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing the behavior 
of the agent. It includes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control the behavior of the agent through budget 
restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules etc.” See Footnote 9, Supra note 61. 
67 See Supra note 61. On the other hand, in Jensen, Michael, and Clifford W. Smith Jr. “Stockholder, Manager, 
and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory.” Recent Advances in Corporate Finance. Harvard 
University Press (1985) at 3, Prof. Jensen provides an alternate definition. He defines it as follows: “(R)esidual 
loss represents the opportunity loss remaining when contracts are optimally but imperfectly enforced.” 
68 Supra note 61. 
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For the purposes of this dissertation, the focus of analysis will be on monitoring costs and 
residual loss. This is because it is difficult in practice to require agents to incur bonding costs 
in the constitutional scheme for the following reasons.  
One way to discourage agents from acting against the interests of the principals is to require 
them to put up a credible commitment in the form of a hostage or to require them to post a 
bond that would be forfeited in the event of misbehavior is required to be given by the 
agent.69 The cost of incentivizing the agent to do so is the bonding cost. Under constitutional 
law, requiring a monetary surety large enough to constitute a ‘credible commitment’ from 
legislators would mean that poor people would be impeded from contesting elections. 
Furthermore, the potential for improper gain through corruption in high political office is 
exceptionally large. This means that the forfeited bond amount would recover little of the lost 
value for the principals and even more importantly, do very little to deter agents from 
appropriating potentially vast fortunes.70 
This section, therefore, establishes that agency theory can help to characterize insights from 
corporate governance in terms of a shared theoretical framework allowing these insights to be 
used to understand and improve constitutional law. It also characterizes the cause of agency 
cost in both systems to be the sum of the residual loss and the monitoring expense (factoring 
in bonding expenses such as internal information gathering etc.). This discussion is continued 
in the following section with the introduction of direct democracy into this shared 
understanding of agency cost. 
 
                                                 
69 See Hill, Charles WL, and Thomas M. Jones. “Stakeholder?Agency Theory.” Journal of Management Studies 
29, no. 2 (1992): 131-154 at 139; Williamson, Oliver Eaton. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, 
Markets, Relational Contracting. Free Press, 1985 and Alchian, Armen A., and Susan L. Woodward. “The Firm 
is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson’s The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 26, no. 1 (1988): 65-79. 
70 The World Bank estimates that $1 trillion was paid as bribes as per 2001-02 economic data. This figure is 
expected to be much larger now and does not include embezzlement of public funds or theft of public assets. It 
goes without saying that the forfeiture of no realistic bond will deter a corrupt agent from accepting bribes and 
acting against the interests of the principals when the rewards of such breach are so truly astronomical. See “The 
Costs of Corruption”, World Bank News & Broadcast, April 8th, 2004 at permanent URL 
http://go.worldbank.org/LJA29GHA80 visited on 20 May 2012. 
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2.3 INTRODUCING DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
This section introduces the use of direct democracy into the theoretical framework outlined 
above. The objective behind this is to demonstrate that corporate and constitutional law 
provisions allowing for the use of direct democracy to make certain types of decisions are 
similar in nature and have a similar impact on agency costs in the two systems.  
This opens the way for corporate governance insights into the impact of ‘direct democracy in 
limited circumstances’ on agency costs to be used to understand and improve constitutional 
law by fine tuning the balance between representative and direct democracy.71  Additionally, 
it can even help to determine the optimum form and procedure to carry out the direct 
democratic decision-making that is provided for.  
To be clear, by ‘direct democracy in limited circumstances’, I refer to the norm in corporate 
and constitutional law that agents vested with delegated decision-making authority make the 
vast majority of policy decisions. Principals on the other hand ordinarily restrict themselves 
to participating in periodic elections. It is only in exceptional circumstances that the approval 
of the principals is required and they may only initiate decisions after satisfying certain 
thresholds and conditions.  
Such exceptions to the norm of delegated decision-making are found in both systems 
typically in the form of a provision requiring the approval of certain major decisions by a 
direct vote of the principals. For example, the approval of the principal may be required to 
amend the articles of association72 or the constitution73.   
In certain circumstances, shareholders and citizens may even be allowed to initiate decision-
making by demonstrating that their proposal is supported by a specified threshold of their 
fellow shareholders or citizens and by meeting some certain specified conditions. If this is 
done successfully, such proposals are voted on by the principals who may adopt or reject 
them. Such initiation of decisions by the principals can be seen in the form of the corporate 
                                                 
71 Direct decision-making is only used in limited circumstances in the corporate and constitutional systems since 
regular decision-making is delegated to the management and the government respectively. The principals only 
make decisions via a direct vote in extraordinary circumstances.  
72 See for example § 242(b)(2), Delaware General Corporation Law. 
73 See Article 46 of the Constitution of Ireland and Section 128 of the Constitution of Australia for examples of 
provisions requiring national referendums in order to amend the constitution. 
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shareholder proposal74 and the initiative under constitutional law75.  The result of direct 
democratic activity may or may not be binding and indeed this forms the basis of chapter 3. 
This section outlines the provisions of corporate and constitutional law that allow principals 
to make certain types of decisions directly by voting upon them instead of relying on their 
representatives. Whenever not specified otherwise, the corporate law used in this analysis is 
the corporate law of the State of Delaware read together with US federal securities laws that 
apply to public companies. A reading of this section will demonstrate the parallels in this 
corporate legal system and the constitutional setup in terms of their provisions for the 
exercise of direct democracy.  
 
2.3.1 Direct Democracy in Corporate Governance 
“Direct democracy in limited circumstances” and by implication delegated decision-making 
under typical circumstances can be seen in the corporate form. Corporate law functions by 
delegating decision-making to the board of directors.76 However, there exist exceptions to 
this rule that allow for the limited use of direct democracy to make decisions under certain 
circumstances. 
Shareholders are required to directly vote to approve certain major decisions of the board. 
These decisions where the shareholders may veto a decision of the board by not approving it 
are: 
 Changes to the articles of association,77  
                                                 
74 See Rule 14a-8 passed under the Securities Exchange Act, 1934 which regulated shareholder proposals in the 
United States. 
75 See Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution of California which allows citizens to propose amendments of the 
constitution which, if the proposal meets certain conditions, is then voted on by the citizens who may adopt or 
reject it.   
76 § 141(a), Delaware General Corporation Law places the responsibility of managing the business and affairs of 
the company on the board of directors.  
“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.” (extract) 
77 § 242(b)(2), Delaware General Corporation Law 
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 Mergers and consolidation,78  
 The sale of all or substantially all the company’s assets not in the ordinary course of 
business,79 
 Dissolution,80 
 Reincorporation, 
 A non-binding vote is even required on executive pay post the Dodd-Frank Act.81 
While the initiation of policy is typically the function of the board of directors,82 shareholders 
are also empowered to initiate proposals if they meet certain requirements. These 
qualifications are typically in the form of shareholding requirements. These may be measured 
in terms of duration of ownership and the voting rights carried by the shares held by the 
group of shareholders initiating the proposal.  
The shareholder proposal has gained a lot of attention in light of the shareholder rights debate 
centered on Rule 14a-8 passed under the Securities Exchange Act, 1934. This rule sets out 
the conditions that a shareholder proposal must meet in order for the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to consider it suitable. It should be noted that one of the key requirements set 
out in this rule is that the shareholder proposal must be in compliance with the law of the 
state of the company’s incorporation. Accordingly, corporate governance scholarship 
covering both Delaware corporate law and US securities laws dealing with this issue will be 
of particular interest in sourcing insights for constitutional law.  
 
                                                 
78 § 251(c), Delaware General Corporation Law 
79 § 271(a), Delaware General Corporation Law 
80 § 275, Delaware General Corporation Law 
81 § 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2010 
82 See for example the case of amendments to the certificate of incorporation after receipt of payment for stock. 
While § 242(b)(2), Delaware General Corporation Law provides for shareholder to vote to approve or reject a 
proposal to amend the certificate of incorporation, § 242(b)(1) places the power to initiate the proposal 
exclusively with the board of directors. 
§ 242(b)(1), Delaware General Corporation Law: “If the corporation has capital stock, its board of directors 
shall adopt a resolution setting forth the amendment proposed, declaring its advisability, and either calling a 
special meeting of the stockholders entitled to vote in respect thereof for the consideration of such amendment 
or directing that the amendment proposed be considered at the next annual meeting of the stockholders.” 
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2.3.2 Direct Democracy in Constitutional Law 
The constitutional schemes of nations and other polities also exhibit this use of ‘direct 
democracy in limited circumstances’ in a system otherwise based on delegated decision-
making. The use of referendums and initiatives empowers citizens to directly vote on the 
following types of decisions:83 
 On fundamental decisions such as constitutional amendments (mandatory 
referendum), 
 When the legislature refers decisions to a vote of the citizens (legislative or optional 
referendum) 
 To vote down laws already passed after having collected a predetermined number of 
signatures (petition referendum).  
They may also have the right to put up a proposal that, if supported by enough signatures, is 
voted upon as if it were a referendum. This poll may take place in the form of a special poll 
or the proposal may be included on the ballot in the next election. This is known as a ballot 
initiative. 
This use of direct democracy exists, as it exists in corporate law, as an exception to the rule of 
governance by agents delegated with decision-making authority. 
 
2.3.3 The Role of Direct Democracy: Balancing Accountability & Authority 
It can be surmised from this discussion that the corporate and constitutional forms both 
provide for similar exceptions to the rule of representative decision-making when principals 
can make decisions directly. Under both systems, critical or fundamental decisions are 
typically subject to be put to a vote before the principals for approval. They both also allow 
for the principals to petition for a proposal to be put to the vote if certain qualifying 
requirements are met. 
                                                 
83 See Matsusaka, John G. “Economics of Direct Legislation.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, no. 2 
(1992): 541-571 and Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy Works.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
19, no. 2 (2005): 185-206. As explained earlier, referendums refer to the process where citizens ratify or veto a 
proposal initiated by the government. On the other hand, initiatives refer to the process whereby citizens 
themselves come up with a proposal by demonstrating that a specified number or proportion of voters are in 
favor of the proposal, typically by collecting signatures on a petition. If this requirement is met, the proposal is 
voted upon by all the citizens and if ratified becomes law. 
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A balance must be maintained to ensure that the collective action problems caused by 
monitoring through direct decision-making do not outweigh the savings in terms of a 
reduction in residual loss.84 Accountability through direct democracy should not destroy the 
value of authority. After all, it is the transfer of decision-making power to a centralized 
authority comprising of agents which makes the corporate and constitutional systems 
effective.85 
Lacking the specialized information available to their representatives, principals might 
deviate from superior decisions made on their behalf by their agents. They might also 
concentrate their energies on campaigning and pursuing short term policies. Additionally, 
agents that tend to be second guessed repeatedly tend to lose managerial initiative.86  
An examination into this trade-off shows that corporate and constitutional laws both share the 
same problems in determining the right balance. Intuitively, it might be said that principals 
may reserve the power to make major decisions to ensure accountability while keeping their 
hands off the regular decisions required for day-to-day operations, in order to preserve 
authority.87 The shared problem in this respect is that the board of directors and the 
legislature themselves only make ‘major’ decisions involving policy. In fact, the day-to-day 
operations and associated decision-making is left to the management and executive 
respectively. 
                                                 
84 Collective action problems in this context refers to the following issue: All principals must bear the 
considerable cost of gathering and assimilating information to monitor the agents in its entirety but they only 
receive a pro-rata share in the benefits of better monitoring in proportion to their shareholding in the company. 
This results in a situation where no individual principal has proper incentives to effectively monitor the agents. 
85 Hutchison, Harry G. “Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by 
the Accountability/Authority Paradigm.” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 36, no. 4 (2005): 1111. See 
also Bainbridge, Stephen. “Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, The.” UClA l. reV. 53 (2005): 601 and 
Bainbridge, Stephen. “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment.” Harvard Law Review 119 (2006): 
1735-2644. 
86 Setälä, Maija. “On the Problems of Responsibility and Accountability in Referendums.” European Journal of 
Political Research 45, no. 4 (2006): 699-721. 
87 The delegation of decisions making power to a centralized decision-making authority is the key feature of 
both corporate and constitutional law. This is because collective action problems make direct decisions making 
for ordinary matters impractical. This is made impossible by the volume and complexity of the information 
required to make reasoned decisions. This issue is discussed further on the following page with the help of 
Professor Arrow’s analysis. 
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Since the entire debate centers around the principal’s intervention in decision-making that is 
not of the day to day kind, corporate law can help to shed light on exactly what kinds of 
policy decisions would benefit from the possibility of such intervention. 
  
2.4 THE IMPACT ON AGENCY COST  
The previous sections of this chapter have established that agency theory can provide a 
common or shared characterization of agency cost under the corporate and constitutional 
systems. It has also been demonstrated that both systems provide for direct decision-making 
by the principals along similar lines. 
In this section, I characterize the influence of direct decision-making by shareholders in terms 
of agency theory. This will allow corporate governance insights to be used to address agency 
problems in constitutional systems (now understood in terms of agency theory) since both 
systems provide for similar types of decisions to be made directly by the principals under 
similar circumstances.  
In order to carry out a useful comparative analysis to optimize the agency costs present in the 
constitutional system, it is essential to understand the purpose behind delegating authority in 
the first place. This will then lead to an understanding of the relationship between agency cost 
and the total cost of decision-making for companies and democratic polities.   
A large and dispersed principal along with the frequency and specialized nature of decision-
making required in the two systems makes decision-making by ‘true direct democracy’ or 
plebiscite on every issue unmanageable. This is caused by a combination of factors such as 
the free rider problem, the need for specialized human capital, problems in coordinating with 
thousand if not millions of individuals etc. as explained below. 
The free rider problem and the lack of specialized human capital here refers primarily to the 
lack of incentive for voters to collect enough information and skills to make informed 
decisions. It is analyzed here in light of Professor Arrow’s information condition.88 He states, 
                                                 
88 See Arrow, K. E. The Limits of Organization. Norton, 1974; Bainbridge, Stephen. “Director Primacy and 
Shareholder Disempowerment.” Harvard Law Review 119 (2006): 1735-2644 and McDonnell, Brett H. 
“Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of the New Corporate Governance in Theory and 
Practice.” Del. J. Corp. L. 34 (2009): 139. Professor Kennith Arrow’s analysis of the collective decision-making 
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“Under conditions of widely dispersed information and the need for speed in 
decisions, authoritative control at the tactical level is essential for success”.89  
Using a cost-benefit analysis, shareholders can only be expected to expend effort to gather 
the information required for them to make informed decisions if the perceived benefit 
exceeds the effort. In this instance, the costs of gathering the required information are 
substantial due to the voluminous and complex nature of the information and the acquisition 
of specialist skills required for making informed decisions.  
On the other hand, shareholders can typically expect only a miniscule proportion of any 
benefits due to their relatively small proportion of the stock of the company. Relatively small 
holdings also mean that shareholders only have a negligible chance of influencing the 
outcome of the decision which makes them all the more apathetic.90 
This leads to shareholders delegating decision-making authority to a smaller group (the board 
of directors) to ensure long term maximization of shareholder value. This is because it is 
‘cheaper and more efficient to transmit all the pieces of information once to a central place’, 
and for the central place to ‘make the collective decision and transmit it rather than retransmit 
all the information on which the decision is based’. 91 
These problems can also be seen mirrored in the constitutional system with the free rider 
problem, rational ignorance and lack of specialized human capital emerging as serious 
problems for direct democracy. After all, both companies and countries require the 
acquisition and assimilation of vast quantities of specialized information in order to make 
reasoned decisions. Neither shareholders nor citizens have the incentives to engage in such a 
                                                                                                                                                        
process in terms of consensus and authority is used here. (Arrow, K. E. The Limits of Organization. Norton, 
1974 at 68-70) He argues that organizations whose constituents have divergent interests and suffer from 
information asymmetries naturally tend towards authority based decision-making structures. The shareholders of 
modern public corporations with widely dispersed shareholders can be said to fit this description. (Bainbridge, 
Stephen. “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment.” Harvard Law Review 119 (2006): 1735-2644)   
89 Arrow, K. E. The Limits of Organization. Norton, 1974 at 69. 
90 Bainbridge, Stephen. “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment.” Harvard Law Review 119 
(2006): 1735-2644 at 1745. 
91 Bainbridge, Stephen. “Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, The.” UClA l. reV. 53 (2005): 601 at 624. 
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herculean task and acquire such skills when they must bear all the cost of doing so yet stand 
to gain only a pro-rata share of the benefits.92 
The other problem with collective decision-making is the issue of divergent interests of the 
principals. While it is assumed that the shareholders of a company seek to maximize profits, 
this in no way reduces the conflict of interest that exists between them. There are often 
differences in preferences for long or short term profits, varying risk appetites that dictate 
shareholder’s support for new investments by the company and divergence of opinion 
regarding dividends. In fact, there may even be divergence of opinion between shareholders 
whether the company should pursue profits to the detriment of social, political, environmental 
or environmental interests. See for example the case of State of Minnesota ex rel. Charles A. 
Pillsbury v. Honeywell Inc.93 In this case, Charles Pillsbury, a shareholder in Honeywell Inc. 
wanted the company to stop manufacture of napalm for use in the war in Vietnam on 
humanitarian grounds. This created a conflict of interest with the management and 
shareholders who wanted to maximize profits by carrying out an unsavory yet perfectly legal 
activity.   
In the constitutional context, similar conflicts can arise. While citizens may agree that 
enhancing social welfare should be the objective of government, how to achieve this is the 
subject of all political movements and consensus can rarely be found. It is, therefore, clear 
that direct democracy will not automatically produce a result that maximizes social welfare or 
even that such a decision will have popular support.  
Accordingly, corporate and constitutional law deliberately provide for a system of delegated 
decision-making and create the principal-agent relationship which gives rise to agency costs 
because it is the lesser of two evils. The less preferable option would be for the dispersed and 
large principal to govern via plebiscite leading to unmanageable collective action problems. It 
can, therefore, be seen that the agency costs inherent in representative decision-making is a 
                                                 
92 Macey, Jonathan R. “Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An 
Application to Constitutional Theory.” Va. L. Rev. 74 (1988): 471. 
93 See for example State of Minnesota ex rel. Charles A. Pillsbury v. Honeywell Inc. 191 N.W.2d 406 (1971). 
See also Supra note 90. 
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rational choice made by the principals in terms of minimizing the total cost of decision-
making.94 
Professors Jensen and Meckling have argued that the existence of agency cost does not mean 
that the (corporate or constitutional) system is “non-optimal, wasteful or inefficient” just as 
the fact that iron must be mined and is not available at zero cost does not make the world a  
“non-optimal, wasteful or inefficient” place. They also note with approval that the view that 
agency cost must be eliminated has been criticized by Professor Demsetz as the “nirvana 
form of analysis.”95  
The goal of this dissertation is, therefore, not to eliminate agency costs. This can be done 
instantly by terminating the agency relationship and making all decisions through direct 
ballot. 96 This, however, is only possible as long as the principal is willing to incur collective 
action problems that would exceed the savings in terms of agency cost which would, of 
course, be counterproductive.97 
This trade-off is excellently characterized by Professors Jensen and Meckling. They argue 
that agency cost understood as the sum of monitoring and bonding cost as well as residual 
loss is an unavoidable result of the agency relationship. Next, they state that because 
principals bear the cost of creating the relationship and capture the savings when these costs 
are minimized, they have incentives to minimize agency cost. Most importantly, they argue 
“agency costs will be incurred only if the benefits to the owner-manager from their creation 
are great enough to outweigh them.”98 (emphasis added) 
                                                 
94Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360 at 328.  
95 See Ibid. See also Demsetz, Harold. “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint.” Journal of Law and 
Economics 12, no. 1 (1969): 1-22. 
96 Jensen, Michael, and Clifford W. Smith Jr. “Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of 
Agency Theory.” Recent Advances in Corporate Finance. Harvard University Press (1985) at 7. “In the 
extreme, agency problems in the open corporation between managers and common stockholders can be 
eliminated by combining the two functions, that is, by abandoning the open corporate form.” 
97 Arrow, K. E. The Limits of Organization. Norton, 1974 at 68. 
98 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360 at 328. 
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The dissertation considers the use of direct democracy in limited circumstances not as a 
replacement for the system of delegated decision-making but rather, as a monitoring tool 
existing within the rubric of representative democracy. Therefore, rather than a substitute, 
direct democracy is conceived as a monitoring mechanism and a tool for intervention in 
exceptional circumstances when the principals consider that their agents are not acting in 
their best interests.99 This is because monitoring cost includes not just the cost of measuring 
or observing the behavior of the agent but also includes the cost of controlling the ‘behavior 
of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules etc.’100 
The threat of intervention by the principals via direct democracy provisions serves to align 
the actions of the agent with the wishes of the principal. Besides the threat of intervention 
which serves a monitoring function, direct democracy also allows citizens and shareholders 
to actively make decisions by adopting ballot initiatives and shareholder proposals or bylaws 
respectively. Actual interventions by which citizens and shareholders make policy decisions 
also allow the principals to actively align the policy to the will of the collective.101 Therefore, 
whether direct democracy affects policy indirectly (by ensuring that agents do not make 
decisions that decrease value for principals) or directly (when principals make decisions that 
increase value themselves), such decisions have a monitoring effect by reducing residual loss. 
As discussed before, intervention via direct decision-making would happen only in situations 
when two conditions are satisfied. Firstly, there must be a large divergence between the will 
of the principal and the actions of the agents. And next, this divergence must cause the 
agency costs to exceed the costs of collective action that intervention via direct decision-
making entails. Direct democracy is, therefore, useful only when the costs of using it are 
                                                 
.99 “As it is used in this paper the term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing the behavior 
of the agent. It includes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control the behavior of the agent through budget 
restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules etc.” See footnote 9, Jensen, Michael C., and William H. 
Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360. at 308. In this vein, direct democracy is conceived as a monitoring 
tool. The threat of intervention by the principal via direct democracy provisions serves to align the actions of the 
agent with the wishes of the principal. Actual intervention allows the principal to actively align the policy to the 
will of the collective. This simplification of the monitoring via direct democracy will be discussed in detail in 
the subsequent chapters. In these chapters, the impact of direct democratic provisions becomes central to the 
positive and normative discussion and will be further elucidated. 
100 See Footnote 9, Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360 at 308. 
101 The relative efficacy of the threat of intervention versus the impact of actual intervention will be discussed at 
length in Chapter 3 dealing with binding versus non-binding direct decision-making. 
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lesser than the residual loss incurred by allowing representatives from following their 
preferred course of action.   
These conditions can be expressed as follows: 
Assuming Delegated Decision-making 
When decisions are made by representatives under the corporate and constitutional setups, 
agency cost can be characterized as follows: 102 
Agency Cost = Monitoring Cost + Bonding cost + Residual Loss 
When direct democracy is introduced into this equation, the collective action problems it 
entails add to the monitoring cost. This is because provisions for the use of direct democracy 
are treated as monitoring and intervention mechanisms rather than a replacement for 
representative decision-making.  
On the other hand, direct decision-making reduces the divergence between the actions of the 
agents and the preferences of the principals. This is because direct decision-making compels 
the agents to do what the principals decide to do by voting on the matter. Since residual loss 
is defined as the divergence of the actions of the agents from the preferences of the 
principals, the alignment of policy with the majority preferences of the principals caused by 
direct decision-making is characterized as a reduction in residual loss.103  
Therefore: 
After the exercise of Direct Democracy Provisions: 
Agency Cost = Monitoring Cost (including the Cost of Collective Action) (↑) + Bonding cost 
+ Residual Loss (↓) 
                                                 
102 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360 at 308. 
103 See Section 2.2.1 for the definition of residual loss and other components of agency cost. 
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In light of this, the use of direct democracy can only serve to reduce agency costs under an 
otherwise representative system if the reduction of residual loss exceeds the increase in 
collective action problems incurred by direct decision-making. 
In other words, direct democracy should only be used when the marginal increase in the 
monitoring cost is exceeded by the marginal decrease in residual loss i.e.  
???
???
??
???
???
 
This expression denotes the first derivative where:  
MC = monitoring cost,  
DD = cost of direct decision-making  
RL = residual loss 
Now, limited direct democracy enabling mechanisms are characterized as monitoring 
mechanisms for the purposes of the dissertation. Since the use of such devices creates 
problems of collective action, monitoring costs can be said to increase by the amount of 
collective action problems introduced by such measures.  
Therefore: 
∆ Monitoring Cost = ∆ Cost of Collective Action 
In light of this, direct democracy will reduce the cost of decision-making and, therefore, be 
efficient only if the following condition is satisfied: 
∆ Cost of Collective Action < ∆ Residual Loss 
Therefore, for direct decision-making to reduce agency cost, the cost of collective action 
borne by the principals must be less than the reduction in residual loss caused by the decision. 
This is, therefore, the normative criterion for minimizing agency cost used in this dissertation.  
To conclude, it is prudent at this stage to reemphasize that the above characterization of the 
agency problem and its relationship with provisions for direct democracy apply to both the 
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corporate and constitutional systems. An analysis under this framework, therefore, allows 
insights from corporate governance to be used to understand and optimize constitutional law. 
This relationship will be further developed in the analysis that follows.    
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2.5 THE UNIQUE VALUE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS TO INFORM 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The section explains why the insights from corporate governance that this dissertation offers 
to constitutional law are of particular significance. The previous sections have explained why 
corporate governance insights can help to understand and improve constitutional law in terms 
of the balance between the cost of direct decision-making and the overall agency cost that 
comes from delegated decision-making. This concluding section of the chapter explains the 
unique value of the insights themselves. 
The use of corporate governance insights allows the use of a body of learning and experience 
that has evolved to mitigate agency problems in order to attract investment and survive in 
competitive business. The corporate form and associated governance rules are the result of 
inter-jurisdictional competition. The theory of inter-jurisdictional competition in the context 
of American corporate law refers to the idea that competition between different states to 
attract companies leads to states enacting corporate laws that are more attractive than those of 
other states. Since shareholders will not invest in companies subject to laws that impose high 
agency costs, states have an incentive to pass laws that involve lesser agency cost than those 
of other states. This causes states to compete to attract companies by passing laws that 
minimize agency costs.104  
The corporate form itself is also subject to the evolutionary pressures of the business market. 
The corporate structure that underpins the large public corporation being discussed in this 
dissertation is subject to competition from other organizational forms throughout its 
existence. After all, forces of competition would put out of business any organization that 
imposed higher agency costs on investors than other competing organizations without 
creating correspondingly greater returns. This would happen because the investors in public 
companies would exit and invest their money in organizations such as limited liability 
partnerships, cooperatives etc. if such organizational structures offered substantially lower 
agency cost.  
                                                 
104 See Romano, Roberta. “State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, The.” Cardozo L. Rev. 8 (1986): 709. 
For a criticism of this theory, see Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “Federalism and the Corporation: the Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law.” Harvard Law Review (1992): 1435-1510  and Kahan, Marcel, and 
Ehud Kamar. “The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law.” Stanford Law Review (2002): 679-749. 
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This means that corporate governance is in perpetual competition with other organizational 
structures in terms of the agency cost its functioning entails. The fact that they have emerged 
as the undisputed leader in attracting investment from dispersed investors for very large and 
complex ventures suggests that investors feel that it does not impose excessive agency costs 
compared to the benefits it provides. This intense evolutionary competition has also had a 
considerable amount of time to improve the corporate principal-agent relationship.105  
The dominant role of regulatory competition in pushing corporate governance towards the 
goal of minimizing agency cost is felt to a lesser extent in constitutional law. After all, it is 
easier to transfer one’s investment from a company with higher agency cost to one with lower 
agency cost than it is to change citizenship and immigrate to a country more responsive to 
citizen’s interests. In fact, oppressive regimes representative of constitutional systems with 
high agency cost often bar their citizens from emigrating freely and immigration laws of 
more attractive destination discourage such citizens from moving there. This stymies the 
ability of their citizens to opt out of their country’s governance arrangements thereby 
disallowing regulatory competition from functioning as freely as it does in the corporate 
system.  
There has also been enormous resources and effort expended in reconciling the need for 
authority and accountability in the field of corporate law. Additionally, the right to make 
decisions directly in corporate law, unlike the provision for referendums and initiatives has 
been introduced based on economic rather than moral or philosophical considerations. This 
means that shareholders’ rights to make decisions directly under corporate law have been 
created on the basis of objective evidence as compared to citizen’s rights under constitutional 
law which are affected by non-economic considerations like freedom, human rights etc. 
In light of this, it can be said that the minimization of agency cost is a key goal of corporate 
governance. On the other hand, minimizing agency cost is one of the many goals of 
constitutional law. The combination of strong regulatory competition and competition with 
other business forms for attracting investors gives corporate governance a laser like focus on 
minimizing agency costs. This laser like focus on agency cost in corporate governance makes 
                                                 
105For a detailed discussion on the evolution of the modern public corporation, see Cooke, Colin Arthur. 
Coorporation, Trust and Company: An Essay in Legal History. Harvard University Press, 1951; Laski, Harold J. 
“The Early History of the Corporation in England.” Harvard Law Review 30, no. 6 (1917): 561-588 and Alva, 
Curtis. “Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency.” Del. J. Corp. L. 15 (1990): 885. 
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it a valuable source of insights when we seek to re-examine direct democracy mechanisms in 
constitutional law with the express and singular view of minimizing agency cost. 
By examining the scope and limits on the power of shareholders to make decisions directly, a 
more objective evaluation of the role and the costs of direct democracy in constitutional law 
becomes possible. This will further allow the minimization of agency cost by analyzing direct 
democracy in constitutional law through the lens of corporate governance. 
Additionally, insights from corporate governance also have the unique advantage of coming 
closest to addressing the scale and complexity of the political principal-agent relationship. 
Along with this, insights from corporate governance on the use of direct decision-making also 
come closest to being able to capture the collective action problems inherent in referendums 
and initiatives. These claims are well supported by the sheer scale of some of the largest 
corporations. As of January 2014, Walmart had annual revenues of approximately $476 
billion,106 greater than the GDP of all but 26 of the countries of the world.107 This similarity is 
not just in terms of the scale of their finances. As of 2010, Walmart, with over 2.1 million 
employees108 also employed a greater number of people than the population of over 80 of the 
world’s nations.109  
While anecdotal, this information only underscores the fact that the public company is the 
dominant organizational structure used to carry out private commercial activity involving a 
large number of investors. Where the scale of operations becomes large enough and of 
sufficient complexity to parallel the complexity of administering a political unit such as a 
nation state or a federal sub-unit, the corporate form is a natural candidate for comparative 
study. 
Lastly, the position of the public corporation as a principal mover of the modern economy has 
driven considerable resources into the study of the principal-agent relationship. It has also 
                                                 
106 As per Walmart Inc.’s income statement available on the company’s website. 
 
107 As per the International Monetary Fund’s data for 2013. 
 
108http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/performers/companies/biggest/ (Figures for 2010. 
Visited on March 2, 2012) 
109 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). “World Population 
Prospects: The 2010 Revision”, CD-ROM Edition. 
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funded and inspired sophisticated scholarship on the consequences of direct decision-making 
by shareholders on this delicate balance. It is not insignificant that Jensen and Meckling’s 
seminal work universally recognized as the leading article on agency cost is about companies, 
and not constitutions.110  
These practical considerations are further extended by the large amount of scholarship 
surrounding the recent academic debate concerning shareholder rights and the treatment of 
shareholder proposals in particular. In other words, constitutional law could benefit from a 
debate on the value and nature of delegating decision-making authority as well as the checks 
and balances that principals should retain in the form of the ability to make certain decisions 
directly. This is not to say that constitutional law does not have high quality research on the 
management of agency cost. It is merely argued that corporate governance has attracted a lot 
of attention regarding the study of agency costs and that a comparative study can provide 
valuable lessons. In light of all the arguments in this chapter, it is expected that constitutional 
law can further benefit from the work of scholars who have focused on the corporate form.   
Some key applications of this approach are presented in the subsequent chapters.  
  
                                                 
110 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360. 
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3 RECONCILING THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH KEY 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF CORPORATE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW  
 
Chapter 3 looks at key differences in the corporate and constitutional systems that may have 
an impact on the comparative study. 
The first section of this chapter discusses the differences in the way voting rights are 
allocated under the two systems. In other words, the constitutional rule of universal adult 
franchise along with one person-one vote is compared to the corporate norm of allocating 
voting rights only to shareholders along with a trend of one share-one vote. It is 
acknowledged that a non-negligible number of corporations issue stock with differential 
voting rights. However the key point here is that voting rights in corporate law are 
determined by the number of shares held rather than the number of shareholders. This 
discussion will examine how the divergence in voting rights impacts agency cost in the two 
systems and identify any resultant limitations on the use of corporate law to understand and 
improve constitutional law.  
Section 3.2 examines the impact of the unique legal liability regime that governs the 
accountability of directors and legislators on agency cost in corporate and constitutional law 
respectively. It finds that that directors and legislators are subject to more relaxed liability 
rules than regular agents such as lawyers, trust fund managers etc. This has a direct impact on 
agency cost as this reduces the ability of principals to use judicial means to monitor their 
agents. 
Section 3.3 examines the influence that ‘super agents’ (agents tasked with monitoring agents) 
have on agency costs. In the corporate field, ‘super agents’ used by shareholders to monitor 
the board of directors can be proxy advisory companies like ISS and GlassLewis, social and 
ethical groups that report on the company’s wider impact on the world etc. In the 
constitutional system, they may be civil society groups, political action groups such as 
PAC’s, environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and other such organizations. 
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The role of intermediaries is critical under both systems as they help a huge dispersed body of 
principals to make informed decisions. By including the role of ‘super agents’ into the 
comparative analysis, the influence of key institutions like PAC’s111, civil society groups, 
political and social organizations etc. can be factored into the recommendations of the 
dissertation. Additionally, this analysis will ensure that corporate law insights will not be 
rendered unhelpful due to the key role played by such ‘super agents’ in the two systems.  
Section 3.4 examines two important factors whereby the agency relationship in the corporate 
and constitutional setups may diverge. Before corporate governance insights can be utilized 
to address agency costs under the constitutional democratic setting, the implications of the 
very different degrees of competition in corporate and constitutional elections as well as the 
impact of the Wall Street Rule must be examined.112 These factors have a strong bearing on 
agency costs and their influence will be discussed in this section. 
Chapter 3 concludes with a section highlighting why insights from the law and economics of 
corporate governance are of particular value in informing our understanding of the influence 
of initiatives and referendums on agency costs. The reasons presented here underscore the 
utility of looking at large public companies rather than other business organizations to 
minimize agency cost through the regulation of these direct democracy mechanisms. 
 
3.1 THE NATURE OF FRANCHISE  
This section begins with an examination of the role played by voting rights in corporate and 
constitutional law. It finds that elections for vacancies on the board of directors are less 
competitive than those for vacancies on the legislature. Taking in account the role played by 
                                                 
111 PACs refer to Political Action Committees typical to the United States. Such groups engage in measures 
supporting or attacking particular legislators typically during elections. They have received a lot of attention 
since the ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) which allowed PAC’s 
to spend unlimited funds to influence the outcome of elections as long as they did not ‘coordinate’ with the 
candidates. 
112 ‘The Wall Street Rule’ refers to the practice whereby shareholders unhappy with the management of a 
company sell their shares in that company rather than using shareholder activism to address the cause of their 
dissatisfaction with the management. This is often the case with stocks with high liquidity that can be easily 
sold. For a discussion on the pros and cons of both approaches, see Admati, Anat R., and Paul Pfleiderer. “The 
“Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice.” Review of Financial Studies 22, no. 7 
(2009): 2645-2685. 
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the market for corporate control113 which is dependent on voting rights for its operation, the 
first sub-section concludes that voting rights are important for managing agency cost in both 
systems, albeit for somewhat different reasons. 
This is followed by an analysis of the two main differences in the way voting rights are 
distributed in corporate and constitutional law. In general, there are two main differences 
which are discussed in sub-sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. They are: 
 Only shareholders vote under corporate law as compared to universal adult franchise 
in constitutional law. 
 Voting rights are a function of shareholding under corporate law as compared to the 
rule of one person-one vote under constitutional law. 
These sub-sections look at the consequences of the divergence on the utility of using insights 
from corporate governance to help understand and optimize agency costs in constitutional 
law. Furthermore, I explain why many of these differences in allocating franchise rights do 
not affect the applicability of corporate governance paradigms to constitutional law within the 
proposed framework. 
 
3.1.1 Why the Allocation of Voting Rights Affects Agency Costs? 
Voting rights are central to managing agency costs in the corporate and constitutional 
systems. This remains true regardless of the fact that the election of directors is typically not 
as competitive as political elections. The vast majority of board elections are fought 
uncontested by the slate of candidates nominated by the board.114 This is in complete contrast 
                                                 
113 See the following sub-section for an explanation of the market for corporate control. See Manne, Henry G. 
“Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control.” The Journal of Political Economy 73, no. 2 (1965): 110-120. 
In short, it argues that there is an incentive for potential buyers to buy the stock of a company that is 
underperforming due to its poor management, replace or improve the management and benefit from the 
resulting increase in share price.   
114 See Bebchuk, Lucian A. “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise.” Virginia Law Review (2007): 675-732 at 
677. In the period from 1996 to 2005, there were only 118 cases of rival slates being put up for election against 
the management slate. In larger companies with a capitalization of greater than $200 million which this 
dissertation is more concerned with, there were only 24 cases of rival slates contesting with only 8 of them 
being successful. 
NYSE listing rules post the Sarbanes-Oxley Act require that the boards slate of nominees be selected by a 
nomination committee comprising of independent directors. This still means there is one slate of candidates for 
election who typically contest unopposed.  
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to the highly contested elections for the legislature where many or at least two political 
parties compete furiously to represent the vast majority of constituencies. Much time, money 
and effort is often expended in these fierce contests.  
It is argued that the relatively lower competiveness of director elections does not make voting 
rights unimportant under corporate law. This is because directors can be replaced in the event 
of takeovers which are a result of the market for corporate control. The motivation of 
challenger groups to displace the board of directors (the agents) when agency cost becomes 
excessive was first outlined by Professor H.G. Manne in his celebrated paper as follows:115 
“The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient 
management, the more attractive the take-over becomes to those who believe that they 
can manage the company more efficiently. And the potential return from the 
successful takeover and revitalization of a poorly run company can be enormous.” 
This leads the consolidation of shares with a single or a few individuals or corporate entities. 
These entities buy enough shares to gain sufficient voting rights to try to appoint their 
representatives to the board of the underperforming company. This is done by garnering the 
support of other shareholders to gain the requisite votes required. The acquiring group gets 
this support by canvasing for the ‘proxies’ of various other shareholders who are dissatisfied 
with incumbent management and would prefer to see them replaced.116 These ‘proxies’ are 
documents denoting permission by the shareholder to the proxy holder to exercise their 
voting rights at the shareholder meeting in favor of the acquiring group’s candidates.   
The role of voting rights in corporate governance is, therefore, central to dealing with agency 
problems even though regular elections to the board of directors are typically far less 
competitive than political elections. This is because the market for corporate control that 
                                                                                                                                                        
The term ‘slate of candidates’ refers to a list of candidates proposed to fill all the vacancies on the board of 
directors that are to be filled up in an election. Such a ‘slate’ is proposed by the board of directors and in rare 
circumstances, by a challenger group. 
115 Manne, Henry G. “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control.” The Journal of Political Economy 73, no. 
2 (1965): 110-120. 
116 See Bebchuk, Lucian, and Oliver Hart. Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control. 
No. w8633. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001. and Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Scott Hirst. “Private 
Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate.” Bus. Law. 65 (2009): 329. 
68
The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
65 
 
plays a key role in monitoring agents relies on the threat of takeovers which pivot around the 
control and exercise of voting rights.117 
It should also be noted that some US companies use staggered boards where only a fraction 
of the board of directors (typically 1/3rd) are appointed in each election.118 This means that 
more than one election is required to entirely replace the agents. This makes elections for the 
board of directors even less competitive. 
The use of staggered boards to make the replacement of agents a slower and more difficult 
process is, however, not unique to corporate law. It is seen mirrored in constitutional law as 
seen in rules governing election to the upper house of the Indian Parliament known as the 
                                                 
117 The importance of the market for corporate control as a principal tool for the monitoring of corporate agents 
is a key element of agency theory. See Manne, Henry G. “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control.” The 
Journal of Political Economy 73, no. 2 (1965): 110-120. See also Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 
“Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360; Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. “Agency Problems and Residual 
Claims.” Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 327-349; Jensen, Michael C., and Jerold B. Warner. 
“The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 20 (1988): 3-24 and Jensen, Michael, and Clifford W. Smith Jr. “Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor 
Interests: Applications of Agency Theory.” Recent Advances in Corporate Finance. Harvard University Press 
(1985). 
It should also not be forgotten that per Delaware law, shareholders may remove the board of directors by a 
majority vote albeit with certain exceptions. This default rule has however been opted out of by a majority of the 
largest corporations with which this dissertation is most concerned with. The relevant provisions of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law are as follows: 
§ 141(k), Delaware General Corporation Code. 
“Any director or the entire board of directors may be removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a 
majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors, except as follows: 
(1) Unless the certificate of incorporation otherwise provides, in the case of a corporation whose board is 
classified as provided in subsection (d) of this section, stockholders may effect such removal only for cause; or 
(2) In the case of a corporation having cumulative voting, if less than the entire board is to be removed, no 
director may be removed without cause if the votes cast against such director's removal would be sufficient to 
elect such director if then cumulatively voted at an election of the entire board of directors, or, if there be 
classes of directors, at an election of the class of directors of which such director is a part.” 
118 Staggered boards are boards of directors of companies whose corporate charter mandates that only a 
proportion of the board will retire and be filled by elections every year. Delaware allows a maximum of 3 
deferments of elections i.e. the whole board must be subject to election every three years. Therefore 1/3rd of the 
board must retire every year. For a detailed discussion into the impact of staggered boards, see Bebchuk, Lucian 
Arye, John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian. “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy.” Stanford Law Review (2002): 887-951.; Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates 
IV, and Guhan Subramanian. “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a 
Reply to Symposium Participants.” Stanford Law Review (2002): 885-917 and Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Alma 
Cohen. “The Costs of Entrenched Boards.” Journal of Financial Economics 78, no. 2 (2005): 409-433. 
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Rajya Sabha and the French Senate.. In the Rajya Sabha,  1/3rd of the members retire every 
two years meaning each of the members serves a term of six years.119 These measures, in 
both corporate and constitutional law make the replacement of agents more difficult. In 
constitutional law, staggered elections restrict the power to replace agents through elections. 
On the other hand, in corporate law, staggered boards act indirectly by restricting the 
replacement of agents by making it harder for the market for corporate control to act.   
In the political scenario, the accountability created by competitive elections directly explains 
the influence of voting rights on agency costs.120 Because elections for the legislature are 
competitive and there is a viable opposition, citizens have the ability to replace their agents if 
they are not satisfied with their performance. More importantly, they can do so during general 
elections without any direct procedural or financial burden. After all, it is just as easy to vote 
for the incumbent party as it is to vote for the opposition. This threat of replacement makes 
voting in elections a powerful monitoring tool in constitutional law.  
When intervention via direct democracy is considered, it is seen that the principals vote 
directly upon proposals in both systems. For example, in both settings, whether or not a 
referendum or a fundamental corporate decision is approved by the principals is solely 
dependent on how many votes are polled for and against it. Such direct democratic action 
brings policy into alignment with the preferences of the majority of the voting principals. 
                                                 
119 See the FAQ page of the Rajya Sabha website at rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/faq/freaq.asp. It should be noted 
that members of the Rajya Sabha are elected indirectly. This means that they are elected not directly by the 
citizens but by the members of the Assemblies of States and Union Territories in accordance with the system of 
proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote.  See also Weston, Margaret. “One Person, No 
Vote: Staggered Elections, Redistricting, and Disenfranchisement.” Yale Law Journal 121 (2012) which 
discusses staggered elections in the United States. For example, 28 of the 50 US states have staggered elections 
for one or both houses of their legislature. 
120 The issue of which constituency has the right to vote and how voting power is distributed affects agency 
costs as this effects how elections carry out the following functions:120 
1. Aggregate and represent the preferences of the voters. 
2. Aggregate and represent the information about past policy and its results. 
3. Deal with adverse selection to select the best agents 
4. Control moral hazard by holding the representatives (agents) accountable.  
Excerpted from Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. “Separation of Powers and Political 
Accountability.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (1997): 1163-1202. at 1165 
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Voting rights are, therefore, a crucial factor in addressing agency costs when principals make 
decisions both directly and indirectly.121  
It is, therefore, clear that the variation in the distribution of voting rights in the two systems 
has a bearing on this dissertation. These variations are examined in the following sub-sections 
to identify how they affect the use of corporate governance insights to help minimize agency 
costs in constitutional law.  
 
3.1.2 Shareholder Franchise v. Universal Adult Franchise 
This sub-section examines how the fact that only shareholders can vote under corporate law 
while all adult citizens can vote under constitutional law affects the applicability of corporate 
governance insights to understand agency problems in constitutional law. 
The answer to this question lies in the conception of an organization as a nexus of contracts 
under agency theory. Professors Jensen and Meckling characterize both corporations and 
governmental bodies such as cities, states and the Federal Government as “legal fictions 
which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.”122 
This approach is distinct from the Alchian-Demsetz team production model which places the 
onus of management and decision-making on an “owner” or “employer” rather than on a 
board of directors or management that has been delegated that power. The Alchian-Demsetz 
model understands a classical firm to be a contractual structure with the following 
properties:123 
“1) joint  input production;  2) several  input  owners;  3) one  party who  is common  
to all the contracts  of  the joint  inputs;  4)  who  has the  right  to  renegotiate  any 
input's  contract  independently  of  contracts  with  other  input owners; 5)  who  
                                                 
121 Such measures in fact reduce residual loss which is a component of agency cost. 
122 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360 at 310. Also cited in Jensen, 
Michael, and Clifford W. Smith Jr. “Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency 
Theory.” Recent Advances in Corporate Finance. Harvard University Press (1985) at 2. 
123 Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” The 
American Economic Review 62, no. 5 (1972): 777-795 at 794. 
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holds  the  residual  claim;  and  6)  who  has  the  right  to sell  his central 
contractual  residual  status.  The central agent is called the firm's owner and the 
employer.”  
This model is rejected for the purposes of this dissertation because it fails to provide an 
economic theory to explain agency costs between the various levels of delegation of power 
from the shareholders to the board of directors and then further up to management. This 
model is, therefore, unsuitable as a theoretical framework for the comparative analysis central 
to the dissertation as it does not explain the separation of ownership and control seen in the 
modern corporation nor does it explain constitutional ordering arrangements.124 
 
It should be noted that the ‘nexus of contracts’ approach used here does not consider 
shareholders to be the ‘owners’ of the company. Rather, they are considered ‘input providers’ 
along with other ‘input providers’ such as bond holders, employees, managers etc.125 The key 
difference is that shareholders typically have voting rights to the exclusion of the ‘input 
providers’. These input providers may sometimes have conflicting interests. These may be 
conflicts between members of the same class of input providers such as disputes between 
various shareholders or disputes between the various bond holders. Or they may be conflicts 
of interest between the various classes of input providers such as one between shareholder 
and bond holders. Furthermore, one or some classes of input providers may have the right to 
vote while other input providers may not.  
Similarly, in the constitutional system minors, expatriates, foreign economic and diplomatic 
partners and in some jurisdictions convicts are examples of input providers who are 
disenfranchised. The power to monitor the agents by voting in elections is based on the rule 
                                                 
124 Having said that, it would be imprudent to fail to mention that Professors Alchain and Demsetz were aware 
that the problem of monitoring the management would arise under the corporate scheme where ownership is 
separate from control. They suggest that the problem can be addressed by making shares freely tradable. This 
allows shareholders to exit companies with unfavorable management and allows for monitoring through the 
market for corporate control. Additionally they suggest that this allows the concentration of shares or votes 
through the proxy process to a point where the free rider problem can be overcome.124 
 
125 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360. at 311. “There is in a very real 
sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the 
owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.” 
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of universal adult franchise. This is because modern democracies require citizens to be 
treated equally under law. Accordingly, all adult citizens of sound mind are entitled to vote 
with exceptions in certain circumstances for convicts etc. Other stakeholders in the country 
such as foreign trading partners and expatriates do not get to vote even though they have an 
interest in the success of the organization. 
There is, however, an important exception to this equal treatment of input providers. 
Employees negotiate their salary and benefits, bond holders negotiate their coupon rate and 
executives negotiate their compensation package before entering into a contract with the 
company. Accordingly, all of them have fixed returns owed to them from the company’s 
revenues. It is only the shareholders who do not get a pre-negotiated benefit from the 
company but rather a portion of the remaining proceeds once all other input providers have 
been paid. Shareholders are therefore the residual claimants of the company. Unlike other 
input providers who receive a predetermined share from the output of the company, the 
shareholders have a claim over whatever remains.  
While bond holders, employees etc. only have an incentive to ensure that the company has 
sufficient output to meet their claims in the present and in the future, shareholders have an 
interest in seeing that the output of the company increases as much as possible. Therefore, 
they are given the right to vote because they have the greatest incentive to grow the 
company’s output by monitoring the agents as effectively as possible. 
In the constitutional context, citizens are, in a sense, like residual claimants. Once the fixed 
claims of other input providers such as trade partners, bond holders, government 
employees126 etc., have been paid out, the remainder of the country’s output goes towards 
providing social services and improving the lives of citizens, considered as a class. Citizens, 
like shareholders thus have an incentive to ensure not just that there is enough output to 
satisfy fixed claims but rather to ensure that output increases as much as possible. For the 
purposes of agency theory, in this limited sense, they are like the residual claimants of the 
country just as shareholders are the residual claimants of a company. Therefore, citizens, like 
shareholders are the only class of input providers vested with voting rights because they have 
the best incentives to monitor the elected agents and maximize output. 
                                                 
126 Just like a company’s employees can vote if they hold shares in their capacity as shareholders but not 
because they are employees, government servants vote in their capacity as citizens but get no franchise rights by 
virtue of being employees 
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Accordingly, it can be seen that the allocation of voting rights only to shareholders in 
companies as compared to all adult citizens under constitutional democracy is consistent with 
agency theory. While it might prima facie appear that there is a disparity in the way the right 
to vote is distributed amongst input providers, both systems in fact allocate such rights 
consistently to the group that has the strongest incentive to monitor the agents and maximize 
output.  
3.1.3 Voting Rights Determined by Shareholding v. One person-One vote 
The allocation of voting rights in companies differs from the constitutional practice in two 
ways. The consequences of the enfranchisement of shareholders to the exclusion of other 
input providers as opposed to universal adult franchise are discussed in the preceding sub-
section. This sub-section examines how linking voting rights to shareholding under corporate 
law as opposed to the rule of one person-one vote under constitutional law impacts the 
comparative analysis. In particular, this discussion will examine how this divergence in the 
two systems impacts the usefulness of corporate governance insights to help optimize agency 
costs through the use direct decision-making. 
For the purpose of this examination, it is assumed that constitutional democracies function on 
the basis of one person-one vote while companies follow the general rule of one share-one 
vote. It, however, recognizes that there is a not insignificant quantity of stock with 
differential voting rights being seen in the market.127 
This situation, however, has not been typical of the two setups through their history and 
strangely enough the trend of allocating voting rights has interchanged between the two. 
The currently basis for the distribution of voting power in the corporate space based on the 
number of shares owned began with an egalitarian democratic phase in corporate law that 
                                                 
127 See Dunlavy, Colleen A. “Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder 
Voting Rights.” Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 63 (2006): 1347 at 1348-49.  
The New York Stock Exchange refused to list the shares of any company that issued non-voting common stock 
throughout the 20th century until it reversed this position in 1985. Since then, a not-insignificant number of 
companies have issued stock with differential voting. In Europe, a study commissioned by the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI) found that more than one third of 33 large companies had issued stock with differential 
voting rights. 
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would have made the political space of its day seem terribly oppressive and plutocratic. In the 
early 19th century when even universal male franchise was seen in isolated parts of the world, 
the default rule for companies in America was surprisingly one person or one shareholder-
one vote rather than one-share, one-vote. This legal position was also translated into practice 
with a sample of over 1,200 companies granted corporate charters by state legislatures in 
America between 1823 and 1835 showing that over 38% of them followed the one 
shareholder-one vote default rule.128 While the position of voting power allocation between 
the extremes of one share-one vote and one shareholder-one vote have changed over time, 
efforts continued to be made to find a “prudent mean” between the two.129  
Conversely, the modern liberal democratic ideal that educates the allocation of voting power 
in political democracies is the principle that every person is equal under the eyes of the law. 
This has also not always been the case and effective democracy with the rule of universal 
adult franchise is a relatively new phenomenon. Setting aside the millennia when monarchy 
and feudalism prevailed, the disenfranchisement of women remains fresh even in living 
memory. A number of countries still deny women the right to vote and even supposedly 
liberal democracies like the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden in Switzerland gave them the 
right to vote only as late as 1990.130 
The use of wealth in determining the allocation of voting rights has also seen widespread use 
from the early Greek and Roman republics. An excellent and more contemporary illustration 
of such allocation of voting rights being the Prussian three-class franchise system or the 
‘Dreiklassenwahlrecht’ introduced by the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm IV in 1849 (and 
lasted till as late as 1918). This system allocated weighted franchise for the election of the 
                                                 
128 Id at 1354-55. 
129 See Alexander Hamilton, “Report on a National Bank”, communicated to the House of Representatives, 1st 
Cong, 2d Sess. (Dec. 14, 1790), reprinted in 2 The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United 
States, app. 2032, 2049 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834). Refer to Id at 1356. “Alexander Hamilton serving 
as Secretary of the US Treasury Department in 1790 provided a characterization of such a ‘prudent mean’ for 
the nascent Bank of the United States. He described it as a balance between one share- one vote that might allow 
large shareholders to “monopolize the power and benefits of the bank” and one shareholder-one vote that gave 
their say insufficient weightage.” 
130 See Frenkel, Max. “The Communal Basis of Swiss Liberty.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 23, no. 2 
(1993): 61-70. Even this much overdue change had to be forced upon the canton by the Federal Supreme Court 
of Switzerland. 
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Lower House of the Prussian state parliament in three tiers of voting rights into which 
citizens were classified on the basis of their direct tax revenues.131 
These illustrations demonstrate that not only are the principles for allocating voting power in 
companies and political democracy changeable but that they have indeed changed  and 
reversed over time. This suggests that the systems for allocating voting rights in corporate 
and constitutional law have historically had strong similarities and a correlation of the two is 
not as farfetched as one might intuitively imagine. 
As pointed out earlier, agency theory supports an explanation of agency cost that is 
compatible with the existence of numerous constituencies with sometimes conflicting 
interests even if only some of those constituencies have the right to vote. Agency theory only 
requires that the group of principals that bear the residual risk of the enterprise have voting 
power to most effectively monitor the behavior of the agents.132 Therefore, since shareholders 
and citizens can be understood to bear this residual risk, only they have (and should have) 
voting rights in order to minimize agency cost.133 
Extending this line of reasoning, the amount of possible benefit to the principal if agents are 
monitored effectively also defines the extent of the voting power conferred. In the 
constitutional context, this explains the distribution of voting power as all citizens are deemed 
to be equal under the law. Public policy, therefore, dictates that each is considered to have an 
equal risk and share in the polity.134 Furthermore, it is objectively impossible to calculate the 
possible benefit available through effective monitoring that can be captured by each citizen in 
the fortunes of their city, province or country so this is the only practical solution. This is the 
reason each citizen is given an equal vote i.e. one person – one vote. 
                                                 
131 See Grunthal, Gunther, Hartwig Brandt, and Klaus Erich Pollmann. “Social Aspects of German 
Constitutionalism: Prussia, Wurtemberg and the norddeutscher bund in the Mid?Nineteenth century.” 
Parliaments, Estates and Representation 9, no. 1 (1989): 65-69 and Hoffmann-Martinot, Vincent. “The Process 
of Citizen’s Political Emancipation in European Cities: The Case of Stuttgart.” XIII Nordiske 
Kommunalforskerkonferansen, Oslo, 26–28.11. 04. (2004). 
132 Fama, Eugene F. “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.” The Journal of Political Economy (1980): 
288-307 at 295.  
133 For a detailed discussion on this issue, please refer to the previous sub-section. 
134 Once the obligations of the polity in terms of paying its employees, its debt etc. are satisfied, the sole 
beneficiaries who enjoy the excess in the form of social welfare are the citizens of the polity. They are therefore 
the bearers of residual risk. 
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On the other hand, the possible benefits from effective monitoring that can be captured by a 
shareholder in a limited liability company is directly proportional to the proportion of shares 
held by that shareholder. Therefore, shareholders with different shareholdings cannot be 
deemed in any meaningful way to have an equal incentive to monitor the board of directors of 
the corporation. Instead, the interest that every shareholder has (and needs to protect through 
his voting power) is proportional to his stake in the company as represented by his 
shareholding. Furthermore, this stake can be easily determined by the quantity of shares held 
by the shareholder 
The scope of this dissertation is limited to companies with one share, one vote.135 However, it 
is admitted that many corporations issue stock with differential voting rights. The existence 
of such companies does not void the comparative analysis. The issuance of stock with 
variable voting rights can be explained as an arrangement whereby shareholders agree to alter 
this default balance either for a discount (shares with less voting rights) or for a control 
premium (shares with extra voting rights, golden shares etc.). In other words, shareholder buy 
or give up some of their ability to monitor the agents and protect the value of their investment 
in exchange for some consideration. 
Since it is the incentive to monitor associated with equity shareholding that leads to voting 
power being allocated to shareholders, it is the only reasonable that the allocation also be 
proportional to the risk that creates those incentives.136 In fact, the equal distribution of voting 
rights to shareholders regardless of their share in the equity would be inefficient in terms of 
monitoring to control agency costs. Shareholders with large holdings will be unable to 
adequately represent and protect the risk they bear while small shareholders would be 
inadequately motivated to monitor the agents.   
What holds true for the monitoring influence of elections also applies to direct democratic 
measures because both use voting to gauge the preferences of the principals. Accordingly, 
voting rights for direct decision-making are rightly allocated in parallel with voting rights for 
electing representatives. 
                                                 
135 See Section 1.4. 
 
136 For a discussion on why only shareholder have the right to vote to the exclusion of other groups such as bond 
holders and employees, see Bainbridge, Stephen. “Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, The.” UClA l. 
reV. 53 (2005): 601, Chapter 1. 
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In light of these arguments, it is clear that the corporate system of allocating voting rights 
based on shareholding and the constitutional rule of ‘one person – one vote’ are both 
consistent with agency theory. Since voting rights are apportioned in both systems in keeping 
with the interests voting principals have to protect, it is argued that effective parallels can be 
drawn to identify valid insights using agency theory. Therefore, corporate governance 
insights can inform our understanding of agency costs in constitutional law and how they are 
conditioned by the impact of direct democracy despite the differences in the allocation of 
voting rights amongst the two systems. 
  
3.2 LEGAL LIABILITY RULES  
This section explores the consequences of the legal liability regimes governing the behavior 
of agents in corporate and constitutional law. This dissertation has followed a largely 
contractarian approach based on the premise that directors are disciplined by market forces. 
This approach, as espoused by Professors Easterbrook and Fischel maintains that corporate 
law is (or at least should be) merely a collection of contractual relationships between 
shareholders, managers and directors.137 
Previous sections have discussed how voting working together with market forces check the 
growth of agency cost in corporate law.138 This is not, however, the only mechanism that 
exists to prevent agents from acting against the interests of their principals. The other tool 
used in corporate law to keep agents honest and reduce agency cost is agency cost is the legal 
system. More specifically, directors owe certain duties, known as fiduciary duties, to their 
                                                 
137 Easterbrook, Frank H. The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. Harvard University Press, 1996. 
138 Bradley, Michael, and Cindy A. Schipani. “Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate 
Governance, The.” Iowa L. Rev. 75 (1989): 1 at 5. (T)he "contractarian" view recognizes that market forces act 
to discipline corporate managers and cause the managers to align their interests with those of the firm's security 
holders. These forces stem from competition in the capital, labor, and product markets, as well as competition in 
the market for corporate control. This view of the large-scale corporation follows from the works of Coase, 
Manne, Alchian and Demsetz, Jensen and Meckling, Fama, and Fama and Jensen.  
High agency costs suffered by a company would lead to reduction is share prices as dissatisfied principals sell 
their interest in the company causing supply to exceed demand. This causes a threat to the incumbency of 
managers (including the board of directors) through its impact on the market for corporate control. This can 
result in the disciplining of existing managers through the threat of removal or their replacement with a new 
management more aligned with the interests of the principals. 
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shareholders and the shareholders have recourse to the courts if the directors breach these 
duties.139  
If they are found guilty of such breach, the directors can face civil and criminal sanction. 
They may also be held personally liable even if the impugned action was taken while acting 
in the capacity of a representative of the company. This legal regime has an impact on the 
incentives of the agents to act for or against the interests of their principals and cannot be 
ignored in the comparative analysis. 
The following arguments examine what duties legislators owe to their citizens for which they 
are personally liable and subject to prosecution. This comparison will reveal the differences 
in the legal consequences directors and legislators face for acting against the interests of their 
agents. These differences, if any, will have an impact on agency cost and their impact on the 
comparative analysis will be determined.   
To identify insights from corporate governance, the actual state and application of liability 
rules within it must be understood. The Delaware Supreme Court has defined fiduciary duties 
as the duty of loyalty, the duty of good faith and the duty of care taken together.140 These 
duties were then limited by the Delaware Supreme Court only to cases not covered by the 
business judgment rule. 141 This rule requires judges to presume, in the absence of evidence of 
fraud or a conflict of interest that the directors acted in an informed manner, in good faith and 
in the best interests of the corporation.142  
This powerful presumption in favor of directors was shaken in Smith v. Van Gorkom.143 In 
this case, the directors of the company were found to be in breach of the duty of care, a 
                                                 
139 Fiduciary duties will be discussed at length in the following pages. The Supreme Court of Delaware has 
defined fiduciary duties as the duty of loyalty, the duty of good faith and the duty of care. See Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).  
140 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). 
141 The Business Judgment Rule is characterized as “a judicially developed doctrine that has come to preclude 
inquiry into the merits of directors' decisions in the absence of evidence of bad faith, fraud, conflict of interest, 
or illegality”. See Cohn, Stuart. “Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and 
Sanctions through the Business Judgment Rule.” Texas Law Review 62, no. 4 (1983) at 594. 
142 Aronson v. Lewis 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
143 Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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component of director’s fiduciary duties. This duty requires directors to act in the best 
interests of the corporation and exercise the level of care an ordinary person in their position 
would exercise.144 To clarify, the duty of care here refers to the requirement that agents take 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the interests of the principals are not harmed. On the other 
hand, the duty of loyalty refers to the requirement that agents not involve themselves in 
situations where they have a conflict of interest with the principals and if they do, the agents 
must put the interests of the principal ahead of their own.  
The reason the court found the directors liable was because they had not properly reviewed a 
merger proposal and had accepted it without examining the related documents. The court held 
that the protection of the business judgment rule only extends to decisions taken on an 
“informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company”.145 The court found that since the directors had not acted on an 
informed basis, they could not claim the protection of the business judgment rule for a charge 
of breach of duty of care.  
The legal position was again modified in 1986 with the adoption of § 102(b)(7), Delaware 
General Corporation Law.146 This provision allows companies to modify their charters in 
order to exempt their directors for violations of fiduciary duties except for (a) violations of 
the duty of loyalty, (b) acts not performed in good faith, and (c) intentional misconduct and 
                                                 
144 Bradley, Michael, and Cindy A. Schipani. “Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate 
Governance, The.” Iowa L. Rev. 75 (1989): 1. 
145 Supra note 150 at 872. 
146 § 102(b)(7), Delaware General Corporation Law: 
“§ 102(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of incorporation by subsection (a) 
of this section, the certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the following matters: 
… 
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders 
for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not 
eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation 
or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a 
knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director 
derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for 
any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective. All references in this 
paragraph to a director shall also be deemed to refer to such other person or persons, if any, who, pursuant to a 
provision of the certificate of incorporation in accordance with § 141(a) of this title, exercise or perform any of 
the powers or duties otherwise conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this title.” 
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illegal activities. Since then, the majority of Delaware companies have taken advantage of 
this law and included such provisions in their byelaws.147  
This legal regime governs the judicial repercussions for directors vis-à-vis the exercise of 
their fiduciary duties. Because agency cost in corporate governance is dependent on legal 
pressures on agents to protect the interests of the principals, a comparison with the personal 
liability of legislators follows. As explained below, legislators are entirely immune from 
personal liability for any vote they cast in the legislature and including the requirement to 
inform themselves as is mandated by Smith v. Van Gorkom.148  
When considered in light of the principal-agent scenario, citizen-principals have no means to 
legally compel their legislator-agents to act in their best interests. While citizens of several 
countries can approach their courts to repeal laws inconsistent with the country’s constitution, 
no jurisdiction could be found which allows courts to strike down legislation based on 
whether or not the legislation is in the interests of the citizens. After all, that is a question for 
the legislature to decide. Therefore, citizens have no judicial redress against legislation on the 
basis that it hurts their interests nor are legislators legally liable for passing such laws. This 
means that constitutional law does not provide liability along the lines of the duty of care as 
found in corporate governance.  
It must be noted that as per § 102(b)(7), Delaware General Corporation Law, a majority of 
the large corporations with dispersed shareholders in Delaware have adopted clauses 
absolving their boards of directors from liability for breach of the duty of care. Therefore, the 
de facto legal position is that both legislators and directors are personally immune for 
prosecution for breach of the duty of care.  
The similarity in corporate and constitutional law regarding a de facto waiver of personal 
liability for breach of duty of care does not extend to the issue of duty of loyalty. The 
constitutions of a large number of the most prominent democracies in the world have 
                                                 
147 For a specific discussion into the use of § 102(b)(7), Delaware General Corporation Law see Bishop, Joseph 
W. “Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers.” 
The Yale Law Journal 77, no. 6 (1968): 1078-1103. For a general discussion on the duty of care applicable to 
directors, see Eisenberg, Melvin A. “Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, The.” U. Pitt. L. Rev. 51 
(1989): 945. 
148 Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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provisions that indemnify legislators for acts done in the legislature and in connection with 
law making. The immunity can be so encompassing that, for instance, in the United States 
and in India, courts have ruled that legislators may not be penalized for accepting bribes to 
make a speech and to vote on a bill respectively.149 
In United States v. Johnson,150 a former Congressman was charged with seven counts of 
violating the federal conflict of interest statute, 18 USC 281, and on one count of conspiring 
to defraud the United States in violation of 18 USC 371.  These charges were the result of the 
said former Congressman Johnson making a speech on the House floor in favor of certain 
savings and loan associations in exchange for consideration.  
In the subsequent proceedings, the said congressman was acquitted by both the Court of 
Appeals for the 4th Circuit and later the US Supreme Court. This is because as per Art I, 
Section (6)(1) of the constitution of the United States, he had immunity from being 
questioned about anything said during the proceedings of Congress in any other place.151   
In the Indian case of P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State,152 the government led by the then Prime 
Minister of India Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao was faced with a vote of no-confidence in 
Parliament on July 28, 1993. In the run up to the vote, members of two political groups were 
allegedly bribed by him and his associates to vote in favor of the government. The result of 
the case before the Delhi High Court and subsequently before a constitution bench of the 
Supreme Court of India was that Members of Parliament who had voted in return for bribes 
                                                 
149 The United States and India are given as examples since they are respectively the most influential and the 
largest democracy in the world. As such, they provide valuable anecdotal evidence. Such indemnifying 
provisions are however not unique to these two countries and are replicated in the constitutions of several 
countries. 
150 United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S.  988. 
151 Art. I Section (6)(1): 
“The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, 
and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of 
the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in 
going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be 
questioned in any other Place. (Emphasis added). See generally Sisitsky. “The Bribed Congressman’s Immunity 
From Prosecution.” Yale LJ 75: 335-337.  
152 P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State, (1998) 4 SCC 626. 
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were held to be protected under Article 105(2) of the Constitution of India.153 Amazingly, the 
court held that taking bribes to vote in a particular way and then not voting accordingly (i.e. 
actually voting contentiously and keeping the money anyway) would not be protected 
behavior. In such a case, the legislator would be guilty of taking a bribe and not be protected 
by Article 105(2) since he or she never voted in furtherance of the act.  
Similar positions are found in Article 26 of the constitution of France which establishes the 
‘irresponsibility’ and ‘inviolability’ of legislators for actions done in their capacity as 
legislators. Another case of legislators being immune from breaches of the duty of loyalty can 
be found in Brazil. Its constitution provides immunity to members of the Chamber of 
Deputies as well as members of the Senate for all actions committed while serving as 
legislators whether or not these actions involved their work as legislators.154   
It can thus be concluded that while directors and legislators are typically immune from 
personal liability for breach of duty of care, legislators are sometimes even immune for 
breaches of the duty of loyalty besides having the same immunities as corporate directors.  
It is clear that the exclusion of corporate and constitutional decision-making agents from 
certain types of legal liability normally attached to agents can lead to increases in agency 
costs. However, this risk is rationally taken on in both systems for a number of reasons.   
Since agents cannot please all of the large number of principals, judicial review of every 
decision by disagreeing members of the principal would be impractical.155 By providing 
immunity to the agents especially for breaches of the duty of care, corporate and 
constitutional law ensure that decisions that aggrieve a certain group do not result in such a 
group starting legal proceedings against the agents responsible for such decisions.  
                                                 
153 Ibid. Article 105(2) of the Constitution of India reads as follows: “No member of Parliament shall be liable to 
any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any 
committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of 
either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.” 
154 See Speck, Bruno Wilhelm. “Conflict of Interest: Concepts, Rules And Practices Regarding Legislators in 
Latin America.” The Latin Americanist. 2006, 49, 2, 65-97. Such acts may include homicide and other serious 
crimes. Prosecution can only proceed if it is approved by it is approved by an absolute majority of the relevant 
chamber and even then the legislator can demand to be tried only by the STF. 
155 Arsht, S. Samuel. “Business Judgment Rule Revisited, The.” Hofstra L. Rev. 8 (1979): 93 at 95. 
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By reducing the likelihood of vexatious and vindictive litigation, both corporate and 
constitutional law ensure that the most capable and qualified prospective agents are not 
deterred from working for the organization due to fear of harassment. Lastly, in the case of 
constitutional law, even the duty of loyalty is relaxed to ensure that legislators can vote 
independently without fear of persecution by their political rivals who may be in government 
or may later come to power.156  
Due to these reasons amongst others, directors and legislators are to a large extent immune 
from institutional pressures such as the influence of judicial review and liability rules to 
ensure that they work in the best interests of their principals. In the absence of judicial 
remedy for issues connected with the duty of care, corporate and constitutional laws are good 
subjects for a comparative study of the use of direct democracy to address agency problems. 
This is because in the absence of legal remedies, both systems are heavily reliant on other 
means including direct decision-making by principals to minimize agency costs.  
In corporate law, direct decision-making helps to counteract the increase in agency costs 
caused by the diluted personal liability of the agents. Since a similar situation exists in the 
constitutional system whereby citizens have limited powers to sue legislators to bring their 
actions in line with the preferences of the principals, insights from corporate governance can 
be very helpful in understanding the impact of limited direct democracy on agency costs. 
 
3.3 SUPER AGENTS  
This section demonstrates that the corporate and constitutional systems both provide for a 
process whereby the principals use a second set of agents to help them monitor the behavior 
of the agents to whom decision-making authority is delegated. In the corporate governance 
system, such super agents can be proxy advisory agencies such as ISS and GlassLewis while 
the constitutional law system has super agents such as environmental groups like the Sierra 
Club and Greenpeace, human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, economic advocacy groups such as chambers of commerce, trade unions etc. 
                                                 
156 This is the reason expressly given by the framers of both the US and the Indian Constitution for adopting Art 
I, Section (6)(1) of the constitution of the United States and Article 105(2) of the Constitution of India 
respectively in their constituent assembly debates. 
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This discussion shows that the use of such ‘super agents’157 to monitor elected representatives 
creates similar agency problems in both systems. Additionally, the discussion shows that the 
use of the same entities that act as super-agents in the conduct of direct decision-making by 
principals in both systems also creates similar problems in the use of such measures.  
For the purpose of this discussion, ‘Super-agent’ refers to an agent that acts as an 
intermediary to help principals monitor the behavior of another agent. This subsection has 
two objectives. The first objective is to understand how the use of intermediaries (termed 
‘super agents’) to monitor representatives affects agency problems in corporate and 
constitutional law when decisions are made by the representatives. This step will demonstrate 
(a) that the use of such agents has a substantial impact on agency costs, (b) that corporate and 
constitutional systems extensively use super agents, and (c) that the use of such super agents 
has a similar result on the agency problems in both systems. This will show that corporate 
law can inform the understanding of agency costs in constitutional law even when super 
agents are introduced into the agency theory framework. 
The next objective is to examine how the influence of these bodies also affects the process of 
direct decision-making under the corporate and constitutional systems. This discussion shows 
that the organizations that act as ‘super agents’ in delegated decision making help principals 
to make decisions through direct democracy mechanisms by helping to uncover, consolidate 
and evaluate information under both systems. The organizations that are treated as super 
agents in delegated decision making continue to be considered as super agents in the context 
of direct decision making because the theoretical framework adopted considers direct 
democracy as a monitoring mechanism.  
It is argued that direct democracy can help to deal with some types of situations where the 
costs of using intermediate agents to monitor primary agents are extraordinarily high and it is 
preferable to make decisions directly. Since super agents are used to monitor the primary 
agents, the cost of using the super agents forms a part of monitoring cost and, therefore, adds 
to the agency cost.  
                                                 
157 See Issacharoff, Samuel, and Daniel R. Ortiz. “Governing Through Intermediaries.” Virginia Law Review 
(1999): 1627-1670 for the origins of the concept of the ‘super-agent’ 
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Here, corporate governance can help to identify circumstances where the cost of using super 
agents exceeds the savings in agency cost they provide through their monitoring activities. 
Corporate governance can also help to identify how super agents impact the process of direct 
decision-making by the principals. This is because super agents also have influence on direct 
decision-making since they play the role of information providers for direct democracy 
ballots and that will be considered where relevant. 
This line of enquiry suggests that not only can corporate governance help improve our 
understanding of when to use direct democracy to optimize agency costs; it can also help to 
improve the direct decision-making process itself in terms of the use of intermediaries. 
These questions must be answered in order for the dissertation to produce policy 
recommendation that have relevance to the real world. The use of intermediaries is essential 
to both the corporate and constitutional systems and their importance cannot be overstated. 
By examining the ramifications of super agents on agency costs and direct decision-making, 
this discussion shows that the parallels being established to allow the import of corporate 
governance insights is robust to the existence and operation of intermediaries in both systems. 
  
3.3.1 Super agents: Impact on Delegated Decision-Making 
Agency theory assumes a degree of information asymmetry amongst agents and principals 
that is only exacerbated by the multiplicity and dispersion of shareholders and citizens. This 
information asymmetry in turn “gives managers greater discretionary control over the use to 
which the firm’s resources are put, increasing the residual loss that stakeholders have to 
bear.”158  
This subsection examines corporate and constitutional systems to study the use of secondary 
agents that help “achieve economies of scale in information gathering and analysis, primarily 
                                                 
158 Hill, Charles WL, and Thomas M. Jones. “Stakeholder?Agency Theory.” Journal of Management Studies 29, 
no. 2 (1992): 131-154 at 140. “An information asymmetry exists between managers and stakeholders…This is 
particularly likely when stakeholders are diffused. Diffusion refers to a situation where a stakeholder group 
contains many individuals or entities, no one of which has command over a significant proportion of the group’s 
total resources. In such circumstances, ceteris paribus, no one individual or entity may be able to finance the 
extensive information-gathering and analysis necessary to reduce significantly the information asymmetry 
between managers and stakeholders.” 
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through the employment of specialists”159 to help principals to monitor their decision-making 
agents. The role of super agents in helping principals with the process of direct decision-
making is discussed in the following sub-section. 
Voters in the corporate and constitutional systems do not have the information or the 
capability to effectively monitor and evaluate the performance of the board of directors and 
legislature respectively. This discussion, therefore, moves towards how principals use cues to 
cast votes that advance and protect their interests on such issues effectively even though they 
do not have the relevant information. It is also demonstrated that these cues are provided by a 
second specialized group of agents (the super agents) who collect and analyze this 
information.160 
 As Professor Eisenhardt explains,  
“In agency theory, information is regarded as a commodity: It has a cost, and it can 
be purchased… The implication is that organizations can invest in information 
systems in order to control agent opportunism.”161 
An examination of the corporate and constitutional systems reveals that they both use actors 
that provide cues regarding the behavior and agenda of the agents to help the principals make 
informed decisions. These intermediaries provide cues to voters that allow them to act on the 
basis of information that cannot ordinarily or cheaply be gathered or assimilated by them. 
These cues provided by an organization allow otherwise non-expert and uninformed 
consumers to quickly and cheaply evaluate a product. For example, the presence of the 
THX® or Dolby Surround® logos on audio equipment convey to the casual consumer that 
the products can deliver certain performance without requiring them to understand technical 
specifications. Similarly, a “FairTrade” logo on food products might indicate that the produce 
                                                 
159 Id. at 140-41. 
160 For an authoritative reference on the importance of cues in decision-making by imperfectly informed voters 
see Lupia, Arthur. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? Cambridge 
University Press, 1998. 
161 Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. “Agency theory: An Assessment and Review.” Academy of Management Review 14, 
no. 1 (1989): 57-74 at 64. 
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was ethically sourced without requiring research or specialized knowledge on the part of the 
consumer. 162 
Similarly, it is argued that intermediaries can help principals by signaling certain negative or 
positive things about corporate and constitutional agents. It can, therefore, be said that such 
intermediation helps both the corporate and constitutional systems “to bring down the direct 
agency costs that would ensue if a principal had to assume the immediate task of overseeing 
and evaluating the work of an agent.”163  
In the political space, there exist a number of cues that voters use to understand the nature of 
decisions that they do not fully understand. This can be the endorsement or opposition of 
groups referred to as ‘super agents’ such as the Sierra Club, Green Peace etc., for policy 
decisions concerning environmental issues;164 groups such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch for issues involving humanitarian assistance or military 
interventions;165 labor unions166 and chambers of commerce for economic legislation.  
Since ordinary citizens do not fully understand the pros and cons of prospective legislation, 
they look to see how trusted super agents react to such proposals. This makes the monitoring 
of legislators subject to the information provided by such organizations.  
The use of cues by voters to intelligently vote to further their interest on questions involving 
issues they themselves do not properly understand is also evident in the corporate space. This 
can be seen in the considerable deference given by shareholders to the opposition or 
                                                 
162 Issacharoff, Samuel, and Daniel R. Ortiz. “Governing Through Intermediaries.” Virginia Law Review (1999): 
1627-1670 at 1629. Professor Issacharoff gives the example of Underwriter’s Laboratories but the meaning is 
the same. The presence of either of these marks on a product signals that it has been tested and approved by a 
trusted intermediary. This is a cue regarding the safety and quality of the device that cannot otherwise be 
ascertained by the consumer without extraordinary expense and effort. 
163 Issacharoff, Samuel, and Daniel R. Ortiz. “Governing Through Intermediaries.” Virginia Law Review (1999): 
1627-1670. at 1630. Additionally, “Intermediaries take up some slack and help us to better monitor our 
representative’s actions, evaluate their behavior, and reward or punish them appropriately.’ 
164 Rootes, Christopher, and Robert Brulle. “Environmental Movements.” The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of 
Social and Political Movements (2004). 
165 Bob, Clifford. “Merchants of Morality.” Foreign Policy (2002): 36-45. 
166 Asher, Herbert B., ed. American Labor Unions in the Electoral Arena. Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 
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endorsement of proxy advisory services such as Institutional Shareholder Services 
(commonly known as ISS) and Glass, Lewis & Co.167 
Super agents are ‘second-order agents’ helping to manage the first order agency relationship 
between the voters and representatives. They are, however, still agents themselves. This 
means that their use creates further agency costs. The principals who use their services must 
(a) monitor the super agents, (b) provide bonding costs and (c) bear the residual loss caused 
by a discrepancy between their interests and the activities of the super agents. The use of 
super agents also implies another set of agency costs caused by a ‘double agency problem’. 
Needless to say, super agents should only be used if the cost of the ‘double agency problem’ 
is lesser than the reduction in primary agency costs brought about by the use of 
intermediaries 
The ‘double agency problem’ alluded to here is complicated by the fact that the super agents 
are not relied upon by the entire body of shareholders or the entire citizenry of a country. 
While the legislators and directors are the agents of all the citizens and shareholders 
respectively, super agents only serve subsets of principals. This contributes to the cost of 
using super agents because of the following reasons: 
 Super agents can have enormous influence over the primary agents.168 
 Super agents have no duty of neutrality or impartiality towards all the principals. 
This means that super agents may influence the primary agents to advance the interests of the 
super agent’s principals to the detriment of the other principals represented by the first order 
agents but not represented by the super-agents. This can also lead to situations where groups 
                                                 
167 See Choi, Stephen, Jill Fisch, and Marcel Kahan. “Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors.” 
Southern California Law Review 82 (2008): 08-18; Choi, Stephen J., Jill E. Fisch, and Marcel Kahan. “The 
Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?” Emory Law Journal 59 (2010): 869; Rose, Paul. “On the Role and 
Regulation of Proxy Advisors.” Michigan Law Review First Impressions 109 (2010): 62 and Alexander, Cindy 
R., Mark A. Chen, Duane J. Seppi, and Chester S. Spatt. The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting. No. 
w15143. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009. The opposition or endorsement of proxy advisors are 
the cues used by shareholders to decide how to cast their vote or more commonly, who to give their proxy to. 
168 Since the cues provided by super agents in both systems have a lot of influence over the preferences of the 
principals, super agents like political parties, social issue based organizations etc. on one hand and shareholder 
advocacy groups, proxy advisory services etc. have tremendous influences over governments and boards of 
directors respectively. 
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of principals try to capture super agents to advance their narrow interest to the exclusion of 
the combined interest of the principals as a whole.169  
Professor Issacharoff argues that by using the power of super agents, groups of principals do 
not equitably cancel out or compromise on each other’s preferences and they seek to 
dominate opposing interests via the asymmetrical influence of favorable super agents. Once 
again drawing a parallel between corporate and constitutional law, he observes that while 
corporate governance has numerous features designed to reduce rent seeking170 within the 
organization; such features are in short supply in constitutional law. This, he argues, creates a 
real problem of rent seeking by ‘factions’ which also troubled James Madison, a key drafter 
of the US Constitution and that nations fourth president in the extreme.171 Since this issue 
relates to the relationship between voters and an elected government in the abstract, it can 
inform the understanding of Parliamentary democracies as well.  
Since the super agents are used to monitor the primary agents, the costs imposed by the 
double agency problem are part of the monitoring cost as far as the use of the primary agents 
is concerned. This has to be considered when shareholder and citizens use super agents to 
provide them with cues that allow them to better monitor the decision-making agents and 
thereby reduce residual loss. The use of second order agents by the principals, therefore, has a 
powerful influence over the agency costs of the corporate and constitutional principal-agent 
relationship. It is proposed that the parallel use of such institutions and the existence of the 
double agency problem in both systems not only preserves the utility of the framework used 
for the comparative analysis but also furthers the analogy between the two systems that is 
advanced throughout the dissertation. 
 
                                                 
169 Issacharoff, Samuel, and Daniel R. Ortiz. “Governing Through Intermediaries.” Virginia Law Review (1999): 
1627-1670 at 1631-32. 
170 Rent seeking in this context can be simply characterized as the expenditure of resources by group to increase 
the share of existing wealth allocated by the group rather than through the creation of more wealth. For a 
detailed discussion, see Tullock, Gordon. Rent Seeking. Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1993. 
171 See Id at 1632-33. “In essence, then, both narrow and general-purpose super agents may undo the central 
insight of James Madison's The Federalist No. 10. Factions will no longer cancel each other out. Those that 
employ the more powerful super agents or that can hold together a minimally winning stable group of primary 
agents will pluck the public purse. More dangerously, they may also seek "cultural" rents and try to impose their 
particular vision of the good on everyone else.” 
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3.3.2 Super agents: Impact on Direct Decision-making 
This discussion examines the impact of ‘super agents’ on direct decision-making. It should be 
borne in mind that for the purposes of this dissertation, direct democracy is conceived of as a 
monitoring mechanism rather than a replacement for delegated decision-making. This is 
because agency theory, adopted as the theoretical framework for the dissertation, examines 
the use of agents in decision making rather than decision making by the principals 
themselves. In light of this, the use of the term ‘super-agent’ as a facilitator of direct decision-
making should be understood as tool to help monitor the primary agents and not to help 
replace their use with pure direct democracy.  
Under both corporate and constitutional law, super agents act as the agents of the principals 
and supply coordination and information services when principals make decisions through 
direct democracy provisions. However, they can still properly be termed as super agents as 
their actions assist in direct decision-making that has been characterized as a monitoring 
function. 
It is an interesting parallel to see that the same organizations that monitor the primary agents 
under corporate and constitutional law also provide information and coordination to the 
principals to help them make policy decisions directly when direct democracy measures are 
used. Put simply, some super agents help principals to not only decide whom to vote for in 
the elections, but also what to vote for when principals vote directly on proposals and make 
decisions directly. For example, proxy advisory services like Institutional Shareholder 
Services Inc. (ISS) and Glass, Lewis & Co. provide recommendations for director elections 
and also recommendations for shareholder proposals.172 Similarly, groups like Greenpeace 
may endorse political parties in general elections and also provide cues on how to vote on a 
ballot initiative that has environmental repercussions.173  
                                                 
172 See http://www.issgovernance.com/ and http://www.glasslewis.com/ for a list of their activities. Shareholder 
proposals are proposals made by shareholders that are distributed at the company’s cost to its shareholders. The 
proposal is voted upon at the next General Meeting of the company. There is a complicated set of regulations, 
procedural requirements and qualifications that govern what may be included in such proposals that will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapters.  
173 Ballot initiatives are the constitutional counterparts of shareholder proposals in this dissertation. Ballot 
initiatives are proposals made by citizens, which if certain requirements are met, are voted upon by the country 
to adopt or reject them. They will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters.  
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The impact of proxy advisors on shareholder voting has been studied with in great detail by 
Professors Choi, Fisch and Kahan. They find that while the direct impact of ISS 
recommendations is limited to a 6 to 10 percent change in how votes are cast, proxy advisors 
play a prominent role as information agents and are key players in shareholder decision-
making. Moreover, they admit that the 6-10% impact figure is conservative and other 
researchers have found it to be higher.174  
The same can be said of organizations like civil society groups, religious organizations, 
environmental groups etc. which help citizens select representatives and also provide cues for 
referendums and initiatives by their endorsement or criticism.175 Professor Hobolt points out 
that there are three main ways by which super agents influence direct democracy in the 
context of her research on the impact of cues provided by political parties on the outcome of 
referendums. They are as follows:176 
Firstly, the recommendations or condemnation of super agents will have a direct effect on 
voting. Since voters do not have adequate information to make sound decisions on particular 
issues, they use the cues provided by trusted super agents as a substitute. This would tend to 
result in voters casting their vote in a manner heavily influenced by super agents leading to a 
ballot result similarly influenced by the actions of the super agents.  
Secondly, super agents help to frame the language and form of the alternative positions that 
will finally be voted upon. By influencing the form and substance of the competing proposals 
that will be voted upon, super agents influence the outcome of direct democracy.  
                                                 
174 Choi, Stephen J., Jill E. Fisch, and Marcel Kahan. “The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?” Emory 
Law Journal 59 (2010): 869. 
175 Hobolt, Sara. “How Parties Affect Vote Choice in European Integration Referendums.” Party Politics 12, no. 
5 (2006): 623-647 and Hobolt, Sara Binzer. “Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party 
Endorsements in Referendums on European Integration.” European Journal of Political Research 46, no. 2 
(2007): 151-182. These papers examine in detail how political parties which typically provide cues for 
legislative elections are also responsible for supplying cues to help voters decide how to vote on referendums. 
(In the case of Professor Hobolt’s scholarship, the discussion is focused on referendums on European integration 
in particular). 
176 Hobolt, Sara. “How Parties Affect Vote Choice in European Integration Referendums.” Party Politics 12, no. 
5 (2006): 623-647 at 629. 
92
The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
89 
 
Thirdly, super agents have an influence on the amount of information available to the voters 
about the issue to be decided. By influencing the quantity and nature of information available 
to the public, super agents also have an impact on the certainty of voters. 
By providing information to principals that allows them to make informed decisions through 
direct democracy, super agents impact direct decision-making in both companies and 
constitutional polities. Therefore, their existence similarly conditions not only the agency 
problems but also the direct democratic checks and balances in corporate and constitutional 
law. 
As this influences both systems in a similar manner by reducing collective action problems, 
the analogous use of super agents only supports the contention that corporate governance 
insights can help address agency costs in constitutional law. Furthermore, it has been 
demonstrated that both the corporate and constitutional setups provide for and actually make 
use of super agents capable of providing cues to enable informed direct democracy. 
Unfortunately, the use of super agents in both systems also creates similar increases in 
agency cost because the cost of the double agency problem in both systems becomes part of 
the overall monitoring cost. Due to this similarity, corporate insights can be presented as 
solutions to improve constitutional law.    
The framework drawn up for the comparative analysis is, therefore, also robust to the 
existence and influence of super agents under both delegated and direct decision-making 
under the corporate and constitutional setups. 
 
3.4 NATURE OF ELECTIONS & THE WALL STREET RULE: COMPETITION TO 
BECOME AGENTS 
This section examines the impact of the difference in the nature of elections and the exit 
options available to the principals to exit the principal-agent relationship within the corporate 
and constitutional systems.   
The ‘difference in the nature of elections’ refers to the highly competitive nature of political 
elections with the existence of a viable opposition as compared to the corporate system where 
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most elections are fought unopposed by the nominees of the board of directors.177 While this 
is true, it should be noted that there is a move towards providing shareholder nominees with 
access to the company’s proxy but this cannot be said to make corporate elections nearly as 
competitive as political ones. By allowing shareholders’ nominees access to the company’s 
proxy, such laws seek to allow candidates having certain shareholder support to campaign at 
the company’s expense at par with director nominees. This leads to greater competition in 
director elections.178  
The reference to the difference in the exit options available refers to the ease whereby the 
principals in companies can end their relationship with the company by selling their shares on 
the market, whereas citizens have far greater costs in terms of emigrating to other 
jurisdictions. 
This section shows that there are key differences between the two systems in terms of the 
nature of elections and in the ability of principals to exit the principal-agent relationship. This 
has consequences on the agency costs associated with corporate and constitutional law. While 
accepting this divergence in the agency problems associated with the two systems as an 
important and real difference, it is, however, argued that this disparity does not negate the 
utility of the comparative analysis to understand and improve constitutional law.  
This section argues that the positive impact of highly competitive legislative elections in the 
form of lower agency costs is opposed by an increase in agency cost brought about by the 
high difficulty faced by citizens in exiting their relationship with the county. On the other 
                                                 
177 See Bebchuk, Lucian A. “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise.” Virginia Law Review (2007): 675-732 at 
677. In the period from 1996 to 2005, there were only 118 cases of rival slates being put up for election against 
the management slate. In larger companies with a capitalization of greater than $200 million which this 
dissertation is more concerned with, there were only 24 cases of rival slates contesting with only 8 of them 
being successful. 
NYSE listing rules post the Sarbanes-Oxley Act require that the boards slate of nominees be selected by a 
nomination committee comprising of independent directors. This still means there is one slate of candidates for 
election who typically contest unopposed.  
The term ‘slate of candidates’ refers to a list of candidates proposed to fill all the vacancies on the board of 
directors that are to be filled up in an election. Such a ‘slate’ is proposed by the board of directors and in rare 
circumstances, by a challenger group. 
178 See Eisenberg, Melvin Aron. “Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery.” Harv. L. Rev. 83 (1969): 1489 and 
Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Scott Hirst. “Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate.” Bus. Law. 65 (2009): 
329.  
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hand, relatively less fiercely contested elections for the board of directors would tend to 
increase agency cost were it not for the countervailing effect of the relatively easy exit option 
open to shareholders. As such, the comparative analysis and results of this dissertation are 
robust to what are serious differences in the principal-agent relationship. This is argued 
further in the following subsections. 
3.4.1 Nature of Elections 
A critical difference in the corporate and constitutional polities is the manner in which 
candidature for elections is managed. Under the corporate model, the incumbent Board of 
Directors179 nominates a slate of candidates for election during the Annual General Meeting 
and any challenger must engage in a costly proxy contest in order to challenge the Board’s 
slate. This refers to the requirement for the challenger to solicit, at his own cost, the support 
of a majority of the company’s shareholders. This support is given in the form of a 
permission to vote a certain way with their shares in the General Meeting which is called a 
‘proxy’. 
Additionally, due to the default of plurality voting,180 shareholders do not have the power to 
stop the election of the Board’s candidates in the absence of a proxy contest if even one share 
is cast in favor of those candidates.181 This leads to a situation of remarkably high 
entrenchment for corporate agents, which in turn has the potential to translate into higher 
agency costs. 
The default of plurality voting can, however, be opted out of. After the fiasco that saw 
Michael Eisner, the very unpopular CEO of Disney, Inc., remaining on the board of directors 
after 43% of shareholder votes for his election being withheld, Delaware law was adapted to 
                                                 
179 Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Board of Directors must nominate candidates through a Nominations 
Committee comprised solely of independent directors. 
180 See § 216, Delaware General Corporation Law; § 7.28(a), Revised Model Business Corporation Act. 
Plurality voting can simply be described as a system of elections where the winner is the candidate who gets the 
largest number of votes cast. There is no requirement to get an absolute majority of the votes cast. 
181 See Sjostrom, William, and Young Kim. “Majority Voting for the Election of Directors.” Connecticut Law 
Review 40, no. 2 (2007) and Vaaler, Bryn R. “Majority Board Election: Where Do We Stand?” Corporate 
Board 168 (2008): 16. Note that there is an increasing trend for companies to adopt more onerous majority 
requirements for director elections. These modified plurality requirements are also known as Pfizer 
requirements after the first major corporation to adopt them and have now been adopted by other large 
companies such as Disney, Pfizer, General Electric, Safeway, Office Depot, Circuit City, Automatic Data 
Processing, US Bancorp and Best Buy. 
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address the problem.  This was done by amending § 141 (b), Delaware General Corporation 
Law to allow bylaws to require directors not getting a specified vote to resign.182 Since then, 
starting with Pfizer, Inc., numerous companies have adopted such provisions often called 
‘Pfizer policies’ after their first prominent adopter.183 It is argued that despite this change, 
elections for the board of directors remains less competitive that political elections since the 
board of directors may refuse to accept a resignation tendered in compliance with such a 
bylaw.184 
This is in contrast to the multi-party democracy found at the constitutional level. The 
availability of opposition party candidates competing on a level playing field in political 
democracies creates a situation where there is undeniably lesser entrenchment. Unlike the 
nominees of the board of directors of Delaware corporations who are included on the slate 
circulated at the company’s expense in the company’s proxy, members of the incumbent 
ruling party are not allowed to take advantage of government resources that are not available 
to opposition parties in order to get re-elected.185 To clarify, constitutions aim to either 
prohibit the ruling party from misusing state resources to campaign for legislative elections or 
they provide for equal public financing for the main political parties.186 Either way, framers 
of constitutions make efforts to ensure that the ruling party is not given an undue advantage 
in contesting elections. 
The advantageous position of incumbent directors vis-à-vis challengers means that the 
elections for positions on the board of directors will tend be less competitive than legislative 
elections, which are contested by challengers on a more equal footing with the incumbents.  
Citizens can more easily replace their agents through regular elections than shareholders can 
                                                 
182 A similar provision was introduced into the Revised Model Business Corporation Act in the form of § 10.22 
which also allows corporations to opt out of plurality voting by means of an amendment to their bylaws. 
183 Bainbridge S., “ABA Keeps Plurality Voting as the Default for Electing Directors”, 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/11/aba-keeps-plurality-voting-as-the-
default-for-electing-directors.html (visited on August 19, 2013) 
184 Ibid. 
185 Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael. “Financing Politics: A Global View.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002): 
69-86. This rule is not respected in certain countries but is nevertheless an essential condition for true 
democracy. 
186 Wertheimer, Fred, and Susan Weiss Manes. “Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of 
Our Democracy.” Columbia Law Review 94, no. 4 (1994): 1126-1159. 
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due to the relatively higher entrenchment of directors caused by the less competitive nature of 
corporate elections. This conclusion is well borne out in the real world with liberal 
democratic countries and federal units regularly changing governments while a successful 
challenge to an incumbent board of directors who opposes it is a comparatively rare 
occurrence. 
It suffices to say that the principals under the corporate system find it more difficult to 
replace underperforming agents through periodic elections than principals under the 
constitutional system. This can be said to lead to greater entrenchment under the corporate 
model. Therefore, since entrenchment is an important factor with a bearing on agency cost, it 
can be said that the nature of elections is a factor that has the potential to create 
comparatively higher agency costs in the corporate system.  
 
3.4.2 The Wall Street Rule 
The Wall Street Rule refers to the tendency of shareholders unhappy with the management of 
a company to sell their shares rather than convince or try to force the management to change 
its behavior.187 Shareholders do not have the proper incentives to actively reduce agency 
costs through electoral or direct democratic means due to the free rider problem. This means 
that while they must expend all the resources required to bring about positive change, they 
will only be able to capture a share of the benefits proportional to their shareholding in the 
company. Due to this, shareholders prefer to exit such companies by selling their shares. This 
is particularly true in the case of large public companies with a substantial float and high 
liquidity which makes the transaction cost of selling low.188 
If a sufficiently large number of shareholders get dissatisfied with the management and sell 
their shares within a narrow window of time, the increased supply of the shares in the market 
causes a fall in the stock price. This may lead to the consolidation of shares with enough 
voting rights to displace the management with one shareholder or a few large shareholders. 
This consolidation alleviates the free rider problem because a shareholder group with a big 
                                                 
187 Admati, Anat R., and Paul Pfleiderer. “The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of 
Voice.” Review of Financial Studies 22, no. 7 (2009): 2645-2685. 
188 The ‘float’ of a company refers to the number of shares that are publicly owned and are available for trading. 
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enough shareholding gains a large enough position in the company that their share of the 
benefits outweighs the cost of replacing the management.189 The large shareholder with 
reduced free rider problems then disciplines errant agents and stands to make a substantial 
profit when the share price increases due to the new improved management. 
The key point here is, however, that shareholders can easily sell their shares and end their 
relationship with centralized delegated decision makers whose policies they do not support. 
Citizens on the other hand cannot. 
Theoretically, the absence of an analogue for the Wall Street Rule in the constitutional space 
is not entirely accurate. As per the Tiebout Model190 propounded by Charles Tiebout in 1956, 
there exists a non-political solution to the free-rider problem. According to this model, 
citizens will relocate to areas that maximize their personal utility conceiving municipalities as 
offering competing baskets of government services and taxes.191   
However, unlike the case of the Wall Street Rule whose influence is seen regularly in the 
operation of public companies, the Tiebout Model has limited applications in real life. 
Companies are regularly taken over by hedge funds and private equity groups who change the 
management and policies of the company and reap the benefits by selling their shares once 
the company’s value increases. 
On the other hand, restrictions on immigration between countries and the high cost of 
personal mobility limits the possibility of most citizens to end their relationship with their 
government by moving to another country. Furthermore, history suggests that when the high 
agency cost of having a repressive government become high enough for sizable numbers of 
people to consider leaving the country, the regime puts physical and legal restrictions on their 
exit. This is well demonstrated by the building of the Berlin Wall and the restrictions on 
                                                 
189 See Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” 
The American Economic Review 62, no. 5 (1972): 777-795 at 788. 
190 Tiebout, Charles M. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” The Journal of Political Economy 64, no. 5 
(1956): 416-424. 
191 The view that citizens, like shareholders, can also relocate to maximize their utility has also been discussed in 
Vanberg, Viktor, and Wolfgang Kerber. “Institutional Competition Among Jurisdictions: An Evolutionary 
Approach.” Constitutional Political Economy 5, no. 2 (1994): 193-219 and Sinn, Stefan. “The Taming of 
Leviathan: Competition among Governments.” Constitutional Political Economy 3, no. 2 (1992): 177-196. 
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leaving the country imposed by authoritarian governments like North Korea and the former 
USSR. 
A consideration of these important factors supports the common sense suggestion that it is 
ordinarily easier to sell stock in a big public company than to change one’s residence and 
domicile. Even though mobility costs are limited and vary from case to case, it can be said 
with certainty that the vast majority of people in the world cannot ‘vote with their feet’ and 
thereby discipline government. 
 
3.4.3 Consequences of Divergence 
The previous discussion in subsections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 identified two key issues: 
 Citizens can address agency problems more easily than shareholders through the 
mechanism of regular elections. 
 Shareholders can address agency problems more easily than citizens by exiting the 
principal-agency relationship which leads to consolidation of shareholdings and the 
disciplining of agents via the market for corporate control. 
These findings suggest that the corporate and constitutional systems have different strengths 
and weaknesses in terms of their mechanisms for minimizing agency cost. The constitutional 
system provides for strong monitoring through fiercely competitive regular elections but 
citizens find it very difficult to exit and end the agency relationship due to the high cost of 
mobility and border restrictions.  
On the other hand, corporate governance provides for relatively poor monitoring of agents 
due to the entrenchment caused by relatively less competitive elections but corporate 
governance makes it easier to discipline agents through exit and the market for corporate 
control.  
This shows that both the corporate and the constitutional systems have shortcomings in terms 
of their ability to minimize agency cost. Direct democracy is used when these methods of 
minimizing agency cost prove to be ineffective.  
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The corporate and constitutional systems thus diverge in how they manage agency cost when 
it comes to the competitiveness of elections and the ease of exit. Corporate law primarily uses 
the Wall Street Rule coupled with the market for corporate control while constitutional law 
uses fiercely competitive elections as the principal means of keeping agents honest. Both 
systems, however, ultimately rely on the threat of replacement if agents do not act in the 
interests of the principals to keep agency costs down.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, it suffices to show that both systems have fundamentally 
similar principal-agent relationships, a shared scheme whereby authority is delegated and that 
both use direct democracy in a similar manner to address these problems. This allows the 
agency problems in both systems to be characterized in terms of agency theory whereby 
corporate governance insights can help optimize the relationship between direct democracy 
and agency cost. 
The variations caused by differences in the format of elections and ease of exit shown in this 
section do not negate the basis of the comparison. It will be seen that the following chapters 
do not presuppose a quantitative equality of agency costs in the two systems but rather a 
convergence in the factors that cause and control them.  
It is also proposed that that the use of direct democracy in corporate and constitutional law 
shows that the market for corporate control and fiercely competitive elections have both been 
found insufficient to control agency costs adequately. After all, if this were not the case, the 
principals would not incur the cost of collective action to replace their agent’s decisions with 
their own. Given this and the similarity in the principal-agent relationship and monitoring 
mechanisms used in corporate and constitutional law, the use of direct democracy in 
corporate governance should prove useful to minimize agency cost in constitutional law.  
In light of this, the divergence identified in this section does not bar the comparative analysis 
but rather presents manageable complications that will be addressed as the need arises. 
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4 KEY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGING 
AGENCY COST 
 
This chapter introduces the main principles for reducing agency cost found in corporate 
governance literature that are used in Part II of this dissertation to draw insights for 
constitutional law.  
The following sections of this chapter examine arguments in respect to citizen’s power to 
make decisions directly using the minimization of agency cost as the normative criterion.192 
In respect to the power to veto major decisions taken by representatives, the clear position of 
corporate law provides a clear basis for drawing normative conclusions.193 Accordingly, the 
discussion of this point will be relatively straight forward. 
With respect to the power of principals to initiate policy, the visible success of both the US 
and the UK models of allocating the right to initiate decisions in a company mean that a clear 
answer cannot be found merely by comparing the relative success of the two jurisdictions. 
The influence of innumerable other factors that affect agency cost in both countries makes 
discounting these factors and attributing causality very risky. Therefore, the dissertation will 
look to corporate governance scholarship for theoretical lessons that may be of more help in 
minimizing agency costs in constitutional law. It will be argued that giving principals the 
right to approve and initiate decisions can reduce agency cost considerably when certain 
types of decisions are to be made under particular circumstances. This dissertation explores 
those conditions to arrive at useful conclusions for achieving the same positive results in 
constitutional law.     
The first step towards this is to understand both corporate and constitutional decision-making 
in terms of two discrete processes. This is done by dividing decision-making into two steps, 
                                                 
192 See Chapter 1. The cost of collective action inherent in direct decision-making by citizens is considered a 
part of monitoring cost and therefore also a part of agency cost. Therefore, the normative criterion is expressed 
as minimizing agency cost rather than optimizing agency cost.  
193 The positive discussion preceding this section establishes that company law in most US states, English 
company law and the company law of all major economies clearly allow shareholders to veto the board of 
directors by requiring the approval of the shareholders before decisions of the board on many major corporate 
decisions can have effect. 
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namely decision management and decision control. Once this issue is discussed, the next 
section addresses the types of decisions that need to be made in the corporate and 
constitutional context. This is accomplished by borrowing Professor Bebchuk’s classification 
of corporate decisions into three types. These categories are ‘rules of the game decisions’ and 
‘specific business decisions’ along with its sub-categories. Decision Management and 
Decision Control 
Chapter 2 has outlined how agency problems between citizens and their government can be 
addressed using lessons learnt from corporate governance. This can help us to fine tune the 
use of direct decision-making under constitutional law to optimize agency cost. Professors 
Fama and Jensen provide the key to identifying lessons from corporate governance in this 
regard. They propose that the key to minimizing such agency problems is to utilize “decision 
systems that separate the management (initiation and implementation) and control 
(ratification and monitoring) of important decisions at all levels of the organization.”194  
This principle of managing agency cost is used by both the constitutional and the corporate 
schemes of governance. This approach has led to the establishment of decision hierarchies 
whereby the “decision initiatives of lower level agents are passed on to higher level agents, 
first for ratification and then for monitoring.”195 This formulation forms the basis of a key 
approach to reduce agency costs in corporate governance. 
Professors Fama and Jensen further state that the utility of their prescription in reducing 
agency cost is correlated to the size and complexity of the organization.196 They define 
complex organizations as organizations where firm-specific information relevant to decision-
making is diffused amongst a large number of individuals whilst non-complex organizations 
are those where such information is concentrated amongst just a few people. Since the cost of 
separating decision management from decision control is diffused amongst all the 
                                                 
194 Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and 
Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 327-349 at 331. See Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. “Separation of 
Ownership and Control.” Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 301-325 for a more detailed 
discussion on this issue. 
195 Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and 
Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 327-349 at 332. 
196 Id at 307. 
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participants, the individual cost of adopting this strategy to reduce agency cost is lowest 
amongst large complex organizations.197  
In the case of countries and their federal sub-divisions, the information required for informed 
decision-making is distributed amongst their dispersed and numerous citizens. This makes 
constitutional bodies good examples of complex organizations that would benefit from the 
separation of decision management from decision control. Additionally, the considerable 
population of such bodies means that the costs of separation of decision management and 
decision control can be dispersed over a large number of principals. Since countries and 
states governed by constitutions have more citizens than the average corporation has 
shareholders, this is an additional reason to apply corporate governance solutions to 
constitutional law. 
An examination of corporate and constitutional governance arrangements shows that both 
models have adopted a system whereby decision management can be separated from decision 
control. This is clear due to the following characteristics evident in the two systems:198 
Firstly, the corporate and constitutional systems provide for a rigid and hierarchical 
organizational design of the corporate management and the political executive respectively. 
Second, both systems provide for an elected body of representatives to “ratify and monitor 
the organization's most important decisions and hire, fire, and compensate top-level decision 
managers.” This is visible in the operation of the board of directors and the legislature which 
both perform exactly those functions. Third and last, both systems provide for “incentive 
structures that encourage mutual monitoring among decision agents.” This is done through 
the use of the competition for management and executive positions and promotions as well as 
through market forces and political competition. 
While these provisions are visible in the corporate and constitutional structures, the system of 
checks and balances sometimes fails to perform adequately in certain circumstances. Under 
such conditions, the institutions set up to separate decision management from decision 
control fail to achieve their goal of controlling agency cost. This may be due to a conflict of 
                                                 
197 Klein, Benjamin. “Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control.” 
Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 367-374 at 371-72. 
198 Supra note 215. 
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interest or inadequate incentives. An example of such a situation is the decision to set the 
compensation of directors and legislators where agents may propose and approve their own 
salary, a decision where there is an obvious conflict of interest. In such circumstances, the 
principals may need to assume the ratification function of decision control themselves in 
order to minimize agency cost in light of Professors Fama and Jensen’s recommendations. 
In both the corporate and constitutional setups, decision management pertains to the 
execution of the functions of the organization while decision control refers to the oversight 
and monitoring of the decision management function. This exercise of the ratification 
function by the principals is seen in the use of referendums in constitutional law and the 
approval of fundamental corporate matters by shareholders in corporate law. 
Figure 2 
 
As shown in Figure 2, Decision management includes the power to initiate new policies by 
putting forward new proposals as to how the organization should act. This is the initiation 
function of decision management. The execution function of decision management on the 
other hand refers to the task of executing those policies. 
Of these two components of decision management, the initiation function has relevance to the 
study of direct democracy and is the subject of this chapter dealing with the merits of 
initiatives.199 While proposals are typically tabled by the management/executive and then 
deliberated over by the board of directors or parliament, this function can be temporarily 
                                                 
199 The characterization of decision management and decision control in this discussion is based on the work of 
Boudreaux and Prichard.  See Boudreaux, Donald J., and Adam C. Pritchard. “Rewriting the Constitution: An 
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process.” Fordham L. Rev. 62 (1993): 111 for an in-depth 
discussion of this issue in the context of the process to amend the US constitution. 
Decision-
making
Decision 
Management
Initiation
Execution
Decision 
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Approval
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taken over by the principals. This happens in the case of ballot initiatives and shareholder 
proposals where a segment of the principals who meet certain requirements can put forward a 
proposal that must be then be considered by the principals acting together and voted upon.  
The execution function of decision management refers to actually carrying out the decisions 
made. It is carried out by the management in the case of companies and the executive in the 
case of governments.  For example, the execution function of decision management would 
include actually manufacturing and distributing what the company has decided to 
manufacture. In the context of constitutional law, it would be actually enforcing the laws 
adopted by the country by arresting and prosecuting offenders. As this function cannot be 
carried out directly by the principals in public companies or countries without incurring 
extraordinary costs due to collective action problems, it is beyond the purview of this 
discussion. 
Decision control includes two functions as well. The evaluation function of decision control 
refers to the role of “overseeing the progress of execution and assessing how all other rights 
were exercised.”200 The approval function of decision control is responsible for choosing 
between all available proposals and then giving the authorization to act upon the policy that is 
finally chosen. The role of the principals can be seen in both these functions.  
Ordinarily, the board of directors and parliament perform the function of evaluating the 
performance of the management/executive. In order to enable the board and the legislature to 
effectively evaluate the performance of the executive or the management, corporate and 
constitutional law allocate to them requisite powers to call for and receive information and 
provide for the creation and operation of appropriate committees to facilitate this function. 201  
Citizens and shareholders perform a secondary evaluation function. This evaluation is given 
voice in their behavior during elections for the board of directors and the legislature. In the 
case of companies, shareholder reaction to the performance of the management is also 
                                                 
200 Boudreaux, Donald J., and Adam C. Pritchard. “Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the 
Constitutional Amendment Process.” Fordham L. Rev. 62 (1993): 111. 
201 Eisenberg, Melvin A. “Board of Directors and Internal Control, The.” Cardozo L. Rev. 19 (1997): 237 at 238. 
“The board is not itself unflawed, but as an organ that is compact and cohesive, individualized to the 
corporation, and capable of being made relatively independent of management control, it is well situated to 
monitor management on an ongoing and close basis on the shareholders' behalf.” 
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expressed through the supply and demand for shares. This happens because shareholders sell 
the shares of under-performing companies thereby driving down the price of its shares and 
making it more vulnerable to a takeover. 
The result of the evaluation carried out by the principals is, therefore, seen reflected in 
election results and in the case of companies, also in its share price. This is the basis of the 
representative system at the heart of parliamentary and shareholder democracy. This function 
can even be considered to spill over into the ambit of direct democracy if provisions for recall 
elections are considered. Recall elections (also called a recall referendum or representative 
recall) enable citizens to end the term of an elected representative prematurely by proposing 
and then voting to pass such a resolution. They are specifically excluded from the scope of 
this dissertation as they do not enable citizens to take decisions on policy. It is indeed an 
extension of the election process and only allows replacement of agents  
The other part of decision control is the approval function. This function is ordinarily carried 
out by the board of directors and the legislature which sets the policy of the organization on 
the basis of information and proposals that are supplied by the management/executive. 
Therefore, the management and the executive propose policies and the board of directors and 
legislature respectively approve or reject them. 
In the case of referendums and binding initiatives,202 the principals step in to directly exercise 
the approval function as they can veto proposals from the board of directors or the legislature 
In this case, it is the principals who take over the approval function.  
It is, therefore, clear that initiatives allow the principals to directly participate in the initiation 
function of decision management, while referendums allow them to take over the approval 
function of decision control. Binding initiatives transfer both the initiation and the approval 
function to the principals. However, in the case of non-binding initiatives, the approval power 
is vested in the legislature or the board of directors with only the power to propose being 
passed to the principals.  
                                                 
202 This section introduces the idea of binding and non-binding initiatives. In a direct initiative, a citizen initiated 
proposal becomes law automatically if it receives the required majority of votes when the proposal is voted on. 
A non-binding or precatory initiative merely results in the result of a popular vote placed before the government 
for its consideration which is not bound to adopt the proposal.   
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Professors Fama and Jensen propose that agency cost in corporate law can be minimized by 
using “decision systems that separate the management (initiation and implementation) and 
control (ratification and monitoring) of important decisions at all levels of the 
organization.”203 The transfer of power to initiate and adopt policy to the principals, 
therefore, goes against their recommendation. The issue at the heart of the debate over 
initiatives is that binding initiatives not only transfer the right to initiate policy to the 
principals but also transfer to them the right to approve those proposals. This issue is, 
therefore, central to many of the arguments against binding initiatives and shareholder 
proposals and is discussed at length in the following chapters. 
  
4.1 RULES OF THE GAME DECISIONS & SPECIFIC BUSINESS DECISIONS 
 
Professor Bebchuk has classified corporate decisions as ‘rules of the game’ and ‘specific 
business decisions’. The latter are further categorized as ‘game-ending’ and ‘scaling down’ 
decisions. In order to use the arguments both for and against allowing principals to initiate 
decisions to help to improve constitutional law, it is essential to conceptualize the types of 
decisions in terms of agency theory. In this discussion, I look at the effect these types of 
decisions have on the principal-agent relationship and provide a roadmap to translating 
corporate governance ideas to address the agency problem in constitutional law. 
  
4.1.1 Rules of the Game Decisions 
In terms of agency theory, rules of the game decisions are decisions that concern the 
relationship between principals themselves and their relationship with their agents. They 
define the rights and duties of the principals and agents and form the basis of the agency 
contract of the corporation. In the constitutional scheme, rules of the game decisions are 
decisions that involve amendments to the constitution and to laws that set out the rights of 
individual citizens and the powers of the government. These types of decisions will be 
                                                 
203 Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and 
Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 327-349 at 331. 
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addressed in depth in the discussion regarding the evolution of constitutional and legal 
provisions later in this chapter.204 
 
4.1.2 Specific Business Decisions 
Specific business decisions may involve the actual administration of the daily affairs of the 
corporation. They also include game-ending and scaling down decisions. When specific 
business decisions involving the day-to-day affairs of the company such as the activities that 
generate revenue for the company are examined in terms of agency theory, we see that such 
decisions focus on the relationship between the company and third parties. They do not 
change in any way the nature of the relationship between the principals themselves and 
between the principals and their agents.  
Similarly, in the constitutional system, there are numerous decisions such as the 
determination of recipients of government contracts, the appointment of junior officials etc. 
that can be considered as specific business decisions as they do not affect the relationship 
between the principals themselves and between the principals and their agents. These types of 
decisions are addressed in Chapter six which discusses how imperfect information, 
considerations of consistency and backseat driving and short termism affect initiation of 
policy directly by principals. 
 
4.1.2.1 Game-ending Decisions 
The discussion on game-ending decisions deals with the termination of the principal-agent 
relationship. Unlike corporations which can cease to exist through voluntary winding up, 
mergers etc., political units like countries rarely cease to exist through a voluntary decision 
taken by the government or its citizens. 
However, the principal-agent relationship in constitutional law may be ended by the exit of 
government functionaries, i.e. a change of agents. The appointment and termination of 
government functionaries like legislators and the executive are determined by the outcome of 
rules of the game decisions like election rules, term limits etc. This means that the conflict of 
                                                 
204 See section 5.6.   
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interest involved in ‘game-ending’ decisions in constitutional law are largely covered by the 
discussion on ‘rules of the game’ decisions. Decisions that relate to the end of the 
constitutional entity itself by means of a popular vote such as the Austrian referendum 
backing the ‘Anschluss’ with Germany in 1938 are extremely rare and are not separately 
discussed in this dissertation. 205 
It should be noted that the only decision that principals may be asked to make outside of 
elections that can end the principal-agent relationship is through the recall. That discussion is 
expressly outside the scope of this dissertation and, therefore, excluded from the 
discussion.206 For these reasons, game-ending decisions are given less attention than rules of 
the game decisions and even scaling down decisions.  
 
4.1.2.2  Scaling Down Decisions 
Scaling down decisions involve reducing the scope of the principal-agent relationship. In the 
case of corporate scaling down, this means that the company returns assets to the principals 
meaning that less is left for the agents to manage on their behalf. Such decisions are quite 
contentious since they often create a conflict of interest for the agents as they have an 
incentive to pursue empire building strategies for career progression,207 to justify greater 
compensation, ambition etc. The same is a problem at the constitutional level with 
governments having a tendency to increase in size.208 
                                                 
205 The referendum was held to determine whether Austria should merge with Germany. After it was successful, 
Austria ceased to exist as an independent nation and therefore the decision can be termed ‘game-ending’. The 
Austrian citizen’s principal agent relationship with the erstwhile Austrian government had come to an end. 
206 See the section titled ‘Scope and Limitations of Research’ in the introduction. 
207 See Hope, Ole?Kristian, and Wayne B. Thomas. “Managerial Empire Building and Firm Disclosure.” 
Journal of Accounting Research 46, no. 3 (2008): 591-626. Professors Hope and Thomas‘s research empirically 
verifies that managers who are not monitored by shareholders tend to maximize their own self-interest by 
aggressively growing the firm even if this destroys firm value and is against the interests of their shareholders. 
Their conclusion suggests that the adoption of aggressive disclosure requirements can aid monitoring by 
shareholders. This improved monitoring drives down agency cost. 
208 See Levinson, Daryl J. “Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 
915-972. On this subject, Professor Milton Friedman suggested that a constitutional initiative with the principals 
i.e. citizens proposing and adopting a limit on government spending may be the only way to a libertarian society 
since government agents have the incentives to increase the size of government and government spending. Note 
that Milton Friedman, together with Friedrich Hayek are two of the most renowned intellectual advocates of 
limited government. 
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These decisions are an interesting topic of study in the current context since they deal with a 
situation very similar to constitutional law where there is a clear conflict of interest between 
principals and agents.  
 Both scaling down and game-ending decisions are of particular interest while comparing the 
utility of referendums and initiatives since the right of principals to initiate decisions is 
crucial in these types of decisions. Having a provision for referendums without providing for 
initiatives may not be helpful in scaling down and game-ending decisions. This is because 
agents have no incentives to initiate policy that leads to an unfavorable outcome for them, in 
this case reducing the scope of their authority. 
Simply put, agents seeking to pursue empire building activities will have no incentives to 
initiate proposals that restrict the scope of their powers. Principals, therefore, need other tools 
to express their desire for restricting the scope of the principal-agent relationship. A detailed 
discussion examining scaling down decisions and game-ending decisions in corporate 
governance to identify means to restrict the unchecked growth of government is presented in 
chapter 5.209  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
See Friedman, Milton, and Rose D. Friedman. Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 1990. See also Kyvig, David E. “Refining or Resisting Modern Government-The Balanced Budget 
Amendment to the US Constitution.” Akron L. Rev. 28 (1994): 97 and Stansel, Dean. Taming Leviathan: Are 
Tax and Spending Limits the Answer? Cato Institute, 1994. 
209 See section 5.6. 
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PART II: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY: 
INITIATIVES AND REFERENDUMS  
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5 THE UTILITY OF HAVING INITIATIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 
 
“Without direct democracy, legislatures have a monopoly over what issues are to be decided, 
in what order, and in what form. With the initiative, the monopoly is broken, and ordinary 
people are allowed to make proposals”210 
In this chapter, I begin with a positive inquiry to reveal the legal position regarding the rights 
of principals to veto decisions taken by their agents as well as their power to initiate policy 
under corporate and constitutional law. I show that corporate law is quite clear and 
unambiguous in vesting with shareholders the right to veto major corporate decisions while 
provisions allowing for referendums are nowhere as universal in the constitutional sphere.211 
On the other hand, the power of shareholders to initiate policy is not a settled issue in 
corporate law or in constitutional law. There exists considerable divergence between the 
United States and the United Kingdom’s position regarding the rights of shareholders to 
initiate policy. Moreover, there is an academic debate raging in the United States regarding 
this issue in the context of shareholder proposals and shareholder-amended bylaws. The 
constitutional position on the matter is equally unsettled. Mature democracies may provide 
for ballot initiatives with a wide scope and ambit as seen in the State of California or not 
provide for initiatives at all as is the case with the United Kingdom, India and the United 
States at a federal level. 
Having pointed out the legal status quo, the chapter turns normative and examines how the 
corporate experience212 can help to educate our understanding of how authority to initiate 
                                                 
210 Matsusaka, John G. “The Eclipse of Legislatures: Direct Democracy in the 21st Century.” Public Choice 
124, no. 1-2 (2005): 157-177 at 170. 
211 Referendums are plebiscites that allow citizens to adopt or reject proposals put forward by their agents. An 
example of a referendum is the plebiscite required to adopt constitutional amendments in the State of California. 
Amendments to the constitution proposed by the legislature only become effective if they are approved by a 
majority of citizens voting in the plebiscite. 
212 The corporate conception of direct democracy for shareholders can be understood to be a settled position in 
favor of the right of shareholders to veto major corporate decisions that require shareholder approval and 
unsettled in respect to the issue of shareholders initiating policy with a raging debate on shareholder proposals 
and proxy access. 
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decisions should be divided amongst citizens and their representatives. Of course, the 
normative criterion remains the minimization of agency cost.213  
 
5.1 THE RIGHT TO VETO – SETTLED IN CORPORATE LAW, VARIED IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The corporate law of important jurisdictions like Delaware, New York and the UK is fairly 
consistent with the philosophy of requiring shareholders to approve many types of major 
corporate decisions. This effectively gives the shareholders of a substantial number of the 
world’s  largest corporations a veto right over these types of decisions. Some examples of 
such major corporate decisions are: 
 Changes to the charter,214  
 Mergers and consolidation,215  
 The sale of all or substantially all the company’s assets not in the ordinary course of 
business,216 
 Dissolution,217 
 A non-binding vote is even required on executive pay since the introduction of the 
Dodd Frank Act.218 
                                                 
213 As understood in this discussion, agency cost includes the cost of collective action associated with direct 
decision-making as a part of monitoring cost. 
214 § 242(b)(2), Delaware General Corporation Law; § 803(a), New York Business Corporation Law. In the 
United Kingdom, the memorandum of association (formerly equivalent to the charter) and the articles of 
association (formerly equivalent to the byelaws) have been consolidated into the articles of association. These 
can be amended by the shareholders by means of a special resolution giving shareholders not only veto rights 
but initiation rights as well. For the purpose of this discussion, it suffices to say that the articles cannot be 
amended without their approval. 
215 § 251(c), Delaware General Corporation Law; § 903(a), New York Business Corporation Law. Under the 
(United Kingdom) Companies Act, 2006, mergers and consolidation typically takes place under the aegis of a 
court order obtained as per part 26 of the act (and also part 27 if the company is a public company). This court 
order however requires a supermajority of 75% thereby giving shareholders a veto. As in the case of changes to 
the articles of association, shareholders also have initiation rights in this respect as members, creditors and if 
applicable, a liquidator or administrator can make an application under part 26 of the act. This takes nothing 
away from the veto rights of shareholders as a supermajority vote is required just the same.  
216 § 271(a), Delaware General Corporation Law; § 909(a), New York Business Corporation Law 
217 § 275, Delaware General Corporation Law; § 1001(a) & (b), New York Business Corporation Law 
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Similarly, the requirement of shareholder approval for such types of fundamental corporate 
decisions exists in most major economies.219 While these decisions are initiated by the board 
of directors, the subsequent approval of shareholders is mandatory. It should be noted that not 
only is the law on this issue largely settled, there is also little academic debate advocating a 
change from such a position. For example, even advocates of director primacy like Professor 
Bainbridge do not propose that the board of directors should be empowered to amend the 
charter, undertake mergers or sell off all the company’s assets without approval from 
shareholders.220 
On the other hand, the right of citizens to approve major decisions such as changes to key 
laws and even amendments to the constitution is not a settled matter. Amongst mature 
democracies, there are some that require citizen approval for major decisions initiated and 
                                                                                                                                                        
218 §951 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010. This act was passed in 
response to the global financial recession of the late 2000’s. Perceiving that the financial problems of the 
country were caused by insufficient regulation of financial entities, the US government adopted extensive 
regulations to control the same. Due to the outcry against perceived excessive executive compensation, 
regulations were introduced into the Dodd Frank Act that required shareholders to approve the compensation of 
directors and top managers in a non-binding vote. 
In the United Kingdom, s. 439 of the Companies Act, 2006 requires non-binding approval of shareholders for 
the compensation of directors. Furthermore, provisions under Chapter 4 of the Companies Act, 2006 (ss. 188 to 
226) provide a number of conditions whereby shareholder approval is required for directors to benefit from their 
position at the company. 
219 The rights of shareholders to participate in and approve fundamental corporate decisions are enshrined in 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.  
See Development (OECD). Steering Group on Corporate Governance. OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2004. OECD Publishing, 2004 at 32. “Shareholders’ rights to influence the corporation center on 
certain fundamental issues, such as the election of board members, or other means of influencing the 
composition of the board, amendments to the company's organic documents, approval of extraordinary 
transactions, and other basic issues as specified in company law and internal company statutes. This Section can 
be seen as a statement of the most basic rights of shareholders, which are recognized by law in virtually all 
OECD countries.” 
See also page 18 which states, “Shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently 
informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: 1) amendments to the statutes, or 
articles of incorporation or similar governing documents of the company; 2) the authorization of additional 
shares; and 3) extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially all assets, that in effect 
result in the sale of the company.” 
220 See Bainbridge, Stephen. “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment.” Harvard Law Review 119 
(2006): 1735-2644. Professor Bainbridge agrees that the approval of shareholders should be required for 
fundamental decisions like amendments to the charter of the company. 
114
The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
111 
 
taken by the legislature221 while many successful democracies give their citizens no such 
right of veto.222  
The discussion on the right of citizens’ to veto certain types of major decisions is, therefore, 
simplified by a settled view on the issue in corporate law. This will be reflected in the 
treatment of the issue in the normative discussion in the following sections. 
 
5.2 THE RIGHT TO INITIATE – UNSETTLED IN CORPORATE AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The positions taken by both corporate and constitutional law on giving principals the right to 
initiate policy differs considerably across jurisdictions. 
In the constitutional system, citizens in many countries are allowed to set the agenda in 
certain circumstances. The process to do so is called an initiative. Citizens can put forward a 
proposal in the form of a petition. If the petition is supported by a predetermined proportion 
of the voters (demonstrated through signatures on the petition), it is then voted upon either in 
a special poll or included on the ballot in the next election.223  
On the other hand, there are many mature democracies that have no such provisions for 
citizens to initiate proposals.224 They may be purely representative democracies225 or 
                                                 
221 All American states barring the state of Delaware require amendments to their constitution to be approved by 
their citizens in a referendum. While no American state requires statutory changes to be approved via 
referendum, 23 states have provisions in their constitutions that permit the legislature to place proposed 
statutory amendments or new statues on the ballot for citizen approval. Some examples of countries that require 
the approval of citizens (by means of referendums) for major decisions such as constitutional amendments are 
Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Iceland and Ireland amongst many others  
222 For example, see Mexico, United States, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Turkey etc. These countries do not 
allow for referendums on any issue at the federal level. 
223 At the national level, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Serbia and Uruguay are examples of countries that allow 
initiatives giving citizens the power to bypass their representatives and directly initiate policy changes. 
224 Many democracies like the United States, Canada, Denmark, Germany, India, Iceland and Norway have no 
provisions for initiatives at the national level.  
225 For example, the US and the Indian constitutions do not provide for any form of direct democracy at all. This 
includes both referendums as well as initiatives. 
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democracies that provide for referendums but not initiatives.226 In the latter case, citizens 
have the right to approve or veto certain proposals from the government (i.e. the right to 
referendum) but do not have the right to propose policy themselves which they can 
subsequently vote to approve or reject (i.e. the right to pass initiatives) 
When we examine shareholders’ rights to (a) initiate policy themselves and (b) approve or 
veto policy initiated by their agents, a similar difference in legal treatment position and 
ongoing academic debate is revealed. In particular, the US and the UK corporate laws differ 
considerably in this regard. This divergence in legal treatment is in sharp contrast to the 
clarity and consensus in corporate law regarding the empowering of shareholders to veto 
fundamental corporate decisions. Accordingly, both the different legal positions must be 
examined in greater detail. 
 
5.2.1 The US Position 
In the United States, the power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation is 
traditionally vested with the board of directors.227 This includes the power to initiate “rules of 
the game decisions” as well as “specific business decisions” that include “game-ending 
decisions”228 and “scaling down decisions”.229 
Rules of the game decisions are classified by Professor Bebchuk as those decisions that 
concern the ‘choice of the rules by which corporate actors play’.230 They are codified in the 
charter of the company and in the corporate laws of the state of the company’s incorporation. 
                                                 
226 For example, the US state of New Mexico’s constitution allows for referendums but has no provisions 
regarding initiatives. 
227 Delaware General Corporation Law, §141(a); Model Business Corporations Act, §8.01(b) and New York 
Business Corporation Law §701. 
228 Game-ending decisions include mergers, consolidations, dissolutions and sale of all the company’s assets. 
These types of decisions end the principal-agent relationship and the company no longer remains a going 
concern. 
229 Scaling down decisions are decisions involving the return of corporate assets to shareholders in the form of 
cash or stock. They are known as scaling down decisions since they scale down the size of the company and 
therefore scale down the scope of the principal agent relationship. See Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for 
Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 at 844. 
230 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-
914. 
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The board of directors has the exclusive right to initiate changes to both these sources of 
rules. This is because firstly, the corporate law of Delaware only allows the board of directors 
to initiate an amendment to the charter.231 Second, only the board of directors can initiate the 
decision to reincorporate in another state by proposing a merger with a shell company in that 
state thereby changing the laws applicable to the company.232   
The shareholder’s power to initiate rules of the game decisions is restricted to proposing 
bylaw amendments – a power they share with the board of directors.233 Shareholders are not 
empowered to initiate amendments to the charter.234 The charter is the incorporating 
document of the company and has precedence over the provisions of the bylaws. In many 
ways, the charter is analogous to the constitution while bylaws are analogous to ordinary 
legislation. This means that shareholders have no power to initiate policy on fundamental 
decisions that affect the principal-agent relationship. Furthermore, bylaws are subordinate to 
the provisions of the charter and they cannot be used to opt out of default provisions of the 
DGCL and the MBCA.235 
When it comes to specific business decisions, shareholders do not fare any better due to the 
wide scope of §141(a), Delaware General Corporation Law and identical provisions in other 
statutes.236 The power to initiate game-ending decisions involving mergers, consolidations, 
dissolutions and sale of all the company’s assets rests exclusively with the board of directors. 
The only rights shareholders have regarding rules of the game decisions and game-ending 
                                                 
231 Delaware General Corporation Law, §242(b); Model Business Corporations Act, §10.03 and New York 
Business Corporation Law §803(a). 
232 Supra note 250 at 844. 
233 Delaware General Corporation Law, §109; Model Business Corporations Act, §10.20 and New York 
Business Corporation Law §601. 
234 See Delaware General Corporation Law, §242(b); Model Business Corporations Act, §10.03 and New York 
Business Corporation Law §803(a). Only the board of directors is given the right to initiate charter amendments. 
235 There are certain exceptions to this particularly relating to the election of directors whereby shareholders may 
initiate and vote upon the decision to opt out of plurality voting. Modifications to the Delaware General 
Corporation Law in 2006 retained the plurality vote default rule but mandated that the board of directors cannot 
modify or rescind a shareholder adopted bylaw which requires a greater of votes for director elections. This 
move was reflected in amendments to the corporate laws of California, Virginia and Washington which had a 
similar effect. The debate regarding proxy access also relates to the ability of shareholders to initiate changes to 
the process whereby directors are elected by changing the default rule. The position of law on this issue is under 
considerable flux and there is no consensus on the optimal situation. See Supra note 250 at 845. 
236 See Model Business Corporations Act, §8.01(b) and New York Business Corporation Law §701. 
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decisions is the power of veto since these decisions have to be approved by shareholders to 
come into effect. 
In the case of scaling down decisions, all authority is vested with the board of directors. 
These decisions involve ordering a cash or stock distribution to shareholders. This reduces 
the size of the company and removes excess cash or assets.237 Shareholders do not have the 
authority to initiate such decisions nor do they even have the power to veto decisions 
involving the distribution of cash or stock to shareholders. 
Under the provisions of the DGCL, shareholders may make non-binding proposals on a wider 
range of issues. Such proposals made under Rule 14(a)(8) passed by the SEC must also be 
included on the proxy of the company. This allows shareholders making the proposal to use 
company machinery to disseminate their proposal to all the shareholders. These proposals are 
then voted on in the next annual meeting of the company.238 
Resolutions passed under Rule 14(a)(8) are typically precatory. This means that the board of 
directors has the discretion to adopt or reject the proposal even after it receives a majority of 
the votes cast by shareholders in the general meeting. The impact of such precatory 
shareholder proposals is hotly debated and will be discussed in detail in section 5.8239   
 
                                                 
237 Supra note 250 at 845. 
238 As explained in Section 6.6, Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders to put forward proposals to be included on the 
company’s proxy. This allows shareholders to circulate their proposal at the company’s expense and the 
proposals are then put to a shareholder vote at the next Annual General Meeting of the company. 
239 See Brownstein, Andrew R., and Igor Kirman. “Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? 
Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions.” The Business Lawyer (2004): 23-77. Professors Brownstein and 
Kirman argue that precatory resolutions are often responsible for influencing company policy even though it is 
not formally adopted as the board of directors since back room negotiations are responsible for addressing many 
of the issues that form the basis of the resolution. They also argue that just because a proposal was not adopted 
does not mean that it was not duly considered by the board and that the Business Roundtable has noted that 
“boards take majority-vote shareholder proposals very seriously, in keeping with their fiduciary duties to the 
company and all of its shareholders”. 
The debate over the advantages of binding v. precatory proposals will be reserved for chapter eight which deals 
with exactly that issue. 
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5.2.2 The UK Position 
The American approach is not the only way of allocating rights to initiate decisions between 
the shareholders and the board of directors. Corporate law in the UK gives greater power to 
initiate decisions to shareholders. Regardless of this, the UK has also had notable success in 
attracting international investment in a corporate environment known for large numbers of 
dispersed shareholders. Moreover, the UK is also a leader in attracting talented managers to 
act as agents in these companies. This suggests that diluted initiation rights for shareholders 
are not a precondition for an efficient corporate system that can attract both investors and 
managers effectively.240 
Under the Companies Act of 2006, shareholders have the power to initiate and pass 
amendments to the articles of association.241 They can do this by means of a special 
resolution242 passed by a supermajority of 75% of the votes cast at a shareholder meeting.243 
This gives the shareholders of UK corporations the right to initiate rules of the game 
decisions.244 While the high supermajority requirement makes initiation and adoption by 
shareholders difficult, there are further protections for shareholders in the law as well. For 
example, if shareholders can demonstrate that they control ten percent or more votes, they 
can compel the board of directors to call a general meeting245 where the shareholders can vote 
on the special resolution.246 In fact, if the board of directors fails to call such a meeting, the 
                                                 
240 For a detailed study of the differences in English and American corporate law and governance, see Gower, L. 
C. B. “Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law.” Harvard Law Review 69, no. 8 
(1956): 1369-1402. 
241 The Companies Act, 2006 merged the memorandum of association and the articles of association (similar to 
the charter and the byelaws of US companies respectively) to create a unified articles of association that serves 
the role of both charter and byelaws. 
242 s. 21(1), Companies Act, 2006. 
243 See s. 283, Companies Act, 2006. Shareholders wishing to table a special resolution at the annual general 
meeting of the company must give prior notice to the company and follow the provisions of Part 13 of the 
statute.     
244 The commentary in Davies, Paul L. Gower & Davies. The Principles of Modern Company Law. Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2008 is the basis of this summary of shareholders’ right to initiate decisions under English company 
law. 
245 s. 303(1) read with s. 303(3), Companies Act, 2006 and s. 304, Companies Act, 2006. 
246 s. 303(5), Companies Act, 2006. 
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shareholders themselves can call a general meeting at the company’s expense247 in order to 
pass the proposal as long as they have the requisite number of shares.  
In the case of specific business decisions, UK law by default provides that the company 
should be managed by the board of directors. However, the Companies (Model Articles) 
Regulations adopted by most public companies provide that “[T]he shareholders may, by 
special resolution, direct the directors to take, or refrain from taking, specified action”.248 
Furthermore, the shareholders of UK companies can also initiate a proposal to replace 
members of the board of directors in an ordinary resolution249 as long as special notice is 
given to the concerned directors.250  
These rights clearly demonstrate that English company law grants far greater power to initiate 
decision-making to shareholders as compared to the company law of Delaware and most 
other American states.  
It is clear, however, that the managers of both US and UK companies have been able to 
convince their investors that their governance mechanisms and legal obligations will ensure 
that investments will not be expropriated and that returns will generated and distributed. 
Similarly, both jurisdictions have also had success in attracting excellent managers who are 
convinced that they will have sufficient discretion to operate effectively. 
Shareholders around the world have not found the relatively diminished right to initiate 
policy in US companies to be a signal of substantially higher agency cost. US companies 
continue to be competitive with respect to UK companies in attracting international 
investment. In light of this, a detailed normative analysis will be carried out in the following 
sections to help determine the extent of agenda control citizens must have in order to 
minimize agency costs.   
 
                                                 
247 s. 305, Companies Act, 2006. 
248 Regulation 4(1), Companies (Model Articles) Regulations, 2008. Note: Regulation 4(2), Companies (Model 
Articles) Regulations, 2008 prohibits any retrospective application of Regulation 4(1). 
249 s. 168(1), Companies Act, 2006. 
250 s. 312, Companies Act, 2006. 
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5.3 WHEN ARE REFERENDUMS NOT ENOUGH? 
This sub-section presents three conditions where the right to veto does not help the principals 
to minimize agency cost. In each case, the only solution is giving principals the right to 
initiate policy. A discussion into these situations which illustrate the advantages of separating 
decision management from decision control is used to show why initiatives may indeed be 
required in addition to referendums. 
Shareholders almost universally have the right to approve certain fundamental decisions of 
the company such as amendments to the charter, mergers, sale of all assets etc.251 Citizens, on 
the other hand, either do not have these rights (in pure representative democracies), or have 
veto rights over certain specified classes of decisions in jurisdictions that provide for 
mandatory referendums. Citizens may also have the opportunity to vote on other issues if the 
government chooses to ask them for their approval as in the case of legislative referendums. 
Their decision may or may not be binding.252 
By requiring the principal’s approval to act, referendums serve as a loss mitigation device by 
preventing decisions that the principals oppose enough to block by voting against them. 
However, agency costs can escalate unchecked in a number of circumstances if principals are 
denied the right to initiate decisions.  
With respect to corporate governance, Professor Bebchuk identifies three circumstances in 
which shareholders will not be able to use the right to veto to compel the board of directors to 
make the decision most favored by shareholders.253 The following discussion summarizes 
these conditions and shows that citizens would similarly be powerless to compel their 
government to make the decision the citizens favor most if the constitution only provides for 
referendums and does not provide for initiatives. 
 
                                                 
251 See section 5.1. 
 
252 Mandatory referendums are referendums required by law or by the constitution in order to make certain kinds 
of decisions or if certain conditions are satisfied. Legislative referendums are referendums held at the discretion 
of the legislature. Such a referendum is not a precondition for making the decision that is the subject of the 
referendum. Since the referendum is held at the option of the legislature, in some cases it may choose to ignore 
its outcome. 
253 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 862-65 
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5.3.1 Agents Prefer the Status Quo 
The power to veto unfavorable decisions is a power that operates very differently from the 
power to initiate decisions. Unlike the power to initiate change, the veto power only gives the 
principals the power to maintain the status quo. In the corporate context, this can help 
shareholders reject unfavorable takeover bids, but does nothing to help remove anti-takeover 
provisions that the agents may find to be in their own self-interest and thus never put to the 
shareholder vote. 
In the constitutional scenario, this means that veto rights do not help citizens to change laws 
when it is in the interest of the legislature to maintain the status quo. Initiatives are, therefore, 
required whenever citizens want to use direct democracy to enact a change that is not in the 
interests of their agents to provide. Examples of such decisions may be measures that reduce 
the scope for corruption, make elections more competitive, create stricter sanctions for abuse 
of power etc.254   
 
5.3.2 Agents Prefer the Worse of Two Beneficial Options 
In a situation where there is more than one option that increases value for the principals, the 
right to veto does not help principals to ensure that the best option is chosen. If the agents 
choose the option that is in their best interest, the principals would rationally approve the 
measure as long as it is preferable to the status quo, even if better options exist. 
Bargaining theory255 suggests that a party in a position to make ‘take it or leave it’ offers to 
the other will have a substantial advantage over the other. The former will, therefore, be able 
to capture virtually all the benefit if the other party “does not have reputational or other 
mechanisms to commit itself to being tough”256 In the constitutional system, the principals 
are uncoordinated and dispersed citizens who are badly situated to take a tough position and 
                                                 
254 Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status 
Quo.” Public Choice 33, no. 4 (1978): 27-43. 
255 See Peters, Michael. “Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency.” Journal of Economic Theory 
111, no. 1 (2003): 88-109 and Forsythe, Robert, Joel L. Horowitz, Nathan E. Savin, and Martin Sefton. 
“Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments.” Games and Economic Behavior 6, no. 3 (1994): 347-369. 
256 Supra note 250 at 863.  
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to make credible commitments. This means that citizens will rarely veto the self-serving 
plans of the government in order to force it to adopt more citizen friendly policies. 
In such a situation, the initiative allows the citizens to propose the option that maximizes their 
value and to adopt the proposal if they can muster the votes required. Adopting the option 
that maximizes value for the citizens using an initiative will lead to lower residual loss and a 
modest increase in monitoring cost.  
 
5.3.3 Agents Bundle the Good with the Bad 
By virtue of having exclusive rights to set the agenda for decision-making, agents in 
companies and countries have the ability to force principals to approve measures that are 
against their interest. This can be done by bundling a proposal that decreases value for 
principals with another proposal that increases value a little more than the decrease caused by 
the original proposal.  
This power to bundle proposals sharply highlights the importance of allowing agents to 
initiate proposals on their own. It illustrates that the vesting of initiation rights exclusively 
with agents has the potential to dilute the utility of referendums as well.257 This is because 
principals would rationally be forced to approve proposals from their agents that benefit the 
principals in one way but also hurt their interests in another as long as the net effect is 
positive. This means that considering a system that provides for referendums as a 
compromise to allowing citizens the right to initiate proposals has the potential for abuse by 
opportunistic agents. 
 
5.3.4 Logrolling and Bundling by Principals 
The legislature typically has the power to bundle various proposals on unrelated subjects into 
an omnibus bill that is then voted on as a whole and is adopted or rejected as if it were a 
single bill.258 This political bargaining and compromise, also called logrolling, allows 
                                                 
257 Lupia, Arthur. “Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information.” The American Political 
Science Review (1992): 390-403 at 390-91. 
258 There are a number of exceptions to this such as the State of Louisiana whose constitution imposes the Single 
Subject Rule on legislative as well. See art. 3, § 15(A) of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana which reads, 
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legislators to achieve the outcomes most important to them in exchange for compromising on 
issues that they find less important.259 For example, a senator from Virginia may support a 
bill intended to subsidize the producers of wine which is an important source of revenue for 
California but not important to Virginia. In exchange for this support, a California senator 
might promise the Virginia senator his support for a bill which subsidizes tobacco farmers, a 
group central to the economy of Virginia but not California. Needless to say, neither party 
would agree to logrolling if they perceive it to be to their detriment. 
The ability to bundle various proposals to be put to the vote as a single proposal is, however, 
often denied to citizens when they frame proposals for ballot initiatives.260 This difference in 
treatment in the ability to bundle multiple proposals into one may be caused by the fact that 
the legislature is capable of compromise and negotiation on bills. On the other hand, due to 
their sheer numbers and dispersion, citizens are not capable of such compromise and 
negotiation.  
When the board of directors and the legislature are compared, it becomes clear that both have 
relatively manageable numbers and the aid of a multiplicity of institutions and procedures 
such as a plethora of committees, agendas, advisors etc. These institutions enable reasoned 
discussion that is not possible between all the shareholders and citizens due to the 
unmanageable number of individuals and the absence of such institutions to help them to 
coordinate. An attempt by principals to try the sort of compromise and negotiation required 
for drafting omnibus proposals would, therefore, suffer from transaction costs orders of 
magnitude higher than that incurred by their agents.261 
While logrolling has numerous benefits, it leads to opacity in the voting records of 
representatives that leads to a dilution in the monitoring abilities of voters. The reduced 
                                                                                                                                                        
“Every bill, except the general appropriation bill and bills for the enactment, rearrangement, codification, or 
revision of a system of laws, shall be confined to one object.” 
259 See Buchanan, James MacGill, and Gordon Tullock. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy. Vol. 100. University of Michigan Press, 1965 for an authoritative treatise on the 
positive impact of logrolling. 
260  Gilbert, Michael. “Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process.” University of Pittsburgh Law Review 
61 (2006): 803 at 812. “By 1959, some version of the rule had been adopted in forty-three states.” 
261 Cooter, Robert D., and Michael Gilbert. “A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule.” A 
Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule 110 (2010): 687 at 697-8, 689. 
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ability to monitor risks an escalation of agency costs and also increases the likelihood capture 
by special interests. In both corporations and political democracies, direct democracy 
presents an alternative for voters to correct the activities of representatives when faced with 
the inability to hold individual agents responsible. It allows principals to “empower 
democratic majorities, weaken special interests, and enhance political transparency.”262 
Although direct democracy may serve as a partial solution to some of the negative 
consequences of logrolling and bundling by representatives, voters themselves are less 
effective in compromising and bargaining due to prohibitively high transaction costs.263 This 
may lead to an inability to accommodate the interests of outlying groups such as ethnic and 
racial minorities while framing proposals for ballot initiatives.  
This is a serious problem since bundling can be misused by groups of principals while 
framing the initiative proposal just as agents can misuse it. As explained earlier, they can do 
through actions such as selecting the worse of two options or bundling a regressive proposal 
with an important and beneficial one.  
The problem of bundling by principals has been addressed by the SEC which prohibited 
shareholders from bundling several proposals into a single shareholder proposal as per Rule 
14a-8(c).264 In the following chapters, these corporate insights are used to examine provisions 
such as the ‘single subject rule’ that already exists in certain constitutions and to argue that 
principals, unlike agents, should not be permitted to bundle proposals.265  
                                                 
262 See Infra note 283 at 699 and Buchanan, James MacGill, and Gordon Tullock. The Calculus of Consent: 
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Vol. 100. University of Michigan Press, 1965. 
263 Cooter, Robert D., and Michael Gilbert. “A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule.” A 
Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule 110 (2010): 687 at 700. 
264 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c). As explained in Section 3.4.1, Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders to put forward 
proposals to be included on the company’s proxy. This allows shareholders to circulate their proposal at the 
company’s expense and the proposals are then put to a shareholder vote at the next Annual General Meeting of 
the company. Rule 14a-8(c) is a limitation on this right which stipulates that several proposals may not be 
bundled into a single proposal for the purposes of Rule 14a-8. 
265 See for example Art. II, Sec. 8 (d) of the Constitution of the State of California, Art. XXI, Sec.1 & Art. IV, 
Pt. 2, Sec. 13 of the Constitution of the State of Arizona, Art. XI Sec. 3 of the Constitution of the State of 
Florida and similar provisions in Colorado, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada , Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Utah, Washington and Wyoming.   
125
The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
122 
 
To resist the introduction of initiatives to the constitutional system due to the danger of 
bundling of proposals would be to throw out the baby with the bathwater. If clear provisions 
prohibiting the bundling of proposals are introduced, there is no reason why such proposals 
would not be rejected or separated and meritorious single subject proposals accepted.  
 
5.4 SEPARATING SPECIFIC DECISIONS FROM ELECTIONS 
Chapter 3 discussed in detail the different impact elections have on agency problems in the 
corporate and constitutional systems. To summarize, the relatively lower competition in 
director elections has the potential to increase entrenchment thereby increasing agency cost. 
On the other hand, this effect is expected to be at least partially neutralized by the 
comparatively greater monitoring influence of the Wall Street Rule and the market for 
corporate control in the corporate system. This can be expected to offset, to an extent, the 
relative increase in agency cost.266 
This section examines whether it is efficient to replace the agent if all that the principals’ 
want is a change of policy on a specific issue. The standard type of bundling in agency theory 
scholarship refers to a situation where the agents bundle a value increasing and a value 
decreasing proposal which may make it rational for principals to approve such a plan as they 
are unable to separate the two.267 Professor Bebchuk identifies the need to replace agents to 
change policy as a second type of bundling problem in the corporate model. It is this second 
type of bundling problem that is addressed here. 
If shareholders are not empowered to initiate decisions and the directors do not respect their 
demands, a situation is created where the only way to change policy even on a minor point is 
to replace the board of directors through an election. This means that a particular decision 
becomes bundled with the need to have fresh elections. This leads to a situation where 
                                                 
266 See sections 3.1 and 3.4. 
267 See Section 5.3. See also Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard 
Law Review (2005): 833-914 at 864-65. This issue is discussed in detail subsequently in this chapter. 
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shareholders may end up shying away from seeking value enhancing changes due to the cost 
of electing new directors.268 
This second type of bundling problem holds equally true in the constitutional system. The 
problem remains that in a pure representative democracy, citizens will only adopt a choice 
opposed by the legislature if the benefits it provides are greater than the cost of replacing the 
legislature. Furthermore, the uncertainty that accompanies political change adds to the cost of 
replacing the legislature for the same reasons that make shareholders wary of replacing the 
board of directors.269 
The need to replace the legislature to effect a change in policy translates to an increase in 
residual loss and also an increase in monitoring cost. This is because principals will be 
discouraged from bringing policy into line with their preferences if the cost of changing the 
representatives is prohibitively high. Since elections and the uncertainty behind their 
outcomes are costly, citizens will accept value-decreasing policies rather than bear the cost of 
replacing the legislature. This compromise can lead to a divergence in the preferences of the 
principals and the actions of their agents. This divergence increases residual loss and, 
therefore, agency cost. 
The need to replace the agents to change their policy also increases monitoring cost since the 
cost of changing agents through elections and the associated uncertainty is extraordinarily 
high. If we add the uncertainty of the actions of the new legislature, even a possible increase 
in residual loss can be avoided by making use of the initiative process.  
An initiative is assumed to be cheaper and to require less information and effort than an 
election since voters only have to inform themselves regarding the subject matter of the 
initiative (and some key alternatives). This is in contrast to all issues related to social, 
political and economic policy that a change of government would entail. Furthermore, unlike 
general elections, initiatives do not require voters to expend resources to evaluate the 
performance of individual legislators and opposition candidates for every seat in the 
legislature. 
                                                 
268 See Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 
833-914 at 857. 
269 Bebchuk, Lucian, and Oliver Hart. Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control. No. 
w8633. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001. 
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By unbundling elections from the initiation of proposals, citizens can bring policy more into 
alignment with their preferences by expending lesser resources. This can be accomplished by 
pushing through a ballot initiative rather than expending far more resources in order to 
replace the legislature via election. ‘Unbundling’ elections from individual policies by 
allowing citizens the right to propose and adopt certain proposals can, therefore, lead to a 
reduction of both residual loss and monitoring cost. 
 
5.4.1 Loss of Accountability and Responsibility    
As shown above, giving citizens the power to directly make certain decisions saves the cost 
of having to replace the majority of the legislature just because citizens are insistent on 
changing one particular decision. This sub-section examines whether letting citizens share 
responsibility for decision-making with legislators would dilute the accountability of the 
legislators for the consequences of government policy per se.  
With respect to the issue of representatives’ responsibility to inform themselves regarding 
issues required for effective decision-making, the well-cited paper by Professor Kessler 
proves instructive.270 She argues that representatives have incentives to inform themselves of 
issues necessary to make good decisions only if they have the discretionary power to make 
those decisions.271 This means that the incentives of the agents to inform themselves will be 
reduced if citizens share the right to make decisions (through initiatives or referendums) 
because the discretionary power of the agents to make decisions would be reduced. 
A greater problem is that of dilution of responsibility. The premise of this argument is that by 
encroaching on the turf of delegated decision-making, direct democratic action runs the risk 
of relieving the agents of the responsibility of policy making and may hence lead to reduced 
accountability for them.272A criticism of direct democracy provisions that applies primarily to 
                                                 
270 Kessler, Anke S. “Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Informational Asymmetries.” 
Public Choice 122, no. 1-2 (2005): 9-38. 
271 Id at 10. 
272 See Grant, Ruth W., and Robert O. Keohane. “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics.” 
American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 29-43 at 29. Professors Grant and Keohane define 
accountability as the right of principals to hold their agents to “a set of standards, to judge whether they have 
fulﬁlled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these 
responsibilities have not been met”. Since the use of direct democracy blurs the line between the efforts of the 
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referendums is that it allows the agents to relieve themselves off the responsibility for the 
outcomes of policies they adopt.273 Professor Setälä examines this possibility in great depth 
and concludes that legislators can effectively avoid accountability for their actions if they are 
able to abuse their right to initiate decisions and then have them rubber stamped through a 
referendum often by framing the issue in a misleading manner.274  
This argument can be demonstrated anecdotally through the furor over former Greek 
President Papadopoulos’ quickly overturned decision to put an urgent but unpopular bailout 
to a referendum.275 In this instance, the Greek President was criticized for failing to take an 
urgent decision regarding whether or not to accept a critical bailout that was conditional on 
tough austerity measures. Since both options available to him were unpopular (bankruptcy or 
harsh austerity), President Papadopoulos declared that the decision would be taken by 
referendum. This action was widely condemned as an attempt by the president to absolve 
himself of the responsibility and the political backlash for making either of the two unpopular 
choices.276  
Another example of a government passing on unpopular decisions to its voters is the 2010 
Israeli decision to require a referendum in order to return occupied territories in the absence 
of a 2/3rd majority in the Knesset.277 This allows the Israeli government to argue that it is the 
                                                                                                                                                        
agents and the results of policy (due to intervention by direct democracy), its use is considered to have a 
detrimental impact on the accountability of the agents. See also Professor Breuer’s analysis of how direct 
democracy has impacted accountability in Latin America in Breuer, Anita. “The Problematic Relation between 
Direct Democracy and Accountability in Latin America: Evidence from the Bolivian Case.” Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 27, no. 1 (2008): 1-23 and Breuer, Anita. “Institutions of Direct Democracy and 
Accountability in Latin America’s Presidential Democracies.” Democratisation 14, no. 4 (2007): 554-579. 
273 See Breuer, Anita. “Policymaking by Referendum in Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Bolivian and 
Colombian Cases.” Latin American Politics and Society 50, no. 4 (2008): 59-89. This paper analyses the impact 
of government initiated referendums on the Presidential elections in two South American countries. 
274 Setälä, Maija. “On the Problems of Responsibility and Accountability in Referendums.” European Journal of 
Political Research 45, no. 4 (2006): 699-721. Please see a complete discussion on the consequences of framing 
in section 3.4.2. 
275 See Donadio, Rache and Kitsantonis, Niki. “Greek Leader Calls Off Referendum on Bailout Plan.” New York 
Times (November 3, 2011). 
276 See for example “Fresh Trouble for Euro: EU Shocked and Furious at Greek Referendum Plan”, Spiegel 
Online (International edition), November 1, 2011 available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/fresh-
trouble-for-euro-eu-shocked-and-furious-at-greek-referendum-plan-a-795176.html (visited on February 5, 2012) 
277 The Israeli Parliament is known as The Knesset. See the J'lem-Golan National Referendum Law, 2010. For 
details, see  http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/knesset-passes-bill-conditioning-land-concessions-
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Israeli citizens rather than the Israeli legislature which is responsible for failing to resolve the 
Israel-Palestine dispute thereby allowing the legislature to sidestep their obligations under 
international law.  
A less obvious, but more common use of direct democracy that, in effect, shielded 
governments from responsibility for controversial decisions was seen in the widespread use 
of referendums by various European countries to determine their level of involvement with 
the European Communities and later the European Union.278 
A similar situation can be contemplated in corporate law. Directors may pass on tough 
decisions to shareholders and shirk responsibility for tough choices and their consequences. 
An example of such a situation may be the shareholder approval of executive compensation. 
The US and the UK have introduced provisions requiring the non-binding approval of 
executive compensation since the financial crisis of 2008.279  Since then, shareholders have 
typically approved the compensation plans of most companies. Professor Myers has argued 
that by getting the approval of shareholders, managers have been freed from the risk of 
sparking an outrage against compensation policies that are excessive or not suitably linked to 
performance. In other words, managers are able to pass on the responsibility for the policy to 
                                                                                                                                                        
with-popular-referendums-1.326172 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11817445 (visited on 
March 14, 2012). 
278 For example, France (1972), Ireland (1973), Norway (1973; chose not to join) and Denmark (1973) held 
referendums to join the European Communities. The UK held a referendum in 1974 to decide whether or not to 
remain a member. Ireland (1992), France (1992) and Denmark (1992 and 1993) held referendums to decide 
whether or not to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. In 1995, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway held referendums 
on joining the EU. In 1998, Ireland and Denmark held referendums to decide whether to ratify the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. In 2001, Ireland refused to ratify and in 2002 agreed to ratify the Treaty of Nice through 
referendums. In 2004, Malta, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia all held 
referendums to decide whether or not to join the EU. In 2000 and 2003, Denmark and Sweden respectively held 
referendums to decide whether or not to join the Eurozone. In 2005, Spain, France, The Netherlands and 
Luxembourg held referendum to decide whether or not to ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. Ireland had a referendum as late as 2008 to decide on the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
279 §951 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010. This act was passed in 
response to the global financial recession of the late 2000’s. Perceiving that the financial problems of the 
country were caused by insufficient regulation of financial entities, the US government adopted extensive 
regulations to control the same. Due to the outcry against perceived excessive executive compensation, 
regulations were introduced into the Dodd Frank Act that required shareholders to approve the compensation of 
directors and top managers in a non-binding vote. 
In the United Kingdom, s. 439 of the Companies Act, 2006 requires non-binding approval of shareholders for 
the compensation of directors. Furthermore, provisions under Chapter 4 of the Companies Act, 2006 (ss. 188 to 
226) provide a number of conditions whereby shareholder approval is required for directors to benefit from their 
position at the company. 
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the shareholders even though the managers themselves are largely responsible for the 
outcome.280   
In both these scenarios, the accountability of the agents is diluted as it becomes increasingly 
difficult to assign credit and blame for the failures and successes of policy. As more and more 
decisions are taken by the principals and the agents jointly, the diluted accountability of the 
agents cannot come without a related increase in agency cost in the relevant company or 
country. 
In light of these findings, it must be said that direct democracy can have a detrimental effect 
because they give the legislators greater plausible deniability for their involvement in the 
adoption of a controversial law. However, it is precisely this sort of controversial and critical 
decision-making where the legitimacy of direct decision-making can be critical.  In such 
instances, failure to effectively monitor the actions of the agents can lead to unusually high 
agency costs.  
To conclude, direct democracy can reduce accountability of legislators in certain cases and it 
seems difficult to establish a process whereby this tendency can be controlled or eliminated. 
This adverse effect on agency cost must, therefore, be balanced against the benefits that 
initiatives may provide. 
 
5.5 BYPASSING A BIASED EXECUTIVE 
This section argues that initiatives allow the legislature to get informed about issues that the 
ordinary working of representative democracy may otherwise stifle. In this discussion, the 
breakdown in the information cycle necessary for effective decision-making occurs not at the 
stage of the legislature but rather at the executive level. Accordingly, the discussion examines 
how the board of directors and the legislature, whose responsibility it is to monitor the 
management and the executive respectively, are reliant upon these very organs to provide 
them with the information needed to judge their performance.  
                                                 
280 See Myers, Minor. “Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, The.” Del. J. Corp. L. 36 
(2011): 417 for a detailed discussion on the impact of ‘say on pay’ provisions on the accountability of the board 
of directors. 
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The interests of the management and the executive are not perfectly aligned with the interests 
of the shareholders and the citizens respectively. This means that the information the 
management and the executive pass on to the board and the legislature has the potential to be 
biased. It stands to reason that the board and the legislature will not be able to effectively 
monitor the management and the executive based on such biased information. This section, 
therefore, argues that initiatives provide a secondary source of information to the legislature 
making their oversight and policies more responsive to the preferences of the citizens. 
The constitutional structure of modern democracies and the complexity of governance 
involved means that legislators, are dependent upon the executive for information upon 
which to base their decisions. Similarly, the board of directors has to rely upon the managers 
of the company to provide them with the information required to make reasoned decisions. 
This creates an information asymmetry between the legislature and the executive and 
between the board of directors and the management. 
In the corporate context, Professors Milgrom and Roberts explain that this information 
asymmetry will be exploited by the management because it has the greater information. They 
explain that even if the management does not misuse the information asymmetry to advance 
their own interests over those of their principals, it will still lead to inefficient decision-
making by the board of directors.281  
Professors Milgrom and Roberts argues that under such conditions of information 
asymmetry, even the most well-intentioned managers will selectively pass on information.282 
They will do this in order to influence the board to do what the managers think is in the best 
interests of the company and to influence the board to promote and retain the managers who 
control the information.283 As it happens, most managers tend believe these two interests 
                                                 
281 Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. “An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations.” 
American Journal of Sociology (1988): S154-S179. 
282 Id. at S156. “Such manipulation can take many forms, ranging from conscious lies concerning facts, through 
suppression of unfavorable information, to simply presenting the information in a way that accentuates the 
points supporting the interested party's preferred decision and then insisting on these points at every 
opportunity.” 
283 Eisenberg, Melvin A. “Board of Directors and Internal Control, The.” Cardozo L. Rev. 19 (1997): 237 at 245. 
132
The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
129 
 
always converge. After all, most managers believe that their own promotion and retention 
will be in the best interests of their employers.284 
This seemingly innocuous information asymmetry has major significance regarding the 
exercise of decision-making authority. The very core of both corporate and constitutional law 
is the separation of decision management and decision control. If the board of directors or 
legislature is entirely dependent upon the management/executive for information on which to 
base their approval of policies and their evaluation of performance, the board and the 
legislature can only be said to serve a nominal role with real power passing to the 
management/executive. 
Professors Milgrom and Roberts provide the following example: While the board of directors 
has the ultimate responsibility to decide if a plant is to be constructed or not, only the 
management in charge of the division that will make use of the plant can provide critical 
information regarding the viability and profitability of the plant.285 In the case of government, 
this situation is doubly true because the volume and complexity of information is so great that 
the legislature has to rely almost exclusively on information gathered and vetted by the 
executive. As in the case of the company in the example, all legislative decision-making is in 
reality predicated on the accuracy and unbiased nature of information provided by the 
executive. 
For example, the US government relies on the DEA (Drug Enforcement Authority) to inform 
it regarding the ill effects and prevalence of marijuana use. However, should marijuana ever 
be legalized, a huge number of DEA officials will be downsized and the organization’s 
budget will be slashed. This is perhaps one of the reasons the DEA maintains that marijuana 
should be classified along with heroin, cocaine and other far more harmful drugs in 
opposition to the opinion of numerous public health experts worldwide.286 
                                                 
284 Supra note 301. 
285 Id. at S154. 
286 For more information on the drug legalization debate, see Kleiman, Mark AR, and Aaron J. Saiger. “Drug 
Legalization: The Importance of Asking the Right Question.” Hofstra L. Rev. 18 (1989): 527; Goode, Erich. 
Between Politics and Reason: The Drug Legalization Debate. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997; Inciardi, 
James A., ed. The Drug Legalization Debate. Sage, 1999; Ostrowski, J., and Cato Institute. “Thinking About 
Drug Legalization.” (1989) and Ostrowski, James. “Moral and Practical Case for Drug Legalization, The.” 
Hofstra L. Rev. 18 (1989): 607. 
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There are two solutions to this problem.  The first solution is to adopt a skeptical posture to 
the information received from biased sources. The second option is to develop parallel, 
competing sources of information.287 The first solution is not effective in the corporate 
system. This is because corporate managers do not have a “known monotonic agenda, such as 
maximizing sales to the decision maker, so that the information he supplies can always be 
evaluated in terms of that agenda.”288 To put it simply, since the biases of corporate managers 
are complex and not decipherable in the context of individual decisions and issues, it is 
difficult for the board of directors to discount for that bias and ascertain what the real facts 
are. 
This argument also holds true in the constitutional system. The diversity of information 
supplied by the executive to enable decision-making by the legislature as well as the disparity 
of interests that motivate and guide the executive makes it impossible for the legislature to 
factor in a known bias. This means that the legislature cannot easily decipher the truth from 
information colored by executive bias even if it knows that a bias exists. 
The second option of opening parallel channels of information is where shareholder proposals 
and initiatives come in. By creating a parallel channel for information to reach the legislature, 
even non-binding initiatives289 can promote informed and responsive decision-making by the 
legislature by providing a signal of the preferences of the citizens. This is because the 
outcome of an initiative actually represents the preferences of the citizens on the subject 
matter of the proposal as directly expressed by them.   
Therefore, by enhancing the information available to the legislature, initiatives can reduce 
agency cost by improving the monitoring of the executive and reducing residual loss by 
passing on accurate information about citizens’ preferences to the decision-making agents. 
  
                                                 
287 Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. “Relying on the Information of Interested Parties.” The RAND Journal of 
Economics (1986): 18-32 at 19-20, 24-25, 30-31. 
288 Eisenberg, Melvin A. “Board of Directors and Internal Control, The.” Cardozo L. Rev. 19 (1997): 237 at 246. 
289 Non-binding initiatives allow citizens to propose and then vote to adopt a proposal just as in the case of 
binding initiatives. The key difference is that the proposal, once adopted by the citizens does not automatically 
become law. Rather, it is up to the government whether to adopt the proposal or not. 
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5.6 PREVENTING DISTORTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL 
EVOLUTION 
This section considers whether the advantage agents have by virtue of having exclusive 
control over the agenda in corporate and constitutional law is magnified by the longevity of 
these organizations. The question it seeks to answer is whether a constitution that gives 
exclusive control of the agenda to the legislature would result in high agency costs over the 
long run.  
Corporations, like countries, have an indefinite lifespan and both can exist for hundreds of 
years. Due to this, they both need their governance arrangements to evolve to keep up with 
the changes in conditions and in order to adopt new ideas as they develop. In the case of 
companies, this requires that the corporate charters and bylaws be amended at appropriate 
times. Since many rules of the game provisions290 are codified in the corporate and securities 
laws of the state rather than in the charter and the bylaws, it is clear that these sources also 
need to be modified regularly. 
In fact, the need to update governance arrangements is much greater in the constitution realm. 
In the case of companies, changes to the company law of the state of incorporation 
automatically keeps the governance arrangements updated on some of the most important 
issues that arise.291 In the case of countries, however, all changes required to keep the 
governance arrangements up to date require action either by the principals or the agents. 
There is no third party to help them since even international law typically takes force in a 
country only if it is ratified and adopted internally.292 
It has been demonstrated that giving exclusive control to the management over the right to 
initiate changes to the charter dramatically swings the policy agenda in their favor due to the 
following problems it creates: 
                                                 
290 Rules of the game provisions govern the relationship between agents and principals and the relationship 
between the various principals themselves. See Section 2.5 and 2.5.1 for further information. 
291 Hansmann, Henry. “Corporation and Contract.” American Law and Economics Review 8, no. 1 (2006): 1-19. 
292 For example, the UK is now bound by the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) only 
because it took the steps to subject itself to them. Only prohibitions against genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity etc. have come to be part of the relationship between citizens themselves and their government 
without being actively adopted. The selective application of these rules in different parts of the world and the 
conflict of sovereignty with foreign interference underscore the difficulty in ‘automatically’ updating 
constitutional law. 
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 Managers will not initiate proposals that increase value for shareholder but will 
decrease value for the managers.293 
 When two options exist that will increase value for shareholders, management will 
choose the option that creates the most value for them rather that the option that 
creates most value for shareholders.294 
 Managers can bundle proposals that increase their value but decrease shareholder 
value with critical proposals that actually do increase shareholder value. If the benefit 
to shareholders from the critical proposal exceeds the loss caused by the first 
proposal, shareholders will be forced to approve the value decreasing proposal as 
well. This way, managers can even get shareholder approval for proposals that reduce 
shareholder value.295 
In addition to these factors, giving management control over the agenda as well as control 
over the timing of referendums magnifies the dangers of pro-management distortion over 
time. Management initiated shareholder votes (typically related to executive compensation) 
have a remarkable disparity between the large number of proposals that narrowly pass the 
50% mark and the unusually small number of such proposals that fall just short of the mark. 
This is in contrast to ballot questions initiated by outside shareholders where no such 
anomaly is detected. The reasons for the anomaly in the case of management originated 
proposals could be strategic timing, strategic lobbying when the management sees the count 
is falling short, and withdrawal of proposals when they see that they would narrowly lose.296  
These imbalances can lead to considerable distortions in favor of the management over 
time.297 Professor Bebchuk argues that the longevity of corporations and the “pro-
management bias in the evolution of corporate charters” means that corporate law needs to be 
                                                 
293 See Section 5.3.1. 
294 See Section 5.3.2. 
295 See Section 5.3.3. 
296 Listokin, Yair. “Management Always Wins the Close Ones.” American Law and Economics Review 10, no. 2 
(2008): 159-184. 
297 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 865. 
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designed “in a way that counters these distortions”.298 A lot of work on corporate governance 
has, therefore, led to a focus on mandatory legal rules and reversible defaults with this 
method being championed by Professor Bebchuk himself. The issue of choosing the optimal 
default is the subject of the following section. 
Another important reason for encouraging the balanced evolution of both corporate and 
constitutional law is that corporations and countries operate in situations very different from 
those that existed at the time of their founding or incorporation. Corporate charters are 
adopted at a time where conditions can be very different from those that companies are faced 
with every day. This is for two reasons: 
 The charter was adopted a very long time ago and conditions and ideas have changed 
since then. 
 The priorities of the company at IPO are very different from those during regular 
operation. (for example, being competitive in the IPO market v. being competitive in 
the business activity the company is involved in) 
A comparison of this with constitutional law shows that the changes in conditions are very 
similar. The constitutions of most existing Parliamentary democracies existing today were 
adopted at the time they became Parliamentary democracies and are difficult to amend. More 
importantly, the political environment in most countries when the constitutions were written 
was highly chaotic with rampant civil and political unrest in many, if not most instances.299  
At the time of drafting the constitution, the priority of the framers of the constitution is to get 
very disparate groups to agree to adopt the constitution and abide by it rather than to establish 
the most desirable system possible. A good example of this can be found in the Directive 
Principles of State Policy that form part of the Constitution of India. At the time of its 
adoption by the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution of India had to make a compromise 
against its secular fabric in order to win support from the Hindu and Muslim hardliners in the 
aftermath of the horrors of partition. The drafters of the Indian Constitution had to allow for 
                                                 
298 Id. at 866-67. 
299 The constitutions of the US, India, and indeed almost all post-colonial countries as well as the post-Soviet 
states are examples of constitutions written and adopted during times of enormous political and economic 
problems. The French constitution is another excellent example of a constitution framed under extra-ordinary 
social and political circumstances. 
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different religions to have different personal laws in contravention of the spirit of Article 14 
which mandates equal treatment under law for all citizens. Foreseeing that the political and 
social climate of the nation would be more stable in the future, they beseeched future 
governments to try and adopt a uniform civil code when conditions were more conducive at a 
later date.300 
Since it is clear that constitutions need to reflect changed realities, it is also clear that they 
need to be amended at reasonable intervals. As demonstrated with the help of Professor 
Bebchuk’s arguments, if agents are given the exclusive right to initiate these changes, the end 
result will be constitutional evolution that is biased in favor of the agents. Putting these 
arguments together, it may be argued that citizens must share initiation rights with legislators 
if constitutional evolution is to move in a balanced direction. 
This issue is central to the work of Milton Friedman who has criticized the continuous growth 
in the size of government. He argued that the only way to reverse the expanding scope of 
government authority is to have a constitutional initiative to cap government spending to a 
percentage of national income.301 This argument relates to a specific, singular initiative to cap 
government spending rather than the effect of the availability of the initiative to the public in 
general.  
Research by Professors Feld and Matsusaka on government spending in Switzerland suggests 
that provision for initiatives cuts combined state and local spending by about 5% and state 
spending by over 10% controlling for political and demographic factors.302 The correlation of 
                                                 
300 See Elster, Jon. “Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies.” U. Pa. J. Const. L. 2 (1999): 345 
at 347. “Constitutions are often written in times of crisis that invite extraordinary and dramatic measures.” 
Professor Elster argues that several American states refused to join the Union if slavery was abolished and if the 
senate did not have proportional representation ultimately getting their way on the issue of slavery. As it is well 
known, the US constitution ended up with a perverse compromise which condoned slavery while at the same 
time declaring every man to be equal. Professor Elster also argues that the French constitution was influenced 
by threats of violence from the Parisian mob. 
301 Friedman, Milton, and Rose D. Friedman. Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 1990. According to Professor Friedman, this trend towards big government ostensibly fueled by 
pro-management bias is well borne out statistically. Note that American federal government spending as a 
percentage of GDP has increased from 2.38% in 1902 to 23.87% in 2011.  
302 See Feld, Lars P., and John G. Matsusaka. “Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from 
Swiss Cantons.” Journal of Public Economics 87, no. 12 (2003): 2703-2724. This research suggests that 
provision for initiatives cuts combined state and local spending by about 5% and state spending by over 10% 
controlling for political and demographic factors (See Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy Works.” The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2005): 185-206 at 195). Though the US is not a Parliamentary 
democracy, it is noted that a relationship between the use of the initiative and government spending is also 
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the availability of the initiative with reduced per capita government spending in the latter half 
of the 20th century amongst American states is also consistent with empirical evidence that 
shows that states which provide for initiatives spend less per capita than states that do not 
have such provisions. 
There is however evidence to suggest that referendums can also serve to limit government 
spending and that “the people themselves appear to care more about ﬁscal discipline than 
their elected representatives”.303 It should also be noted that there is research that shows that 
initiatives can lead to increased government spending.304 This shows that institutional 
specificities influence the ability of initiatives to limit the tendency of representatives to 
increase their influence. This finding must be tempered by the argument that citizens may 
want a greater role for government and initiatives might be the means by which they ensure 
greater public services. 
This data suggests that the legislature and the executive are averse to initiating measures that 
reduce the scope of their own authority and that under certain institutional environments, 
initiatives can help to reign in the role of the state. This issue is discussed in more detail in 
the following sub-section on empire building.305 
This discussion has shown that giving principals the right to set the agenda may allow them 
to restrict the undesirable expansion of the powers of their agents. Therefore, the provision 
for initiatives can be an effective tool to restrict the tendency of government to expand its 
powers and its spending. The details of how this would work are discussed in the following 
sub-section on ‘empire building’. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
identified amongst its states. See Matsusaka, John G. “Fiscal Efects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the 
Last 30 Years.” Journal of Political Economy (1995): 587-623; Zax, Jeffrey S. “Initiatives and Government 
Expenditures.” Public Choice 63, no. 3 (1989): 267-277; Matsusaka, John G. “Fiscal Effects of the Voter 
Initiative in the First Half of the Twentieth Century.” JL & Econ. 43 (2000): 619; Matsusaka, John G. “Direct 
Democracy Works.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2005): 185-206.  
303 Feld, Lars P., and Gebhard Kirchgässner. "Does Direct Democracy Reduce Public Debt Evidence from Swiss 
Municipalities." Public Choice 109, no. 3-4 (2001): 347-370 at 365. 
 
304 Blume, Lorenz, Jens Müller, and Stefan Voigt. "The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy—A First Global 
Assessment." Public Choice 140, no. 3-4 (2009): 431-461. 
 
305 See section 5.6.1 
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5.6.1 Comparison with ‘Empire-building’ 
Under Delaware law, decisions involving the transfer of assets (through dividends in cash or 
kind) from the company to the shareholders are made solely at the discretion of the board of 
directors.306 Shareholders may not initiate such decisions. This situation results in an 
imbalance in power in favor of the agents that might lead to an ‘empire building problem’ for 
the company. 
Empire building refers to the tendency of management to retain excess assets that may be 
more efficiently managed if they were returned to shareholders. Managers may retain these 
assets because they are incentivized to make the firm ever larger. The incentive comes from 
the increased pecuniary and non-pecuniary personal benefits connected with managing a 
larger corporation.307 The resultant lack of alignment in the preferences of shareholders and 
managers creates a conflict of interest. The tendency for empire building and the conflict of 
interest it creates has been described by Professors Henry Hansmann and Michael Jensen as 
the most significant agency problem facing large public companies.308  
Similarly, the trend of governments starting to manage an ever-increasing sphere of social 
and economic functions has been described by Professors Milton Friedman and Friedrich 
Hayek as the most significant threat to freedom and liberty itself.309 In the case of the 
constitutional system, legislators and administrators have an incentive to grow the 
government ever larger for greater prestige and influence.310 After all, the prestige and 
                                                 
306 The decision to issue dividends is covered by the wide authority conferred to the board of directors under s. 
141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law and is exercised at the discretion of the board of directors. “Such 
decisions transfer assets from company control into shareholder hands, in effect reducing the size of the empire 
under management’s control.” 
307 Kanniainen, Vesa. “Empire Building by Corporate Managers: The Corporation as a Savings Instrument.” 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24, no. 1 (2000): 127-142. 
308 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 903. See Hansmann, Henry. The Ownership of Enterprise. Belknap Press, 2000 at 38 and Jensen, Michael. 
“Eclipse of the Public Corporation.” Harvard Business Review (Sept.-Oct. 1989), revised (1997) at 61, 66. 
309 See Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press, 2009. and Hayek, Friedrich 
August. The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition. University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
See also Boudreaux, Donald J., and Adam C. Pritchard. “Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of 
the Constitutional Amendment Process.” Fordham L. Rev. 62 (1993): 111 for a discussion into the relationship 
between constitutional amendments and agency cost. 
310 Levinson, Daryl J. “Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 915-
972. 
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influence of the legislators depends on the social and economic influence that their actions 
have on the lives of the citizens. 
This is all fine if the citizens also want big government. However, if citizens want to restrict 
the scope of the government’s activities, they will find it hard to convince their 
representatives to do so due to the reasons explained above. If the citizens are unable to 
reduce the scope of government to bring it in line with their preferences, there will be an 
increase in residual loss and, therefore, an increase in agency cost.311 
In the context of corporate governance, Professor Bebchuk suggests a solution to address this 
sort of agency problem leading to ‘empire building’ problems.312 He suggests that 
shareholders should be permitted to initiate and adopt binding shareholder resolutions forcing 
the management to pay dividends in cash or assets such as the stock of subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, he argues that these shareholder resolutions should also be allowed to set 
dividend policy for the future. This means that scaling down decisions would be subject to 
initiation by both directors and shareholders. 
A similar solution is given for the similar agency problem that arises in game-ending 
decisions.313 In game-ending decisions, the conflict of interest arises when shareholder value 
will be maximized by the winding up the company or by the exit of senior executives or 
board members.314 In such circumstances, the interests of the agents conflict with those of 
their shareholders because the agents stand to lose the private benefits they accrue from 
managing the company. Professor Bebchuk has argued that decisions regarding the sale of the 
business’s assets and its dissolution must also be amenable to initiation by both directors and 
shareholders.315 This way the shareholders can initiate game-ending decisions when such a 
                                                 
311 See section 2.2. Note that Agency cost = Monitoring cost + bonding cost + residual loss.  
312 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 902. 
313 See section 4.1.2. Game-ending decisions are decisions that terminate the principal agent relationship. 
314 Unocal corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
315 Supra note 337 at 897. “Under current rules, shareholders may not initiate an auction of the company or of its 
assets or a process of dissolution. Under the proposed regime, however, shareholders will have the option to 
adopt arrangements that will give them the power to initiate such processes.” 
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decision would maximize shareholder wealth but the directors are hesitant to do so because 
they would lose their compensation, benefits and prestige.  
In the constitutional system, an example of a decision that dramatically and directly impacts 
the future career prospects of agents is the issue of term limits.  Intuitively, one would expect 
that states where only legislators are allowed to initiate policy would not adopt term limits. 
This is because the legislators would not initiate a policy that severely restricts the length of 
their political careers. On the other hand, states where citizens can also initiate policy 
(through ballot initiatives) would be more likely to have such laws to reduce entrenchment.  
In fact, this is borne out empirically. Even though this dissertation concerns itself with the 
Parliamentary system, the clear evidence from the term limits for congressmen and state 
legislators in the US is instructive. Out of 24 American states that allow for initiatives, 22 
have term limits for congressmen or state legislators. On the other hand, only 2 out of the 26 
states that do not provide for initiatives provide for such limits.316 While this is a limited 
sample, the sharp contrast in the adoption of term limits in states that allow for initiatives 
versus states that do not supports the argument that agenda control is a valuable tool for 
citizens seeking to reduce ‘empire building’ concerns.  
Another example of such a situation is one where citizens want the government to stop 
regulating an activity. This is, of course, against the interests of the regulators who oversee 
that activity since they have a private interest to continue regulating the activity in order to 
keep their jobs. For example, as mentioned before, it is in the private interest of police forces 
that enforce narcotics laws to ensure that marijuana is not decriminalized since that would 
result in huge downsizing of their organizations and lead to budget cuts. The solution that 
emerges from corporate governance is that principals must have the power to initiate and pass 
resolutions allowing them to scale down the scope of the principal-agent relationship. It is 
interesting to note that the movement to legalize marijuana is driven by ballot initiatives at 
the state level and has received far less support through representative democracy.317  
                                                 
316 Matsusaka, John G. “The Eclipse of Legislatures: Direct Democracy in the 21st Century.” Public Choice 
124, no. 1-2 (2005): 157-177 at 166. 
317 Ostrowski, J., and Cato Institute. “Thinking About Drug Legalization.” (1989). 
142
The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
139 
 
Initiatives are, therefore, a powerful tool to optimize agency cost. Direct democracy cannot 
be entirely effective by only allowing for referendums and not providing for initiatives. One 
solution is to make the availability or unavailability of initiatives a default rule (i.e. a rule that 
can later be changed) rather than a mandatory rule. This way, initiatives can be suspended if 
they are found to be undesirable or introduced at a later time if their need is felt in the future. 
The following section looks at what the optimal default rule should be. The answer is 
predicated on finding the default that will most easily get reversed if it is later found to be 
inefficient.  
5.7 SETTING DEFAULTS 
The previous section argued that granting the right to propose key decisions exclusively to 
the legislature can lead to distorted constitutional evolution. This distortion may lead to an 
unchecked growth of the powers of government and cause excessive government spending. 
Similarly, the vesting of agenda control for key decisions solely with the board of directors 
can lead to excessive expansion of the agency relationship causing an empire building 
problem.318 Therefore, it is seen that the asymmetrical distribution of initiation rights can lead 
to excessive agency cost.  
Since agency theory looks at the relationship between principals and agents as a contract,319 
principals and agents are free to renegotiate the distribution of agenda control at a later 
date.320 This means that agents can expand the scope of their authority beyond what is desired 
by the principals because of the default rule that gives them the exclusive power to initiate 
policy. In other words, agents are able to acquire excessive authority merely because they 
were given exclusive initiation rights at the time of incorporation of the company or the 
adoption of the constitution. This is so even if the corporate charter or country’s constitution 
does not prohibit principals from being granted the right to initiate policy at a later time. It is, 
therefore, not enough that the agency contract allows for a possibility to change the allocation 
                                                 
318 See Hansmann, Henry. The Ownership of Enterprise. Belknap Press, 2000 at 38 and Jensen, Michael. 
“Eclipse of the Public Corporation.” Harvard Business Review (Sept.-Oct. 1989), revised (1997) at 61, 66. 
319 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360. 
320 Ayres, Ian, and Robert Gertner. “Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules.” The Yale Law Journal 99, no. 1 (1989): 87-130 at 87. The rules governing contracts and corporations 
are of two types. Immutable rules that cannot be altered by the parties and default rules that ‘fill in the gaps in 
incomplete contracts’ which can be contracted around by the parties 
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of initiation rights at a later date. In fact, the charter or constitution must begin with an 
arrangement that makes it easy to change the default if it is found to be unsatisfactory later.  
This section tries to answer the following question: Is it better to adopt a constitution that 
does not provide for initiatives at the time of ratification (but allows for the use of initiatives 
to be adopted through a constitutional amendment at a later time)? This option would create a 
default state of no initiatives. Or, on the other hand, is it better to start off by allowing the use 
of initiatives which can then be done away with at a future date through a constitutional 
amendment if they are found to be unpopular? This would be termed a default state allowing 
for initiatives. 
One solution to this problem is to adopt Professors Easterbrook and Fischel’s suggestion 
(also supported by Justice Posner) to choose as a default those rules that the parties would 
have negotiated in conditions of full information and low negotiation costs.321 This solution, 
however, is not perfectly workable under the circumstances. 
As explained before, constitutions are typically adopted at time of great civil and political 
unrest. This means that considerations of efficiency often have to give way to considerations 
of political expediency when constitutions are framed and adopted. When the political and 
social conditions have stabilized, there is often room for improvement to make the agency 
contract established more efficient. Furthermore, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel’s 
suggestion does not take into account empire building problems. After all, there is a strong 
incentive for agents not to initiate changes to arrangements that later become inefficient if 
doing so would reduce the scope of their authority or their benefits.  
This means that even default rules “negotiated in conditions of full information and low 
negotiation costs” which create a monopoly on the power to initiate decisions in favor of the 
agents might prove to be a liability in the future. This can happen if conditions change and it 
is later found desirable to do away with this monopoly and for principals to share initiation 
rights with agents. Under such situations, principals will find that their agents have little 
incentive to put forward a proposal to grant them such rights. Since the principals have no 
                                                 
321 Easterbrook, Frank H. The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. Harvard University Press, 1996; Posner, 
Richard A. Economic Analysis of Law. Vol. 5. New York: Aspen Law & Business, 1998 at 372. See also 
Barnett, Randy E. “Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, The.” Va. L. Rev. 78 (1992): 821. 
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means to initiate the decision-making process to give themselves the right to initiate 
decisions, they will be left with an inefficient principal-agent relationship.   
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have considered this problem and proposed the concept of 
penalty defaults which give one party to the contract an incentive to opt out of the default 
arrangement.322 This concept of penalty defaults has been tailored to address the problem of 
empire building in corporate governance by Professors Bebchuk and Hamdani in their 
recommendation of mandatory rules and reversible defaults.323 Their proposal suggests that 
whenever there is a possible choice between two default arrangements, the arrangement that 
is more restrictive on management should be chosen. This is because if such a choice is later 
found to be inefficient, both the shareholders and the management, who control the agenda, 
will have the incentives to opt out of such an arrangement. On the other hand, if the option 
less restrictive on management is chosen and later found to be inefficient, managers may not 
have the incentives to opt out of it due to the problem of empire building. 
In light of this statement, it would be rational to allow for initiatives as a default. If they are 
later found to be inefficient in reducing agency cost, citizens and legislators will both have 
the incentives to end the practice. However, if the constitution does not provide for initiatives 
and the government has the sole control over the agenda, it is unlikely that the legislators will 
give up such a monopoly over the agenda even if it is later found that allowing for initiatives 
would be more efficient. 
Since the existing constitutions of many countries vest sole control of the agenda with the 
government, a Catch 22 situation is created since the agents have no incentive to adopt a 
reversible default that is more restrictive on them than the existing situation. However, for 
states that are yet to adopt new constitutions, the suggestion by Professors Bebchuk and 
Hamdani to introduce, as a reversible default, the option more restrictive on management 
seems to be the optimal solution. This means that allowing for initiatives with the option of 
doing away with them in the future seems to be an excellent idea in light of this analysis. 
 
                                                 
322 Ayres, Ian, and Robert Gertner. “Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules.” The Yale Law Journal 99, no. 1 (1989): 87-130 at 97. 
323 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, and Assaf Hamdani. Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution. No. w8703. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002. 
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5.8 INDIRECT BENEFITS 
This section deals with the impact of direct democracy when the provisions are not actually 
utilized. In other words, this section discusses how provisions mandating or allowing for 
shareholder proposals, shareholder approval of fundamental corporate decisions, initiatives 
and referendums affect agency cost regardless of whether or not they are actually used to 
make decisions. It examines the impact that the threat of such action by the principals has on 
their agents and how that in turn affects agency cost. 
In corporate governance, the benefits of shareholders having a veto over fundamental 
corporate decisions are felt both directly and indirectly. This is because directors know that 
decisions that only benefit them or proposals that do not create value for shareholders will be 
rejected by the shareholders.324 This causes directors to not bother putting exploitative 
proposals before shareholders in the first place. This works the same way in the case of 
constitutional referendums. The threat of rejection by citizens causes legislators to only put 
forward proposals that they think will be approved by citizens. 
Similarly, the primary benefits of initiatives will also be indirect. Rather than waiting for 
initiatives to be passed on issues that are popular with the citizens, legislators will choose to 
preempt such initiatives and pass the laws in question themselves. This will happen because 
legislators will want to take the credit for passing popular laws. In fact, legislators may even 
pass laws opposed by powerful lobbying groups if they know that such a law would get 
passed through the initiative process anyway. It should, therefore, be noted that the impact of 
the initiative process cannot be measured effectively by looking at the number of successful 
initiatives or even the number of initiatives that reach the ballot. In other words, direct 
democracy has an impact on representative decision-making by virtue of the credible threat 
of its use.325 
It must be noted Professors Blume, Müller and Voigt have shown empirically that the indirect 
effect of initiatives is found to be significantly less pronounced that its direct effects in the 
                                                 
324 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 878. 
325 See Lupia, Arthur, and John G. Matsusaka. “Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions.” Annu. 
Rev. Polit. Sci. 7 (2004): 463-482 and Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy Works.” The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2005): 185-206 at 192. 
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constitutional system.326 However, this research also shows that the indirect effect of 
initiatives is more pronounced in ‘weak’ democracies than more developed and sophisticated 
‘strong’ ones. This lends some credence to the idea that initiatives have a limited but not 
insignificant indirect monitoring effect. This is because the legislatures of ‘strong’ 
democracies would be more aligned with the preferences of the citizens and would require 
lesser deviation in policy to reflect the preferences of the citizens in the countries where they 
are faced with the possible threat of an initiative. On the other hand, the legislatures of ‘weak’ 
democracies would tend to poorly represent the preferences of the citizens. They would, 
therefore, be expected to show a greater deviation from their policies in countries where they 
are subject to the possibility of monitoring by direct intervention through the initiative 
process.  
The indirect effect of initiatives is not without its risks. If legislators are not aware of voters’ 
preferences, they might move policy away from the preferences of the majority of their voters 
when faced with the chance that an extreme initiative might be passed by a special interest 
group.327 However, precisely these pressures are also created by the competitive effects of 
regular elections so initiatives do not introduce an entirely new problem.  
The next indirect effect of direct democracy is to increase the information and political 
engagement in the citizenry. Since direct democracy requires the support of a majority of 
voters, the opponents and proponents of proposals ensure that information concerning the 
decision is widely dispersed and is understood by the public at large. Information 
disseminated in the context of referendums and initiatives helps to increase political 
awareness, increases voter turnout and also increases citizen engagement with interest 
groups.328  
                                                 
326 Blume, Lorenz, Jens Müller, and Stefan Voigt. "The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy—A First Global 
Assessment." Public Choice 140, no. 3-4 (2009): 431-461. 
 
327 Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy Works.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2005): 
185-206 at 192-93. One way to mitigate the threat of government responding to threats of extreme initiatives is 
to require initiatives to be passed twice in consecutive ballots to be effective. This relieves the government from 
the threat of extreme initiatives where they are unsure about the possible result. Under this sort of system, the 
government can ignore extreme initiatives and only worry about measures that came close to the vote 
requirements to get adopted the first time. 
328 Tolbert, Caroline J., Ramona S. McNeal, and Daniel A. Smith. “Enhancing Civic Engagement: The Effect of 
Direct Democracy on Political Participation and Knowledge.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 3, no. 1 (2003): 
23-41. These finding are based on American National Election Studies data for 1996, 1998, and 2000. The 
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The existence of direct democracy provisions also has an impact on the way interest groups 
are organized and how they operate. When decisions are made via representative democracy, 
interest groups with narrow and well-defined interests and limited numbers of influential 
members have an advantage in influencing policy over interest groups with wider, more 
general interests.329 This is because groups with small memberships representing narrow 
economic interests are better able to manage the free rider problem and because there is 
minimal divergence in interest amongst the members.330  
Since direct democracy revolves around public opinion, the influence of broad based interest 
groups that champion causes of general public interest gains importance relative to the 
lobbying power of special economic interests.331 Therefore, direct democracy can have the 
happy consequence of encouraging citizen groups and civic engagement over the influence of 
the lobbying by narrow economic interests. 
This analysis shows that the indirect effects of direct democracy are well understood in both 
corporate and constitutional law scholarship. Both fields of study converge in how they 
understand the impact of the credible threat of direct decision-making by principals on the 
actions of their agents. The agency theory based analysis can, therefore, effectively factor in 
the indirect effect of direct decision-making since it has a similar impact on the motivations 
of both directors and legislators. 
 
5.9 FINDINGS 
Chapter five has shown that the corporate laws of most jurisdictions require the approval of 
shareholders before the board of directors can take certain major corporate decisions such as 
                                                                                                                                                        
authors attribute this to the argument that voting directly to make decisions makes citizens feel empowered and 
responsible for the governance of the country. 
329 Scarrow, Susan E. “Direct Democracy and Institutional Change A Comparative Investigation.” Comparative 
Political Studies 34, no. 6 (2001): 651-665. 
330 Interest groups with small memberships and a narrow interest find it easier to ensure that all the members 
who benefit from the interest group’s activities pay for its work as compared to groups with numerous members 
which have trouble ensuring that all the individuals who benefit from its activities pay a fair share to fund its 
activities.  
331 Boehmke, Frederick J. The Indirect Effect of Direct Legislation: How Institutions Shape Interest Group 
Systems. Ohio State University Press, 2005. 
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mergers, dissolutions etc. On the other hand, corporate laws differ significantly regarding the 
rights of shareholders to initiate decisions. When direct democracy in constitutional systems 
is considered, insights from corporate law strongly favor referendums for major decisions 
such as amending the constitution, joining the European Union etc. This is because 
referendums can minimize agency cost by separating decision management from decision 
control. The status of initiatives which allow citizens to share control of the agenda with 
legislators is more controversial. 
There are situations where agents prefer the status quo, the worse of two positive outcomes or 
where they bundle a self-serving but shareholder value decreasing decision with one that 
increases shareholder value more than the first decreases it. In such situations, it is shown that 
the right to veto enshrined in referendums proves to be of no help at all. This leads to an 
examination of the initiative to see if it fares better at advancing citizen interest.  
Initiatives can help to separate individual decisions from periodic elections. This lets citizens 
take action immediately instead of having to wait for the next election. It also saves them the 
need to deal with the uncertainty that would accompany the replacement of representatives 
just because of a conflict on a single issue. This sharing of decision-making authority by 
citizens can, however, reduce the accountability and the responsibility of the legislature.  
Initiatives also allow citizens to bypass the executive wing of government and express their 
preferences directly to the legislature. This creates a far more effective means for the 
legislature to gauge public preferences than information provided by the executive and from 
the results of periodic elections. 
Initiatives also help to check the gradual yet steady move towards greater agency costs that 
giving sole control of the agenda to agents might entail as the agents seek to increase their 
powers and position. Borrowing from the debate on proxy access, it is proposed that the 
optimal default rule for constitutional law is to provide for referendums and initiatives with 
the option to opt out at a later date. That way, if initiatives are found to have a negative 
influence, they can easily be done away with because both the principals and the agents will 
support such a move. However, if the default does not allow for initiatives when the 
constitution is framed, it is far more difficult for initiatives to be introduced to the 
constitution later if the legislature has sole control of the agenda and is jealous of sharing this 
power with the public.  
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This problem can be solved by introducing penalty defaults. By choosing as the default rule 
the option that is more restrictive on the legislature, the constitution can ensure that 
legislators will have the incentives to propose doing away with the default if it is found to be 
problematic and the citizens will support that proposal. This means that initiatives should be 
provided by default and legislatures charged with reversing this default if it is found that 
initiatives are not reducing agency cost. This is better than starting with a default that does 
not provide for initiatives and finding that the legislators have no incentives to introduce them 
later if the need for initiatives is felt at a later time. 
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6 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS FOR IMPLEMENTING 
INITIATIVES EFFECTIVELY 
 
This chapter examines key issues that are relevant to the success or failure of the initiative 
process and uses corporate governance arguments to cast light on potential pitfalls that are 
likely to arise. The first section examines the incentives of voters to inform themselves 
enough to express their preferences effectively and participate in the initiative process. The 
incentives of citizens are then compared with the incentives of different types of shareholders 
and a study of the use of shareholder proposals by various types of shareholders is used to 
draw insights to improve the use of initiatives in constitutional law. 
Section two discusses the potential for nuisance proposals proposed by certain groups of 
voters (citizens and shareholders) in order to advance their own private interests at the 
expense of the collective interest of other voters. This is followed by section three which 
looks at issues pertaining to information to evaluate whether shareholders have the means to 
get informed about the facts necessary to make informed decisions. This analysis is then 
extended to constitutional law to see if citizens are adequately informed to effectively express 
their preferences. Section four examines the problems of consistency in corporate policy and 
evaluates whether, and to what extent, problems of consistency and long-term planning also 
exist in constitutional law. It then proposes corporate governance solutions that can be 
adapted to minimize agency cost through the use of initiatives. 
The last section looks at the problems of special interests, short termism and black mail. 
These are all problems caused by a difference in the interests of different groups of 
principals. Corporate governance is examined to provide solutions to manage these problems 
in the context of initiatives in constitutional law. 
 
6.1 PROPER INCENTIVES FOR VALUE INCREASING INITIATIVES 
An objection to allowing greater scope for shareholder proposals is that shareholders do not 
have the incentives to bring forth desirable proposals. Unlike a successful proxy contest for 
control of the company that yields monetary and non-monetary rewards in the form of control 
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for the acquiring shareholder, a shareholder proposal does not.332 This is because the benefits 
of a shareholder proposal, if successful, accrue to the company and are distributed amongst 
all shareholders in proportion to their shareholding in the company.  
Furthermore, the supporters of a successful shareholder proposal do not gain control of the 
corporate machinery unlike the winners of a successful proxy battle for seats on the board of 
directors. This means that the supporters of a successful shareholder proposal cannot 
reimburse their expenses ex post.333 This leads to a situation where the costs of the proposal 
are concentrated while the benefits are dispersed. Theoretically, this can lead to a free rider 
problem where no party will make proposals.334 Another reason why shareholder proposals 
may not work is because of the behavior of institutional investors. Besides the free rider 
problem mentioned earlier, institutional investors have incentives to stay on good terms with 
the management and are, therefore, reluctant to interfere with their policies and decisions.335   
Both these problems can also be found in constitutional law. Citizens who propose and work 
to pass initiatives need to expend their own resources to do so. On the other hand, the 
perceived benefits of the initiative are distributed across the population. Unlike political 
elections for the legislature, the proponents of the initiative also have no hope of getting 
direct or indirect monetary or non-monetary windfalls that membership of Parliament might 
bring. There is also no provision in any major democracy known that provides for 
                                                 
332 See section 3.1.1. In short, a proxy is an authorization from a shareholder to the holder of the proxy enabling 
the holder to exercise the voting rights the shareholder is entitled to in a shareholder meeting.   
333 The free rider problem is not automatically eliminated in the context of takeovers. Other shareholders have 
an incentive to let the acquirer expend resources to gain control of the company and improve shareholder value 
while reaping the benefits of the acquirers actions at no cost to themselves. For a detailed discussion, please see 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. “Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem, and the Theory of the 
Corporation.” The Bell Journal of Economics (1980): 42-64; Holmström, Bengt, and Barry Nalebuff. “To The 
Raider Goes The Surplus? A Reexaminationof the Free?Rider Problem.” Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy 1, no. 1 (1992): 37-62; Harrington, Joseph E., and Jacek Prokop. “The Dynamics of the Free-rider 
Problem in Takeovers.” Review of Financial Studies 6, no. 4 (1993): 851-882 and Cohen, Lloyd. “Holdouts and 
Free Riders.” The Journal of Legal Studies 20, no. 2 (1991): 351-362. 
334 Bainbridge, Stephen. “Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, The.” UClA l. reV. 53 (2005): 601 at 
633. See Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, and Marcel Kahan. “A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy 
Contests.” California Law Review (1990): 1071-1135 at 1127 for a discussion on the incentives of shareholder 
to make useful proposals in issue contests (not related to particular director elections).  
335 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 876. See also Bainbridge, Stephen. “Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, The.” UClA l. reV. 53 
(2005): 601  at 632-33. 
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reimbursement of expenses even in the case of successful initiatives, let alone unsuccessful 
ones. 
Furthermore, just as institutional investors are wary of conflict with the management and, 
therefore, conservative in their opposition, super agents like labor unions, organizations for 
ethnic minorities etc. may also have much to lose by antagonizing the government by 
interfering through initiatives. For example, large institutional investors like insurance 
companies and banks may be hesitant to oppose the management of a company they hold 
shares in due to fear of losing insurance or banking business from the firm. Similarly, super 
agents like Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) who get part or all of their funding 
from the government might be hesitant to propose initiatives that seriously upset the 
government and may result in a retaliatory budget cuts.  
“Under conditions of widely dispersed information and the need for speed in decisions, 
authoritative control at the tactical level is essential for success.”336 This argument of 
Professor Arrow stipulates that using a cost benefit analysis, shareholders and citizens can 
only be expected to gather information required to make informed decisions if the perceived 
benefits exceed the effort. According to Professor Bainbridge, the costs of collecting and 
understanding this information will be especially high. This is due to the large number of 
complex disclosures, which are the source of most publically available corporate information 
and the cost of acquiring the specialist skills required to analyze them. On the other hand, the 
perceived benefits are likely to be low because there is a chance that the proposal will not be 
adopted. Even if the proposal is adopted, the benefits, unlike the costs, will be distributed 
amongst all the shareholders.337 This will lead to shareholders delegating decision-making 
authority to the board of directors to ensure the long term maximization of shareholder 
value.338 
The argument for increasing shareholder decision-making presupposes that shareholders seek 
more information than is made available to them and that they want to be more involved with 
                                                 
336 Arrow, K. E. The Limits of Organization. Norton, 1974 at 69. 
337 Bainbridge, Stephen. “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment.” Harvard Law Review 119 
(2006): 1735-2644 at 1745. 
338 Bainbridge, Stephen. “Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, The.” UClA l. reV. 53 (2005): 601 at 
624. 
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the decision-making of the company.339 This is countered by advocates of the director centric 
approach who argue that shareholders do not have the time, the skills or the incentives 
required to analyze relevant information. Furthermore, the director centric approach argues 
that shareholders can be misled into voting against their interests if the information available 
to them is not carefully regulated.340 
This dilemma is addressed by Professor Bebchuk in the context of corporate governance. He 
argues that the cost of initiating proposals that are clearly value enhancing and enjoy 
widespread support amongst shareholders will be low because they would require relatively 
little effort in the form of campaigning and soliciting proxies. Since these are exactly the sort 
of proposals that are desired for minimizing agency cost, the objection that shareholders will 
not bear the cost of initiating proposals loses some ground.  
Additionally, even though shareholder proposals are mostly precatory i.e. non-binding, and 
are often ignored, they are still regularly put forward in a large number of companies showing 
that shareholders do have an interest in direct decision-making.341 If shareholders expend 
energy and resources to put forward resolutions that are not binding and are often ignored 
year after year, it can be reasoned that there will be even greater support for an even greater 
number of resolutions if they were binding and shareholders were convinced of their efficacy. 
This argument, however, does not answer all the criticism of shareholder decision-making 
and further analysis is required. 
The information condition in Professor Arrow’s analysis also merits further comment. The 
information required for making business decisions is indeed highly specialized and difficult 
for the common man to understand as far as it applies to a specific company, the business it 
                                                 
339 See Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 
833-914 and Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 
The.” Case W. Res. L. Rev. 55 (2004): 557. 
340 Strine, Leo E. “Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for 
Improving Corporate America.” Harvard Law Review 119, no. 6 (2006): 1759-1783; Bainbridge, Stephen. 
“Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, The.” UClA l. reV. 53 (2005): 601; Bainbridge, Stephen. 
“Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment.” Harvard Law Review 119 (2006): 1735-2644; 
Bainbridge, Stephen M. “Why a Board-Group Decision-making in Corporate Governance.” Vand. L. Rev. 55 
(2002): 1. 
341 Supra note 361 at 877. “In 2003, 427 precatory resolutions took place, with an average participation rate of 
more than eighty percent of all outstanding shares.” 
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pursues and the market conditions affecting its business.342  However, when a proposal is 
tabled as a ballot initiative in the political context, it is likely to receive wide media attention, 
be directly related to the lives of voters and is sure to receive endorsement and disapproval 
from various trusted sources. This has a dramatic effect on both the quantity and veracity of 
the information available to the voters and must be considered when addressing the 
information condition in Professor Arrow’s analysis.   
Till now, this section has looked at whether or not shareholders have the proper incentives to 
get informed in order to propose, vote on and adopt value-enhancing shareholder proposals to 
minimize agency cost and how this translates to the constitutional context. This argument, 
however, needs to be substantiated by a look at how shareholders respond to shareholder 
proposals in the real world. The following discussion examines how US investors have 
responded to their ability to mount shareholder proposals. In particular, the following sub-
sections examine different types of shareholders, their varying interests and look at how they 
react to shareholder proposals. 
 
6.1.1 Individual Shareholder Activists 
Historically, the most visible exercise of direct decision-making by shareholders has been by 
individual shareholders. These wealthy individuals acquire a sizable stake in a company and 
then lobby for value enhancing changes by means of direct democracy provisions and other 
means.343 Good examples of such shareholders in recent years are investors like Carl Icahn 
and Kirk Kerkorian.344 The relatively small proportion of stock owned by individuals in light 
of the trend towards ever increasing institutional ownership has made this sort of activism 
less important in recent years. However, a considerable exercise of direct democracy by 
                                                 
342 Arrow, K. E. The Limits of Organization. Norton, 1974. 
343 Yermack, David. "Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance." Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 2, no. 1 
(2010): 103-125. 
344 Both Carl Icahn and Kirk Kerkorian are famous ‘corporate raiders’ known for heavily leveraged buyouts 
(taking lots of debt to buy control of the target company) and accusations of asset stripping (selling assets of the 
acquired company to repay the debt taken on to acquire the company). Mr. Icahn and Kerkorian are now 
increasingly being regarded as activist investors rather than being the corporate raiders they became famous for 
in the 1980’s. See Katelouzou, Dionysia. “Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical 
Evidence.” Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 7 (2013): 459-561. 
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individual shareholders can be seen empirically in data collected by Professors Gillan and 
Starks for a somewhat earlier period.  
Between 1987 to 1994, a total of 2,042 shareholder proposals were put forward by 
shareholders out of which 1,277 proposals were initiated by individual shareholders with 
institutional shareholders following with 463 proposals.345 It is, therefore, noted that 
individual investors are very important users of direct decision-making provisions in 
corporate law. Later analysis will show how this, together with the behavior of other types of 
shareholders, can help to understand the behavior of citizens in initiatives. 
 
6.1.2 Mutual Funds and Pension Funds 
According to Professor Jensen, the downturn in takeover activity in the 1990’s has 
diminished the effect of the market for corporate control in reducing agency costs.346 Due to 
this, a number of shareholders have demonstrated an interest in influencing the strategy of the 
companies they hold stock in. Since large shareholders are able to capture a large share of the 
value generated by positive changes to the company’s strategy through shareholder action, 
they suffer the least from the free rider problem inherent in such activity.347  
However, mutual funds and corporate pension funds have had limited involvement in 
shareholder activism.348As in the case of individual activist shareholders like Carl Icahn and 
Kirk Kerkorian, institutional investors are not free from the free rider problem which is a 
natural consequence of owning less than 100% ownership of stock. Similarly, they also have 
                                                 
345 See Table 2 in Gillan, Stuart L., and Laura T. Starks. “Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder 
Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors.” Journal of Financial Economics 57, no. 2 (2000): 275-305 at 
283. Of the 1366 proposals credited to individual shareholders in this table, 54 were initiated by religious groups 
and 35 by unidentified shareholders. Accordingly, the actual figure is lower and is actually 1277. 
346 See Jensen, Michael C. “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems.” The Journal of Finance 48, no. 3 (1993): 831-880. 
347 Gillan, Stuart L., and Laura T. Starks. “Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The 
Role of Institutional Investors.” Journal of Financial Economics 57, no. 2 (2000): 275-305 at 279. Shareholder 
activists have to bear the entire cost of activism. However, being a large investor reduces the free rider problem 
since a large shareholder gets a correspondingly large proportion of the benefits which might be big enough to 
offset the requirement of internalizing the entire cost of activism.  
348 Supra note 369 at 117. 
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no means of compensating themselves even if successful unlike the case involving a contest 
for control. 
One reason for this and the consequent lack of enthusiasm for shareholder activism by mutual 
funds and corporate pension funds are legally mandated diversification requirements. This 
means that the law ensures that such investors can only get a small proportion of the benefit 
in case of successful shareholder activism while bearing all of the costs. In other words, laws 
requiring diversification do not permit mutual funds and corporate pension funds to acquire 
holding large enough that their pro rata share of the benefit would be sufficient to offset the 
cost of activism. 
The case of public pension funds is somewhat different. Public pension funds like CalPERS 
have been active since 1987 in sponsoring proposals that call for improved corporate 
governance.349 This move has picked up since 1992 when the SEC made coordination 
between institutional investors easier and public pension funds have subsequently emerged as 
key activist shareholders.350 Research by Professor Wahal also shows that public pension 
funds have moved from supporting takeover related proxy proposals in the late 1980’s to 
supporting governance related proposals in the 1990’s.351 
What is the reason for this? Why do public pension funds buck the trend prevalent amongst 
other shareholders of being deterred by the free rider problem? Professors Gillan and Stark 
offer an answer. They argue that pension funds often find it difficult to sell underperforming 
stocks due to the fact that they are required to index a large proportion of their portfolios. The 
locking-in of the pension fund’s investment into the fortunes and future performance of 
specific companies gives public pension funds an incentive to pursue activist behavior.352  
                                                 
349 CalPERS is the organization that manages the pensions funds of California’s public employees. See section 
6.1.2.  
350 Supra note 369 at 118; Choi, Stephen J., and Jill E. Fisch. "On Beyond Calpers: Survey Evidence on the 
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance." Vand. L. Rev.61 (2008): 315. 
351 See Table 2 in Wahal, Sunil. “Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance.” Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 31, no. 01 (1996): 1-23 at 9. This contention is confirmed in Black, Bernard. “Shareholder 
Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States.” as published in the New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law 3 (1998): 459-465. 
352 See Supra note 373 at 278. “The level of indexing in public pension funds is reflected by their very low 
turnover. CalPERS has annual turnover in its equity holdings of approximately 10% and the New York 
Retirement funds have annual turnover of about 7% of total equity.” 
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The other reason offered is that public pension funds face a lower conflict of interest than 
other institutional investors because they do not need to worry about getting business from 
the companies they hold stock in.353 The last reason, of course, is that the leadership of such 
funds sometimes use shareholder activism to advance their political objectives.354  
The activities of public pension funds have been notably successful in bringing about 
governance reforms through negotiations or after gaining considerable shareholder support in 
terms of votes in the Annual General Meeting.355 However, these reforms have not led to a 
clear increase in value for the companies targeted in terms of market capitalization.356 
6.1.3 Hedge Funds 
As demonstrated above, the track record of large shareholders with diversified investment is 
not very encouraging. Even in the case of public pension funds, the results are mixed at best. 
In order to advocate the use of principal initiated proposals for the constitutional setup, an 
example of its successful use in the corporate context seems important. The case of hedge 
funds provides such an example.357  
                                                 
353 Black, Bernard. “Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States.” as published in the 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 3 (1998): 459-465. 
354 Romano, Roberta. “Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered.” Columbia Law 
Review 93, no. 4 (1993): 795-853. See the controversy surrounding the alleged misuse of CalPERS (California’s 
public employees’ pension fund) by its chief executive, Mr. Phil Angelides to advance his political ambitions.  
355 English II, Philip C., Thomas I. Smythe, and Chris R. McNeil. “The “CalPERS effect” Revisited.” Journal of 
Corporate Finance 10, no. 1 (2004): 157-174; Wahal, Sunil. “Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance.” 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, no. 01 (1996): 1-23; Ertimur, Yonca, Fabrizio Ferri, and 
Stephen R. Stubben. “Board of Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder 
Proposals.” Journal of Corporate Finance 16, no. 1 (2010): 53-72.  
356 Crutchley, Claire E., Carl D. Hudson, and Marlin RH Jensen. “Shareholder Wealth Effects of 
CalPERS’Activism.” Financial Services Review 7, no. 1 (1998): 1-10; Nesbitt, Stephen L. “Long-term Rewards 
from Shareholder Activism: A Study of the “CalPERS Effect”.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 6, no. 4 
(1994): 75-80; Barber, Brad M. “Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS’ Activism.” The Journal of 
Investing 16, no. 4 (2007): 66-80; Karpoff, Jonathan. “The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target 
Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings.” Available at SSRN 885365 (2001).  
357 See Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas. “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Performance.” The Journal of Finance 63, no. 4 (2008): 1729-1775. The authors posit 
that hedge funds can generally be said to have four characteristics: (1) they are pooled, privately organized 
investment vehicles; (2) they are administered by professional investment managers with performance-based 
compensation and significant investments in the fund; (3) they are not widely available to the public; and (4) 
they operate outside of securities regulation and registration requirements. More specifically, hedge funds avoid 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 by having a relatively small number of sophisticated investors. 
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A series of empirical studies report very high success rates for hedge fund sponsored 
shareholder proposals that have allowed hedge funds to have their reforms adopted by the 
targeted companies.358 Moreover, these reforms often lead to permanent improvements in 
shareholder value.359 
The key factors responsible for the success of hedge funds to effectively use shareholder 
proposals are the lack of diversification requirements, higher performance expectations of 
investors from hedge fund managers and the ability to invest in illiquid securities that allow 
greater secrecy and flexibility. Other factors identified as being responsible are high leverage 
and empty voting strategies360 as well as the eventual takeovers of targeted companies.361 
                                                 
358 See Klein, April, and Emanuel Zur. Hedge Fund Activism. (2006); Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, 
and Randall Thomas. “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance.” The Journal of 
Finance 63, no. 4 (2008): 1729-1775. (looking at data from Schedule 13D filings from 2001 to 2006); Clifford, 
Christopher Patrick. Hedge Fund Activism. ProQuest, 2008. (looking at data from Schedule 13D filings from 
1998 to 2005); Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas. “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Performance.” The Journal of Finance 63, no. 4 (2008): 1729-1775 (looking at data from 
Schedule 13D filings from 2001 to 2005) 
NOTE: SEC Schedule 13D filings are used to measure hedge fund activism since they indicate when the hedge 
fund acquires 5% or greater shareholding in the company and may also indicate specific goals behind the 
acquisition of shares and proposed future actions. 
359 Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and Randall S. Thomas. “The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism.” 
Financial Analysts Journal (2008): 45-61. (looking at data from 2001 to 2006); Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, and 
Hyunseob Kim. “Hedge Fund Activism: A Review.” Foundations and Trends in Finance 4, no. 3 (2009); 
Yermack, David. "Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance." Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 2, no. 1 (2010): 
103-125 at 119. It should be noted that while Professor Klein’s many papers suggest a positive impact of hedge 
fund activism on shareholder value (especially around the time of the filing of SEC Schedule 13D (when the 
hedge fund acquires 5% of voting rights), he shows that it has a negative impact on bond holder’s wealth. See 
Klein, April, and Emanuel Zur. “The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm’s Existing 
Bondholders.” Review of Financial Studies 24, no. 5 (2011): 1735-1771. Since only shareholders are considered 
principals within the framework of this dissertation, this is not immediately relevant but must be considered 
when examining the impact of direct democracy on non-voting constituents such as foreign trading partners, 
neighboring countries, disenfranchised felons etc. 
360 See Ringe, Georg. “Empty Voting Revisited: The Telus Saga.” Butterworths Journal of International 
Banking and Financial Law (2013): 154-156. Empty voting strategies refer to a process by which activist 
shareholders separate their economic risk from the value of their shares. This is done through different types of 
hedging arrangements, for example. Once the risk and voting rights have been separated, the activist 
shareholders can use their voting rights to further their agenda free from the risk of loss if share prices were to 
go down as a result.  
361 Infra note 390 at 119. See also Kahan, Marcel, and Rock, Edward B., “Hedge Funds in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2007): 1021-1093 and Klein, 
April, and Emanuel Zur. Hedge Fund Activism. (2006).  
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Professors Kahan and Rock identify two objections to the role of hedge funds.362 First, that 
hedge funds’ interests may differ from those of other shareholders and second, that their 
intense activism may overburden the regulatory system.363 However, the analysis rightly 
concludes as follows: “The resulting concerns, however, are relatively isolated and narrow, 
do not undermine the value of hedge fund activism as a whole, and do not warrant major 
additional regulatory interventions.” Similarly, these concerns are not sufficient to 
meaningfully impact the comparative analysis that forms the basis of this dissertation. This is 
because appropriate threshold requirements for signatures in support of petitions for 
initiatives can keep the number of proposals to a manageable number as explained later in 
this chapter. 
 
6.1.4 Social Activists 
Social activists have used shareholder proposals to raise social, environmental and political 
issues receiving an average of 15.4% voting support as of 2007.364 Many of the proposals 
tabled by such shareholders have nothing to do with increasing shareholder value and in some 
cases would have the opposite effect if adopted.365 As such, they serve as means of gaining 
publicity for a certain cause and for putting the issue on the agenda of the company’s 
shareholders and board of directors. 
                                                 
362 Kahan, Marcel, and Edward B. Rock. “Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control.” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2007): 1021-1093 at 1022. 
363 See Black Jr, Lewis S., and A. Gilchrist Sparks III. “SEC as Referee-Shareholder Proposals and Rule 14a-8, 
The.” J. Corp. L. 2 (1976): 1. A large number of shareholder proposals has the potential to swamp the SEC 
because the SEC must determine whether or not to issue no-objection letters regarding the decisions of various 
companies not to include the shareholder proposals in the board’s proxy. 
364 Yermack, David. "Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance." Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 2, no. 1 
(2010): 103-125. 
365 See Guay, Terrence, Jonathan P. Doh, and Graham Sinclair. “Non-governmental Organizations, Shareholder 
Activism, and Socially Responsible Investments: Ethical, Strategic, and Governance Implications.” Journal of 
Business Ethics 52, no. 1 (2004): 125-139 and Tkac, Paula. “One Proxy at a Time: Pursuing Social Change 
Through Shareholder Proposals.” Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 91, no. 3 (2006): 1. A 
large number of socially motivated shareholder proposals want the company to cease a profitable but socially 
harmful activity or want the company to pursue a socially useful activity at the cost of shareholder value. See for 
example State of Minnesota ex rel. Charles A. Pillsbury v. Honeywell Inc. 191 N.W.2d 406 (1971). In this case, 
the plaintiff shareholders put forward a shareholder proposal asking Honeywell Inc. to cease the manufacture of 
napalm which was being used by the US military against civilians in Vietnam. While this was a socially well 
motivated proposal, it proposed social benefit at the cost of corporate profits.  
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These proposals are usually withdrawn after negotiations and compromise with the board and 
very rarely receive majority support in the shareholders meeting.366 
 
6.1.5  Analysis 
An examination of the different results of shareholder activism by different types of investors 
presents important findings for constitutional law. It is clear that shareholders who are 
relatively less diversified such as hedge funds and individual shareholder activists are more 
successful in countering the free rider problem which is responsible for the disappointing use 
of shareholder proposals by other types of shareholders such as mutual funds. Diversified 
investors like mutual funds are not only discouraged by the pro-rata distribution of the 
benefits of reform but by the fact that their investment in individual companies is too small a 
portion of their portfolio to warrant the attention and effort. This shows that if shareholders 
are able to concentrate their portfolio to just a few companies, their high stake and high 
returns will allow them to overcome the free rider problem as is seen in the case of hedge 
funds and sometimes with individual shareholder activists. 
In the constitutional scenario, all citizens can be assumed to be entirely non-diversified. This 
is because the vast majority of citizens have their freedom and fortune linked to the 
conditions in their country. After all, the average citizen cannot hedge the risk of poor 
economic, social and political performance by getting the citizenship of multiple countries or 
owning property internationally. As discussed earlier, citizens find it much harder to ‘vote 
with their feet’ since immigration is exponentially harder than selling shares in a large public 
company for the vast majority of people.367  
It is much easier to hedge company risk by investing in multiple companies than it is to 
hedging the risk of bad governance by getting multiple citizenships. In fact, may countries do 
not allow their citizens to accept the citizenship of another country without giving up their 
original citizenship. Accordingly, citizens can be expected to behave more like hedge funds 
as compared to mutual funds which only have a few percentage points of their portfolio 
                                                 
366 David, Parthiban, Matt Bloom, and Amy J. Hillman. “Investor Activism, Managerial Responsiveness, and 
Corporate Social Performance.” Strategic Management Journal 28, no. 1 (2007): 91-100. 
367 See section 3.4.2.  
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linked to the fortunes of any one company. This means that citizens and ‘super agents’,368 
such as political parties, civic action groups, environmental groups, religious groups etc. 
which only operate in a single country can be expected to have incentives akin to hedge funds 
or individual investor activists such as Carl Icahn. In fact, they can be considered to be 
relatively even less diversified than hedge funds or individual investor activists and treated as 
entirely undiversified in most circumstances. Accordingly, citizens and their super agents can 
be expected to have even stronger incentives than hedge funds or big individual investors in 
taking beneficial direct democratic action. Furthermore, since citizens, political parties, civic 
groups etc. all have their interests permanently intertwined with the fortunes of their country, 
the criticism of hedge funds as being short term result oriented also does not apply in the 
constitutional setup.369     
The publicity issue is not without importance to this discussion. While corporate governance 
scholars have criticized social activism through shareholder proposals as a means of using 
company funds to publicize private concerns, this is not as much of a problem in the 
constitutional space. Sufficiently high requirements in terms of signatures for a petition to be 
placed on the ballot along with other such checks and measures can ensure that fringe ideas 
would be excluded. On the other hand, a successful democracy needs to ensure that all issues 
dear to a significant portion of the population are debated and publicized even if they are not 
acted upon by the majority. Accordingly, the use of public funds to place these proposals on 
the ballot and at the same time requiring that private funds are used for actively canvassing 
the proposal seems to be a fair compromise. 
For example, two of the most publicized instances of social activism through shareholder 
proposals were to stop companies from manufacturing napalm for use on Vietnamese citizens 
and doing business with apartheid South Africa.370 While the merit of using corporate funds 
                                                 
368 See section 1.7 for a discussion on the role of super agents on direct as well as delegated decision-making. 
369 See section 6.5 for a discussion about dealing with short term versus long term planning in corporate and 
constitutional law. 
370 See State of Minnesota ex rel. Charles A. Pillsbury v. Honeywell Inc. 191 N.W.2d 406 (1971) regarding the 
shareholder proposal against continuing to manufacture and supply napalm to the US military. For examples of 
shareholder proposals being used to boycott the apartheid regime in South Africa, see O’Rourke, Anastasia. “A 
New Politics of Engagement: Shareholder Activism for Corporate Social Responsibility.” Business Strategy and 
the Environment 12, no. 4 (2003): 227-239; Proffitt, W. Trexler, and Andrew Spicer. “Shaping the Shareholder 
Activism Agenda: Institutional Investors and Global Social Issues.” Strategic Organization 4, no. 2 (2006): 165-
190 and Ryan, Patrick J. “Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy.” Ga. L. 
Rev. 23 (1988): 97.   
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to gain publicity for such activities remains controversial, few objections can be raised 
against spending public money to place such proposals on the ballot in political elections 
especially if the advocates of the initiative bear the cost of campaigning for their adoption. 
While shareholder proposals are criticized for pushing social, political and environmental 
agendas, these are precisely the sorts of issues that are suitable for initiatives as provided 
under constitutional law. Of course, reimbursing the costs of successful initiatives remains an 
option that would perhaps make the use of ballot initiatives even more effective by improving 
the incentives for advocating initiatives on popular issues. 
This section has demonstrated that citizens, like hedge funds, individual activist shareholders 
and oftentimes public pension funds have sufficient incentives to engage in direct decision-
making even though they have to bear its entire cost. The section also shows that the free 
rider problem can be overcome if the principals are sufficiently undiversified and have a large 
stake in the company. Since the citizens of a country have their future wellbeing (and their 
children’s future wellbeing) heavily dependent on the social, economic and political 
performance of their own country, they can be considered to be entirely undiversified and 
heavily invested in those counties. Taking a cue from the corporate governance position 
explained in this section, it is argued that they will have sufficient incentives to engage in 
direct democracy in an informed fashion. Of course, it should be noted that just like different 
types of shareholders have different incentives to monitor their agents and engage in direct 
democracy, different groups of citizens can also have different incentives and differing 
responses to direct democracy. The arguments made here only apply to the broad class of 
citizens and there are exceptions to the rule. 
 
6.2 NUISANCE PROPOSALS 
Advocates against increased shareholder voting rights argue that shareholder proposals have 
the potential to waste the time and resources of both shareholders and management by 
allowing self-serving shareholders to make proposals that do not increase shareholder value. 
This wastes resources because shareholders will have to vote down such proposals and the 
management would have to expend resources to campaign against them.371 Unlike the free 
                                                 
371 Palmiter, Alan R. “Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, The.” Ala. L. Rev. 
45 (1993): 879. 
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rider problem that might dis-incentivize shareholders from initiating shareholder proposals, 
they argue that distributing the cost of publicizing proposals and then voting upon them also 
creates a serious problem. 
In such circumstances, shareholders may use corporate machinery to broadcast their private 
views that do not have the potential to increase shareholder value thereby imposing costs 
upon the rest of the principals.372 In other words, allowing shareholder activism at no cost to 
the activist obliges the company to finance the private activism of its shareholders on matters 
not relevant to corporate performance or related to minimizing agency cost. 
These objections may also be raised in the constitutional system. However, while such 
objections are not baseless, they can be adequately addressed by designing the initiative 
process appropriately. An examination of solutions to prevent such a problem in corporate 
governance may prove instructive. Professor Bebchuk provides the following solutions:373 
1. Threshold signature requirements to screen out frivolous proposals that do not enjoy 
support amongst a sizable proportion of the shareholders. 
2. Barring readmission of proposals that failed to garner a specified threshold of support 
in a previous year. 
3. Requiring a majority of outstanding shares to approve proposals rather than a majority 
of voting shares. 
4. Requiring that a proposal be adopted in two successive meeting before it is adopted. 
Of these solutions, the first two can be adapted to constitutional initiatives without any 
problem and they will help to reduce frivolous initiatives. By adopting sufficiently high 
threshold signature requirements for a petition to be put on the ballot, the problem of 
nuisance proposals can be alleviated to a significant extent since the nuisance proposals will 
have a hard time attracting the requisite signatures. Additionally, prohibiting the readmission 
of proposals that did not receive a specified proportion of votes cast in consecutive years 
ensures that even fringe proposals that can meet the signature requirement do not have to be 
voted on every year. 
                                                 
372 Liebeler, Susan W. “Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, A.” Ga. L. Rev. 18 (1983): 425 at 
425-26. 
373 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 879-80. 
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Adapting the last two proposals to fit constitutional law is a little more complicated. Since 
voter turnout differs vastly across jurisdictions, a requirement of approval by a majority of 
registered voters might make any initiative impossible to adopt. Professor Bebchuk’s idea 
does, however, have applicability in countries that have compulsory voting for legislative 
elections like Brazil and Australia.  
In such jurisdictions, initiative proposals are often bundled together with the elections for 
choosing legislators in order to save time and money. This way the same election 
infrastructure can serve both ends because voters cast their vote for their choice of 
representative as well as their vote on the initiative proposal during the same visit to the 
polling booth. Requiring a majority of votes cast in the legislative election in support of the 
ballot initiative has the benefit of allowing citizens who oppose the initiative to express their 
disapproval by not voting yes or no for the initiative when they vote for their representatives. 
This solution negates the claim that a burden will be placed on citizens since the only people 
who have to do anything are the people who support the proposal. The citizens who do not 
support the initiative can oppose it by doing nothing with respect to it. It should be noted that 
for this solution to work, voting for the legislative election must be mandatory but voting for 
the ballot initiative bundled with that election must be optional.  
The idea of requiring approval in two successive votes before an initiative takes effect is also 
worth considering in the constitutional setting. This requirement has the advantage of helping 
the government to save time and resources that would otherwise be spent campaigning 
against a detrimental proposal just because there is a small chance that it might get passed. In 
fact, Professor Matsusaka has suggested exactly the same solution for constitutional law.374 
This allows the government to gauge the will of the electorate and gives it ample time to 
campaign against the proposal’s adoption till the second vote takes place. Consequently, a 
two-step approval requirement prevents the government and indeed the citizens from being 
taken by surprise. It also introduces a measure of caution and consideration into the initiative 
process. This has a positive effect as minimum resources have to be expended to defeat fringe 
proposals. 
                                                 
374 Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy Works.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2005): 
185-206 at 192-93. One way to mitigate the threat of government responding to threats of extreme initiatives is 
to require initiatives to be passed twice in consecutive ballots to be effective. This relieves the government from 
the threat of extreme initiatives where they are unsure about the possible result. Under this sort of system, the 
government can ignore extreme initiatives and only worry about measures that came close to the vote 
requirements to get adopted the first time. 
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In conclusion, this section advocates that initiative proposals must be required to meet 
threshold signature requirements to screen out frivolous proposals that are not supported by a 
sizable proportion of the citizens. Proposals that do not meet a specified threshold of support 
when voted on as an initiative should be barred from being readmitted the next year. And 
lastly, nuisance proposals can be greatly deterred by mandating that proposals must be 
adopted twice, in successive initiatives in order to take effect.  
 
6.3 IMPERFECT INFORMATION  
This section discusses the relationship between the information available with principals and 
the effectiveness of direct democracy. 
One of the primary challenges for direct democracy is the free rider problem which suggests 
that voters will remain rationally ignorant of the vast and oftentimes complex and technical 
information required for educated and effective policy making. The natural corollary of this 
statement is that direct democracy would lead to less efficient outcomes than delegated 
decision-making by representatives. This is because representatives have access to the 
specialized human capital required to analyze the specialized information necessary to make 
those decisions which is absent amongst the principals.375 
It is conceded that principals (shareholders and citizens) lack some of the specialized and 
complex information that may be important to informed decision-making. Furthermore, 
principals also lack the appropriate incentives to inform themselves since they bear the cost 
of information gathering and processing but do not capture the perceived benefits which are 
distributed to the company or country as a whole.376  
There are, however, notable exceptions to this. It is argued that this perceived information 
asymmetry does not hamper the ability of citizens to make ‘rules of the game’ decisions 
because such decisions often do not require specialized information. For example, 
referendums on issues like religion, gay rights, euthanasia etc. are issues of collective social 
                                                 
375 Id at 193; See also Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. “The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in 
Government.” The American Economic Review 94, no. 4 (2004): 1034-1054. 
376 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on 
Charter Amendments.” Harvard Law Review (1989): 1820-1860 at 1836-40. 
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conscience and may not require much specialized information.377 According to Professor 
Matsusaka, the liberal use of referendums on European integration is a result of this approach 
because the consequences of consolidation of authority in Europe are widely dispersed and 
difficult for the legislature to fully capture in its analysis.378  
Furthermore, there is no bar on the legislature disseminating the specialized information that 
it has while arguing either for or against the initiative.  In fact, this may lead to situations 
where citizen are faced with an initiative where the legislature, having better information but 
worse incentives, faces off against a citizen group with worse information but better 
incentives. In such a situation, initiatives allow citizens to weight between these two options 
and to make a considered choice.379 
If for some reasons the required information is sensitive or secret, the legislature can express 
this to the electorate and give its recommendations without disclosing the information. How 
much consideration the citizens will have for such recommendations depends upon the trust 
the citizens have in the legislature. If the legislators are not trusted by the citizens, depriving 
the citizens of the right to initiate policy will concentrate power with untrusted agents leading 
to increased agency costs not to mention an erosion of democracy. Since few rules of the 
game decisions require secret information, leaving it up to the government to release suitable 
information and to ask the citizens to trust them as far as protected information is concerned 
will enable informed decision-making and be suitable for dealing with such issues.  
                                                 
377 Matsusaka, John G. “The Eclipse of Legislatures: Direct Democracy in the 21st Century.” Public Choice 
124, no. 1-2 (2005): 157-177 at 163. 
 
378 Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy Works.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2005): 
185-206 at 193. For example, France (1972), Ireland (1973), Norway (1973) and Denmark (1973) held 
referendums to decide whether to join the European Communities. The UK held a referendum in 1974 to decide 
whether or not to remain a member. Ireland (1992), France (1992) and Denmark (1992 and 1993) held 
referendums to decide whether or not to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. In 1995, Austria, Finland, Sweden and 
Norway held referendums on joining the EU. In 1998, Ireland and Denmark held referendums to decide whether 
to ratify the Treaty of Amsterdam. In 2001, Ireland refused to ratify and in 2002 agreed to ratify the Treaty of 
Nice through referendums. In 2004, Malta, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia and 
Latvia all held referendums to decide whether or not to join the EU. In 2000 and 2003, Denmark and Sweden 
respectively held referendums to decide whether or not to join the Eurozone. In 2005, Spain, France, The 
Netherlands and Luxembourg held referendum to decide whether or not to ratify the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. Ireland had a referendum as late as 2008 to decide on the ratification of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
379 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 881-82. 
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When specialized and esoteric rather than secret information is involved, citizens, like 
shareholders can rely on cues to vote on issues on which they are inadequately informed. 380 
For example, proxy advisory services like ISS and Glass, Lewis& Co. provide 
recommendations for director elections and also give recommendations regarding which way 
to vote on shareholder proposals.381 The same can be said of organizations like political 
parties, which help citizens select representatives and also provide cues for referendums and 
initiatives by their endorsement or criticism. In fact, empirical research has shown that voters 
in California can accept or reject esoteric insurance-related propositions based on whether or 
not they are in their best interests with a great deal of accurately by just looking at the 
endorsement or criticism given by trusted individuals or organizations.382  
It can even be argued that voting to select a candidate while unaware of his or her position on 
a vast range of complex matters in regular elections requires more information if the citizens 
are to make an informed decision. Voters rely on the use of cues from reliable sources to 
make their choice in all elections for the legislature. In this respect, direct democracy will 
work similarly to representative democracy.  
In addition to the use of cues for voting intelligently even when uninformed of the specific 
information behind a proposal, the numerous and dispersed voters of corporate and 
constitutional democracies alike also benefit from the influence of the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem383 to give voice to the majority view.  The Condorcet Jury Theorem operates as 
follows: Voters must choose between choices A and B where one choice is better than the 
other. Each individual voter has a chance just marginally higher than 50% of making the 
correct decision based on the information available to him. In such a case, the Condorcet Jury 
                                                 
380 ‘Cues’ refers to signals voters receive from their super agents such as political parties, civic groups, NGOs 
etc. These signals usually in the form of support or criticism of a certain policy enables voters to vote to further 
their interests without having to understand all the issues required to make an informed decision by themselves. 
381 Verdam, Albert. “An Exploration of the Role of Proxy Advisors in Proxy Voting.” Available at SSRN 
978835 (2006) and Rose, Paul. “On the Role and Regulation of Proxy Advisors.” Michigan Law Review First 
Impressions 109 (2010): 62. See also http://www.issgovernance.com/ and http://www.glasslewis.com/ for a list 
of their activities. 
382 Lupia, Arthur. “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance 
Reform Elections.” American Political Science Review (1994): 63-76. 
383 See de Caritat, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas. Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des 
décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. L’imprimerie royale, 1785. Note: Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de 
Caritat was the Marquis of Condorcet (Marquis de Condorcet), France. He was also known as Nicolas de 
Condorcet. 
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Theorem states that as the number of voters increase, the probability of the correct option 
being chosen in the election approaches 100%. Adapting the theorem for the purposes of the 
issue at hand, it can be said that a multitude of voters receiving some information instructive 
to making a decision optimal for them will be able to do so. This is because “aggregating the 
opinions of a million voters can be highly accurate by the law of large numbers even if each 
person's chance of being right is small”. This is true as long as the policy disagreements are 
caused by differing information being available to them rather than different underlying 
preferences.384  
Accordingly, even if informational problems do not allow voters to make fully informed 
decisions, the law of large numbers will guide the majority decision towards the median 
preferences of the body politic in both companies and in countries. However, some decisions 
that require specialized and technical information like food and water safety standards should 
be left to experts. Interestingly, evidence suggests that in jurisdictions with provisions for 
initiatives, representative decision-making by legislators focuses on technical issues while 
initiatives are largely restricted to issues which are decided on the basis of dispersed 
information and social and personal values.385 
Corporate governance researchers have also recognized the importance of the Internet in 
informing principals in a manner not previously possible. “Increased access to the internet for 
investors and shareholder activists has coincided with liberalized proxy rules for 
communicating amongst shareholders.”386 This is no accident. The rapid proliferation of the 
Internet has allowed the cheap and instantaneous transfer of information amongst various 
shareholders and between the management and the shareholders. This enhanced 
communication is expected to further strengthen the scope for shareholder democracy in the 
coming years. In the constitutional system, the role of the Internet should also be recognized 
in encouraging political direct democracy. This is especially true for countries with 
                                                 
384 Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy Works.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2005): 
185-206 at 193. 
385 Id.at 193-94. 
386 Brownstein, Andrew R., and Igor Kirman. “Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? Responding 
to Majority Vote Resolutions.” The Business Lawyer (2004): 23-77 at 31. 
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substantial internet penetration where citizens can be expected to gather information and 
make more informed decisions due to it.387  
As in the case of corporate governance, the impact of modern communication networks and 
of the Internet in particular, has been recognized by constitutional law and public choice 
scholars.388 This literature not only maintains that the internet allows citizens to inform 
themselves regarding key issues but that it also allows deliberation on those issues to a 
certain extent. In light of this, the increasing penetration of the Internet and hundreds of 
millions of people getting access to Internet-connected mobile phones every year makes the 
argument about citizens not being able to adequately inform themselves weaker with each 
passing day. 
It can, therefore, be argued that the use of cues and the influence of the Condorset Jury 
Theorem can alleviate many of the informational problems with direct democracy in 
constitutional law as it does in corporate governance. Accordingly, the lack of information is 
not a complete argument against giving citizens the right to use direct democracy to make 
decisions. In fact, lessons from corporate governance suggest that citizens will be able to 
make decisions that further their interests even when they individually may not be suitable 
informed. These arguments, along with the rapid inroads being made by the Internet and 
digital communications suggest that citizens will have sufficient information to allow 
effective decision-making via direct democracy. 
 
                                                 
387 Ferdinand, Peter. “The Internet, Democracy and Democratization.” Democratization 7, no. 1 (2000): 1-17; 
Buchstein, Hubertus. “Bytes that Bite: The Internet and Deliberative Democracy.” Constellations 4, no. 2 
(1997): 248-263; Morris, Dick. “Direct Democracy and the Internet.” Loy. LAL Rev. 34 (2000): 1033; Gimmler, 
Antje. “Deliberative Democracy, The Public Sphere and the Internet.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 27, no. 4 
(2001): 21-39. The internet also has the potential to spread disinformation that may mislead the voters. 
However, it is argued that the net effect of Internet access amongst voters is greater levels of awareness about 
the issues to be decided. 
388 See Morris, Dick. “Direct Democracy and the Internet.” Loy. LAL Rev. 34 (2000); Buchstein, Hubertus. 
“Bytes that Bite: The Internet and Deliberative Democracy.” Constellations 4, no. 2 (1997): 248-263; 
Ferdinand, Peter. “The Internet, Democracy and Democratization.” Democratization 7, no. 1 (2000): 1-17; 
Tolbert, Caroline J., Ramona S. McNeal, and Daniel A. Smith. “Enhancing Civic Engagement: The Effect of 
Direct Democracy on Political Participation and Knowledge.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 3, no. 1 (2003): 
23-41 and Gimmler, Antje. “Deliberative Democracy, The Public Sphere and the Internet.” Philosophy & Social 
Criticism 27, no. 4 (2001): 21-39. 
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6.4 THE NEED FOR LONG TERM PLANNING AND CONSISTENCY IN DECISION-
MAKING  
This sub-section discusses the impact of direct decision-making on the continuity and long-
term planning that is essential for success in both companies and countries. 
An important concern in corporate governance against increasing shareholder voting rights is 
that it will disrupt a coherent and long-term corporate strategy.389 This issue has also been 
identified as a problem for constitutional law due to the use of initiatives. An example of 
myopic direct democracy is Proposition 13 passed by California voters in 1978 which 
amended Article 13A of the state constitution. It placed a cap of 1% on the taxation of real 
property and required that all future tax increases be passed by no less than 2/3rd of both 
houses of the state legislature. This initiative, later upheld by the US Supreme Court in 
Nordlinger v. Hahn390 has been criticized for its potential to make spending choices 
inconsistent with financing strategy.391  
In the context of corporate governance, Professor Bebchuk has argued that while 
inconsistency can indeed arise due to initiation of policy by shareholders, shareholders will 
not blindly adopt the short-term or simplistic solution that would disrupt corporate strategy. 
Just like in the case of specialized information, the board of directors is expected to explain 
its long-term view to the shareholders and to point out how a shareholder proposal or bylaw 
amendment might disrupt it. At the end of the day, it is up to the shareholders to decide 
whether to believe the management’s claims about possible disruption, which is arguably 
based on better information, after carefully considering possible conflicts of interests that the 
managers might have.392  
This system means that shareholders can start adopting policies inconsistent with the position 
of the board of directors if shareholders have lost faith in the board without having to wait to 
                                                 
389 See Bainbridge, Stephen M. “Why a Board-Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance.” Vand. L. Rev. 
55 (2002): 1 and Bainbridge, Stephen. “Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, The.” UClA l. reV. 53 
(2005): 601. These arguments are also accepted as having merit by Professor Bebchuk, an ardent advocate of 
increased shareholder rights in Infra note 418 at 882. 
390 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992). 
391 Whalen, Bill. “Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Initiative.” Hoover Digest (2000) 3. 
392 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 883. 
171
The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
168 
 
replace it through elections. Moreover, shareholders might be satisfied with the performance 
of the company but they may not trust the managers to put the interests of the shareholders 
ahead of their own interests in a particular transaction that poses a serious conflict of 
interest.393  
This line of argument can be extended to constitutional law. For example, citizens might be 
quite satisfied with their government’s performance but may not trust their legislators to 
objectively decide special cases where the agents have a particularly serious conflict of 
interest. An example of a decision that creates a uniquely serious conflict of interest for the 
legislators is a decision to introduce or repeal term-limits for the legislature. Since this 
decision directly and drastically impacts the political future of legislators, it may be better off 
being decided through direct democracy. An initiative may, therefore, be the least disruptive 
means of providing for term limits, while also keeping the incumbent government.  
Regarding both the issue of information and consistency, it is important to note that there is 
no single solution to the problem. Since some issues both involve a conflict of interest and 
concerns relating to consistency and information, it is best that citizens be allowed to weigh 
the matter and decide which factor is more important in the particular case. For example, in 
an initiative concerning the compensation of legislators, citizens will pay less heed to the 
opinion of the legislature. This is because the decision requires little specialized knowledge to 
evaluate the living expenses of parliamentarians, poses few problems of disrupting 
government strategy but creates a very great conflict of interest for the legislators. 
On the other hand, an initiative that affects military matters will be driven more by the advice 
of the legislature. This is because such decisions require a large amount of specialized and 
often secret information, they might disrupt long term strategy and the legislators have a very 
small chance of having a conflict of interest. In such cases, even if the government does not 
divulge the secret information that forms the basis of its recommendation, the citizens are 
likely to go along with the government because the absence of a conflict of interest makes 
misdirection less likely.  
                                                 
393 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Empowering Shareholders.” Berkeley Program in Law and 
Economics. (2003). 
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This argument is perhaps best borne out by the fact that the government of the United States 
had little trouble in convincing its population to support a war against Iraq based on its 
fictitious involvement in the 9/11 attacks and its non-existent weapons of mass destruction.394 
This shows that even a government with widely publicized links to the military industrial 
complex would have little difficulty in maintaining consistency in terms of military 
matters.395 On the other hand, if legislators have lost the faith of its citizens to such a degree 
that citizens are not willing to trust it even on matters of national security, the country needs 
an immediate change in policy (and probably even a change in government). Consistency 
can, therefore, not be held out to be a valid argument to perpetuate the policies of such an 
unpopular and untrusted legislature. 
It can, therefore, be said that agents can preserve long term planning and consistency in 
policy even when citizens have the right to use initiatives. This can be done by providing 
citizens with the relevant information explaining why a short-term decision proposed through 
an initiative may be against their interests. This shows that corporate law can give insights 
into how interests of consistency can be balanced with interests of transparency and trust in 
constitutional law using direct democracy. 
 
6.5 SPECIAL INTERESTS, SHORT-TERMISM AND BLACKMAIL 
Traditionally, institutional investors have aimed to maximize their returns, to stay 
competitive and to satisfy their investor’s demands for greater returns by minimizing their 
costs. This has led institutions to shy away from investing the time and money involved in 
                                                 
394 See Isikoff, Michael, and David Corn. Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq 
War. Random House Digital, Inc., 2006; Kaufmann, Chaim. “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the 
Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War.” International Security 29, no. 1 (2004): 5-48 and Foyle, 
Douglas C. “Leading the Public to War? The Influence of American Public Opinion on the Bush 
Administration’s Decision to go to War in Iraq.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 16, no. 3 
(2004): 269-294. 
395 The United States government is widely seen as suffering from uncomfortably close ties to the military 
industrial complex that affects the interests of legislators and government possibly creating a conflict of interest. 
See Adams, Walter. “The Military-Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State.” The American Economic 
Review 58, no. 2 (1968): 652-665.  While there was no direct democracy involved with the Iraq War, the fact 
that the government was so easily able to build up support with no real evidence shows that the public will 
typically back the government when relevant information is secret and specialized and the chances of disrupting 
long term strategy are high. 
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shareholder democracy, both in term of monitoring costs and the cost associated with actively 
opposing the board.396 
The tendency to avoid activism is further reinforced because several institutional investors 
have parent or subsidiary companies that seek business and investment from the very 
companies they hold stock in. This means that engaging in activism can lead to reduced 
business and lost profits for the parent or subsidiary companies if the board of the target 
company choses to retaliate.  
These disincentives to engage in activism only add to the fact that shareholder activism nets 
only pro-rata benefits for the activist and requires them to bear the entire cost. This leads to a 
free rider problem that discourages the institution from proceeding with such plans in the first 
place. Direct-decision-making by shareholders is, therefore, threatened by a concern that 
institutional shareholders will seek to curry favor with the management of companies they 
invest in by avoiding activist measures.397 
While these factors usually deter activism by shareholders who have an interest in the 
company other than their interest as shareholders, activism by such institutions could also 
result in them being bought off by the management. Large investors such as insurance 
companies and mutual funds which have divisions that also manage private pension funds for 
companies have a strong incentive to remain on good terms with the management of 
companies that they invest in. This relationship can help to get more business from the 
company for their associated concerns or to be allowed to retain their existing business and 
not be punished by the company taking its business elsewhere.398 Due to this power that the 
managers have over certain institutional investors, the latter may have incentives to withdraw 
from shareholder proposals if pressured and may, therefore, be susceptible to being bought 
off by the management.   
                                                 
396 Bainbridge, Stephen. “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment.” Harvard Law Review 119 
(2006): 1735-2644 at 1753. 
397 See Section 6.1 for a detailed discussion into how different types of shareholders are incentivized to 
participate in shareholder direct decision-making. See also Id at 1754. 
398 See Roe, Mark J. Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. 
Princeton University Press, 1996 at 62 and Supra note 422 at 1754.  
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The role of private interests such as seeking rewards in a capacity other than as a shareholder 
or seeking greater than pro-rata returns have also been identified as the drivers of shareholder 
activism by union and public employee pension funds.399 These groups are active participants 
in shareholder democracy.400 One example of the potential misuse of the right to initiate 
decisions is the upsurge of shareholder activism by CalPERS allegedly driven by the political 
ambition of Phil Angelides.401 In this instance, Phil Angelides was accused of misusing his 
control over California’s public employee pension fund when he was the state’s Treasurer in 
order to further his ambition of becoming the state’s governor by pursuing corporate 
activism.  
As in corporate governance, there exist similar concerns in constitutional law that the 
initiative process might be used to pursue special interests and short-term goals over the long-
term health of the company or country. The objection that special interests might capture the 
process has to be addressed by the design of the initiative. Since a majority vote is required to 
pass a proposal, the requirement of the support of an extremely large number of voters means 
that a special interest proposal will have little chance of being adopted. As discussed earlier, a 
system requiring a majority of registered voters could be introduced to make doubly sure that 
special interest proposals are defeated in countries with very high voter turnout and in 
countries with compulsory voting for legislative elections.402 This argument is supported by 
the corporate governance experience where “the only resolutions that systematically obtain 
majority support are ones calling for changes that are viewed as value enhancing by a wide 
                                                 
399 Union and public employee pension funds manage investments to finance the payouts of union and public 
employees’ pensions respectively. They are important institutional investors due to the large amounts of money 
they have under management. For example, the largest public employee pension fund in the US known as the 
Civil Service Retirement System has a projected balance of an astonishing $832 billion as of September 30, 
2013.  Note that Japan’s public pension fund is worth about $1.37 trillion. This makes it clear that public 
pension funds are major stockholders with relevance to the study of direct decisions making. 
400 See Brownstein, Andrew R., and Igor Kirman. “Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? 
Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions.” The Business Lawyer (2004): 23-77 and Thomas, Randall, and 
Kenneth Martin. “Should Labor be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals?” Washington Law Review 73, no. 
1 (1998). See also the discussion in Section 6.1.2. 
401 Barber, Brad M. “Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS’ Activism.” The Journal of Investing 16, no. 
4 (2007).  
402 See Section 6.1. This requires a system where voters are required to vote in legislative elections and the 
initiative proposals are voted upon at the same time. Here citizens can reject the initiative by not voting on the 
initiative or voting against it. However, they must actively vote for the proposal to register their support for it. 
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range of financial institutions… In contrast, proposals that focus on social or special interest 
issues uniformly fall far short of a majority”.403 
However, this might not be the case in the constitutional system where powerful and well-
funded super agents404 like chambers of commerce, large unions etc. may be able to have 
their proposals placed on the ballot even if they serve narrow goals of special interest groups. 
Getting the approval of the majority of the voting population is a different matter but some 
danger inevitably remains. Additionally, the scope for damage is also much greater in the 
case of initiatives than it is with shareholder proposals due to the vast scope of political 
power. After all, bad corporate decisions can only lead to financial loss and even that can be 
hedged against. On the other hand, bad decisions at the constitutional level threaten life, 
liberty and every aspect of human life. 
The risk of short-term thinking trumping long-term considerations is, however, less of a 
problem in constitutional law than it is in corporate law. Since almost all citizens live and die 
in the same country and more importantly, most citizens have children whose interests are 
very dear to them, there is no identifiable group of voters who have an unambiguous short-
term interest that outweighing their long-term interests. As long as the government is there to 
inform the voters about the long- term impact of an initiative and the checks and balances 
discussed in this chapter are introduced, there is little fear that the majority of citizens will 
deliberately vote to damage their own future and their children’s future.  
This inherent long term interest is, however, not true for the special interest groups that fund 
and frame the proposal. After all, the leaders of political parties, labor unions etc. might 
sacrifice the long-term good of the country in favor of measures that give results in the short-
term in order to win elections. They may do this, for example, by supporting an initiative that 
cuts taxes or raises the minimum wage before the elections even if it is economically 
unfeasible in the long term. This means that the ultimate check on the abuse of initiatives by 
special interests is the ability of citizens to vote to further the long term interest of the 
citizenry at large. A problem that arises is that special interest groups can coordinate and 
                                                 
403 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 884.  
404 See section 2.3. See also Issacharoff, Samuel, and Daniel R. Ortiz. “Governing Through Intermediaries.” 
Virginia Law Review (1999): 1627-1670. 
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work together to combine their forces. This might result in an omnibus proposal that is 
supported by several special interest groups which furthers all their agenda’s at the expense 
of everyone else. For example, racists, misogynists and homophobes could come together and 
draft a terrible proposal that encompasses all their biases and thus gain support from all these 
groups.  
This problem can be addresses by introducing a requirement that proposals for initiatives may 
only address a single issue and no more. This rule would make it impossible for special 
interest groups to coordinate with each other thereby preventing omnibus bills that benefit a 
number of powerful and narrow interests at the expense of the others. This is an imperfect 
solution but no better one seems to be available besides judicial remedies if the proposal 
adopts or amends a statute and that statute falls foul of the constitution.405 
In fact, the only institution in this discussion that has a short term interest is the legislature 
itself. Legislators may indeed sacrifice their long-term interest in favor of short-term gains 
(particularly before elections).406 If anything, the initiative, in some circumstances, may be an 
instrument against the short termism of legislators rather than a source of short term benefit at 
the expense of long term prosperity. 
A concern regarding shareholder proposals is that they can be abused by certain shareholders 
to extract private benefit from management by bringing or threatening to bring a proposal.407 
As in corporate law, this objection is a serious impediment to the use of initiatives in 
constitutional law. If the proposal is value decreasing in nature, the government has to 
campaign against the measure and prevent it from being adopted by the citizens.408  
                                                 
405 Eule, Julian N. “Judicial Review of Direct Democracy.” The Yale Law Journal 99, no. 7 (1990): 1503-1590 
and Tushnet, Mark. “Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Judicial Review of Direct Legislation.” Ann. 
Surv. Am. L. (1996): 373. 
406 Albertazzi, Daniele, and Duncan McDonnell. Twenty-first Century Populism. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
407 Supra note 429. 
408 In such a situation, the government is in a privileged position as it can use public funds to pay for research on 
the proposal as well as publicizing its support or objections to a proposed initiative. As should be the case, 
citizens can weigh the persuasiveness of the governments’ recommendations against the conflict of interest their 
legislators may have before the citizens make their decision. 
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Campaigning against every fringe proposal that may be value decreasing would still lead to 
resources being wasted and, therefore, Professors Matsusaka’s proposal of requiring 
initiatives to be approved in two widely spaced, consecutive ballots gains some traction.409 
This solution of requiring principals to adopt twice, in consecutive polls, any proposals 
initiated by them has also been proposed by Professor Bebchuk in the context of corporate 
governance. 
Requiring approval in consecutive ballots also takes care of Professor Bainbridge’s objection 
that even if managers believe that shareholders would not adopt a value reducing proposal, 
the managers, being risk averse,410 will still be susceptible to blackmail.411 Simply put, the 
agents might negotiate with the proponents of a value-reducing proposal because they do not 
want to take any risk of the proposal getting adopted if it is voted on by principals. If 
approval of proposals in consecutive ballots is required to adopt initiatives, the legislature has 
far fewer concerns that a value reducing initiative may get adopted. This is because a 
proposal will not become law until it is reapproved in another vote. This gives the legislature 
ample time to educate the public about proposals that actually stand a chance of being 
adopted rather than worrying about fringe proposals surprising them.  
On the other hand, if a proposal is value enhancing and the legislature wants to avoid it for 
selfish reasons, compromising with the proponents of the proposal will be of little use. This is 
because any value enhancing proposal that the legislature thinks has a good chance of being 
adopted by the voters will just be proposed by other parties thereby making payoffs to the 
original proponents pointless.412 
                                                 
409 Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy Works.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2005): 
185-206 at 192-93. One way to mitigate the threat of government responding to threats of extreme initiatives is 
to require initiatives to be passed twice in consecutive ballots to be effective. This relieves the government from 
the threat of extreme initiatives where they are unsure about the possible result. Under this sort of system, the 
government can ignore extreme initiatives and only worry about measures that came close to the vote 
requirements to get adopted the first time. 
410 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “Federalism and the Corporation: the Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law.” Harvard Law Review (1992): 1435-1510 at 1464.  
411 Bainbridge, Stephen. “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment.” Harvard Law Review 119 
(2006): 1735-2644 at 1756. 
412 Supra note 429 at 884-86. These payoffs may include favoring the interests of the group that brought forward 
to proposal in a particular government decision or in future government decisions as well as illegal bribes. 
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It is clear that the problems of special interest, short termism and back seat driving stem 
primarily from a double agency problem.413 This is a situation where the second order agents 
such as political parties, civic groups, NGOs etc. increase agency problems by advancing the 
interest of their constituents at the expense of others. The managers of such second order 
agents may also abuse the power exercised by these organizations to seek private rents. The 
important thing to note is that with appropriate checks and balances such as requiring the 
adoption of a proposal in two successive ballots, legislatures can rely upon the rationality and 
self-interest of their citizens and not have to strike deals with special interest groups.  This 
should insure that the problems of special interest, short termism and blackmail do not 
undermine the savings in agency cost brought about by the use of initiatives. 
 
6.6 THE SUBJECT MATTER OF INITIATIVES 
This section examines what is the appropriate subject matter for initiatives in order for their 
use to reduce agency cost. When corporate governance literature is examined for answers, 
Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act, 1934 appears in the vast majority of papers. This 
rule gives shareholders the right to initiate a proposal and to have it included in the 
company’s proxy.414 Key to the discussion here is that Rule 14a-8 mandates that shareholder 
proposals must be consistent with the law of the company’s state of incorporation.415 This 
means that shareholder proposals can only deal with subject matter that shareholders are 
empowered to decide under the corporate law of the state of incorporation. This section 
examines Delaware law in particular to get insights into what issues should be amenable to 
direct decision-making. 
The analysis of Rule 14a-8 must be done mindful of the difference in the way voting is 
carried out in companies and in countries. The centrality of the proxy system in corporate 
voting means that this rule determines what can and cannot effectively be put to the vote of 
the shareholders. This is because placing the proposal on the company’s proxy significantly 
                                                 
413 See section 3.3. See also Issacharoff, Samuel, and Daniel R. Ortiz. “Governing Through Intermediaries.” 
Virginia Law Review (1999): 1627-1670. 
414 See section 3.1.1. In short, a proxy is an authorization from a shareholder to the holder of the proxy enabling 
the holder to exercise the voting rights the shareholder is entitled to in a shareholder meeting.  
  
415 See SEC v. Transamerica Cortp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947). See also Ledes, John G. “Review of Proper 
Subject under the Proxy Rules, A.” U. Det. LJ 34 (1956): 520. 
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alleviates the free rider problem by causing the company to bear a large part of the cost of 
publicizing the proposal. Since the company now pays for the proposal and also gets the 
benefits of such proposals, the proposing shareholder does not have to spend more than he 
can hope to gain if the proposal is successful. Because Rule 14a-8 requirements effectively 
determine what can and cannot be put to the shareholders’ vote unless the proponent cares to 
assume the entire expense himself, these requirements are examined to identify lessons for 
constitutional law. 
The origins of Rule 14a-8 can be traced to the “Summary of Proposed Revision of Proxy 
Rules” released in August 19, 1942. This document opened the debate on shareholder 
democracy by providing for shareholders to have almost any matter placed on the company’s 
proxy.  From then onwards, the rule has seen an evolution to prevent shareholder proposals 
from becoming “an all-purpose forum for malcontented shareholders to vent their spleen 
about irrelevant matters.”416 
As expected, the original approach needed to be balanced and the first objection was received 
by the Chairman of the SEC less than 2 months later in the form of a letter dated October 12, 
1942 from an industry committee. It argued that such an arrangement could lead to 
companies faced with a shareholder’s demand to place libelous and malicious matter in their 
proxies thereby putting the board in a no-win legal position. They would either be guilty of 
violating the proxy rules for not including such material in their proxy or suffer prosecution 
for libel and slander. Accordingly, the proposal that was adopted by the Commission on 
December 18, 1942 required that the proposal must be a “proper subject for action” and also 
that it would be the shareholder and not the company and its agents who would be legally 
liable for the contents of the proposal.417  
This shows that the evolution of the SEC’s position on the suitability of the subject matter of 
a shareholder proposal began from an extreme position where almost anything could be 
included and an almost instant move towards systematically restraining this power. 
                                                 
416 Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 678 (D.C. Cir.1970), vacated, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). 
Cited from Palmiter, Alan R. “Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, The.” Ala. 
L. Rev. 45 (1993): 879. at 888. 
417 Ledes, John G. “Review of Proper Subject under the Proxy Rules, A.” U. Det. LJ 34 (1956): 520 at 520-21. 
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In 1945, Rule 14a-8 was given further definition by the SEC. From then onwards, a 
shareholder could only ask for a proposal to be included in a company’s proxy if the subject 
matter of the proposal was considered open to shareholder action under the law of the 
company’s state of incorporation. Furthermore, shareholder proposals relating to general 
social, political and economic issues could be excluded from the company’s proxy.418 This 
provision was finally withdrawn in 1972 and replaced with a more “objective standard”419 
with the inclusion of subsection (c)(5) to Rule 14a-8 which restricts proposals to matters of 
significance and interest to the company.   
Per subsection (c)(5), proposals must relate to activities that account for a minimum of 5 
percent of the company’s total assets, gross annual sales or net annual earnings OR be 
“otherwise significantly related to the company’s business”.420 This change has allowed 
shareholder to move proposals that are of political and social import when they meet the 
conditions laid down above. As exemplified by Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands Ltd.421, the 
SEC has used this change to allow for a wider range of proposals. This has allowed 
shareholder proposals to be used to ask management to submit a report on force feeding 
geese to produce pate even though it accounted for less that 0.05% of the firm’s assets as the 
SEC held that to be an issue “significantly related to issuer’s business.” 
This situation can be compared to the 2002 amendment to the constitution of the State of 
Florida that gave pregnant pigs the right to a cage in which they could turn around.422While 
animal rights legislation is important and may well be a suitable area for the use of the 
initiative, the constitution is definitely not the best place to put animal rights legislation such 
as this. This shows that the initiative process works but can be messy in its results.  
Subsequently, the exclusion of proposals of social and political import mandated by SEC 
Exchange Act Release 3638, 1945 was removed and retained only as an example of an issue 
                                                 
418 SEC Exchange Act Release 3638, 1945. Opinion Dir. Corp. Fin. Div. Cited from Id. at 521. 
419 Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 9784, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,178,23,179 (Sept. 22, 1972). Cited 
from Infra note 449 at 891. 
420 Proposals of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(cX5) (1993). Cited from Infra note 449 at 891. 
421 Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985). 
422 Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy Works.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2005): 
185-206 at 202. 
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that may be a “matter[s]…. Not significantly related to the business of the issuer… not within 
the control of the issuer”.423 This language was then further changed so that the reference to 
‘social and political cause’ was entirely removed424  which led a spurt of such proposals 
being tabled by shareholders. While this may have been a debatable move, the inclusion of 
the "significantly related" and "ordinary business" exclusions in Rule 14a-8(c)(5) created a 
near-perfect bureaucratic Catch-22. A proposal can be neither so general that it is unrelated to 
the firm's business nor so specific that it is a matter of ordinary business.425 
This is an important issue that needs to be addressed before a provision like Rule 14a-8(c)(5) 
can be adopted in the constitutional setting. In other words, if citizens are to be allowed to 
table ballot initiatives that are significantly related to the function of the government but not 
related to the ordinary business or functioning of the government, clear guidelines will have 
to be provided to ensure that a deadlock does not occur.  
An analysis of these restrictions introduced over time shows that similar concerns arise when 
direct democracy is considered at the constitutional level. One important issue is how to deal 
with situations where the subject matter of an initiative conflicts with a more fundamental set 
of laws. This may be a conflict with the constitution in cases where an initiative seeks to 
enact or amend a statutory provision. Ballot initiatives may also conflict with basic human 
rights or with fundamental provisions of the constitution when citizens try to amend the 
constitution through an initiative. 
It should be noted that allowing citizens to initiate constitutional amendments is not 
inherently a bad idea and has successfully been in place in jurisdictions like California. 
However, if this seems like too great a risk to take, the ‘basic structure doctrine’ as 
propounded by the Indian Supreme Court may be considered.426 While the Indian constitution 
                                                 
423 Palmiter, Alan R. “Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, The.” Ala. L. Rev. 
45 (1993): 879 at 911. 
424 Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Investment Act Release No. 9539, 41 
Fed. Reg. 52,994, at 52,9977 (Nov. 22, 1976). Cited from Ibid. 
425 Supra note 429 at 892. 
426 For a detailed discussion on the “basic structure doctrine” see His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati v. The 
State of Kerala and Others (AIR 1973 SC 1461). The Supreme Court of India noted that while the government 
has the power to amend the constitution, it may not alter the basic structure of the constitution. What constitutes 
the basic structure is to be decided on a case to case basis by the courts. This is the only case to ever be 
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does not provide for initiatives, the ‘basis structure doctrine’ mandates that the legislature 
may not change the basic structure of the constitution. Whether or not a constitutional 
amendment changes the basic structure of the constitution is determined by the courts. It is 
proposed that such a limitation can also be imposed on initiatives to protect basic rights and 
liberties.    
When corporate governance is examined for other rules that exclude shareholder proposals, it 
becomes clear that shareholders are not allowed to champion personal claims or grievances 
through this mechanism.427 Shareholders are also not allowed to put forward proposals that 
cannot be acted upon by the company,428 proposals that are moot429 and proposals that require 
the company to break the law.430 Rule 14a-9 contains anti-fraud provisions which prohibit 
false and misleading solicitations which have been interpreted by the SEC to also include 
“vague and indefinite” proposals.431  
It is argued that all these provisions can help to make the initiative process more efficient in 
constitutional law. Not allowing personal claims and grievances to be included in proposals 
for ballot initiatives will ensure that only issues of general interest are voted upon. It will also 
ensure that the initiative process is not swamped with proposals that do not affect a sizable 
proportion of the population. It should be noted that threshold requirement for signatures that 
petitions much receive before they are considered for inclusion as an initiative also resolve 
this problem to a large extent. 
Not admitting proposals that cannot be acted upon by the government and not allowing 
initiatives that are moot is also a sensible idea to borrow from corporate governance. The 
analysis in this dissertation is based on the ability of principals to act directly and on the basis 
                                                                                                                                                        
considered by a 13 judge bench of the Indian Supreme Court and as such has precedence over all other Indian 
judicial decisions.  
427 Proposals of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(cX4) (1993). This paragraph draws from the analysis 
of SEC exclusions for shareholder proposals in Supra note 429 at 889. 
428 Proposals of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(cX6) (1993). 
429 Proposals of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(cX10) (1993). 
430 Proposals of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(cX2) (1993). 
431 False or Misleading Statements, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1993). 
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of a credible threat of such intervention by direct decision-making by the agents. This is the 
basis of the monitoring role served by direct democracy and decisions that cannot be acted 
upon do not serve such a purpose. It can, therefore, be said that initiatives should not be used 
to pass symbolic resolutions that cannot be acted upon. For example, a proposal that citizens 
should strive to be more patriotic may have good chances of receiving many votes but is a 
bad subject for an initiative since it serves no monitoring function and does not minimize 
agency cost. 
The corporate governance rule banning proposals that require the company to violate the law 
also convert well to the constitutional model. Just as the directors are bound by state and 
national laws that their principals cannot force them to violate, legislators are bound by the 
constitution. Accordingly, citizens must be barred from proposing initiatives to adopt laws 
that violate the constitution. If citizens are allowed to amend the constitution, they must 
explicitly frame such a proposal as a constitutional amendment and not as an unconstitutional 
statutory amendment. 
Similarly, constitutional law would also benefit from barring “false and misleading” as well 
as less malicious “vague and indefinite” proposals from being voted upon. If such proposals 
are voted upon, citizens may be misled into voting against their interests and agents may get 
an erroneous impression of the citizen’s preferences from the results. This will lead to an 
escalation in residual loss and therefore an increase in agency cost.  Accordingly, this 
corporate governance solution for regulating the subject matter of initiatives can also be 
adopted to reduce agency cost through direct democracy.      
The bar on proposals dealing with matters of general social, economic or political interest, 
however, cannot be excluded as these are the very matters on which laws are made at the 
constitutional level. As such, these ‘rules of the game’ decisions must remain within the 
scope of the initiative. 
This discussion shows that Rule 14a-8 adopted by the SEC to govern shareholder proposals 
can provide many useful insights to help reduce agency cost in constitutional law by 
determining what the appropriate subject matter to be decided via initiatives is.  
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6.7 FINDINGS 
This chapter analyzed corporate governance literature to identify what conditions and rules 
are required for initiatives to be implemented efficiently. The first issue analyzed is whether 
citizens have the proper incentives to bring value increasing proposals. This is compared with 
the participation of individual shareholder activists, mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds 
and social activists in shareholder proposals. This comparison reveals that shareholder 
activism is strongest amongst social activists and amongst shareholders who have a 
substantial stake in the company which significantly alleviates the free rider problem. 
Just like shareholders with substantial shareholding in a company, citizens can be considered 
to have a large and undiversified stake in the fortunes of their country. Accordingly, 
initiatives are expected from super-agents acting on behalf of a sizable part of the population, 
from special-interest groups that are able to capture enough of the benefits to justify the costs 
of the initiative and from social activists. This seems to reflect reality in constitutional law 
quite accurately. 
Corporate governance literature and, in particular, Rule 14a-9 along with sub-section (c)(5) of 
Rule 14a-8 passed under the Securities Exchange Act, 1934 are then used to identify methods 
by which nuisance proposals can be kept off the ballot if initiatives are provided for. Other 
solutions from corporate governance literature offered in this chapter are to require a 
minimum number of signatures for the petition, rejection of proposals that got a poor 
response in previous votes and using a variation of the ‘proper purpose’432 test from proxy 
access literature.  
Citizens are found to be rationally uninformed but are still able to vote intelligently on both 
representative elections and ballot initiatives through the use of cues. In addition to this, a 
representative result can be arrived at even if citizens have imperfect information due to the 
                                                 
432 Rule 14-8(i)(1) determines whether or not a shareholder proposal relates to subject matter deemed suitable to 
be circulated to shareholders under Rule 14a-8. As per Rule 14-8(i)(1), shareholder proposals must comply with 
the law of the state of incorporation. The company laws of most states provide that companies are free to 
determine what types of proposals shareholders can put forward and vote on in shareholder meetings. However, 
because state law typically vests authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, the SEC has 
created a rule of thumb: 
If a shareholder proposal is precatory does not bind the board of directors, it is presumed to fall within the 
‘proper purpose’ of shareholder action and may be circulated and voted upon. In such cases, the onus shifts to 
the board of directors to prove that the subject matter of the proposal is not suitable if they wish to exclude the 
proposal from the company’s proxy statement and stop it from being voted upon by shareholders. 
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influence of the Condorcet jury theorem.433 This discussion concludes that citizens are 
capable of directly deciding matters relating to social values or where information is widely 
dispersed amongst the population and that they should be allowed to do so. On the other 
hand, legislature should make decisions requiring specialized and technical information. In 
fact, it is seen that this is exactly what happens in jurisdictions with provisions for ballot 
initiatives. 
The next issue examined is the threat of inconsistent policy. This threat is determined to be 
real with California’s budget woes being a good example. The solution on offer is for the 
government to explain to the population how their choice may create such problems and 
thereby convince them to vote differently. This is related to issues of special interests, short-
termism and the scope for blackmail. Firstly, citizens are all considered to have long-term 
horizons while deciding laws and therefore have the incentives to oppose the short-term 
interests of special interest groups. The self-interest of citizens is also presented as a partial 
cure to the threat of blackmail since the legislature can explain its criticism of a harmful 
proposal to the people and be assured that it will fail without having to compromise with its 
proponents. Additionally, initiatives may be required to be approved in two consecutive 
meetings. This gives the legislators far more breathing space as they can wait to see if a 
detrimental proposal passes the first vote before having to expend time and resources 
campaigning against it. 
The chapter concludes by examining the evolution of Rule 14a-8 to identify suggestions for 
keeping the subject matter of initiatives relevant to the needs of the voters and the democratic 
process. As in the case of companies and their shareholders, citizens should not decide 
matters that are related to the ‘ordinary business’ of governing the polity nor should they be 
allowed to make proposals that are not ‘substantially related’ to the work of government. For 
example, initiatives relating to whom government departments should buy pencils from and 
who should be the captain of the national football team are both inappropriate for those 
reasons respectively. 
                                                 
433 See section 6.3. The Condorcet Jury Theorem operates as follows: Voters must choose between choices A 
and B where one choice is better than the other. Each individual voter has a chance just marginally higher than 
50% of making the correct decision based on the information available to him. In such a case, the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem states that as the number of voters increase, the probability of the correct option being chosen in 
the election approaches 100%. 
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The last word on the chapter is that while there are disadvantages as well as advantages to 
allowing for initiatives, the advantages seem to be greater on a number of counts. This is, at 
the very least, sufficient to advocate for constitutions to include a reversible default in favor 
of initiatives.  
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7 SHOULD REFERENDUMS BE BINDING? 
 
This chapter examines whether referendums should be binding or non-binding in order to 
minimize agency cost. This does not refer to whether or not a referendum must be held to 
decide a particular issue.434 Rather, whether or not a referendum is binding refers to whether 
a negative vote by citizens in the referendum bars the government from pursuing the policy 
rejected in that referendum. This is referred to as the finality of the veto and this chapter 
considers how this impacts agency cost. This analysis is used to determine what decisions 
should be subject to a final, binding veto by principals and when the veto should be non-
binding in order for agency cost to be minimized. 
The first issue alluded to above is the difference between mandatory referendums, as opposed 
to legislative or referred referendums. Mandatory referendums are referendums required by 
the constitution (and sometimes by statutory provisions) in order for the government to make 
certain types of decisions. For example, a provision requiring all constitutional amendments 
be adopted only after they are approved via a referendum gives rise to mandatory 
referendums. On the other hand, referendums held by the government when there is no legal 
obligation to seek the approval of the citizens for deciding an issue lead to legislative 
referendums (also known as optional or referred referendums). The proposals that are the 
subject matter of legislative or referred referendums are, therefore, within the authority of the 
legislature to decide even without holding a referendum.435  
Legislative referendums are conducted the same way as the mandatory referendums. The 
rules for the actual conduct of the referendum may or may not be specified by the constitution 
or by statute. If the process is not specified, the referendum is held as per rules set by the 
legislative decree that called for the referendum. Such referendums are known as ad hoc 
optional or legislative referendums. Since the rules governing how they are conducted are 
often set by the act of the legislature that calls for the referendum, whether or not they are 
                                                 
434 Referendums that are required to ratify certain decisions as per the constitution are called mandatory 
referendums. Referendums called at the discretion of the government are called optional referendums. This 
chapter deals with whether or not the results of a referendum can be ignored by the legislature once the 
referendum has been held. It does not focus on whether or not a referendum is required to be held in the first 
place. 
435 See J.G. Matsusaka, “Direct Democracy”, Encyclopedia of Public Choice, at 1.  
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binding varies. Such referendums are typically called by governments to push through 
legislation that might fail to get adopted by parliament and they may even be votes of 
confidence in the government itself.436 
This chapter examines whether or not referendums need to be binding in order to minimize 
agency cost. First, the chapter carries out a positive analysis looking at what types of 
referendums around the world are binding and in what circumstances. This is then compared 
to the finality of shareholder vetoes in corporate governance when shareholder approval is 
needed or asked for by the board of directors. The chapter then carries out a normative 
analysis to look at whether the decisions that require binding shareholder approval in 
corporate governance are correctly identified in order to actually minimize agency cost. This 
is contrasted with the choice of decisions that mandatorily require the approval of citizens in 
constitutional law. This analysis is used to identify how agency cost can be minimized by 
properly designing the laws that govern the use of referendums in constitutional law. 
   
7.1 REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: BINDING OR NON-BINDING? 
Referendums have received very different treatment in the constitutions of the nations of the 
world. They are used with different procedures to settle different types of questions in various 
countries and states. This varied treatment of the referendum around the world has resulted in 
a divergence in the finality of the decisions reached by such processes. In some countries, a 
rejection of a proposal in a referendum is binding and the proposal cannot become law. In 
others, the result of a referendum is merely advisory and it is up to the government whether 
or not to enact the proposal into law regardless of the outcome of the referendum.  
                                                 
436 See Beramendi, Virginia, Andrew Ellis, Bruno Kaufman, Miriam Kornblith, Larry LeDuc, Paddy McGuire, 
Theo Schiller, and Palle Svensson. Direct Democracy: The International IDEA Handbook. International Idea, 
2009 at 45-49. 
Regarding the use of legislative referendums to push through policy that might fail to get adopted by parliament 
or as votes of confidence in the government, the handbook gives the following examples. France held an 
optional referendum in 1988 on the issue of New Caledonia, Denmark held one in 1986 regarding the 
ratification of the Single European Act and Bolivia held one in 2004 to help pass a law to regulate its natural gas 
reserves. These were held because there was insufficient support for government policy in the legislature. 
Optional referendums may also be held to resolve a difference in opinion between two houses of Parliament. 
Examples of this are the 1950 referendum in Belgium to decide the issue of the return of King Leopold III from 
exile and Sweden’s 1957 referendum on supplementary pension plans. Optional referendums can also be held to 
demonstrate the public’s confidence in the government or its leader(s). The failed French referendum of 1969, 
the Chilean referendum of 1978 and the Russian referendum of 1993 are all examples of referendums used not 
to settle a policy question but rather to ask the citizens whether they support the government or not.  
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In fact, some countries have provisions for both binding and non-binding referendums. For 
example, the October 1972 referendum held under Article 20 of the Danish Constitution 
regarding Denmark’s membership of the European Economic Community was binding. On 
the other hand, the Danish referendum in February 1986 called by the government regarding 
Denmark’s acceptance of the Single European Act was merely advisory and could be rejected 
by the government.437 This diversity in the treatment of referendums can have other criterion 
as well. For example, the results of local referenda in Poland and Macedonia are binding if 
they are adopted in votes with participation rates greater than 30% and 50% respectively. If 
the participation rate is lower, the referendum is still valid but its results are only advisory 
and can be rejected by the government.438 
As this is a positive examination looking at the circumstances under which referendums are 
binding in constitutional law, an empirical overview is called for. From an examination of the 
data from 214 countries and territories surveyed in 2008, it can be seen that 108 countries and 
territories provide for mandatory referendums while 120 provide for legislative 
referendums.439 Further analysis shows that out of the 108 countries that provide for 
mandatory referendums and 120 countries that provide for legislative referendums, 34 
countries only provide for mandatory referendums, 46 countries only provide for legislative 
referendums and 74 countries provide for both. 
Of the 34 countries that have only mandatory referendums, 22 are confirmed to treat their 
result as binding; the status of 10 countries is unclear and only 2 countries, namely Nigeria 
and Palau can be identified where a mandatory referendum can, under some circumstances, 
be disregarded by the government. When the 46 countries that only provide for legislative 
referendums are considered, the picture is different. While 20 countries provide for binding 
legislative referendums, 7 specifically require that the outcome of legislative referendums 
must be precatory. Of the remaining countries, 10 countries mandate that the result is binding 
only in certain circumstances and the position of the remaining 9 countries is unknown. 
                                                 
437 Siune, Karen, and Palle Svensson. “The Danes and the Maastricht Treaty: The Danish EC Referendum of 
June 1992.” Electoral Studies 12, no. 2 (1993): 99-111 at 101.  
438 Bûcek, Jan, and Brian Smith. “New Approaches to Local Democracy: Direct Democracy, Participation and 
the Third Sector” Environment and Planning C 18, no. 1 (2000): 3-16 at 6. 
439 See Annex A, Beramendi, Virginia, Andrew Ellis, Bruno Kaufman, Miriam Kornblith, Larry LeDuc, Paddy 
McGuire, Theo Schiller, and Palle Svensson. Direct Democracy: The International IDEA Handbook. 
International Idea, 2009 at 202-211. 
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The case of countries that allow for both types of referendums is mixed. Out of 74 such 
countries, 50 require the results to be binding, in 15 countries the results can be either binding 
or precatory depending on specified conditions, and the position of 8 countries is unknown. 
Iceland is the only country that provides for both types of referendums and requires that the 
outcome of both types be precatory. 
It can be concluded that while data on this issue is incomplete mainly due to lack of 
information on very small countries and some overseas territories, there is clear evidence that 
mandatory referendums are typically binding. In fact, Iceland is the only country that 
identified which requires that the results of mandatory referendums be precatory and only 
Nigeria and Palau allow for a possibility of the results of mandatory referendums to be 
ignored in certain circumstances. 440    
An examination of the countries where the result of referendums is binding on the 
government shows that issues that require public approval through referendum are typically 
decisions with major political significance. Some examples of decisions requiring mandatory 
referendums that are binding on the government are:441 
1. Constitutional amendments in Australia, Denmark, Japan, Switzerland, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
2. Ratification of certain international treaties in Switzerland. 
3. Transfer of authority to international bodies and organizations in Denmark (if the 
decision is not approved by a 5/6th majority in the parliament. 
4. Issues touching on sovereignty or national self-determination in the Republic of 
Ireland as witnessed regarding the decision to join the European Union. 
Certain types of decisions are sometimes excluded from the requirement to hold a mandatory 
referendum even if they are important decisions with major political significance. These may 
be issues concerning taxes and public expenses where it is felt that the public at large would 
not decide wisely.442 Therefore, a state might require mandatory referendums for 
                                                 
440 Ibid. 
441 Beramendi, Virginia, Andrew Ellis, Bruno Kaufman, Miriam Kornblith, Larry LeDuc, Paddy McGuire, Theo 
Schiller, and Palle Svensson. Direct Democracy: The International IDEA Handbook. International Idea, 2009 at 
43. 
442 Id at 44-45. See for example Article 42 of the Constitution of Denmark. It reads: 
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constitutional amendments but might carve out an exception for matters regarding taxes and 
public expenses. In such a case, a constitutional amendment relating to taxes would be 
exempt from the requirement for being approved via referendum.  
This is a matter of balancing the monitoring effects of referendums with certain special 
circumstances of tax policy which make it less suitable for resolution through direct 
democracy. The exclusion of tax and fiscal matters from the purview of referendums is not in 
any way universal and research suggests that Swiss referendums on tax and fiscal matters 
may have helped by reducing the centralization of fiscal activities.443 
Mandatory and binding referendums may also be required to pass laws that ordinarily do not 
need to be approved in a referendum, if certain specified procedural conditions arise.444 For 
example, under certain conditions, constitutions may require a referendum if there is a 
disagreement between the President and the legislature445 or as a means of bypassing a strict 
supermajority requirement in the legislature.446 
 
7.2 FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE DECISIONS 
This discussion examines whether or not a failure by management to get shareholder 
approval for a decision that requires such approval is fatal to the proposal under corporate 
law. In other words, is the rejection of the board’s proposal final and is the management 
enjoined from pursuing the rejected policy? Looking at the provisions mandating shareholder 
approval for different classes of decisions shows a uniformity in treatment. Fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                        
“Finance Bills, Supplementary Appropriation Bills, Provisional Appropriation Bills, Government Loan Bills, 
Civil Servants (Amendment) Bills, Salaries and Pensions Bills, Naturalization Bills, Expropriation Bills, 
Taxation (Direct and Indirect) Bills, as well as Bills introduced for the purpose of discharging existing treaty 
obligations shall not be submitted to decision Referendum.” 
443 Feld, Lars P., Christoph A. Schaltegger, and Jan Schnellenbach. "On Government Centralization and Fiscal 
Referendums." European Economic Review 52, no. 4 (2008): 611-645. 
444 Supra note 467 at 45. 
445 See for example the Icelandic constitution that requires that a referendum be held on laws that are passed by 
the Parliament but then rejected by the President. 
446 See for example the case of Denmark where a referendum is required on decisions involving transfers of 
national sovereignty if the measure is not supported by 5/6th of Parliament. Israel takes this a step further and 
requires a referendum on returning occupied territory if the measure has less that 2/3rd support in the Knesset, 
the Israeli Parliament. 
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corporate decisions that have traditionally required shareholder approval cannot go ahead if 
such approval is denied. 
The discussion regarding the power of shareholders to veto fundamental corporate decisions 
has been examined at some length in Chapter 2.447 For the purposes of a concise positive 
examination of this right, it suffices to point out (a) the types of decisions that are subject to 
such a veto, (b) how universal is this legal treatment of shareholder rights, and (c) whether 
this veto is binding or not. 
Binding shareholder approval is required for fundamental corporate decisions in almost all 
jurisdictions.448 For example, the US and the UK both require shareholder approval for 
changes to the charter,449 mergers and consolidation,450 the sale of all or substantially all the 
company’s assets not in the ordinary course of business451 and dissolution.452 This treatment 
is widely accepted453 and has been recognized as a crucial right by the OECD and included in 
its Principles of Corporate Governance as follows:454 
                                                 
447 See section 2.1 
448 See the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance discussed in the following paragraph. 
449 § 242(b)(2), Delaware General Corporation Law; § 803(a), New York Business Corporation Law. In the 
United Kingdom, the memorandum of association (formerly equivalent to the charter) and the articles of 
association (formerly equivalent to the bylaws) have been consolidated into the articles of association. These 
can be amended by the shareholders by means of a special resolution giving shareholders not only veto rights 
but initiation rights as well. For the purpose of this discussion, it suffices to say that the articles cannot be 
amended without their approval. 
450 § 251(c), Delaware General Corporation Law; § 903(a), New York Business Corporation Law. Under the 
(United Kingdom) Companies Act, 2006, mergers and consolidation typically takes place under the aegis of a 
court order obtained as per part 26 of the act (and also part 27 if the company is a public company). This court 
order however requires a supermajority of 75% thereby giving shareholders a veto. As in the case of changes to 
the articles of association, shareholders also have initiation rights in this respect as members, creditors and if 
applicable, a liquidator or administrator can make an application under part 26 of the act. This takes nothing 
away from the veto rights of shareholders as a supermajority vote is required as the same.  
451 § 271(a), Delaware General Corporation Law; § 909(a), New York Business Corporation Law 
452 § 275, Delaware General Corporation Law; § 1001(a) & (b), New York Business Corporation Law 
453 See Davies, Paul L. Gower & Davies: The Principles of Modern Company Law. Sweet and Maxwell, 2008 at 
375-76. This reiterates that the UK has an almost identical requirement for shareholder ratification for 
fundamental decisions. 
454 Infra note 481 at 18. 
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“Shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on, 
decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: 1) amendments to the statutes, 
or articles of incorporation or similar governing documents of the company; 2) the 
authorization of additional shares; and 3) extraordinary transactions, including the transfer 
of all or substantially all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company.” 
This is not just an ideological convergence across all major economies but also a convergence 
in terms of real world legal treatment. The OECD reports that provisions requiring 
shareholder approval for fundamental corporate decisions “can be seen as a statement of the 
most basic rights of shareholders, which are recognized by law in virtually all OECD 
countries.”455  
This shows that shareholders have the right to ratify or reject certain fundamental corporate 
decisions in major world economies and that their rejection of such a decision typically bars 
the management from giving effect to the rejected proposal.  
  
7.3 OTHER IMPORTANT DECISIONS REQUIRING SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL   
This sub-section highlights the recent trend towards making executive compensation subject 
to the approval of shareholders. In recent times, the legislature in both the US and the UK has 
expanded the realm of the power of shareholders to approve corporate decisions. As per §951 
of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010, companies are 
required to put their executive compensation plan to a non-binding vote before the 
shareholders.  
Before October 1, 2013, the UK also required non-binding approval of shareholders for 
executive compensation plans. Section 439 of the Companies Act, 2006 required the non-
binding approval of shareholders for the compensation of directors in the form of a 
remuneration report as per s. 420 of the same Act.456 This non-binding say-on-pay regime has 
                                                 
455 Development (OECD). Steering Group on Corporate Governance. OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2004. OECD Publishing, 2004. 
456 See Infra note 483; Gordon, Jeffrey N. ““Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case 
for Shareholder Opt-In.” Harv. J. on Legis. 46 (2009): 323-585; Conyon, Martin, and Graham Sadler. 
“Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK.” Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 18, no. 4 (2010): 296-312. 
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had unimpressive results with empirical studies showing a very small, although noticeable 
reduction in what the researchers categorized as excessive compensation (particularly at the 
CEO level).457  
The UK witnessed considerable political movement in the direction of introducing a binding 
say-on-pay vote for executive compensation which saw the light of day on October 1, 2013 in 
the form of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act. This legislation requires that 
executive compensation plans be subject to the binding approval of shareholders.458  
Unlike the nearly universal incidence of binding votes on fundamental corporate decisions, 
requiring a non-binding shareholder vote to approve a decision of the board is a relatively 
new concept.459 The requirement for shareholder approval with the possibility to ignore a 
negative outcome is found only a few countries and is narrowly restricted to decisions 
regarding executive compensation. Agency theory suggests that the compensation contracts 
of executives should be designed in order to maximize shareholder value.460 Since 
shareholders are numerous and dispersed, they delegate the negotiation of the compensation 
contracts to the board of directors. The problem is that the top management wields decisive 
influence on the appointment of directors and this creates a conflict of interest for the board 
of directors. The managers are instrumental in the appointment of directors and the directors 
determine the pay and benefits of the managers. This gives both groups an incentive to please 
each other rather than promoting shareholder value.461  
                                                 
457 Ferri, Fabrizio, and David A. Maber. “Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK.” 
Review of Finance 17, no. 2 (2013): 527-563. 
458 The UK’s Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013 requires the binding approval of shareholders every 
three years in the form of an ordinary resolution to approve the compensation policy that determines the 
compensation of the company’s directors. Any deviation from this policy must also be approved by the 
shareholders.  
459 The novelty of even non-binding ‘say on pay’ provisions is clear from their recent origin in the aftermath of 
the last financial crisis. As mentioned, binding ‘say on pay’ provisions are an even newer trend and as of now 
are seen only in the UK. 
460 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360. The compensation contracts for 
senior executives often include provisions for bonding costs which are designed to minimize agency cost in 
order to maximize shareholder value. 
461 Cai, Jie, and Ralph A. Walkling. “Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value?” Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 46, no. 2 (2011): 299 at 300. 
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This is the root of the agency problem in executive compensation and giving the shareholders 
a say in the matter is thought to alleviate the problem.462 Accordingly, even though executive 
compensation is not a ‘fundamental corporate decision’, it is made conditional to shareholder 
approval due to the large conflict of interest suffered by the board of directors. However, 
since this is a new practice, the US and the UK have differing opinions as to whether or not 
such approval must be binding on the directors in order to minimize agency cost and there is 
insufficient data to reveal a clearly superior strategy. 
  
7.4 INCENTIVE TO GET INFORMED 
This discussion looks at how the finality of a referendum impacts the information available to 
the principals who vote on it. Intuitively, the more important a decision, the more effort a 
rational person will expend in gathering and understanding the facts required to make an 
informed decision. This sub-section studies how the binding or precatory nature of a 
referendum impacts the incentives of principals to inform themselves. This is followed by an 
examination of how differences in citizens’ incentives to get informed may impact the ability 
of referendums to manage agency cost. 
Professor Kessler has argued that representatives will inform themselves of the issues 
necessary to make good decisions only if they have the discretionary power to make those 
decisions.463 This means that agents would not have proper incentives to adequately inform 
themselves if principals have the final say on a particular decision and the agents feel they are 
not accountable for its consequences.464 After all, it stands to reason that directors will have 
lesser incentives to inform themselves if the decision of shareholders is final rather than if it 
is the director’s decision that will supersede that of the shareholders. This is true because the 
latter scenario would end with the adoption of the director’s proposal and the board would be 
held responsible for its outcome. 
                                                 
462 This contention has its opponents. See Bainbridge, Stephen. “Remarks on Say on Pay: An Unjustified 
Incursion on Director Authority.” UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper 08-06 (2008) for a 
discussion into the negative effects of shareholder say on executive pay. 
463 Kessler, Anke S. “Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Informational Asymmetries.” 
Public Choice 122, no. 1-2 (2005): 9-38 at 10. 
464 Myers, Minor. “Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, The.” Del. J. Corp. L. 36 (2011): 
417. 
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In the context of corporate governance, shareholder approval and rejection of management 
proposals are binding and final insofar as they relate to fundamental corporate decisions.465 
This would suggest that such types of decisions are considered important enough to risk 
reducing the incentives of agents. Moreover, greater reductions of agency cost may be 
possible by directly ascertaining and acting on the preferences of shareholders. 
The case of ‘say-on-pay’ provisions is interesting because such matters are not considered to 
have sufficient risk of escalating agency cost to require a binding vote by shareholders, at 
least in countries except the UK. Professor Kessler’s argument holds good for shareholders as 
much as it does for directors. If shareholders know that their decision will be final, they will 
have a greater incentive to adequately inform themselves than if they know that their decision 
is not binding and it is the board of directors that will make the final decision. 
This means that making ‘say on pay’ provisions non-binding rather than binding reduces the 
incentives of shareholders to inform themselves. Conversely, non-binding ‘say on pay’ 
provisions provide greater incentives to directors to inform themselves as compared to 
binding ‘say on pay’ provisions. ‘Say on pay’ is, therefore, an issue where binding 
shareholder veto is found to be excessive but the conflict of interest of the board of directors 
is considered high enough to merit a non-binding shareholder vote.466  
Since US ‘say on pay’ provisions are non-binding, it is important to see how this impacts the 
information available and understood by shareholders who have less incentive to inform 
themselves than if the ‘say on pay’ provisions were binding. The short answer is that ‘say on 
pay’ provisions have had very limited success in reducing executive compensation.467 Large 
                                                 
465 See section 3.1.2.1 
466 See section 3.1.2.2. As explained there, agency theory suggests that the compensation contract of executives 
should be designed in order to maximize shareholder value. Since shareholders are dispersed, they delegate the 
negotiation of the compensation contracts to the board of directors. The problem is that the top management 
wields decisive influence on the appointment of directors which creates a conflict of interest for the board of 
directors. The managers appoint the directors and the directors reward the managers giving both groups an 
incentive to please each other rather than promoting shareholder value. This is the root of the agency problem in 
executive compensation and giving the shareholders a say in the matter is thought to alleviate the problem. 
467 See Cheffins, Brian R., and Randall S. Thomas. “Should Shareholders have a Greater Say over Executive 
Pay: Learning from the US Experience.” J. Corp. L. Stud. 1 (2001): 277 for the US experience. See Ferri, 
Fabrizio, and David A. Maber. “Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK.” Review of 
Finance 17, no. 2 (2013): 527-563; Gordon, Jeffrey N. ““Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience 
and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In.” Harv. J. on Legis. 46 (2009): 323-585; Conyon, Martin, and Graham 
Sadler. “Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK.” 
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institutional shareholders who are instrumental for determining the outcome of shareholder 
votes can also be expected to be well informed of prevailing trends in executive 
compensation and to also have detailed knowledge regarding the performance of the 
company.468 Since such well-informed shareholders have shown limited interest in ‘say on 
pay’ votes, the lack of information caused by the non-binding nature of the vote cannot be 
blamed.  
The ideal case to study here is the recent reform of the ‘say on pay rules’ in the UK to make 
them binding rather than precatory as they were until the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Act 2013 went into effect in October 1, 2013. This will allow an analysis of the reasons why 
‘say on pay’ should be binding and not precatory while not changing other variables.469 The 
UK’s Department for Business Innovation and Skills proposal behind the enactment of this 
law suggests that the reason for making shareholder ‘say on pay’ votes binding was that 
“feedback from shareholders is that many companies are not responding adequately to their 
concerns”.470 A reading of the proposal and the enacted legislation suggests that the non-
binding nature of ‘say-on-pay’ provisions has not been found to be the cause of insufficient 
information amongst shareholders in the UK. Instead, the documents and debates leading to 
the adoption of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 have identified the lack of 
information as a separate issue and addressed it as such. In fact, the proposal from the 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills is packed with separate requirements for the 
simplification of the executive compensation plan so shareholders may better understand it. It 
                                                                                                                                                        
Corporate Governance: An International Review 18, no. 4 (2010): 296-312 for the UK experience (not 
accounting for the forthcoming introduction of binding say on pay provisions). 
468 Gillan, Stuart, and Laura Starks. “Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional 
Investors: A Global Perspective.” Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper 2003-01 (2003). 
469 This dissertation was complete at the time the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 came into force 
on October 1, 2013. The dissertation has been revised to reflect the change in the law. However, it is impossible 
to include an analysis of the impact that this change will have since no data is yet available. 
470 See the UK’s Department for Business Innovation and Skills proposal for making say on pay for executive 
compensation binding at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31653/12-900-directors-pay-
guide-to-reforms.pdf 
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also includes requirements to provide data that helps shareholders to compare the 
compensation plan to those of similar companies.471  
This means that making ‘say on pay’ provisions binding is not thought to be a solution to 
making shareholders more informed by the UK experts involved in the drafting of the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. This in turn suggests that the link between 
binding vetoes and shareholder’s incentive to inform themselves has not been recognized as 
crucial by UK lawmakers.  
This debate translates well into the constitutional context. Referendums held at the national or 
regional levels typically deal with well-publicized topics that generate considerable media 
attention. They are highly publicized and debated which means that the information required 
to make an informed decision is, by and large, available to the public. The information 
condition is also different from corporate governance if the referendum concerns issues that 
are of moral or social import. For example, referendums on issues like gay marriage, 
euthanasia etc. have a strong moral component where citizens can vote their conscience with 
the help of information in the public sphere without expending significant time and resources 
to gather specialized information.472  
More importantly, unlike shareholder votes, the rule of one person-one vote and large 
populations means no citizen can rationally expect his or her vote to decide the outcome of an 
election. This is a crucial difference because the number of citizens is extremely large and 
unlike corporate governance, one person cannot accumulate disproportional voting rights. It 
is, therefore, not unreasonable to argue that citizens would have similar incentives to inform 
themselves regarding a referendum regardless of whether or not their vote will determine the 
end outcome. In other words, citizens will vote to express their preferences in a non-binding 
referendum even if they cannot rationally expect their actions to change the end result. After 
all, citizens can never rationally expect their single vote to change the outcome of an election, 
poll or referendum but they inform themselves and vote anyway. 
                                                 
471 Ibid. 
472 Matsusaka, John G. “The Eclipse of Legislatures: Direct Democracy in the 21st Century.” Public Choice 
124, no. 1-2 (2005): 157-177 at 163. “Think of moral issues such as whether to allow gay marriage or physician 
assisted suicide. Many budgetary policies share the same flavor; they are mainly about establishing spending 
priorities and do not require a great deal of expertise to form an opinion.” 
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It can, therefore, be said that although there is some added incentive to gather information if a 
referendum is binding, this connection has been downplayed in corporate governance by the 
UK government. The legal position is Delaware also gives the same insight. By making the 
approval of executive compensation non-binding, it assumes that shareholders will have 
sufficient incentives to inform themselves regarding the issue even when their decision is not 
final. Put differently, factors other than the principals’ incentive to collect and assimilate 
information must be relied upon to decide whether or not a referendum should be binding. 
 
7.5 FRAMING CONCERNS 
Agents can use cleverly framed referendums to represent the wishes of the principals as 
different from what they really are. This would increase agency cost since it increases 
residual loss. The residual loss is increased because strategic wording of the proposal can 
create a gap between the real preferences of the citizens and the perceived preferences of the 
citizens as will be expressed in the referendum.473 If the agents then act on the basis of a 
distorted view of citizen’s preferences provided by an improperly framed referendum, their 
actions and policies will naturally not be aligned with the citizen’s true preferences. 
A good example of framing concerns in referendums is the one called by General Augusto 
Pinochet in Chile in 1978. The referendum question asked the Chileans to vote yes or no on 
the following question:  
“In the face of international aggression against the government of our fatherland, I support 
President Pinochet in his defense of Chile’s dignity, and I once again confirm the legitimacy 
of the government of the republic in its leadership of the institutional proceedings in this 
country.”474 
A yes vote would extend General Pinochet’s term by another eight years while a no vote 
would trigger general elections in December 1989. 
                                                 
473 Residual loss is the cost of a difference between the preferences of the principals and the actions of the 
agents.  
474 Beramendi, Virginia, Andrew Ellis, Bruno Kaufman, Miriam Kornblith, Larry LeDuc, Paddy McGuire, Theo 
Schiller, and Palle Svensson. Direct Democracy: The International IDEA Handbook. International Idea, 2009 at 
49. 
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This question reads more like a test of patriotism rather than a referendum on the leadership 
of General Pinochet. The confusing wording of the referendum question surely led to many 
people voting yes because they were concerned about the defense of Chile’s dignity in the 
face of international aggression, an argument that is not the subject of the referendum. By 
framing the referendum this way, General Pinochet was able to avoid calling for general 
elections, succeeded in entrenching himself in power and heaped on his people the 
extraordinary agency costs associated with the residual loss brought about by eight more 
years of military dictatorship.475 
The tactical framing of referendums can especially escalate residual loss if the referendum is 
used to bypass a constitutional or legal obstacle that barred the action in the absence of such a 
referendum. For example, legislators may frame referendums cleverly to convince voters to 
approve measures that take away certain rights in countries where the constitution requires 
that such measures be approved through referendum. In such instances, strategic framing may 
allow agents to defeat safeguards designed to minimize agency cost in the form of the 
requirement to hold mandatory referendums. From this, it is clear that framing can be a 
problem and will increase agency cost if abused by the agents to circumvent constitutional 
checks and balances.  
The question here is, however, whether the residual loss component of agency cost would be 
reduced in such circumstances if the referendum were non-binding or whether the residual 
loss component of agency cost would increase if it were binding. A strategically worded 
referendum can allow agents to demonstrate inflated support for a policy or leader. It can also 
allow them to overcome certain constitutional or legal barriers to the adoption of the policy. 
In all these circumstances, a non-binding vote would work just as well as a binding one. 
If the vote is binding and successfully manipulated by clever framing, agency cost sees an 
increase in the form of an increase in residual loss. On the other hand, if the vote is non-
binding, the authority to make the decision remains with the agents. In such a case, the agents 
can use the manipulated referendum to show support for their position and then make the 
decision themselves. Either way, the policy of the country will deviate from the preferences 
of the principals. Both situations will lead to a similar increase in residual loss and, therefore, 
                                                 
475 Panzer, John, and Ricardo D. Paredes. "The Role of Economic Issues in Elections: The Case of the 1988 
Chilean Presidential Referendum." Public Choice 71, no. 1-2 (1991): 51-59 at 51. 
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similar increase in agency cost.  Therefore, when legislators successfully misguide the 
citizens into voting for a referendum that is against their interests, it does not matter much 
whether or not the referendum is binding as far as the impact on agency cost is concerned. 
The solution to controlling an escalation in agency cost due to improper framing of 
referendums, therefore, lies in rules governing how referendums can be framed and not by 
making the referendum non-binding. 
  
7.6 SEPARATION OF DECISION MANAGEMENT AND DECISION CONTROL 
Chapter 4 discussed Professors Fama and Jensen’s argument that the separation of decision 
management (initiation and implementation) and decision control (ratification and 
monitoring) is critical to minimizing agency cost.476 This section examines how this axiom 
applies to the question of whether or not referendums should be binding in order to minimize 
agency cost. 
In the case of referendums, the initiation function of decision management is performed by 
the government because it creates the proposal that the referendum is supposed to decide.477 
Therefore, Professors Fama and Jensen’s arguments suggest that in order to effectively 
reduce agency cost, the ratification function of decision control must move to another party. 
Corporate governance is now examined for pointers as to how this can be done.  
Corporate law in all American states, the UK and as per the OECD report,478 the corporate 
laws of all modern economies require that fundamental corporate decisions that are initiated 
by the board of directors should be subject to the approval of the shareholders.479 Therefore, 
corporate governance uses the principals as a distinct source of ratification for decisions 
                                                 
476 See Section 2.4.  See also Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. “Agency Problems and Residual 
Claims.” Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 327-349 at 331 and Klein, Benjamin. “Contracting 
Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control.” Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 
2 (1983): 367-374 at 372. 
477 See Matsusaka, John G. “Initiative and Referendum.” The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer US, 2003 
at 624-628. “Referendum” is defined as “a process that allows the electorate to approve or reject a proposal by 
the legislature.” 
478 Development (OECD). Steering Group on Corporate Governance. OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2004. OECD Publishing, 2004 at 18. 
479 See Section 5.1. 
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initiated by the agents. The nearly universal principle of requiring the approval of 
shareholders for fundamental corporate matters, therefore, effectively separates decision 
management and decision control for the most important types of decisions.  
These types of decisions are often ‘rules of the game’ decisions that regulate the relations 
between the agents and the principals and between the principals themselves. Since such 
decisions have a high propensity for increasing agency costs if the agents were in complete 
control, the corporate governance approach seems to be conducive to lower agency costs. 
Alas, the situation in constitutional law is not as simple. Referendums are called not only 
when special types of decisions need to be made but also when special circumstances arise. 
For example, the constitution may require a referendum if there is a disagreement between 
the President and the legislature480 or as a means of bypassing a strict supermajority 
requirement in the legislature.481  
This means that referendums are not necessarily initiated by a certain majority in the 
legislature. Therefore, if such a decision is subjected to a non-binding referendum and the 
final decision is made by the legislature in light of such a referendum, decision management 
and decision control are not necessarily intermingled. This is because such referendums can 
be initiated by the President or by a minority in the legislature and then ratified by the 
complete legislature (with a sufficient majority) with the benefit of knowing the citizens’ 
preferences. This means that, unlike the case of corporate governance where a non-binding 
vote on fundamental corporate changes would be contrary to Professors Fama and Jensen’s 
argument, the case for binding political referendums is not as straightforward. 
It might, therefore, be argued that referendums on issues like constitutional amendments 
proposed by the legislature should be binding in order to ensure the separation of decision 
management and decision control in rules of the game decisions. This is because these 
decisions, like fundamental corporate decisions may seriously impact agency cost by altering 
the principal-agent relationship itself. Like fundamental corporate decisions proposed by the 
                                                 
480 See for example the Icelandic constitution that required a referendum on laws passed by the Parliament but 
rejected by the President as soon as possible. 
481 See for example the case of Denmark where a referendum is required on decisions involving transfers of 
national sovereignty if the measure is not supported by 5/6th of Parliament. Israel also requires a referendum on 
returning occupied territory if the measure has less that 2/3rd support in the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament. 
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board of directors, most referendums are proposed by the government which enjoys the 
support of a majority in the legislature. In such situations, if the referendum is non-binding, 
the same institution would be control both decision management and decision control and 
lead to high agency cost. 
On the other hand, referendums can also be triggered by a difference in opinion between the 
President and the legislature or on the basis of a motion by a specified minority of legislators.  
In such cases, the decision cannot be said to have been initiated done by a majority vote in 
the legislature. However, if such a proposal is approved or rejected by a non-binding 
referendum, the final decision will be taken by a majority vote in the legislature. In such 
cases, even a non-binding referendum would satisfy Professor Fama and Professor Jensen’s 
suggestion to avoiding combining decision management and decision control. This is because 
the approval function is exercised by a majority in the legislature while the initiation of the 
decision is triggered by causes such as a disagreement of the legislature with the President as 
provided by the constitution of Iceland or by a resolution by a minority of legislators.  
Therefore, as per Professors Fama and Jensen’s argument for separating decision 
management from decision control to reduce agency cost, referendums initiated by a majority 
of the legislature should be binding in order to effectively reduce agency cost. Here, the 
legislature initiates the decision thereby assuming the function of decision management. If 
the referendum is non-binding, once the citizens have approved or rejected the proposal, the 
legislature would sit in judgment once again to wield the real power of decision control by 
approving or rejecting the result of the referendum. This can lead to high agency costs. 
However, when the referendum is triggered by actors other than a majority in the legislature, 
even non-binding referendums can separate decisions management and decision control since 
a majority in the legislature does not initiate the decision but only gives the final approval. 
Such decisions can, therefore, be subject to non-binding referendums without risking high 
agency costs.  
 
7.7 THE FINALITY OF BINDING REFERENDUMS 
Binding referendums can help to reduce agency cost if they are actually effective in helping 
principals to block a proposal that is against their interests. This sub-section looks at how 
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agents can sometimes bypass binding referendums and how this impacts the ability of 
binding referendums to minimize agency cost. 
In 1992, the government of Denmark failed to get the approval of the citizens in a referendum 
to decide whether to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. So they tried again with a reworded 
referendum in 1993.482 Similarly the Irish government failed to get the approval of the 
citizens for the ratification of the Nice Treaty 2001. So they tried again in 2002 with 
somewhat different wording.483  This attempt to keep putting an issue to referendum till it 
gets accepted was taken to an extreme in Palau, which held seven referendums to allow the 
passage of nuclear capable warships from the United States through its waters. All of them 
failed. Eventually, the government reduced the super-majority requirement of 75% required 
to allow nuclear weapons and platforms in Palau as established by its constitution and the 
treaty was signed in 1993.484 The question then becomes one of how binding a binding 
referendum really is? 
As seen from the previous examples, the results of a binding referendum are final only until 
the time that they are overturned by another binding referendum. This shows that the need to 
change policy with changing circumstances is not unduly hindered by binding referendums. 
Writing about the repeated referendums in Denmark and Ireland, Professors Worre and 
Hayward concede that circumstances had changed when the second referendums were held 
from what they were during the first.485 The ability of the government to hold repeated 
referendums on the same issue is, therefore, a positive thing in light of the fluid 
circumstances facing nations. The question of interest to agency cost, therefore, becomes how 
often the government should be able to put forward the same measure for referendum? Too 
often would cause the public to lose faith in the referendum process and too large intervals 
would reduce the ability of the state to respond to changing circumstances. 
                                                 
482 Worre, Torben. "First No, Then Yes: The Danish Referendums on the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and 
1993." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 33, no. 2 (1995): 235-257. 
483 Hayward, Katy. “‘If at first you don’t succeed…’: The Second Referendum on the Treaty of Nice, 2002.” 
Irish Political Studies 18, no. 1 (2003): 120-132. 
484 Hinck, Jon. "The Republic of Palau and the United States: Self-Determination Becomes the Price of Free 
Association." California Law Review (1990): 915-971. 
485 Supra note 508. 
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In the case of corporate law, it is the notice provisions that force the board of directors to 
space out the votes on fundamental corporate decisions. This means that every time the board 
of directors wants to seek the approval of shareholders on a proposal, they need to circulate it 
afresh which provides a minimum time interval between such votes. Corporate law, therefore, 
indirectly requires that a period of time elapses between successive shareholder votes on 
proposals initiated by the board of directors. Since referendums are much more expensive and 
difficult to organize than shareholder meetings, it is advisable that constitutional law adopt a 
much larger minimum interval between consecutive referendums. This will help to ensure 
that the monitoring cost associated with the holding of referendums does not exceed the 
potential reduction in residual loss provided by the blocking of unpopular actions of the 
government.  
This solution is directly applied in constitutional law in the Constitution of Argentina which 
requires that no referendum be repeated within two years of its rejection. The requirement for 
a reasonable period of time to elapse between successive referendums on the same issue 
seems to be a good compromise to ensure the sanctity of the referendum as well as allow for 
its review after a reasonable period of time by the principals. This will ensure that the 
monitoring cost of holding referendums does not exceed potential savings in terms of the 
reduction in residual loss. 
 
7.8 FINDINGS 
This chapter shows that corporate law in the world’s major economies almost always 
provides for shareholders to exercise binding veto power over fundamental corporate 
decisions initiated by the board of directors. In the US and the UK, shareholders are also 
required to approve executive compensation plans because directors suffer from a strong 
conflict of interest while making such decisions. This requirement to get shareholder 
approval exists even though such decisions cannot be termed as fundamental corporate 
decisions having an impact on the ‘rules of the game’. In the case of such decisions, corporate 
law is not uniform across jurisdictions as to whether the veto rights of shareholders are 
binding or non-binding.   
Accordingly, the chapter looks deeper in corporate governance literature to identify insights 
regarding the relative potential of binding and non-binding referendums to minimize agency 
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cost. The first issue considered is how binding and non-binding referendums influence the 
incentives of principals and agents to gather and assimilate information. Professor Kessler 
argues that both shareholder and directors have incentives to gather information relevant to 
making decisions when they have the discretionary power to make that decision.  
Applying this reasoning to constitutional law suggests that citizens would have higher 
incentives and legislators would have lower incentives to inform themselves when decisions 
are subject to a binding referendum. The situation is reversed when the decision is subject to 
a non-binding referendum where citizens’ incentives to inform themselves are lowered and 
the incentives of the legislators are increased. This relationship is made more complicated by 
other issues that are peculiar to constitutional law and do not arise in corporate law. The 
information required to vote on a referendum receives widespread media publicity and citizen 
have the benefit to using cues to understand issues that they would not be able to analyze 
themselves. Furthermore, many issues raised in referendums may not require any specialized 
information and be decided on the basis of social and moral norms. Lastly, it is argued that 
citizens inform themselves sufficiently to vote at elections when they know that the odds of 
their vote changing the outcome is negligible so it may be assumed that citizens gather 
information out of a sense of civic participation even when their individual vote may not 
change outcomes. 
Next, the chapter examines the impact of strategic framing of the referendum question on 
agency cost and compares how binding and non-binding referendums affected by this. The 
results of this examination are straight forward. Both binding and non-binding referendums 
have the same effect of rubber stamping and giving legitimacy to the decisions of the 
legislature if the legislature succeeds in confusing the citizens who vote on it. After all, if the 
government succeeds in getting the citizens to approve a value decreasing proposal in either a 
binding or a non-binding referendum, it will lead to an increase in residual loss not to 
mention the monitoring cost brought about by holding the referendum.  
This chapter then looks at how the corporate governance scheme for separating decision 
management from decision control in order to minimize agency cost can be insightful to 
understanding binding and non-binding referendums. This scheme suggests that the entity 
initiating a decision should not also have the power to approve that decision. Based on this 
principle, corporate governance ensures that directors perform decision management and the 
shareholders perform decision control while making fundamental corporate decisions by 
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requiring binding shareholder approval. If the directors were to sit in final judgment and 
decide whether or not to defer to the decision of the shareholders, it is the directors who 
would fulfil both roles. 
This reasoning also applies to constitutional law when the legislature asks for a referendum 
by a majority vote. If such a referendum refers to a ‘rules of the game’ decision, agency cost 
would be minimized by requiring a binding referendum. However, not all referendums are 
triggered by a majority vote in the legislature. When the constitution permits the President or 
a minority of the legislators to call a referendum, even a non-binding referendum can serve to 
minimize agency costs. In such cases, the proposal will be decided by a majority of the 
legislators if it is adopted in the referendum while the initiation would have been done by the 
President or a minority of legislators. In such cases, non-binding referendums might also 
adequately minimize agency cost. 
Lastly, the chapter examines whether legislators should be allowed to act contrary to the 
results of a binding referendum after a certain amount of time has passed and also to 
determine how subsequent referendums can be held on that subject. A positive examination 
of constitutions around the world shows that legislatures have in fact adopted policies that 
their citizens have earlier rejected in binding referendums. This has been done either by 
ignoring the previous referendum or by holding repeated referendums and manipulating the 
procedure used until the legislators got the results they desired.  
In the case of constitutional law, it would be unwise to prohibit any further action by the 
legislature merely because a proposal was defeated in a referendum because circumstances 
might change in the future. On the other hand, it is also important to ensure that legislatures 
do not keep holding referendums in the hope of getting the outcome that they want until 
citizens lose faith in the process. Accordingly, the corporate governance solution is to require 
the agents to wait till the next meeting of the principals to resubmit the defeated proposal.. 
However, keeping in mind the great cost of holding referendums, a reasonable interval such 
as the period of two years required by Argentina between successive binding referendums on 
the same issue is recommended.   
It is argued that if the suggestions given in this chapter are adopted, binding referendums can 
be expected to reduce agency cost when ‘rules of the game’ decisions are to be made or when 
deciding issues that create a conflict of interest for the legislators. On the other hand, non-
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binding referendums can help to minimize agency cost when making specific business 
decisions and also when referendums are called by means other than a majority vote in the 
legislature. 
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8 SHOULD INITIATIVES BE BINDING?   
 
Having discussed the question of whether or not referendums should be binding, this chapter 
asks the same question with respect to initiatives. The following sections examine how the 
impact of initiatives on agency cost depends on whether or not the results of the initiative are 
binding (or non-binding).  
 
8.1 INITIATIVES AROUND THE WORLD: BINDING OR NON-BINDING? 
Out of 214 countries and territories surveyed, the citizens of only 37 have the right to propose 
and pass a citizens’ initiative at the national level. However, such initiatives are provided for 
at the local or provincial level in far more countries. Of the 37 countries that allow for 
initiatives at the national level, 26 countries allow for citizens’ initiatives for amendments to 
ordinary legislation while 20 countries allow them to amend the constitution.486 
Most countries that allow for citizens’ initiatives to make such constitutional amendments 
also provide for initiatives on legislative amendments. However, there may be limits on the 
power of citizens to amend the constitution. For example, the constitution of Slovakia allows 
citizens to amend the constitution via initiatives but does not allow them to make 
amendments that affect basic rights and liberties.487 On the other hand, countries like 
Switzerland allow for initiatives on constitutional amendments, but not on regular legislative 
matters at the national level.488  
Therefore, when initiatives are allowed, some constitutions allow initiatives only for 
fundamental questions like constitutional amendments, while reserving regular legislative 
                                                 
486 Beramendi, Virginia, Andrew Ellis, Bruno Kaufman, Miriam Kornblith, Larry LeDuc, Paddy McGuire, Theo 
Schiller, and Palle Svensson. Direct Democracy: The International IDEA Handbook. International Idea, 2009 at 
62. “[S]ome countries which have no such instruments [citizens’ initiatives] at the national level do provide 
initiative rights at the regional and the local levels – particularly large federal countries such as Brazil, Germany 
or the United States. In the United States, 24 of the 50 states have provisions for citizens’ initiatives. Other 
jurisdictions offer them at the local level only, for example, Mexico, Panama and many European countries.” 
487 Frey, Bruno S. “Direct Democracy for Transition Countries.” Development and Transition 7 (2003): 42-59. 
488 Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Dominique Wisler. "Social movements and direct democracy in 
Switzerland." European Journal of Political Research 30, no. 1 (1996): 19-40. 
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matters for the legislature. Other constitutions have adopted the opposite approach where 
they consider constitutional amendments to be too important to be left to citizens, and only 
allow them to use initiatives to decide normal legislative subjects. Some other constitutions 
allow for initiatives on both types of decisions, i.e. constitutional amendments and normal 
legislative subjects. 
Citizens must collect a predetermined number of signatures on a petition to demonstrate the 
support of a proportion of the citizenry in a specified amount of time. There might be 
additional requirements such as demonstrating minimum amount of support for the petition in 
individual geographic territories. Once the eligibility criterion is met, the petition is put to a 
popular vote as an initiative proposal. The required majority might be different for different 
types of amendments proposed. For example, it might be higher super majority requirement 
for constitutional amendments. Additionally, a quorum of minimum turnout as a percentage 
of the voting population may also be required for the popular vote to be binding. 
If the proposal receives a majority, or in some cases a super-majority of the votes, two things 
can happen. If the initiative is binding, the proposal is adopted and it becomes law. If the 
initiative is non-binding, the proposal is considered by the legislature that has the final say on 
whether or not to adopt it. 
Initiatives are, therefore, not necessarily binding on the legislature. Non-binding initiatives 
are known as agenda initiatives. Agenda initiatives give citizens the right to put an issue 
before the legislature for discussion as long as certain signature requirements are met in a 
specified time and the issue is open to such initiation as per the constitution. The legislature is 
only required to consider the proposal and is not required to vote on it, let alone required to 
implement it. Hence agenda initiatives are non-binding. 
Like the citizens’ initiative, agenda initiatives are not as wide spread as referendums. Out of 
214 countries surveyed, as of 2008, agenda initiatives were only available at the national 
level in 46 countries and territories and only at the local or provincial level in 9 countries and 
territories.489  
                                                 
489 Supra note 512 at 84-89. The signature requirements for agenda initiatives vary from no less than 25% of the 
voting population in Uruguay to less than 1% in Georgia. The signature requirement can also vary depending on 
whether the agenda initiative is connected to a constitutional or legislative amendment as in the case of Costa 
Rica.  
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8.2 THE FINALITY OF DECISIONS INITIATED AND APPROVED BY 
SHAREHOLDERS 
This section examines the power of shareholders to initiate and approve decisions to see 
whether they are binding or not. These decisions can be made in the form of shareholder 
proposals and in some cases, specifically through shareholder initiated bylaw amendments.490  
Unlike the power of shareholders to approve or reject fundamental corporate decisions491, 
their right to initiate decisions that bind the board of directors is not consistent across major 
economies.492 To highlight the different schools of corporate thinking, this sub-section will 
separately examine the rights of shareholders to initiate policy in the US and in the UK. 
 
8.2.1 The US Position 
Delaware and the US states that follow the Model Business Corporation Act vest the power 
to manage the business and affairs of the corporation in the board of directors.493 This 
includes the power to initiate rules of the game decisions as well as specific business 
decisions including game-ending decisions and scaling down decisions.494 
Rules of the game decisions are classified by Professor Bebchuk as those decisions that 
concern the ‘choice of the rules by which corporate actors play’.495 They are codified in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Interestingly, several countries exclude important public policy issues like constitutional amendments (Austria, 
Brazil, Cape Verde, and Thailand), the adoption of international treaties (Austria, Mali, Peru), public expenses 
(Albania, Burkina Faso, Uruguay) and devolution of power (Niger) outside the purview of agenda initiatives. 
490 The following discussions on US and UK law provide distinctions between shareholder proposals and 
shareholder initiated bylaw amendments based on the statutory provisions of the respective countries.  
491 See section 5.1. 
492 See section 5.2. 
493 Delaware General Corporation Law, §141(a); Model Business Corporations Act, §8.01(b) and New York 
Business Corporation Law §701. 
494 See section 4.1. 
495 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-
914. 
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charter of the company and in the corporate laws of the state of incorporation. The board of 
directors has the exclusive right to initiate changes to both these sources of rules as only the 
board can initiate an amendment to the charter496 or reincorporate in another state by 
proposing a merger with a shell company in that state.  The shareholder’s power to initiate 
rules of the game decisions is restricted to proposing bylaw amendments497 – a power they 
share with the board of directors. This power is hamstrung by the fact that bylaws are 
subordinate to the provisions of the charter and they cannot be used to opt out of default 
provisions of the DGCL and the MBCA.498  
By and large, corporate law in the US allows for by-laws "relating to the business of the 
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its 
stockholders, directors, officers or employees”499 By amending the bylaws, shareholders can 
ostensibly initiate and ratify decisions concerning these issues without the approval of the 
board. Interestingly, the most popular use of the bylaw amendment is to get rid of shareholder 
rights plans (the so called ‘poison pill’) or to prohibit their future adoption.500 This is 
                                                 
496 Delaware General Corporation Law, §242(b); Model Business Corporations Act, §10.03 and New York 
Business Corporation Law §803(a). 
497 Delaware General Corporation Law, §109; Model Business Corporations Act, §10.20 and New York 
Business Corporation Law §601. 
498 See Supra note 521 at 845. There are certain exceptions to this particularly relating to the election of 
directors whereby shareholders may initiate and vote upon the decision to opt out of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law’s default of plurality voting. Modifications to the Delaware General Corporation Law in 2006 
retained the plurality vote default rule but mandated that the board of directors cannot modify or rescind a 
shareholder adopted bylaw that requires a greater of votes for director elections. This move was reflected in 
amendments to the corporate laws of California, Virginia and Washington that had a similar effect. The debate 
regarding proxy access also relates to the ability of shareholders to initiate changes to the process whereby 
directors are elected by changing the default rule. The position of law on this issue is under considerable flux 
and there is no consensus on the optimal situation. 
499 Extracted from § 109(b), Delaware General Corporation Law. Other states have similar statutes as well. See 
for example N.Y Bus. CORP. LAW § 601(c); CAL. CORP. CODE § 212(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0206(2) 
; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.11(A); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1504(A); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT 
ANN. art. 2.23(A). Examples other than the Delaware General Corporation Law and NY law cited from 
Hamermesh, Lawrence A. “Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street.” 
Tul. L. Rev. 73 (1998): 409 at 413 
500 Poison pill rights plans are anti-takeover devices that allow all shareholders except for the shareholder who 
has reached a threshold percentage of shareholding (the prospective acquirer) to buy additional shares at a 
discount.  Since the board of directors has the power to decide whether or not to invoke this provision, 
prospective acquirers are forced to negotiate with the board. If the acquirer does not get the board’s approval 
and the poison pill is triggered, the value of the acquirer’s shares will fall as additional shares are sold at a 
discount. Furthermore, the acquirer’s shareholding in the company will decline in terms of percentage of shares 
held making the takeover more difficult. See also Gordon, Jeffrey N. “Just Say Never-Poison Pills, Deadhand 
Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett.” Cardozo L. Rev. 19 (1997): 511. 
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important for the purpose at hand because such measures are often opposed by the board of 
directors due to a conflict of interest since poison pills increase the ability of directors to 
entrench themselves.501 
Bylaws can be initiated and adopted by the shareholders and nothing needs to be done by the 
board of directors for them to take effect. Since the board of directors is bound by such 
bylaws, shareholders undoubtedly have the power to make binding bylaw amendments. This 
is because bylaws are self-executing and the board of directors has no opportunity or 
authority to approve or reject bylaws adopted by the shareholders.502 
However, since shareholder bylaw amendments provide a means to shareholders to check the 
power of the board, such power would be ineffective if the board of directors could simply 
repeal or replace the amended provision in the bylaw.503 While this issue is discussed in detail 
in section 8.4, to help place it in context, the discussion is summarized here. 
The corporate law of Delaware and New York do not allow specifically allow shareholders to 
adopt bylaws that forbid subsequent amendment by the board of directors as long as the 
charter empowers the board to amend the company’s bylaws.504 
As per (then) Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court, the judicial 
interpretation of Delaware courts on the issue is inconclusive as to “whether, in the absence 
of an explicitly controlling statute, a stockholder-adopted bylaw can be made immune from 
repeal or modification by the board of directors.”505 This is because of two earlier 
                                                 
501 See Gordon, Jeffrey N. “Just Say Never-Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An 
Essay for Warren Buffett.” Cardozo L. Rev. 19 (1997): 511. Professor Gordon agrees that shareholders have had 
little success in repealing poison pill rights plans through shareholder initiated bylaw amendments. However he 
argues that, on principle, shareholders should have the right to adopt bylaw amendments that limit the use of 
poison pills.  
502 Brownstein, Andrew R., and Igor Kirman. “Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? Responding 
to Majority Vote Resolutions.” The Business Lawyer (2004): 23-77 at 52-53. 
503 See section 8.4. 
504 Hamermesh, Lawrence A. “Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the 
Street.” Tul. L. Rev. 73 (1998): 409 at 417. § 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law and § 601 of the 
N.Y Bus. CORP. LAW for example shows no evidence of such restrictions on the power of the board of 
directors to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws. 
505 As per Vice Chancellor Strine (in dicta) in General DataComm Industries, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin 
Investment Board, 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.1 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
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contradictory decisions that have not yet been resolved. The first is American Int’l Rent a 
Car, Inc. v. Cross506 which held that shareholders could include provisions in a bylaw that 
barred the board of directors from further amending the bylaw in question. This stands in 
opposition to Centaur Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc.507  In this case, the Delaware 
Supreme Court ruled that a bylaw limiting the number of directors was void because it 
specifically barred the board of directors from amending it in the future. This was because the 
charter of the company allowed the board of directors to determine the number of directors 
on the board by adopting bylaws. To add to this lack of clarity, directors can also use their 
exclusive right to amend the charter to undo the effect of many shareholder initiated bylaw 
amendments.  
It should be noted that there is a special provision in the DGCL that allows shareholders to 
adopt bylaws related to the number or proportion of votes required for director elections that 
includes a clause barring the board of directors from amending the bylaw.508 This is clear 
evidence that the statute does indeed envisage circumstances where shareholders can initiate 
and adopt decisions immune from subsequent amendment by the board of directors. Section 
8.3 and 8.4 analyze this issue at length and draw conclusions regarding whether or not the 
legislature should be allowed to amend laws passed by initiative. 
Having pointed out the legal position regarding the ability of directors to amend or repeal 
shareholder-adopted bylaws, the power and responsibility of the board of directors to manage 
the business and affairs of the corporation is examined.509 This raises a question regarding 
which takes precedence - the discretionary power of the board or right of shareholders to 
adopt bylaws. 
Practically speaking, proposals for binding shareholder bylaw amendments need to satisfy the 
conditions of Rule 14a-8 if they are to be included in the company’s proxy for circulation to 
shareholders at the expense of the company. This is a critical requirement since privately 
                                                 
506 American Int’l Rent a Car, Inc. v. Cross, 1984 WL 8204 (Del. Ch. 1984). 
507 Centaur Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990). 
508 See § 216, Delaware General Corporation Law. 
509 See for example Delaware General Corporation Law, § 141(a), Model Business Corporations Act, §8.01(b) 
and New York Business Corporation Law §701. 
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financing the solicitation of proxies creates a free rider problem. The solicitor of the proxies 
must bear the entire cost of soliciting proxies but will only be able to capture a pro rata 
percentage of possible benefits in proportion to his shareholding in the company. 
Accordingly, the requirements of Rule 14a-8 in this regard must be examined to determine 
the actual possibility of shareholder adopted bylaws to bar further amendments by the board 
of directors. 
One of the requirements that any proposal circulated under Rule 14a-8 must meet is that it 
must be in compliance with the law of the state of the company’s incorporation. This means 
that the legal uncertainty discussed in American Int’l Rent a Car, Inc. v. Cross,510 Centaur 
Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc.511 and General DataComm Industries, Inc. v. State 
of Wisconsin Investment Board512 also affects the application of Rule 14a-8. This requirement 
and the SEC’s conservative approach to approving proposals means that many shareholder 
proposals are rejected due to the unsettled position of Delaware law on shareholder bylaws 
not amenable to amendment by the board.513 
This reluctance on the part of the SEC is based on fundamental legislative grounds caused by 
a conflict that is difficult to resolve. While § 109(a) of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law empowers shareholders to adopt bylaws, § 109(b) provides that “the bylaws may contain 
any provision, not inconsistent with the law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to 
the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights 
or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” This grant of power creates a 
conflict with § 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation law which confers similarly 
comprehensive powers to the board of directors. Per § 141(a), “The business and affairs of 
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of 
                                                 
510 American Int’l Rent a Car, Inc. v. Cross, 1984 WL 8204 (Del. Ch. 1984). 
511 Centaur Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990). 
512 General DataComm Industries, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Investment Board, 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.1 (Del. Ch. 
1999). 
513 “When drafting a proposal, shareholders should consider whether the proposal, if approved by shareholders, 
would be binding on the company. In our experience, we have found that proposals that are binding on the 
company face a much greater likelihood of being improper under state law and, therefore excludable under Rule 
14a-8(i)(1).” See Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Staff Legal Bull. No. 14, § G, at 28 (July 13, 2001). 
Cited from Brownstein, Andrew R., and Igor Kirman. “Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? 
Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions.” The Business Lawyer (2004): 23-77 at 54. 
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a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate 
of incorporation.” 
It is argued that § 141(a) provides that the board of director’s authority to manage the 
business and affairs of the company is expressly limited by provisions of Chapter 1 of the 
DGCL or the certificate of incorporation. The exclusion of the bylaws as a source of 
limitation on the powers of the board of directors in this section can, therefore, be interpreted 
to be a conscious exclusion by legislature. Therefore, bylaws that interfere with the 
encompassing power of the board to manage the affairs of the company may fall foul of 
Delaware law and § 141(a) in particular. Furthermore, if § 109(a) and (b) are construed to 
override § 141(a), we are left with a situation where shareholders have the power to control 
any aspect of the functioning of the company.514 
Accordingly, shareholder adopted bylaws cannot be used to pass binding resolutions relating 
to specific business decisions that are the prerogative of the board of directors.515 The power 
to initiate game-ending decisions involving mergers, consolidations, dissolutions and sale of 
all the company’s assets rests exclusively with the board of directors. The only right 
shareholders have regarding rules of the game decisions and game-ending decisions is the 
power of veto since these decisions must be approved by shareholders to come into effect.516 
Similarly, in the case of scaling down decisions, all authority is vested with the board of 
directors. These decisions involve ordering a cash or stock distribution to shareholders. This 
reduces the size of the company and removes excess cash or assets.517 Shareholders do not 
have the authority to initiate such decisions nor do they even have the power to veto decisions 
involving the distribution of cash or stock to shareholders. 
                                                 
514 Hamermesh, Lawrence A. “Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the 
Street.” Tul. L. Rev. 73 (1998): 409 at 432. 
515 Delaware General Corporation Law, § 141(a), Model Business Corporations Act, §8.01(b) and New York 
Business Corporation Law §701. 
516 The shareholder’s right to veto fundamental corporate decisions is discussed at length in section 2.1. This 
power is comparable to citizens’ rights to veto certain decisions taken by the government through a referendum. 
517 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 833-914 
at 841. 
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Under the provisions of the DGCL, shareholders may make precatory proposals on a wider 
range of issues than they can adopt shareholder bylaws. In fact, when a shareholder proposal 
is found to violate state law by impinging on the discretion of the board under §141(a), it can 
be converted to a precatory proposal. Shareholders can, therefore, propose and adopt bylaws 
on issues that are not restricted to the discretion of the board of directors and may propose 
precatory proposals on other issues. However, if the shareholder proposal is to be included in 
the company’s proxy to avoid the free rider problem, it must nevertheless meet the 
requirements of Rule 14a-8. It should be noted that the adoption of precatory shareholder 
proposals is subject to the discretion of the board.518  
Professor Brownstein has suggested that the purpose of Rule 14a-8 was to create a 
consultation mechanism to allow discussion of proposals amongst shareholders themselves 
and between shareholders and management. It was never to establish direct democracy in the 
corporate model. He argues that the SEC has itself suggested that binding resolutions under 
the rule would largely be impermissible. This is because binding resolutions would be 
considered to be beyond the scope of proper subject for action by shareholders under the 
relevant state corporate laws. On the other hand, if the resolutions are precatory, they are 
more likely to be allowed. 519  
This view is upheld by the note to Rule 14a-8 added in 1976 which argued that binding 
resolutions may often fall foul of state law definitions of what is proper action for 
shareholders and might impinge on the discretionary powers of the board.520  
                                                 
518 Levit, Doron, and Nadya Malenko. “Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals.” The Journal of Finance 
66, no. 5 (2011): 1579-1614 at 1579. 
519 See Brownstein, Andrew R., and Igor Kirman. “Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? 
Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions.” The Business Lawyer (2004): 23-77 at 40. “Proposals by security 
holders that mandate or direct the board to take certain action may constitute an unlawful intrusion on the 
board's discretionary authority under the typical statute. On the other hand, however, proposals that merely 
recommend or request that the board take certain action would not appear to be contrary to the typical state 
statute, since such proposals are merely advisory in nature and would not be binding on the board even if 
adopted by a majority of the security holders.” Per Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 
12,999, 1976 SEC LEXIS 326, at 20-21 (Nov. 22, 1976).  
520 “Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not considered proper under state law if they would be 
binding on the company if approved by shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are cast as 
recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action are proper under state law. 
Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the 
company demonstrates otherwise.” Per Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 
Exchange Act Release No. 12999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, at 7 (Dec. 3, 1976) cited from Id. at 41. 
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Therefore, this discussion shows that Delaware shareholders can initiate and adopt binding 
proposals in the form of bylaw amendments. There is, however, confusion regarding whether 
or not the shareholders can prohibit the board of directors for later modifying such bylaws. 
On the other hand, shareholders can typically pass only non-binding resolutions using Rule 
14a-8 if the resolution is not put in the form of a bylaw amendment. 
   
8.2.2 The UK Position 
The American approach is not the only way of allocating rights to initiate decisions between 
the shareholders and the board of directors. English corporate law gives greater power to 
initiate decisions to shareholders. Regardless of this, the UK has still had notable success in 
attracting international investment in a corporate environment of large dispersed shareholding 
without controlling shareholders. This suggests that diluted initiation rights for shareholders 
are not a precondition to an efficient corporate system that can attract both investors and 
managers effectively.521 This sub-section provides a positive analysis of the treatment of 
shareholder initiated decisions in the UK. 
Under the Companies Act, 2006, shareholders have the power to initiate and adopt 
amendments to the articles of association522 by means of a special resolution523 passed by a 
supermajority of 75% of the votes cast at a shareholder meeting.524 Because the articles of 
association create and limit the principal-agent relationship in UK corporations, this gives 
shareholders of English corporations the right to initiate rules of the game decisions. While 
the high supermajority requirement means the initiation and adoption of amendments by 
shareholders is difficult,525 there are other provisions that help shareholders to initiate 
                                                 
521 For a detailed study of the differences in English and American corporate law and governance, see Gower, L. 
C. B. “Some Contrasts between British and American Corporation Law.” Harvard Law Review 69, no. 8 (1956): 
1369-1402. 
522 The Companies Act, 2006 merged the memorandum of association and the articles of association (similar to 
the charter and the byelaws of US companies respectively) to create a unified articles of association that serves 
the role of both charter and byelaws. 
523 S. 21(1), Companies Act, 2006. 
524 See s. 283, Companies Act, 2006. Shareholders wishing to table a special resolution at the annual general 
meeting of the company must give prior notice to the company and follow the provisions of Part 13 of the 
statute.     
525 Davies, Paul L. Gower & Davies: The Principles of Modern Company Law. Sweet and Maxwell, 2008. 
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decisions under UK law. Ten percent or more shareholders can compel the board of directors 
to call a general meeting526 where the shareholders can vote on the special resolution 
containing the proposed amendment.527 In fact, if the board of directors fails to call such a 
meeting, the shareholders themselves can call a general meeting at the company’s expense528 
in order to adopt the proposal.  
In the case of specific business decisions, UK law by default provides that the company 
should be managed by the board of directors. However, the model articles of association 
provided by the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations have been adopted by most public 
companies in that country. These model articles of association provide that “The shareholders 
may, by special resolution, direct the directors to take, or refrain from taking, specified 
action”.529 Furthermore, the shareholders of UK companies can also initiate a proposal to 
replace members of the board of directors in an ordinary resolution530 as long as special 
notice is given to the concerned directors.531  
This clearly demonstrates that UK company law grants shareholders greater power to initiate 
decision-making and to bind the board to their decisions as compared to the company law of 
Delaware and of most other American states. However, it is clear that both the UK and the 
US have met with considerable success in attracting investors and entrepreneurs. This can 
only be if both investors and entrepreneurs were attracted by the principal-agent relationship 
created by the corporate laws of these countries. It must thus be argued that neither system’s 
treatment of shareholders’ right to initiate and ratify binding decisions creates agency costs 
that are high enough to make the jurisdiction non-competitive in attracting both principals 
and agents. Accordingly, a deeper normative discussion will be required in the following 
sections to ascertain an optimum degree of initiation rights for citizens in the absence of a 
clear answer in corporate governance. 
                                                 
526 s. 303(1) read with s. 303(3), Companies Act, 2006 and s. 304, Companies Act, 2006. 
527 s. 303(5), Companies Act, 2006. 
528 s. 305, Companies Act, 2006. 
529 Regulation 4(1), Companies (Model Articles) Regulations, 2008. Note: Regulation 4(2), Companies (Model 
Articles) Regulations, 2008 prohibits any retrospective application of Regulation 4(1). 
530 s. 168(1), Companies Act, 2006. 
531 s. 312, Companies Act, 2006. 
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8.3 COMPARING NON-BINDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS WITH NON-
BINDING INITIATIVES 
This section begins the normative analysis into why certain types of decisions initiated by 
shareholders are binding while others are non-binding on the management. It examines what 
this implies for agency cost. Chapter 1 demonstrated that the agency relationship established 
by corporate and constitutional law exhibit a sufficient degree of similarity to draw useful 
conclusions for direct democracy. In light of this, the following arguments will use the 
reasoning adopted in corporate governance to determine when initiatives should be binding 
and when they should instead be precatory in order to minimize agency cost. 
This section in particular examines why decisions initiated by shareholders should be 
precatory in certain circumstances in order to minimize agency cost. Intuitively, it might be 
said that whenever agents ignore the decisions of the principals, agency cost escalates 
drastically. If we assume that the principals know what is in their own interest better than 
their agents, agency cost will increase when agents ignore the instructions of their principals. 
This is because agency cost includes residual loss and residual loss is defined as the cost of 
the divergence of the actions of the agents from those that would be in the principal’s best 
interests.532 
This, however, makes an important assumption that the principals can effectively express 
their preferences through direct decision-making. This is not always true. Corporate law 
recognizes that directors may better understand what is in the best interests of the 
shareholders better than the shareholders themselves. Many provisions of corporate law give 
precedence to the discretion of the board of directors by treating shareholder proposals to be 
precatory in a large number of cases.533 The tempering of the right of shareholders to make 
decisions is also reflected in takeover regulations. In fact, the jurisprudence of takeovers is a 
careful balancing of two views. On one hand, directors, being better informed can judge the 
real value of the company better than their shareholders and can bargain more effectively for 
a good price. On the other hand, shareholders can be expected to know what is in their own 
                                                 
532 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360 at 308. See section 2.2.1. 
533 See section 8.1. 
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best interests. The considerable discretion given to directors during takeover suggests that the 
case in favor of shareholder discretion is not conclusive.534     
Corporate governance literature suggests that directors, being bound by their fiduciary duties 
to protect the interests of shareholders must use their best judgment in evaluating the merit of 
a proposal passed by a majority of shareholders. They must, therefore, take factors other than 
the result of the shareholder resolution into account while making their decision.535 If the 
board of directors feels that a proposal adopted by the majority is not in the best interests of 
shareholders as a whole, they have the right and the obligation to not implement the 
proposal.536 
The case of Smith v. Van Gorkom is a clear illustration of the duty of the board of directors to 
use their business judgment even when there is a clear majority vote from the shareholders in 
favor of a decision. In this case, the directors were held liable for breach of fiduciary duty for 
not following a proper process in approving the sale of the company. The court ruled so 
despite the fact that the sale was supported by the CEO, had been placed on the company’s 
proxy and had received a majority vote from the shareholders.537 
In Am. Int'l Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Cross, Vice-Chancellor Berger of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery ruled that the board of directors cannot be said to be in breach of their fiduciary 
duties merely because they act contrary to the wishes of a majority of their shareholders. He 
argued that while the board of directors must give due consideration to the wishes of the 
shareholders, they must do what they consider best for the company in the exercise of their 
business judgment.538 The issue was again reviewed in the celebrated case of Paramount 
                                                 
534 See Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. “Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem, and the Theory of the 
Corporation.” The Bell Journal of Economics (1980): 42-64. This article explains how the free rider problem 
can make shareholder decision-making ineffective for protecting their best interests. 
535 See for example Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, No. 511, 1998 (Del. Sup. Ct. Dec. 31, 1998). In 
this case, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled that "one of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is 
that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a 
corporation.” See also Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
536 Brownstein, Andrew R., and Igor Kirman. “Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? Responding 
to Majority Vote Resolutions.” The Business Lawyer (2004): 23-77 at 24. 
537 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Note that there were additional claims regarding 
misinformation being given to shareholders. However, this case is widely known for its requirement that the 
board of directors follow a proper process in order to enjoy the protections of the Business Judgment Rule. 
538 Am. Int'l Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Cross, No. 7583, 1984 WL 8204, at 3. 
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Communications Inc. v. Time Inc. both by the Delaware Court of Chancery and by the 
Delaware Supreme Court.539 Both courts returned the same finding as in Am. Int'l Rent-a-
Car, Inc. v. Cross.540  
Chancellor Allen confirmed the ratio of these cases for the Delaware Chancery Court by 
ruling as follows in Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc.: 
“The corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their 
powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of shares. In fact, 
directors, not shareholders, are charged with the duty to manage the firm."541  
When the case was heard on appeal by the Delaware Supreme Court, the Chancery Court’s 
position was affirmed and made crystal clear by the Supreme Court ruling as follows: 
“[The plaintiff's] contention stems, we believe, from a fundamental misunderstanding of 
where the power of corporate governance lies. Delaware law confers the management of the 
corporate enterprise to the stockholders' duly elected board representatives… The fiduciary 
duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement 
of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the stockholders."542 
This position has been adopted in a number of states where courts have ruled that the board is 
not bound to carry out the wishes of the majority of shareholder and must use their discretion 
in determining what is in the best interests of the company.543 
Shareholder proposals are a strong signal of the wishes of the shareholders. Unlike stock 
market performance, these signals are clear indicators unaffected by external factors to the 
                                                 
539 In this case, Paramount Communications Inc. sought to enjoin Time Inc. from making a tender offer for 51% 
shares of Warner Communications at a time when Paramount Inc. was trying to acquire control of Time Inc.   
540 American Int’l Rent a Car, Inc. v. Cross, 1984 WL 8204 
541 Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, & 10935, 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. July 
14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d. 1140 (Del. 1990). 
542 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990). 
543 See Brownstein, Andrew R., and Igor Kirman. “Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? 
Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions.” The Business Lawyer (2004): 23-77 at 45 for examples of judicial 
pronouncements by courts in a number of other states mirroring the position in Delaware. 
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same extent. In constitutional law, it can be said that citizens’ initiatives and agenda 
initiatives give a clearer indication of public sentiment on a specific issue than periodic polls. 
This is because initiatives allow citizens to vote based on single-issue preferences while 
legislative elections bundle together all political, social and economic positions of a candidate 
into a single take it or leave it choice.  
This bundling occurs because voters have to vote for legislative elections by taking into 
account past performance and future promises of candidates on each and every public policy 
issue. This means that voters cannot reward or punish a candidate based solely on his or her 
outlook on a particular issue. Therefore, all issues are bundled into one election and voters 
cannot express their preferences on particular issue. In the case of initiatives, voters can 
separate the issues concerning government and express their preferences on a particular issue 
without impacting government policy on all other, non-connected issues. This reason makes 
initiatives a clear indicator of the wishes of the public on a particular issue which the 
government can ignore at its own peril. 
The benefit of a precatory resolution, whether passed by a majority or narrowly defeated, can 
be considered to be two-fold. Firstly, it serves as an indication of dissatisfaction of a majority 
of shareholders and the dissatisfaction of a significant minority if the initiative is narrowly 
defeated. This is a cause of concern for the board. Secondly, the tabling of the proposal forces 
the board to reply to the shareholder tabling the proposal. Being forced to reply to the 
shareholder forces the board to consider the concerns of the shareholder(s) and perhaps to 
reevaluate its existing position.544  
This indirect benefit of a shareholder resolution should translate effectively into the political 
framework and a similarly conciliatory attitude can be expected from legislature to initiatives. 
An examination of how boards have reacted proactively to integrate shareholder feedback 
into their decision-making process will prove instructive to how legislatures may behave. 
Boards of directors have been increasingly open to adapting their policies to address at least 
some issues advocated in shareholder proposals and have become more open to informal 
                                                 
544 Schulman, Stephen. "Shareholder Cause Proposals: A Technique to Catch the Conscience of the 
Corporation." Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 40 (1971): 1.  
224
The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance 
 
221 
 
negotiations with the supporters of the shareholder proposal.545 Empirical research by 
Professors Bizjak and Marquette shows that even though shareholder proposals have 
considerable difficulty in securing majority votes, shareholder rights plans (i.e. poison pills) 
are almost three times as likely to be restructured and seven times more likely to be removed 
or put to a shareholder vote when there has been a precatory shareholder resolution asking for 
the pill to be removed. This impact is largely due to negotiations between the board of 
directors and the proponents of the proposal.546  
The increased cooperation between the board and shareholders caused by the ability of 
shareholders to send clear signals is an important argument in favor of precatory ballot 
initiatives. This positive effect would be available in the political setting due to the similar 
nature of the agency problem between the dispersed principals and the centralized decision 
makers. 
Professor Levit specifically compares the merits of binding v. non-binding shareholder 
proposals. He concludes that non-binding shareholder proposals are effective in aligning 
policy with the preferences of a majority of shareholders if managerial discipline is strong. 
He argues that the impact of non-binding votes is greatest when it is enhanced by the 
influence of the market for corporate control and especially when the proponent of the 
proposal threatens a proxy contest.547 
This means that non-binding voting is effective when agents are not well entrenched and 
when there is fierce competition to replace the agents. Due to the default of plurality 
voting,548 shareholders do not have the power to stop the election of the Board’s candidates in 
                                                 
545 Supra note 569 at 69, 73. 
546 Bizjak, John M., and Christopher J. Marquette. “Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence 
from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33, no. 4 
(1998) at 501. 
547 Levit, Doron, and Nadya Malenko. “Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals.” The Journal of Finance 
66, no. 5 (2011): 1579-1614 at 1602-03. 
548 See section 3.4.1. See also Sjostrom, William, and Young Kim. “Majority Voting for the Election of 
Directors.” Connecticut Law Review 40, no. 2 (2007) and Vaaler, Bryn R. “Majority Board Election: Where Do 
We Stand?” Corporate Board 168 (2008): 16. Note that there is an increasing trend for companies to adopt more 
onerous majority requirements for director elections. These modified plurality requirements are also known as 
Pfizer requirements after the first major corporation to adopt them and have now been adopted by other large 
companies such as Disney, Pfizer, General Electric, Safeway, Office Depot, Circuit City, Automatic Data 
Processing, US Bancorp and Best Buy. 
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the absence of a proxy contest if even one share is cast in favor of those candidates.549 
Furthermore, the incumbent board of directors has the privilege of using the company’s proxy 
statement to promote their nominees as compared to political elections which provide a level 
playing field for incumbents and challengers.550 These factors create entrenchment that dulls 
the effect of non-binding shareholder proposals. 
The case of constitutional law is different. Because political elections are much more 
competitive, Professor Levit’s argument that precatory votes are most effective when there is 
low entrenchment and high competition (for the position of agent) supports the case for 
meaningful yet non-binding initiatives. Therefore, while precatory shareholder proposals 
have met with some success in influencing the policy adopted by the board of directors, 
precatory initiatives are bound to have a greater impact on the policies adopted by the 
legislature. This means that, in terms of agency cost, residual loss can be minimized more 
effectively by allowing principals the right to initiate non-binding decisions in constitutional 
law than in the context of corporate governance.   
This idea of using non-binding decisions initiated by the principals to increase 
communication and dialogue between principals and agents is the underpinning of the agenda 
initiative in constitutional law. An agenda initiative is a process whereby citizens can propose 
a petition, get the required number of signatures and vote to ask the legislature to consider 
discussing a particular issue. In other words, a successful agenda initiative only requests or 
compels the legislature to debate the issue in question rather than proposing any particular 
solution. 
It is argued that there is little risk in requiring the legislature to discuss a measure that has the 
qualified support of the voting population. The purpose of an agenda initiative is to put a 
given issue into the spotlight and have a parliamentary debate on it. Since a successful agenda 
                                                 
549 See § 216, Delaware General Corporation Law; § 7.28(a), Revised Model Business Corporation Act. 
Plurality voting can simply be described as a system of elections where the winner is the candidate who gets the 
largest number of votes cast. There is no requirement to get an absolute majority of the votes cast. With the 
move towards introducing proxy access, arguments have been made to allow shareholders to include their own 
slate of nominees for election to the board of directors on the company’s proxy. This has the potential to make 
corporate elections much more competitive if a challenger group acquires the threshold of shares required to 
include their representative on the company’s proxy. 
550 Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael. “Financing Politics: A Global View.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002): 
69-86. 
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initiative has already succeeded in putting the issue into the spotlight, it is little infringement 
on the discretion of the legislature if they were to also be constitutionally required to formally 
discuss it. Such a requirement takes away nothing from the legislature’s responsibility to 
make the best decisions as it sees fit since the final decision rests with it. On the other hand, it 
allows citizens to draw attention to issues that concern a reasonably large percentage of 
citizens as determined by the threshold of votes required for an agenda initiative to be 
successful. 
The insights gained from corporate governance in this section, therefore, suggest that non-
binding initiatives can help information about citizen’s preferences flow from citizens to 
legislators thereby reducing residual loss. There is also little difference in monitoring cost 
whether an agenda initiative is binding or whether it is non-binding. This is because the 
legislature is only required to consider an issue that has already been voted upon by the 
citizens and the collective action cost of direct democracy which is part of the monitoring 
cost has already been borne. Furthermore, there is little downside in requiring the legislature 
to consider such proposals considering that a threshold limit of signatures shows considerable 
popular support for the proposal. 
 
8.4 COMPARING BINDING SHAREHOLDER BYLAW AMENDMENTS AND 
BINDING INITIATIVES 
Having discussed the issue of precatory shareholder proposals and agenda initiatives in the 
previous section, this discussion focuses on the nature of shareholder bylaw amendments and 
binding initiatives (also known as citizen’s initiatives).  
Shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 are typically precatory since binding shareholder 
proposals are often found to be in violation of state law.551 However, shareholders have 
coextensive rights to amend the bylaws of the company together with the board of 
directors.552 Shareholders can, therefore, use Rule 14a-8 to pass binding resolutions as long as 
                                                 
551 Black Jr, Lewis S., and A. Gilchrist Sparks III. “SEC as Referee-Shareholder Proposals and Rule 14a-8, 
The.” J. Corp. L. 2 (1976): 1. 
552 Delaware General Corporation Law §109(a); Model Business Corporations Act; §10.20 and New York 
Business Corporation Law §601. 
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the subject of their proposal is amenable to inclusion in the bylaws and the shareholder 
proposal advocates the adoption of that amendment or insertion of a new bylaw. 
In the majority of companies in the United States, the power to make, amend or repeal bylaws 
rests concurrently with both the board and the shareholders due to provision for the same in 
the relevant statute or the certificate of incorporation.553 This can lead to a situation where a 
board may nullify a shareholder-made bylaw by replacing it by their own new bylaw. There 
is a divergence in opinion amongst the laws of different American states regarding the 
legality of such an action. This part of the chapter examines the circumstances in which 
agents should be allowed to overrule their principals’ decisions taken in such a manner. 
About half of the US states have adopted corporate laws which follow the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act. This is a draft corporate code framed by legal experts in the 
United States to encourage states to adopt best practices and create a degree of uniformity 
amongst the laws of the various states. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act has a 
clear statutory position allowing shareholders to pass resolutions which include a clause 
prohibiting the board from subsequently amending or repealing the said amendment.554  
The jurisdiction of Delaware is an outlier in this regard. Unlike the states mirroring the Model 
Business Corporations Act, the corporate statutes of both Delaware and New York do not 
expressly allow for provisions in bylaw amendments that prohibit subsequent repeal by the 
board of directors.555 There is a key difference between the laws of New York and Delaware. 
The New York Business Corporations Law § 601 contains a specific provision empowering 
                                                 
553 Note that in the State of Delaware, the power to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws is given to directors by a 
provision in the charter rather than by statute. By default, directors can only adopt, amend and repeal bylaws 
until the time the company has not taken any money for its shares. This issue is discussed in depth in the 
following pages. 
554 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20(a)(2). This provision has been given force in CAL. CORP. CODE § 
211; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607. 1020(1)(b); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.120(2); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
1504. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act is a revision of the Model Business Corporation Act of 
1946. Like the earlier version, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act is an attempt by US legal experts to 
formulate a model corporate code that states may adopt, in full or in part in order to promote a degree of 
harmonization in the corporate laws of the different American states. For a detailed study of the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act, see Goldstein, Elliott, and Robert W. Hamilton. “The Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act.” The Business Lawyer (1983): 1019-1029. 
555 See Delaware General Corporation Law § 109; N.Y Bus. CORP. LAW § 601 
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the shareholders to amend any bylaw adopted by the board of directors.556 However, there is 
no corresponding provision that expressly gives the board of directors the power to amend 
bylaws adopted by the shareholders. The express inclusion of the right of shareholders to 
amend bylaws passed by the board but the absence of a converse provision leads to the 
conclusion that the legislature deliberately chose to deprive the board of such a power.557 
This is especially the case if the shareholder-adopted bylaw prohibits further amendment by 
the board. This is not the case in Delaware law. While there is no clear provision in the 
DGCL to this effect, case law discussed subsequently is a strong indicator that a clause in a 
shareholder bylaw barring future repeal or amendment by the board would be in violation of 
Delaware law.  
It should be noted that under the DGCL, the board is not granted the power to make or repeal 
bylaws by the statute but rather through the certificate of incorporation of an overwhelming 
majority of its corporations. DGCL § 109(a) provides that the original bylaws of a company 
can be adopted, amended or repealed by the incorporators or by its initial directors. DGCL § 
109(a) further provides that the board of directors may continue to adopt, amend or repeal the 
company’s bylaws but only up to the time that the company does not receive any payment for 
its shares. Once a company does receive payment for its shares, DGCL § 109(a) shifts the 
responsibility and authority to amend the bylaws to the shareholders.558 
This is, however, not the practice in any large Delaware public company because DGCL § 
109(a) provides that the certificate of incorporation can give the power to adopt, amend or 
                                                 
556 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 601(a): “When so provided in the certificate of incorporation or a by-law 
adopted by the shareholders, by-laws may also be adopted, amended or repealed by the board by such vote as 
may be therein specified, which may be greater than the vote otherwise prescribed by this chapter, but any by-
law adopted by the board may be amended or repealed by the shareholders entitled to vote thereon as herein 
provided.” 
557 “The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, however fallible as a guide to statutory construction, 
would quite plausibly lead a court construing section 601 of the New York Business Corporation Law to 
conclude that having expressly conferred upon the shareholders the power to amend or repeal by-laws adopted 
by the directors, the legislature could not and would not have remained silent on the obvious converse power of 
the directors to amend or repeal by-laws adopted by the shareholders.” Cited from Hamermesh, Lawrence A. 
“Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street.” Tul. L. Rev. 73 (1998): 
409 at 468. 
558 Delaware General Corporation Law § 109(a): “After a corporation has received any payment for any of its 
stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote…” 
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repeal bylaws to the board of directors.559 In fact, the certificate of incorporation of all 
significant Delaware public companies contains a provision to this effect without any 
reservations. It should be noted that DGCL § 109(a) further provides that the shareholders 
continue to have the authority to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws even if the certificate of 
incorporation gives such power to the board of directors.560  
Regarding the issue of the board of directors amending or repealing shareholder-adopted 
bylaws, there is no express legislative instruction to guide the courts. However, there are 
hints as to legislative intent in DGCL § 203 and § 216. Section 203(b)(3) places an express 
restriction on the right of the board of directors to further amend or annul a shareholder bylaw 
under section 203 concerning dealings between the company and any shareholder holding 
greater than 15% of the company’s shares. DGCL § 216 has a similar clause in respect to the 
choice of majority v. plurality voting for director elections. It reads. “A bylaw amendment 
adopted by shareholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the election of 
directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors”. 
 The presence of specific instances in the DGCL that prevent the board of directors from 
amending shareholder-adopted bylaws suggests that the board does have such power in 
normal circumstances. This argument is based on the principle Expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius ("the express mention of one thing excludes all others")561 which is a canon of the 
interpretation of statutes. 
This argument is supported by judicial pronouncement to a certain degree. The best argument 
that Delaware law prohibits shareholder bylaws from limiting the power of the board to 
subsequently amend or repeal them was given in the Centaur Partners case.562 The court 
argued that the power to amend bylaws is given to the board by the certificate of 
                                                 
559 Delaware General Corporation Law § 109(a): “any corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer 
the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors.” 
560 Delaware General Corporation Law § 109(a): “The fact that such power has been so conferred upon the 
directors… shall not divest the stockholders… of the power, nor limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal 
bylaws.” 
561 Garner, Bryan A., Black’s Law Dictionary, (7th ed.). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1999 at 602. 
562  Centaur Partners IV v. Nat'I lntergroup Inc., 582 A.2d 923 (Del. 1990). Has been previously discussed in 
section 8.2.1. In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that a bylaw limiting the number of directors was 
void because it barred the board of directors from amending it. This was because the charter of the company 
allowed the board of directors to determine the number of directors on the board by adopting bylaws. 
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incorporation and this arrangement is allowed by a specific statutory position, i.e. DGCL 
§109. Since the power of the board to amend and repeal bylaws is granted by the certificate 
of incorporation which takes precedence over the provisions of the bylaws, it is unlikely that 
a bylaw provision can limit the power of the board to amend and repeal bylaws, a power 
granted by the certificate of incorporation and specifically allowed by statute.563  
In Centaur Partners IV v. Nat'I lntergroup Inc., shareholders of the company adopted a 
bylaw prohibiting further amendment by the board of directors that read “the foregoing 
sentence [expanding the board to 15] is not subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the 
Board of Directors.”564 However, like most Delaware companies, the charter of the company 
required that the number of directors shall be specified in the bylaws of the company and also 
gave the directors the right to amend the bylaws. Due to this, the court found that the 
provision that prohibited the directors from further amending or repealing that particular 
bylaw was contrary to the provisions of the charter. Since the provisions of the charter 
supersede those of the bylaws, the provision limiting the power of the board to change the 
number of directors was held to be invalid. The operative part of the judgment in this respect 
is reproduced below: 
“Where a bylaw provision is in conflict with a provision of the charter, the bylaw provision is 
a nullity” 565 
The legal position on the issue in question is, however, not settled. In American Int’l Rent a 
Car, Inc. v. Cross, the Delaware Chancery court, in dicta, specifically stated that shareholders 
who wish to prohibit the board of directors from repealing a shareholder bylaw amendment 
can do so.566 The court wrote that shareholders can do this by including a provision in the 
                                                 
563 Ibid.  
564 Ibid. cited from Hamermesh, Lawrence A. “Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: 
Taking Back the Street.” Tul. L. Rev. 73 (1998): 409 at 471. 
565 See Centaur Partners IV v. Nat'I lntergroup Inc., 582 A.2d 923 (Del. 1990) at 929. Reaffirmed in Oberly v. 
Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991). 
566 The term ‘in dicta’ refers to the part of a legal judgment that does not directly address the issues being 
litigated. The part of the judgment delivered in dicta does not have to be followed by lower courts (as is 
normally the case in common law jurisdictions due to the principle of precedence) and is considered only to 
have persuasive value. 
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bylaws that prohibits the board from amending the said bylaw.567 However, this observation 
was in dicta and, therefore, has only persuasive value and cannot be used as precedent. 
Vice Chancellor Strine (now Chancellor) of the Delaware Chancery Court had the 
opportunity to review this matter several years after both Centaur Partners and the American 
Int’l Rent a Car, Inc. decisions. Having considered the previous judicial precedents, he ruled 
that the matter remained undecided.568 
This issue was re-examined in 2008 by the Delaware Supreme Court in CA, Inc. v. 
AFSCME.569 The Delaware Supreme Court ruled the power of shareholders to adopt bylaws 
cannot be inconsistent with the law of the State of Delaware which includes DGCL § 141(a). 
Accordingly, the court ruled that DGCL § 109 cannot be construed to be an exception to 
DGCL § 141(a). 
These are the main legal arguments for and against allowing shareholders to amend bylaws 
adopted directly by the shareholders. These arguments have significant implications for 
constitutional law. Whether or not shareholders can adopt bylaws that cannot be amended or 
repealed by the board of directors can help answer whether agency cost is most effectively 
minimized if citizens are empowered to use initiatives to pass laws that cannot later be 
amended or repealed by the legislature.  
Direct democracy relies on the ability of the principals to influence the decisions of their 
agents through the ability to supersede or veto the decisions of their agents or to directly 
influence policy. If either the board of directors or the legislature has the power to amend or 
repeal decisions taken by principals ex-ante, the ability of principals in both systems to 
supersede or veto the decisions and to directly influence policy is reduced in a similar way.  
Allowing agents to amend or repeal decisions directly taken by their principals can lead to an 
increase in residual loss since it enable agents to move policy away from the preferences of 
                                                 
567 American Int’l Rent a Car, Inc. v. Cross, 1984 WL 8204. “If a majority of American International's 
stockholders in fact disapproved of a Board's amendment of the bylaw, several recourses were, and continue to 
be, available to them. They could vote the incumbent directors out of office. Alternatively, they could cause a 
special meeting of the stockholders to be held for the purpose of amending the bylaws and, as part of the 
amendment, they could remove from the Board the power to further amend the provision in question.” 
568 General DataComm Indus. v. State of Wis. Inv. Board, 731 A.2d 818 (Del. Ch. 1999) at 822. 
569 CA Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
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their principals as expressed through direct democracy. On the other hand, if a bar on agents 
prohibiting them from deviating from policy set by direct democracy prevents them from 
reacting suitable to changed circumstances in the future, monitoring cost can be said to have 
increased. This is because the costs brought about by the lack of the agent’s ability to respond 
can be attributed to the binding decisions taken by the principals trying to control their 
agent’s behavior ex ante. This trade-off is explained in the following arguments.   
If a citizens’ initiative amends a piece of regular legislation and includes a provision that 
prohibits the subsequent repeal of the amendment by the legislature, the reasoning of Centaur 
Partners would be applicable. This would be the case unless the constitution specifically 
provides that law created through initiatives cannot be amended by the legislature and such 
cases do exist in practice.570 In some cases, a supermajority of the legislature may be required 
to amend a law adopted through initiative.571 Since the government gets its authority to pass 
legislation and govern the country from the constitution, regular legislation ordinarily cannot 
negate that right. This is similar to the court’s thinking in Centaur Partners which maintained 
that a provision in the bylaws cannot abrogate the right of the board of directors to manage 
the business and affairs of the company.572   
Because the legislature gets its power to make laws from the constitution, it would appear 
that a citizens’ initiative that amends or creates a regular law (as opposed to a constitutional 
amendment) would run into the same problem. Most countries having rigid constitutions do 
not permit ordinary legislation to nullify or be contrary to the provisions of the constitution. 
                                                 
570 See for example Art 3, § 52(f) of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming that provides that laws adopted 
via initiative cannot be repealed by the legislature within two years of their effective date. Cited from 
Hamermesh, Lawrence A. “Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street.” 
Tul. L. Rev. 73 (1998): 409 at 474. 
571 See Art 2, § 41 of the Constitution of the State of Washington that requires a two thirds majority in both 
houses of the legislature to amend a law adopted through the initiative process. Cited from Hamermesh, 
Lawrence A. “Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street.” Tul. L. Rev. 
73 (1998): 409 at 474. 
572 That is because the power of the board of directors comes from a nearly universally adopted provision in the 
charter which takes precedence over the provisions of the bylaws. It should be noted that under the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, the board of directors has the power to amend the bylaws till they have received 
payment for the company’s shares. Once that happens, the power to amend the bylaws shifts to the shareholders. 
(See § 109(a), Delaware General Corporation Law). The reason why the board shares this power with 
shareholders in almost all Delaware companies is because nearly all of them provide for such a sharing of power 
in their charters. 
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In such countries, it would appear that citizens’ cannot place limitations on the legislature’s 
power to amend a regular law by means of a provision in another or the same law.573 
How constitutional law differs drastically from the DGCL is that certain countries allow 
citizens to initiate amendments to the constitution as well as changes to legislation. Out of the 
37 countries in the world that provide for initiatives at the national level, 20 countries allow 
citizens’ initiatives to amend the constitution. On the other hand, 26 of the 37 countries allow 
initiatives to only be used to adopt and amend ordinary legislation.  This is in variance to the 
DGCL, which restricts the right to initiate charter amendments to the board of directors.574 
However, it is in line with UK law that allows shareholders to pass amendments to the 
unified articles of association.575  
It can be said that allowing legislators the right to reverse any amendments made through the 
initiative process would undo the advantage of providing for initiatives to prevent ex ante 
diversion from the policy favored by the principals. This would increase residual loss. While 
it may be argued, and rightly so, that legislators would think twice about reversing a measure 
adopted by popular vote, the Swedish example of the government undoing a no vote in a 
referendum without holding another one shows that this is not inconceivable. On October 16, 
1955, Sweden held a non-binding referendum to decide whether to switch to driving on the 
right hand side of the road rather than the UK and Commonwealth trend of driving on the left 
hand side. The proposal was comprehensively defeated by a vote of 82.9% against the switch 
and 15.5% for it. Despite the fact that the voter turnout for the referendum was greater than 
                                                 
573 See ‘Chapter: III: Flexible and Rigid Constitutions’ in Bryce, James Bryce. Studies in History and 
Jurisprudence. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1901. Constitutions that allow apex or 
constitutional courts to strike down legislation (or parts of legislation) that conflict with provisions of the 
constitution are examples of rigid constitutions. On the other hand, Viscount Bryce writes that ancient 
constitutions like those of the Greek states like Athens, of Rome, Carthage etc. were flexible and that such 
constitutions are increasingly rare nowadays. He states, 
“Excluding despotically governed countries, such as Russia, Turkey, and Montenegro, there are now only three 
in Europe, those of the United Kingdom, of Hungary—an ancient and very interesting Constitution, presenting 
remarkable analogies to that of England—and of Italy, whose constitution, though originally set forth in one 
document, has been so changed by legislation as to seem now properly referable to the Flexible type. Elsewhere 
than in Europe, all Constitutions would appear to be Rigid.”  
While Viscount Bryce wrote this in 1901, the situation today remains similar. 
574 § 242(1), Delaware General Corporation Law 
575 s. 21(1) r/w s. 283 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
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50% and the public consensus was clearly against switching to driving on the right hand side 
(82.9% against), on September 3, 1967, the government did so anyway without again 
consulting the people.  
Admittedly, the Swedish example concerns a referendum rather than an initiative but the 
lesson is the same – legislatures may ignore direct democracy when it is expedient for them 
to do so.  
This shows that the government may reject the principal’s preferences expressed through a 
popular vote thereby threatening an escalation of residual loss.576 If agents amend or repeal 
decisions directly adopted by a majority vote of their principals, this deviation would tend to 
increase since the agents are moving away from their principals’ expressed preferences. 
Allowing the legislature to reverse amendments adopted through initiatives can, therefore, 
lead to increased agency cost. 
On the other hand, not giving the legislature the power to amend laws adopted via initiatives 
may interfere with the ability of the government to cater to certain unforeseen circumstances. 
Since direct democracy is considered a monitoring mechanism for the purposes of this 
dissertation, the costs brought about by its use by constraining the ability of agents to react to 
changed circumstances would be an increase in monitoring cost. This problem was 
recognized by the Supreme Court of Idaho in the legislative context. The court recognized the 
problem of constraining agents from reacting from changed circumstances after the direct 
democracy mechanisms had been used. It also considered the risks associated with of drafting 
and lack of deliberation and compromise between competing interests in initiatives and found 
that legislatures should have the power to reverse such decisions if they find them to be 
problematic.577  
Since the legislature is far better suited to quick decision-making in times of crisis than the 
initiative process, such un-amendable provisions may create considerable problems when 
unforeseen situations arise in the future. Furthermore, if the negative consequences of citizens 
initiatives are widely dispersed and invisible but the benefits are clearly visible, it might be 
                                                 
576 As pointed out in section 2.2, residual loss is the cost imposed by the deviation of the actions of the agents 
from the preferences of their principals. 
577 See Luker v. Curtis, 136 P.2d 978, 979-80 (Idaho 1943); See also Hamermesh, Lawrence A. “Corporate 
Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street.” Tul. L. Rev. 73 (1998): 409 at 475. 
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difficult to motivate the citizens to use direct democracy to reverse such a decision. For 
example, citizens of a country with poor education about climate change may adopt 
initiatives that defang environmental regulations in order to get a short term boost in 
economic growth. Here, it might be difficult to convince the citizens to repeal such laws 
because environmental damage is slow and difficult to quantify while economic benefits can 
be felt more substantially. This sort of situation can lead to inefficient laws. Accordingly, in 
Luker v. Curtis, the Supreme Court of Idaho ruled that “[T]he initiative provision . . . places 
no limitation whatever on the power of amendment or repeal of an initiative act."578 
However, the court ruled that citizens can expressly include a provision in the amendment 
introduced through the initiative which prohibits the legislature from repealing or further 
amending it. 
Many states, therefore, take the position that unless the initiative specifically provides that the 
law so adopted may not be amended by the legislature, the legislature may validly amend or 
repeal it. This position is reflected in ruling by courts in the states of Colorado, Nebraska, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Tennessee as well as Idaho.579 This situation is analogous to 
the discussion in section 8.2.1 about the ability of shareholders to adopt bylaws that contain a 
clause prohibiting the board of directors from subsequently amending or repealing it.  
A greater issue for minimizing agency cost than inefficient laws is situations whether the 
initiative creates rules to improve monitoring of the legislators or the interest groups that 
influence them.580 In countries with a tenuous democratic history, giving potentially 
autocratic or corrupt legislators the right to reverse popular measures such as these can lead 
to dangerous escalations in residual loss and therefore increases in agency cost. In some 
                                                 
578 Luker v. Curtis, 136 P.2d 978, 979-80 (Idaho 1943). 
579 See In re Senate Res. No.4, 130 P. 333,336 (Colo. 1913); Luker, 136 P.2d at 979; Klosterman v. Marsh, 143 
N.W.2d 744, 748 (Neb. 1966) ("In the absence of specific constitutional restraint, either [the people or the 
Legislature] may amend or repeal the enactments of the other."); State ex rei. Singer v. Cartledge, 195 N.E. 
237,239 (Ohio 1935); Granger v. City of Tulsa, 51 P.2d 567, 569 (Okla. 1935); State ex rei. Pierce v. Slusher, 
248 P. 358 (Ore. 1926); State ex rei. Richards v. Whisman, 154 N.W 707, 710 (S.D. 1915), appeal dismissed, 
241 U.S. 643 (1916); Chattanooga-Hamilton Co. Hosp. Auth. v. City of Chattanooga, 580 S.W.2d 322, 327-28 
(Tenn. 1979). Cases cited from Hamermesh, Lawrence A. “Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-
Laws: Taking Back the Street.” Tul. L. Rev. 73 (1998): 409 at 474. 
580 Rent seeking in this context can be simply characterized as the expenditure of resources by group to increase 
the share of existing wealth allocated by the group rather than through the creation of more wealth. For a 
detailed discussion, see Tullock, Gordon. Rent Seeking. Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1993. 
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states, popular pressure on legislators that would result from repealing a law passed by a 
popular initiative may not be enough.  
For example, citizens might use the initiative process to adopt key measures like term limits, 
restrictions on the power of the President, financial declaration requirements for legislators 
etc. that can reduce agency cost but are restrictive on the agents. In such cases, the pressure of 
public opinion to avoid amending or repealing such popularly adopted legislation may not be 
enough to stop autocratic or dishonest representatives from doing so. It may, therefore, be 
prudent to protect legislation which restricts the power of agents to improperly enrich or 
entrench themselves. This can be done by putting a clause in such legislation that prohibits 
the legislature from subsequently amending or repealing it. 
Constitutions contain ‘rules of the game’ decisions that determine the extent and scope of the 
power of the legislature and the executive. When citizens have the right to amend the 
constitution, they can ensure that their agents cannot again give themselves excessive powers 
and restrict citizen’s rights. Citizens can do this by introducing term limits, disclosure 
requirements for legislators’ personal finances, election campaign finance etc. Since such 
provisions are introduced to regulate the conduct of legislators in order to reduce agency cost, 
allowing the legislators to amend or repeal the provisions that regulate their own behavior can 
be counter-productive. In fact, citizens may use initiatives to introduce constitutional 
amendments that check the rise of authoritarian leaders. The question, therefore, arises: Will 
the authoritarian representatives such provisions are introduced to deter care sufficiently 
about a public backlash for amending the provisions? Or should citizens be allowed to bar 
their agents from amending the very provisions that serve as a check and balance on their 
power?  
Examining these questions in terms of how to minimize agency cost provides the following 
insights. Allowing amendments adopted through initiatives to be exempt from repeal by 
legislature can help to reduce agency cost. This is particularly the case when the citizen-
initiated amendment is specifically designed to reduce residual loss. These can be through 
amendments introducing disclosure requirements which enhance the ability of principals to 
monitor the agents, for example, or term limits that restrict entrenchment.  If the legislature is 
allowed to repeal such laws, the protections of the constitution designed to reduce agency 
cost will fail when they are needed most – to constrain legislatures who do not care enough 
about the public backlash that would come from repealing such policies. 
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It is, therefore, opined that the UK model which allows shareholders to adopt amendments to 
the articles of incorporation including clauses prohibiting subsequent amendment by the 
board of directors is the appropriate stance to minimize agency cost. The detailed 
examination of the case law on shareholders’ right to adopt bylaws that the board of directors 
cannot amend later shows that there is qualified support for this argument in the US as well. 
US Courts, in American Int’l Rent a Car, Inc. v. Cross581 held that shareholders could include 
provisions in a bylaw that barred the board of directors from further amending the bylaw in 
question while Centaur Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc.582states the opposite. This 
lack of consensus, unlike the clear UK position, cannot be advanced as advocacy for not 
allowing subsequent amendments by agents. Nevertheless, the analysis of various decisions 
and principles of interpretation of statutes carried out in this chapter shows that the UK 
position is not incompatible with US practice.     
On the other hand, the existence of citizen initiated and adopted decisions that bar subsequent 
amendment by legislature relating to ordinary business decisions may lead to inefficiencies 
like a compromised ability to react to certain crises. After all, given sufficient time, an 
unforeseen event might occur which the initiative made law does not adequately account for. 
In the case of many ordinary business decisions (except game-ending decisions), the potential 
for increased residual loss is not great enough to take the risk of high monitoring cost that can 
be the consequence of making laws rigid and not adaptive to crisis. Even more importantly, 
the potential for selfish gain for the agents through such decisions is also lower than ‘rules of 
the game’ decisions which means that the public backlash from amending directly adopted 
laws should deter most legislators from doing so. In other words, the gains to the agents are 
unlikely to be worth antagonizing the electorate by overtly acing against their wishes. 
The best balance may, therefore, be to allow un-amendable initiative-based laws only in cases 
that deal with monitoring the government and are adopted to protect democratic institutions 
and processes. It must be noted that this analysis the tradeoff between residual loss and 
monitoring cost discussed above is dependent on the unique institutional characteristics of the 
constitutional system as well as the political climate of the country. If the legislators are 
either extraordinarily responsive to citizen’s demands or extraordinarily well entrenched and 
                                                 
581 American Int’l Rent a Car, Inc. v. Cross, 1984 WL 8204 (Del. Ch. 1984). 
582 Centaur Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990). 
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self-serving, the suggestions given here may not be applicable. In the case of uniquely 
responsive representatives, even rules of the game decisions taken by initiative can be 
subjected to amendment by the legislature since the chances of residual loss are lowered by 
the high integrity of the representatives. On the other hand, countries with extraordinarily 
well entrenched and potentially corrupt legislators might incur high residual loss by allowing 
legislative amendment of ordinary business decisions taken by initiative and may prefer to 
incur the relatively lower monitoring cost of having laws that may not be suitably responsive 
to future needs. 
 
 
8.5 KEY CONCERNS REGARDING BINDING INITIATIVES AND BYLAW 
AMENDMENTS 
8.5.1 Drafting 
This chapter has shown that Rule 14a-8 governs the solicitation of proxies for nearly all 
proposed shareholder bylaw amendments. This rule requires the shareholder who initiates the 
amendment to draft the proposed bylaw and submit it to the company so it may be placed on 
the company’s proxy and circulated to all the shareholders. If the draft bylaw and the request 
for its circulation amongst shareholders satisfy all the legal requirements, the proposal to 
amend the bylaws along with the draft amendment is circulated to all shareholders and then 
voted upon in the shareholder meeting.583  
This means that the actual draft being voted upon by shareholders has not had the advantage 
of being discussed and debated. Additionally, the proposal’s drafters have not had the 
opportunity for compromise or improvement. The free rider problem and the fact that 
shareholders do not have access to the company’s expert human capital and financial 
resources also means that the proposal will lack the specialist treatment from lawyers and 
other experts that a board sponsored amendment would receive. These factors mean that the 
draft bylaw might not achieve the best compromise between all the interests involved and 
might not identify the best possible solution to a particular problem. Since direct democracy 
                                                 
583 Black Jr, Lewis S., and A. Gilchrist Sparks III. “SEC as Referee-Shareholder Proposals and Rule 14a-8, 
The.” J. Corp. L. 2 (1976): 1. 
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is envisaged as a monitoring tool, such imperfect law making through initiatives will increase 
monitoring cost and, therefore, increase agency cost. 
In a post on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial 
Regulation, James Morphy of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP has suggested that it is the precisely 
the difficulty in drafting bylaws that has led to most institutional investors putting forward 
precatory proposals even when they have the option of putting forward a binding proposal. 
This is because binding proposals carry with them far greater drafting responsibilities which 
institutional investors would rather avoid.584 By making the proposal precatory, the 
institutional shareholders can specify the substance of the bylaw amendment they want and 
leave the responsibility of drafting the final language of the bylaw to the board of directors. 
The argument that dispersed principals lacking specialized drafting skills and negotiating 
mechanisms might lead to sub-optimal rules can also be extended to laws made via 
initiatives. This is in contrast to laws made by the legislature which are characterized by 
vigorous discussion and debate on the floor of the house and intense scrutiny by committees 
and experts. Additionally, legislative rule making is also characterized by compromise and 
improvement that happens when deals are struck amongst legislators to gain support for the 
changes proposed. National and even state legislatures rely on staffs of hundreds, if not 
thousands of experts and legislative draftsmen. Legislators also have the advantage of 
receiving advice from leading external experts who private individuals are unlikely to have 
similar access to. Furthermore, laws and constitutional amendments have a far wider ranging 
impact than corporate bylaws. This makes it harder to foresee all possible consequences of 
legislative or constitutional amendment. 
It is, therefore, clear that legislative drafting is a highly specialized skill that proponents of 
citizens’ initiatives would have limited expertise in.585 This means that the all-important 
language of the initiative proposal will not be as precise and effective as it might have been if 
                                                 
584 See Morphy, J, “Proxy Access Proposals: Review of 2012 Results and Outlook for 2013”, June 28, 2012, The 
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation available at  
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/06/28/proxy-access-proposals-review-of-2012-results-and-outlook-
for-2013/#2b (Visited on May 1, 2013). 
585 For a discussion into the “careful deliberation and reasoned decision-making” that legislative processes 
provide that are not available to the initiative process, see Staszewski, Glen. "Rejecting the Myth of Popular 
Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy." Vanderbilt Law Review 56 (2003): 395 at 
398. 
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the legislature had drafted it. Improper wording in the initiative proposal might also have 
harmful unintended consequences because the unskilled and non-expert drafters of initiatives 
might not foresee contingencies that experts might otherwise have catered to. Even though 
drafting legislation is not an exact science, experience plays a critical role in foreseeing 
eventualities and examining the potential interpretations of the legislation’s language in light 
of past judicial practice. Therefore, implementing a citizens’ initiative as law without giving 
the legislature a chance to review it carries some risk regarding concerns over the drafting of 
the provision. 
The problem of unforeseen consequences and imperfect wording of the proposal can be 
avoided by allowing the legislature the power to fine tune the language of the resultant 
legislation. One way of doing this would be to allow the legislature to put forward its own 
expertly drafted proposal that gives effect to the demands of the citizen initiative. The 
legislature may then appeal to the citizens to pick its version over the original draft. In fact, 
the legislature can also preempt improperly framed initiatives by passing legislation that 
addresses the concerns espoused by that initiative before it is voted on by the citizens. Once 
effectively drafted legislation has addressed the concerns, the legislature can negotiate with 
the initiative’s proponents to ask them to withdraw the now redundant proposal or appeal to 
the citizens to vote against it. It is, therefore, argued that as long as the legislature is willing 
to pass legislation that complies with the spirit of popular initiatives, they can preempt the 
adoption of improperly drafted initiatives that threaten unforeseen consequences or 
interpretations.  
 
8.5.2 Diluting the Accountability of Agents 
Chapter five explained that the excessive use of referendums can lead to a dilution of the 
accountability of agents and an attendant increase in monitoring cost.586 This happens 
because principals cannot hold their agents accountable for decisions that they (the 
principals) have themselves approved. Professor Kessler has also argued that representatives 
only have the incentive to inform themselves of issues necessary to make reasoned decisions 
                                                 
586 See section 5.4.1. 
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if they have the discretionary power to make those decisions.587 This means that directors and 
legislators would expend lesser effort on gathering and assimilating relevant information if 
their decisions is subject to the approval of shareholders and citizens respectively, than if 
their decision was final.   
This discussion extends the line of argument to address binding initiatives. If principals have 
the power to make decisions that are binding on the agents, the agents cannot be said to have 
discretionary authority on that subject. The agents would, therefore, have reduced incentives 
to inform themselves regarding the relevant issues. Furthermore, principals who take 
decisions that are binding on their agents cannot hold their agents accountable for those 
decisions since the agents have no authority to interfere with or to correct such decisions. 
Therefore, for the purposes of initiatives, the accountability of agents is predicated on 
whether or not the agents have discretionary power, which depends on whether or not 
initiatives are binding. This discussion focuses on examining this issue. 
As discussed earlier, the ramifications of legislative and constitutional amendments are far-
reaching and are often not entirely predictable. In a system where the discretion of the agents 
is frequently replaced by the principals, it may be difficult to determine whether it was the 
actions of the agents or the principals that caused poor performance in the future. For 
example, if citizens pass even a few binding initiatives that have a significant impact on 
economic or fiscal policy, they will not be able to hold the legislature solely responsible for 
future economic outcomes. This is because legislation, especially economic and fiscal 
legislation, has far reaching and unexpected consequences that cannot be separated from the 
results of other legislation. In other words, when citizens actively make decisions on certain 
issues, they will have a hard time determining whether unwanted outcomes in the future are 
the result of their initiatives or were caused by the policies of the legislature. More 
specifically, citizens will not know in what proportion the blame can be allocated when 
things go wrong or whom to give credit to when things go well.  
The inability to apportion blame and give credit where it is due means the ability of the 
principals to monitor their agents will be compromised. Since difficulty in monitoring would 
lead to elevated monitoring costs, agency cost would also rise in a corresponding manner. 
                                                 
587 Kessler, Anke S. “Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Informational Asymmetries.” 
Public Choice 122, no. 1-2 (2005): 9-38 at 10. 
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Regarding the merits of binding or non-binding initiatives, it seems that a binding initiative 
leaves no room for any accountability of the legislature for that decision. This is because the 
legislature is outside the decision-making process and the initiative proposal bypasses it 
entirely to make laws.  
It is, therefore, clear that binding initiatives will lead to a certain dilution in the accountability 
of government as it shifts authority from the legislature to the citizens. Having determined 
that binding initiatives decrease the accountability of the legislature, the question that remains 
to be answered is whether non-binding initiatives also dilute the accountability of agents and 
contribute to an increase in monitoring cost and agency cost? This question is answered 
below. 
Talking about the value of authority, Professor Arrow wrote, “if every decision of A is to be 
reviewed by B, then all we really have is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B and 
hence no solution to the original problem.”588 At first glance, this would suggest that if the 
legislature reviews all non-binding initiatives, there would be no loss of accountability since 
the decision-making authority would have shifted back to the legislature. The legislature 
would, therefore, be responsible for the consequences of all policy, even if some of it is 
proposed though the initiative process and the non-binding initiative would cause no increase 
in monitoring cost due to reduced accountability of agents. This is because for the purposes 
of Professor Arrow’s argument, it is the legislature and not the citizens who exercise 
decision-making authority in the case of non-binding initiatives because the decision of the 
citizens is subject to review by legislature. 
Unfortunately, the situation is not that simple. Professsor Hamermesh, in the context of 
corporate governance, suggests that it may be overstating the case to claim that accountability 
transfers entirely from principals to the agents just because the agents have the power to 
review decisions adopted via non-binding initiatives.589 In fact, responsibility for such 
decisions may not pass to the agents even if they have the final say because the principals 
will nevertheless take partial credit or blame for the consequences. This would mean that the 
responsibility for the consequences of decisions taken by the citizens and then affirmed by 
                                                 
588 Arrow, K. E. The Limits of Organization. Norton, 1974 at 78. 
589 Hamermesh, Lawrence A. “Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the 
Street.” Tul. L. Rev. 73 (1998): 409 at 463. 
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the government would fall on both citizens and legislators. Therefore, neither would be 
entirely accountable. 
To summarize, it is clear that binding initiatives can lead to a serious dilution in the 
accountability of the legislature if misused. This would cause an increase in monitoring cost 
and, therefore, an increase in agency cost. However, binding initiatives minimize residual 
loss because the policy adopted directly by the citizens tends to reflect the majority view of 
the principals. The problem of not being able to hold the agents accountable for the outcomes 
of initiatives can be alleviated somewhat by making the initiatives precatory and subject to 
the approval of the legislature. However, the requirement to get the legislature’s approval for 
non-binding initiatives does not entirely eliminate the dilution of accountability. 
It is, therefore, proposed that initiatives should be binding only when there is a high 
likelihood of a conflict of interest between citizens and legislators. In such cases, the interest 
of ensuring that agents do not overrule the wishes of the principals to benefit themselves is 
greater than the cost of lowered accountability. In other words, the chance of extraordinary 
residual loss is greater than the threat of high monitoring cost caused by reduced 
accountability. Section 6.4 discussed a similar matter in the context of consistency in 
planning and maintaining a long term approach. It explained that concerns of consistency in 
policy may be less important than preventing legislators from making self-serving decisions 
when decisions involving a strong conflict of interest for legislators have to be made. On the 
other hand, when there is no such conflict of interest, greater discretion can be given to 
legislators.  
Similarly, in this case, binding initiatives should be allowed for decisions that create a 
conflict of interest for legislators such as decisions to introduce term-limits, mandate 
financial disclosures for legislators, regulate campaign finance etc. Here, the risk that the 
legislature may reject a non-binding initiative introducing such provisions due to self-interest 
is likely to be greater than the risk that such a decision might reduce legislators’ 
accountability and increase monitoring cost.  
Decisions on issues that do not pose a serious conflict of interest for legislators can be 
restricted to non-binding initiatives. For example, giving the legislature the final say on non-
binding initiatives involving education reform, energy policy etc. is unlikely to suffer from a 
conflict of interest. On the other hand, such decisions have high potential to reduce 
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accountability. After all, education and energy policies are highly complicated and it would 
be difficult to determine whether future improvements or problems in education and energy 
supply were caused by legislative actions or were the triggered by laws adopted via a binding 
initiative. This would make it difficult to hold legislators accountable for future performance 
thereby increasing monitoring cost and leading to increased agency cost. When the chances 
of conflict of interest are low, the enhanced flexibility and partial transfer of accountability to 
the legislature brought about by non-binding initiatives, therefore, seems to be the better 
option because extraordinary residual loss is not the primary problem in such cases. 
 
8.5.3 The Role of Special Interest Groups 
Chapter six discussed the role of special interest groups in direct democracy.590 This 
discussion extends that line of argument examining how special interest groups differently 
influence binding and non-binding initiatives. While the adoption or rejection of initiatives 
(and shareholder bylaw amendments) is a decision made by a majority of the principals, it has 
been pointed out that “the direct lawmaking process gives powerful leverage to initiative 
drafters, who are situated to construct a phantom popular intent through strategic drafting.”591  
As discussed in connection with referendums, framing can play a powerful role in 
determining the outcome of majority votes.592 Special interest groups can, therefore, use a 
cleverly worded proposal to create a gap between the real preferences of the people and their 
perceived preferences as are expressed through the majority vote.593   
                                                 
590 See Section 6.5 
 
591 Schacter, Jane S. “The Pursuit of “Popular Intent:” Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy.” 105 Yale 
Law Journal 107 (1995).  
592 See section 7.5. 
593 See for example the text of the referendum question put by Genenral Pinochet before the Chilean people 
discussed in section 6.5. 
“In the face of international aggression against the government of our fatherland, I support President Pinochet 
in his defense of Chile’s dignity, and I once again confirm the legitimacy of the government of the republic in its 
leadership of the institutional proceedings in this country.”  
While this is the text of a referendum, the same framing concerns arise regardless of whether the proposal is 
framed by unscrupulous legislators or unscrupulous special interest groups.   
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This problem has been recognized in corporate governance with respect to initiation of 
decisions by the principals. Professor Gordon postulates that the ability of factions amongst 
shareholders to use direct decision-making to secure private gains rather than common gains 
is a key reason why the board of directors has extraordinary discretionary power. In 
particular, he says that this is a critical argument against shareholder initiation of decisions.594  
Citizens have a greater diversity of interests than shareholders because issues of distribution 
create competing interests within the voting population in a country. This means that there is 
a greater risk that special interest groups may advance the interests of some principals at the 
expense of the others. Special interest groups, therefore, pose a greater problem constitutional 
law than in corporate governance.595 Accordingly, binding citizens’ initiatives are fraught 
with risk of special interest groups capturing private gains. This problem is magnified by the 
role of super agents which might selectively serve the interests of special interest groups. 
This creates a high chance of incurring significant monitoring costs to oversee the actions of 
the super agents.596  
Making such initiatives non-binding may alleviate this risk. This solution would allow the 
legislature to block the most objectionable initiatives while explaining their reasons to the 
voting population in fulfilment of their fiduciary responsibility to all citizens. This trades the 
possibility of a small risk of increased residual loss for a minimization in the chance of 
incurring considerable monitoring costs 
Accordingly, the recommendation of allowing binding initiatives only in cases where the 
legislature has a strong conflict of interest and precatory initiatives in all other circumstances 
alleviates the threat posed by special interest groups. The suggestion of only permitting 
initiatives that deal with a single issue suggested earlier in the dissertation will also reduce 
the scope for special interest groups to coordinate their activities and advance their interests 
at the expense of other citizens. 
                                                 
594 Gordon, Jeffrey. "Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate 
Law" University of Cincinnati Law Review 60: 347-354 at 361. 
595 Unlike shareholders who share a common goal of enhanced shareholder value with differences as to long 
term or short term outlook, citizens have more fundamental differences in interest. Perhaps the best example of a 
divergence of interest amongst groups of citizens is the distribution of wealth which places the interests of rich 
citizens directly in opposition to the interests of poor citizens. 
596 See the role of super agents in direct decision making discussed in section 3.3.2. 
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8.6 FINDINGS 
Delaware courts have recognized that there are no easy solutions to reconcile the discretion of 
the board of directors’ to manage the business and affairs of the company and the rights of 
shareholders to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws. This stems from the absence of judicial 
consensus on the conflict between DGCL §141(a) and DGCL §109(b). This confusion is 
heightened when the case of the UK is considered since the principal-agent relationship 
created by the corporate laws of the UK allows shareholders to direct the actions of the 
directors to a greater degree than in Delaware.597  
Since corporate governance has been unable to settle the issue of shareholders’ right to 
initiate binding decisions in a decisive fashion, various solutions offered in corporate 
governance literature to help resolve this impasse are examined. This examination is used to 
identify which options would be most effective in minimizing agency cost if applied to 
constitutional law.598 The focus on theory is necessary since the different systems in the US 
and the UK have both seen success in reducing agency cost to a level low enough to become 
internationally competitive in attracting investment and management talent.   
Professor Coffee suggests that a suitable litmus test for restricting the power of the board 
through direct decision-making is a distinction between ordinary and fundamental matters. 
He suggests that shareholders might be allowed to pass bylaws regulating or restricting the 
power of the board to make fundamental decisions but not their power to make ordinary 
business decisions.599 This classification mirrors a constitutional scheme that permits 
citizens’ initiatives on constitutional amendments but not on regular legislation. This would 
allow citizens to share agenda control and discretionary power with the legislature on 
fundamental ‘rules of the game’ decisions but excludes them from ordinary matters 
corresponding to ‘specific business decisions’. 
                                                 
597 See section 8.2.2. 
598 Agency cost is defined as the cost of using an agent. Since direct decision-making is used here as a 
monitoring mechanism, it forms part of the total agency cost. This concept is discussed in detail in Chapter 1.  
599 Coffee Jr, John C. "Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests, 
The." U. Miami L. Rev. 51 (1996): 605 at 613-14. 
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Rules of the game decisions such as fundamental corporate decisions govern the relationship 
between principals and their agents and between the principals themselves.600 Such decisions 
often have an impact on the continued employment, career advancement or empire building 
ambitions of agents. Rules of the game decisions, therefore, have the potential to create a 
conflict of interest when agents are solely responsible for making them.  
By following the same approach and by providing citizens’ with the right to propose and 
adopt binding initiatives on matters where the legislature has a conflict of interest or the 
decision affects the “rules of the game”, constitutional law can address the most serious 
concerns for agency cost. At the same time, restricting binding initiatives to certain defined 
classes of decisions and not permitting binding initiatives on “specific business decisions” 
will limit the chance of them being abused. 
Admittedly, the cost of collective action incurred due to initiatives may be high due to a 
combination of factors such as control of the process for drafting initiatives, the dilution of 
agent’s accountability, agent’s incentives to inform themselves and special interest groups 
amongst principals. Since direct democracy is used to intervene in delegated decision-making 
in a limited manner to keep policy in line with the wishes of the principals, its cost is 
characterized as monitoring cost. As long as the cost of collective action (here a component 
of monitoring cost) remains lower than the high residual loss expected from decisions where 
the agents have a conflict of interest, agency cost can be minimized using binding initiatives.  
A larger cost of collective action is worth incurring in situations where the risk of a conflict 
of interest for the agents is high. This is because agents with vast discretionary power such as 
directors and legislators can impose huge residual losses if they breach their fiduciary duties. 
This means that the expected residual loss stemming from not allowing binding initiatives on 
rules of the game decisions and conflict of interest decisions is higher than the increased 
monitoring cost brought about by binding initiatives. Accordingly, the proposed solution of 
allowing citizens to use binding initiatives to make decisions when the legislators have a 
conflict of interest and to amend the “rules of the game” will minimize agency cost. 
                                                 
600 See Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review (2005): 
833-914 at 844. An explanation of rules of the game decisions is also given in section 4.1.1. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation aims at providing insights from the field of corporate governance to 
minimize agency cost in constitutional law by improving the use of direct democracy. 
Chapter two establishes the basis for a comparative analysis by assuming that companies and 
countries are both governed through delegated decision-making. The use of direct decision-
making by principals is an exceptional intervention which serves as a monitoring mechanism. 
Accordingly, the cost of collective action imposed by direct democracy is considered to be a 
part of the monitoring cost. On the other hand, the convergence of policy with the preferences 
of the principals reduces residual loss. Agency cost is thus lowered by the use of direct 
democracy only when the reduction of residual loss exceeds the accompanying increase in 
monitoring cost. 
The dissertation argues that findings from corporate governance have much to offer 
constitutional law in this regard. To identify such insights, the corporate law of the State of 
Delaware, read together with relevant federal laws and regulations was selected as the subject 
of the comparative analysis. This is because the principal-agent relationship addressed by 
corporate law in Delaware has emerged as a fore-runner in attracting numerous and dispersed 
investors (principals) and top management talent (agents), out-performing not only other 
jurisdictions but also other vehicles for business such as limited liability partnerships.  
However, the UK is also known worldwide for having a large number of big public 
companies with dispersed shareholders. It has also been very successful in attracting agents to 
manage these companies. Accordingly, when there are differences in the use of direct 
decision-making between US (Delaware) and UK law, both systems are analyzed. 
The third chapter examines how certain key differences between corporate and constitutional 
law impact this comparative analysis and looks at how these differences can be compensated 
for. 
Using this methodology, two questions were answered. 
 Are initiatives useful even when referendums are provided for? 
 Should the results of direct democracy be binding? 
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The first question is selected because it directly relates to the status quo in corporate 
governance around the world. Chapter five explains that constitutional law varies between 
countries regarding the availability of referendums and initiatives and the presence or absence 
of these provisions are not by themselves indicative of agency cost in those countries. On the 
other hand, the corporate laws of nearly every country provide that shareholders’ approval is 
mandatory for fundamental corporate decisions. Interestingly, however, like constitutional 
law, corporate law varies across jurisdictions on the rights of shareholders to initiate 
decisions.   
Seeing that corporate law almost universally gives shareholders rights equivalent to a 
referendum regarding fundamental corporate decisions, whether or not this requirement 
reduces agency cost is examined. This is followed by an analysis of whether these findings 
from corporate law are applicable to constitutional law. It appears that the near universal 
ability of shareholders to veto a fundamental corporate decision reduces agency cost by 
separating decision management from decision control.601 Furthermore, by providing a veto 
for rules of the game decisions and normally not providing a veto for ordinary business 
decisions, corporate law provides extra monitoring for major decisions that have are likely to 
pose a greater conflict of interest for the agents.602   
This is followed by an exploration of corporate governance literature to identify theoretical 
insights that help to determine when principals should have the right to initiate decisions. 
Chapter five demonstrates that referendums do not reduce agency cost when agents prefer the 
status quo, agents prefer the worse of two beneficial options or when agents bundle a value 
increasing proposal with a value decreasing one.603 In such cases, only initiatives can help 
principals to adopt the policy they wish to pursue. 
It is argued that initiatives can reduce agency cost by separating specific issues from 
elections, bypassing a biased executive to provide information to legislators and by 
preventing distortions in constitutional evolution. Additionally, initiatives can separate 
                                                 
601 See section 2.4 and Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims.” 
Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2 (1983): 327-349. 
602 Rules of the game decisions often involve a conflict of interest when decided by agents because they involve 
the relationship between principals and agents and between the principals themselves. 
603 See section 5.3. 
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specific issues from elections by allowing citizens to adopt policies that the incumbent 
legislature has not initiated. Citizens can, therefore, avoid the need to replace the legislature 
just to change a single policy. It also means that citizens only need the information required 
to make a single decision rather than information on all government policies which is 
required to replace the legislature. 
Initiatives also provide a direct view of citizens’ preferences to the legislators. In the 
alternative, legislators are restricted to information supplied by bureaucrats who have a 
personal interest in protecting and advancing their careers and may adjust the information 
they pass on accordingly.  
The initiative process can also ensure that legislators do not get exclusive control over the 
agenda when it comes to amending the constitution thereby preventing a distortion in 
constitutional evolution in favor of the legislators. If initiatives are not provided for, a series 
of amendments over the extremely long lifespan of the constitution can lead to a situation 
where legislators accumulate more power than their citizens want them to have and what any 
single amendment taken alone could have given them. 
This is followed by chapter six which contrasts the advantages of initiatives discussed above 
to certain problems that the use of initiatives can give rise to. Furthermore, this chapter also 
examines corporate governance literature to see how these problems are addressed in 
corporate law. It examines how difficulty in determining whether decisions made by the 
agents or decisions made by citizens are responsible for future outcomes can dilute the 
accountability of legislators. Next, it looks at how corporate law avoids the submission of 
nuisance proposals and how those principles can be applied to screen initiatives in 
constitutional law. Then the issue of imperfect information available with citizens is 
addressed. It is shown here that citizens use cues from trusted parties and this, combined with 
the influence of the Condorcet Jury Theorem suggests that they can vote to advance their 
interests even if they are not perfectly informed at the individual level.  
This chapter also looks at how corporate law recognizes the need to have consistent, long-
term policy to manage the company and how this long-term policy can be protected from 
being derailed by shareholder proposals that take a short-term view. It also looks at how the 
laws regulating shareholder proposals protect the directors from blackmail by special interest 
groups who threaten extreme shareholder proposals if their demands are not met. 
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The findings of this chapter suggest that constitutional law would benefit from adopting a 
rule that has seen nearly universal adoption in corporate law. That is, the requirement for 
principals to approve decisions that impact the principal-agent relationship by altering the 
relationship between the principals and their agents. Such rules are called ‘rules of the game’ 
decisions. The dissertation also argues that the approval requirement for adopting and 
amending such rules should also be extended to decisions that involve a substantial conflict 
of interest for the agents even if they are not ‘rules of the game’ decisions. 
With respect to initiatives, the conclusions are more limited and tempered with certain 
reservations. It is found that allowing for initiatives has considerable advantages as well as 
the possibility for abuse. Accordingly, it is opined that the best solution in this case is to 
create a default rule that provides for initiatives rather than making mandatory provisions for 
or against the use of initiatives. For example, if non-binding initiatives are provided for by 
default and are later found to be more trouble than they are worth, citizens would propose a 
decision to do away with initiatives and the legislature would support such a decision. On the 
other hand, if initiatives are not provided for by default, the legislature might not introduce 
later even if they are then found to be desirable. This is because legislators may not want to 
share agenda control and in such cases, citizens will have no means to introduce initiatives at 
a later date. This solution suggests that agency cost can be minimized by adopting a default 
rule that is more restrictive on the legislators and counting on them to opt out of the default 
rule if it is later found to be ineffective. 
Corporate law also has insights to offer regarding issues of information and incentives related 
to citizens’ participation in direct democracy. Chapter six points out that shareholders who 
have a large and undiversified interest in the company such as individual activist investors, 
hedge funds etc. most often engage in shareholder activism. Because such shareholders have 
a large stake in the company and receive a substantial proportion of the company’s profits, 
they have the incentive to gather sufficient information required for direct decisions making. 
The free rider problem can, therefore, be overcome by principals who have a large enough 
interest in the success of the company even though they do not own a hundred percent of the 
shares. 
Since most citizens live their whole lives in the same country, they can be considered to be 
undiversified. Because the social and economic wellbeing of citizens is deeply affected by the 
policies of their country, they are found to have a large and substantial interest in the country. 
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In light of this, it is believed that citizens would have adequate incentives to get informed 
about issues relevant to referendums and initiatives. This information may be gathered 
through cues and with the assistance of super agents. In fact, the dissertation argues that even 
if citizens are not informed, the results of the vote may be representative due to the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem. This theory suggests that a large enough sample of voters will accurately 
represent their preferences as long as each of them individually has a greater than fifty 
percent chance of identifying the best option based on the available information. 
Lastly, Chapter six proposes that the proper purpose test of Rule 14-8(i)(1) may be used to 
determine the proper subject for initiatives. According to this, if a shareholder proposal does 
not bind the board of directors, it is presumed to fall within the ‘proper purpose’ of 
shareholder action and may be circulated and voted upon under Rule 14a-8. In such cases, the 
onus shifts to the board of directors to prove that the subject matter of the proposal is not 
suitable if they wish to exclude the proposal from the company’s proxy statement and stop it 
from being voted upon by shareholders. Applying this rule to constitutional law, it is 
proposed that initiatives framed as recommendations, which do not bind the government, 
should also be presumed to be suitable for inclusion on the ballot as long as other 
requirements are satisfied. 
When initiatives do require action on the part of the government, the application of Rule 14-
8(i)(1) read together with Delaware law must be considered. Applying §141(a), DGCL to 
constitutional law suggests that initiatives must relate to subjects that are ‘substantially 
related to the functions of government’ but do not pertain to the ‘ordinary business and affairs 
of the country’. This implies that citizen initiatives must address strategic rather than 
managerial decisions and must confine themselves to issues that the government is 
empowered and expected to address.  
Chapter seven looks at whether referendums should be binding in order to best minimize 
agency cost. As mentioned earlier, the corporate laws of nearly all countries require the 
approval of shareholders for fundamental corporate decisions. Of particular importance here 
is the fact that such approval is mandatory. In other words, the decision of the shareholders is 
binding on the directors and the directors cannot pursue a policy rejected by the shareholders. 
When constitutional law around the world is examined, it becomes clear that there is no 
uniformity amongst countries regarding whether or not the approval of citizens in a 
referendum is mandatory. Some countries provide for binding referendums while others 
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provide for non-binding referendums. To shed light on which option might provide the least 
agency cost, corporate governance scholarship on shareholder approval of board proposals is 
examined in depth. 
Briefly summarized, it is found that there is a potential for extraordinary residual loss and a 
high potential for self-dealing and corruption when agents make ‘rules of the game’ decisions 
under constitutional law. Legislators have a large degree of immunity from prosecution and 
in some countries they may also be highly entrenched. This can lead to situations where 
legislators may ignore non-binding referendums and risk upsetting the citizens if the conflict 
of interest is large enough. Therefore, it is often better to accept the increased monitoring cost 
caused by binding referendums rather than risk extraordinary residual loss that may be 
imposed by corrupt legislators who may choose to ignore a non-binding referendum. This 
argument is supported by an analysis of how the choice of binding v. non-binding 
referendums affects the incentives of citizens and legislators to get informed, how it 
influences framing concerns and how it impacts the separation of decision management from 
decision control. 
Chapter eight examines whether initiatives should be binding or non-binding in order to most 
effectively reduce agency cost. To conduct a comparative analysis, a positive examination of 
corporate law is carried out. This study shows that shareholders are allowed to initiate 
binding as well as non-binding decisions. Shareholder proposals per se are typically non-
binding otherwise they are not approved by the SEC under Rule 14a-8 due to the state law 
exception. However, shareholders share the right to amend the bylaws with the board of 
directors. Since bylaws are self-executing, shareholders can initiate and adopt bylaws which 
would be binding on the board of directors. The result of this is that shareholders can initiate 
binding decisions on matters that are subject to inclusion in the company’s bylaws.      
The position in the UK is clear. Shareholders can initiate amendments to the articles of 
association and give binding instructions to the board of directors. The US position is highly 
complicated. To decide the issue one way or another to decide which option provides more 
useful lessons for constitutional law, corporate governance literature is examined in depth.  
First, this chapter examines whether shareholder-initiated decisions have sufficient influence 
on the agents to bring the agents’ behavior in line with the wishes of the shareholders. Then it 
compares the relative merits of non-binding shareholder proposals v. binding bylaw 
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amendments. The lessons learnt from this are applied to understand the relative merits of 
binding v. non-binding initiatives. Then the discussion is taken one step further and the 
chapter looks at whether decisions taken by principals should be subject to repeal or 
amendment by the agents at a later date. In the absence of clear statutory indications, the 
evolution of case law on the matter is examined. To see how DGCL §141(a) and DGCL §109 
can be reconciled, General DataComm Industries, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Investment 
Board, American Int’l Rent a Car, Inc. v. Cross¸ Centaur Partners, IV v. National 
Intergroup, Inc. and finally CA, Inc. v. AFSCME are examined. This chain of decisions 
suggests that even though there is a lack of clarity on the issue, shareholders may not be able 
to adopt bylaws with provisions that prevent the board of directors from subsequently 
amending or repealing the bylaw.   
The case on point in constitutional law is Luker v. Curtis in which the Supreme Court of 
Idaho held that nothing prevented the legislature from amending or repealing provisions 
enacted through initiatives unless the initiative prohibited it. It is argued that allowing 
citizens to adopt laws through initiatives that cannot later be amended by the legislature can 
be dangerous because it does not take into account unforeseen circumstances. This is doubly 
dangerous since initiatives are drafted without the deliberation and expert treatment the 
legislature can provide. On the other hand, allowing legislators to amend or repeal laws 
adopted via initiatives can lead to high agency cost if the government chooses to reverse a 
measure that restricts their power. It is, therefore, proposed that the legislature should only be 
prohibited from amending laws adopted through the initiative process if such laws deal with 
issues where the legislators have a conflict of interest and in the case of rules of the game 
decisions. In all other cases, it is recommended that the legislature should be allowed to 
repeal or amend such laws to ensure that the legislature is empowered to respond to 
unforeseen eventualities. This will ensure that when conflict of interest is at its highest, 
agents can be prohibited from subsequently amending or repealing the provisions designed to 
stop agents from breaching their fiduciary duties.  
The application of insights from corporate governance can, therefore, be used to gain insights 
into how direct democracy can be used to minimize agency cost in corporate governance. 
This dissertation has explored some of the important issues relating to the use of direct 
democracy and provided possible solutions should help to make the principal-agent 
relationship in constitutional law more efficient. The rapid pace of evolution in corporate 
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governance means that several opportunities to gain further insights continue to emerge. On 
October 1, 2013, the UK adopted the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 which 
requires the binding approval of shareholders for the executive compensation policies of 
public companies. This is a drastic departure from the previous ‘say on pay’ regime in the US 
and the UK which was strictly non-binding. As more data becomes available, it would be 
useful to see what impact making shareholder approval of executive compensation binding 
has on executive compensation vis-à-vis the period when ‘say on pay’ was precatory. The 
results of the new UK provisions can also be contrasted with the results of precatory ‘say on 
pay’ requirements that continue to exist unchanged in the US.  
This study can allow a comparison to see whether requiring binding shareholder approval 
where the directors have a conflict of interest is more effective at reducing agency cost than 
requiring only non-binding approval. The findings of this dissertation suggest that binding 
decisions taken via direct democracy create more monitoring cost than non-binding direct 
democracy measures. However, the dissertation still recommends binding decision-making 
via direct democracy in cases where the agents have a conflict of interest and in major rules 
of the game decisions. This is because the consequences if agents ignore the principals’ 
wishes can be extremely serious in constitutional law. The resultant increase in residual loss 
can, therefore, negate the savings in monitoring cost that non-binding decision-making would 
produce. An examination of the change in monitoring cost and residual loss caused by the 
introduction of binding say on pay rules in the UK is, therefore, a promising direction for 
further research.  
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Summary 
This doctoral dissertation seeks to improve the usage of direct democracy in order to 
minimize agency cost. It first explains why insights from corporate governance can help to 
improve constitutional law and then identifies the relevant insights from corporate 
governance that can make direct democracy more efficient.  
To accomplish this, the dissertation examines a number of questions. What are the key 
similarities in corporate and constitutional law? Do these similarities create agency problems 
that are similar enough for a comparative analysis to yield valuable insights? Once the utility 
of corporate governance insights is established, the dissertation answers two questions. Are 
initiatives necessary to minimize agency cost if referendums are already provided for? And, 
should the results of direct democracy be binding in order for agency cost to be minimized?  
This comparative analysis is valuable because no existing research can be found which uses 
corporate governance to draw insights that can minimize agency cost in constitutional law, 
particularly by improving the use of direct democracy. 
After having explained the theoretical framework, this dissertation looks at circumstances 
where the right to veto (e.g. referendums) cannot help principals to reduce agency cost. 
Building on the corporate governance debate, this dissertation argues that introducing 
initiatives in constitutional law can reduce agency cost by separating individual issues from 
general elections. It also argues that giving legislators exclusive control of the agenda can, 
over the course of decades, lead to a situation where legislators accumulate more authority 
than citizens wish to delegate.  
Because initiatives also carry the risk of diluting the accountability and responsibility of the 
legislators, the dissertation proposes a system of ‘penalty defaults’ in favor of initiatives. By 
creating a default restrictive on legislators (namely a default rule allowing for initiatives), the 
constitution can ensure that initiatives are possible in the normal situation in which they 
actually reduce agency cost. At the same time, legislators are well situated to push for an end 
to the use of initiatives if they are being abused too frequently.  
The dissertation then argues that referendums should be binding on the legislature in two 
cases: one, when they relate to ‘rules of the game’ decisions; and two, when the legislators 
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have a conflict of interest. This is based on insights from the almost universally accepted 
right of shareholders to approve or reject fundamental corporate decisions initiated by the 
board of directors or whenever they have a conflict of interest.  
The last issue covered by the present work is whether or not initiatives should be binding in 
order to minimize agency cost. The U.S. and the UK have both been successful in attracting 
investors and managerial talent despite considerable differences in the ability of shareholders 
to initiate decisions. In light of this, these two legal systems and the pertinent academic 
literature on corporate governance are examined in order to identify when initiatives should 
be binding in order to minimize agency cost. Based on this analysis, it is argued that binding 
initiatives should only be allowed for making ‘rules of the game’ decisions especially when 
the legislators have a conflict of interest. Interestingly, this dissertation recommends that 
initiatives should also be allowed on ‘ordinary business decisions’, but such initiatives should 
be non-binding in order to minimize agency cost. 
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Samenvatting  
Dit proefschrift tracht het gebruik van directe democratie te verbeteren teneinde agency 
kosten te minimaliseren. Als eerste wordt verklaard waarom inzichten van corporate 
governance kunnen helpen om constitutioneel recht te verbeteren. Vervolgens worden 
relevante inzichten van corporate governance geïdentificeerd waardoor directe democratie 
efficiënter kan worden gemaakt. 
Om dit te bereiken wordt in dit proefschrift een aantal vragen onderzocht. Wat zijn de 
belangrijkste overeenkomsten tussen ondernemingsrecht en constitutioneel recht? 
Veroorzaken deze overeenkomsten agency problemen die zodanig overeenkomen dat een 
vergelijkende analyse waardevolle inzichten op zou kunnen leveren? Nadat de waarde van 
corporate governance inzichten is vastgesteld, worden er in dit proefschrift twee vragen 
beantwoord. Zijn er initiatieven nodig om agency kosten te minimaliseren als hier al 
referendums voor bestaan? En zouden de uitkomsten van directe democratie bindend moeten 
zijn voor de minimalisering van agency kosten?  
Deze vergelijkende analyse is waardevol omdat er geen bestaand onderzoek te vinden is dat 
corporate governance gebruikt om inzichten te verschaffen die agency kosten in 
constitutioneel recht kunnen minimaliseren, met name door  de toepassing van directe 
democratie te verbeteren. 
Na een uitleg van het theoretische raamwerk te hebben gegeven, kijkt dit proefschrift 
vervolgens naar de omstandigheden waar het vetorecht (bijv. referendums) de principals niet 
kan helpen om agency kosten te beperken. Voortbouwend op het corporate governance debat, 
beargumenteert dit proefschrift dat het introduceren van initiatieven in constitutioneel recht 
de agency kosten kan verlagen door individuele zaken te scheiden van algemene 
verkiezingen. Het stelt tevens dat het overdragen van exclusieve controle over de agenda aan 
wetgevers in de loop der tijd kan leiden tot een situatie waar wetgevers meer macht 
verkrijgen dan burgers wensen te delegeren. 
Omdat initiatieven tevens het risico met zich meebrengen dat de aansprakelijkheid en 
verantwoordelijkheid van wetgevers wordt verminderd, wordt in dit proefschrift een systeem 
van ‘standaard boetes’ voorgesteld ten gunste van initiatieven. Door een standaard beperking 
voor wetgevers te creëren (namelijk een standaardregel die initiatieven toestaat), kan de 
constitutie zich ervan verzekeren dat initiatieven mogelijk zijn in de normale situatie waar zij 
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inderdaad agency kosten verlagen. Tegelijkertijd zijn wetgevers juist in de positie om een 
einde te maken aan het gebruik van initiatieven als deze te vaak worden misbruikt. 
Het proefschrift beargumenteert vervolgens dat referendums bindend zouden moeten zijn 
voor de wetgevende macht in twee zaken: (1) wanneer ze gerelateerd zijn aan ‘regels van het 
spel’ beslissingen; en (2) wanneer er sprake is van een belangenverstrengeling bij de 
wetgevers. Dit is gebaseerd op inzichten van het vrijwel algemeen geaccepteerde recht van 
aandeelhouders om door de Raad van Bestuur geïnitieerde fundamentele beleidsbeslissingen 
goed of af te keuren, of wanneer er sprake is van een belangenverstrengeling.  
Het laatste punt dat in dit proefschrift wordt behandeld, is of initiatieven al dan niet bindend 
zouden moeten zijn teneinde agency kosten te minimaliseren. De V.S. en de UK zijn beide 
succesvol in het aantrekken van investeerders en leiderschapstalent ondanks aanzienlijke 
verschillen in de bevoegdheid van aandeelhouders om beslissingen te initiëren. In het licht 
hiervan worden deze twee juridische systemen en relevante wetenschappelijke literatuur 
onderzocht teneinde initiatieven te identificeren die bindend zouden moeten zijn om agency 
kosten te minimaliseren. Gebaseerd op deze analyse wordt beargumenteerd dat bindende 
initiatieven alleen toegestaan zouden moeten worden om ‘regels van het spel’ beslissingen te 
nemen, in het bijzonder wanneer er sprake is van belangenverstrengeling bij de wetgevers.  
Interessant is dat dit proefschrift aanbeveelt dat initiatieven ook toegestaan zouden moeten 
worden voor ‘gewone zakelijke beslissingen’. Deze initiatieven zouden echter niet-bindend 
moeten zijn om agency kosten te minimaliseren. 
 
